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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to explore and understand the changes to the social institution of caste 
that arise from the ongoing modernisation of Indian society. The research setting is the 
IT industry in Bangalore and Hyderabad.  As the Indian IT industry is the economic 
sector most exposed to globalised modernisation, it  has come to represent a social 
milieu deemed particularly modern in India. The thesis discusses the social role of the 
IT industry in India; the rise of the new middle classes, and the specifics of the locality 
of Bangalore. It is argued that caste as a social institution systematically connects three 
different dimensions of human existence; the economic (caste-wise division of labour); 
the biological (rules concerning exogamy and endogamy); and the ideational (various 
rationalisations for caste). While the economic dimension of caste is increasingly losing 
its meaning, caste endogamy remains largely intact and is rationalised in forms much 
more compatible with modernity. This composite model of caste is then contrasted with 
a model of modernity based arguments presented by the most relevant sociologists, 
from Max Weber to  Peter  Wagner.  In  the analysis  here,  the  contemporary,  ‘quasi-
ethnic’  reinterpretation  of  caste  appears  still  to  conflict  with  the  implications  of 
modernity.  Even  though  caste  provides  actual  benefits  for  those  who  employ  the 
concept and practise it – ranging from political to economic to private – its rationale 
nevertheless contrasts with the motives that are generally attributed to modernity.
The empirical research, employing qualitative, semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and hermeneutic interpretation of first-hand sources, produces a complex 
picture. The interviews with more than 70 IT employees of various caste backgrounds 
(including over 40 from SC/ST categories – underrepresented in the industry) indicate 
that caste is seemingly irrelevant in professional settings. In support of this conclusion, 
additional research hints at the prevalence of widespread anonymity in the IT industry 
and  limited  understanding  of  caste  amongst  IT  employees.  By  contrast,  participant 
observation during seven months living amongst IT engineers suggests that caste still 
matters: In private, the consequences of the practise of caste are still apparent, even 
though ritual  restrictions are waning in  importance.  Thus,  a  pronounced caste-wise 
compartmentalisation  of  Indian  society  remains  visible  even  amongst  young  IT 
engineers.  The thesis concludes that  caste is  not  disappearing from Indian society; 
rather, it is dramatically adapting to modern circumstances.
2
Positional Statement
Academia in general  and sociology in particular is  supposed to be the place where 
bright and honest minds are able to research and discuss the great problems of mankind 
in a free and open spirit. Unfortunately however, contemporary sociology suffers from 
some  serious  shortcomings;  the  discipline  has,  historically,  had  an  uneasy  and 
sometimes hostile relationship with the natural sciences, and seems even today largely 
unable  or  unwilling  to  acknowledge  recent  advances  in  closely  related  disciplines, 
ranging from psychology to human biology. Yet, within the subject, there is perhaps 
more infighting than consensus. An overly-prescriptivist obsession with methodological 
‘purity’ and ever-more fastidious compartmentalisation glosses over the fact that most 
sociologists  are  not  prepared to  accept  challenges  to  their  entrenched world  view. 
Consequently,  sociology is increasingly losing its  relevance in the public  eye;  what 
began as a promising discipline some 150 years ago is now in danger of becoming a 
laughing stock.
This thesis has been written in full knowledge of these problems, but is – at the same 
time  –  compromised  by  this  situation.  An  under-resourced  and  inexperienced 
researcher, who tackles a topic traditionally seen as being at the fringe of the discipline 
(and hence left to social anthropology), can, after all, only be expected to deliver less-
than-ideal results. Unfortunately but inevitably, therefore, this thesis is beset with all 
the typical shortcomings of a PhD thesis; while it tries to cover far more ground than is 
feasible,  it  is,  at  the  same  time,  both  over-  and  under-referenced  (depending  on 
particular topic).  Since it takes a new theoretical approach, there are few empirical 
sources upon which to base critical analysis and discussion. In particular, there are no 
sociological sources that take the biological argument within caste into account, and the 
thesis is forced to enter unknown territory in this regard. Last but not least, and hardly 
surprising in such an ideologically divided discipline, getting adequate supervision for 
this (potentially) controversial research topic proved to be challenging, to say the least.
Nevertheless,  one  particular  aspect  of  this  thesis  deserves  attention.  While  most 
sociologists would confine themselves exclusively to references from within their own 
discipline, this thesis draws upon an eclectic range of sources – and hence deliberately 
trespasses  into  non-sociological  territory.  Furthermore,  whereas  many  sociologists 
would  balk  at  the  very  idea  of  acknowledging  (human)  biological  facts,  this  thesis 
unashamedly accepts such facts where and when necessary. In the manner in which it 
puts the research topic first and questions of disciplinary boundaries second, it tries to 
rescue the subject of caste from the self-inflicted limitations of contemporary social 
sciences.  The obvious  outcome of  this  approach is  predictable:  This  thesis  will  be 
condemned by those who value established sociological conventions and methodological 
purity. However, for those who dare go beyond the merely conventional or who wish to 
challenge their pre-conceptions – that is, those who have a genuine interest in the topic 
– this thesis would be an interesting and thought-provoking read.
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Value Judgements
The question of value judgements is almost as old as sociology itself. In Science as a 
Vocation, Weber famously makes the point that (social) scientists misuse their power if 
they  include  normative  preconceptions  in  their  academic  writings.  This  point  was 
valuable then; it is invaluable now. Unfortunately, this value free ideal of science is 
impossible to achieve in practice; scientists are, after all, human and humans always 
have their biases, perspectives and prejudices. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly 
indicate my own position: While sociological research can potentially  inform political 
discussion,  it  should under no circumstances be equated  with political debate itself. 
These  distinct  ‘value-spheres’  follow  their  own  respective  rationales,  and  any 
conflation of scientific knowledge and political judgement would corrupt them both. All 
(social) scientists should, therefore, avoid value judgements in situations where they 
are acting as scientists. Yet, despite this clear position, freedom from value judgements 
is not fully possible for the reasons stated above. The only meaningful way to deal with 
this dilemma is to reflect upon one’s own value system and publicly disclose it. I will  
therefore openly state my own beliefs and opinions on the most problematic issues 
touched upon by this research.
First and foremost, Human Dignity is non-negotiable; it is a natural right of all human 
beings and must be treated as the ultimate aim of all political endeavour. Furthermore, I 
believe that a democratically legitimised combination of a thriving capitalist economy 
and a strong and comprehensive welfare state – epitomised by the Western European 
nation  states  –  is  the  best  practical  means  to  achieve the  ideals  laid  down in  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Most Human Rights can only be honoured once 
a  certain  stage  of  economic  development  is  reached.  In  my  opinion,  enlightened 
capitalism offers the best way to achieve this end. That does not imply that capitalism is 
an end in itself nor that it is beyond legitimate critique. Nevertheless, this does suggest 
that  it  makes  more  sense  to  contemplate  alternatives  to  capitalism in  a  developed 
country  rather  than  in  a  developing one,  where  capitalistic  modernisation  is  badly 
needed to raise standards of living beyond the subsistence level.
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Glossary
Backward Caste term for socio-economically deprived castes, in most cases identical with →Low Caste
BPO Business Process Outsourcing – alternative name for →ITES
Forward Caste colloquial, but sometimes officially used term for →High Caste
Gotra traditional kinship classification, patrilineal gotra-exogamy prevents inbreeding
HDI Human Development Index
High Caste traditionally castes associated with Brahmin, Kshatriya or Vaishya varna, also called 
“twice born”
IHDS Indian Human Development Survey http://ihds.umd.edu/
IT Information Technology, in the context here an economic sector centred on the design, 
development and maintenance of computer software, 
ITES IT-enabled Services; analogous to BPO, all services that are outsourced by using 
Information and Communication Technology between customer and service provider
Jajmani traditional crop-sharing system within a village community, economically linking 
different castes
Jati in most of the literature seen as the actual caste today, most Jati have vague affiliation 
to one of the four Varna categories
Low Caste traditionally all castes associated with Shudra Varna, or no varna affiliation at all
MNC Multinational Corporation
OBC Other Backward Classes; official administrative classification of castes and communities 
eligible of affirmative action, but outside of SC or ST
Panchayat village council, comprised of elder representatives of the major castes in the locality 
Untouchables (derogatory) term for those castes below the Varna scheme, today called Scheduled 
Castes (officially), Harijans (euphemistically) or Dalits (politically, self-identificatory)
SC Scheduled Castes – official administrative classification of (mainly) former Untouchable 
Castes
ST Scheduled Tribes – official administrative classification of India’s tribal population
Varna the Vedic precursors of today’s castes; Brahmins (priests / teachers) Kshatriyas (rulers / 
warriors) Vaishyas (merchants / traders) Shudras (labourer / servants) 
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Introduction
India’s relationship with modernity has not always been smooth and easy, but at least since 1991 this 
country has been modernising with ever-accelerating pace. Given that India consistently achieves an 
economic growth rate of up to 8 per cent per year, it is almost certain that this nation will soon be fully 
integrated  into  the  developed  world.  Already  a  democracy,  India’s  eventual  embrace  of  capitalism 
removed the only obstacle in the way to becoming a fully-fledged modern nation state. In the decades to  
come, it will more and more resemble the developed nations of the OECD. Or so it seems. There are a  
number of possible alternatives paths India could follow on its own route towards modernity, and it is 
not yet clear if India will get where it wants to be. As scholars from all academic backgrounds try to  
assess the changes that India is going through, an especially thorny set of questions are being asked 
about India’s social customs, including its religious traditions. 
While Hinduism is generally not seen as a major hindrance for the modernisation of India, more detailed  
analysis regarding certain practices may reveal difficult issues. One set of particularly vexed questions  
concerns the survival of pre-modern institutions in the context of socio-economic change, with the social  
institution of caste a key concern. Long perceived as a phenomenon that carries essentially anti-modern 
values,  caste’s  apparent  survival  in  modernising  India  poses  questions  that  do  not  allow  simplistic 
answers. On the one hand, there is clear evidence that caste is adapting to modern socio-economic  
conditions  and  that  the  conflict  with  modernity  is  at  least  partially  resolvable.  However,  a  deeper 
analysis will show – and this will be discussed in the thesis – that the very idea of caste is never fully in  
sync with the underlying values of modernity. For this reason alone, caste will always have a frictional  
and discordant relationship with modernity and with the values that are understood as underlying any  
notion of modernity. Moreover, the values that are intrinsic to caste are not consistent with scientific  
evidence about human nature – another reason to look at this phenomenon more closely than has 
previously been done. The more contradictory the topic appears the more rewarding possible research 
projects will be.
In regard to the academic background, this thesis will try to balance several different elements: It will  
bring together one of the most discussed topics in sociology – modernity – with one that has been 
relatively neglected or ‘outsourced’ to social anthropology – the institution of caste. Even though neither  
phenomenon  is  fully  understood,  and  both  remain  controversial,  the  sociological  literature  about 
modernity could fill libraries whereas the (theoretical) literature on caste would fit on a single shelf. And 
while  there  are  numerous  empirical  studies  about  actual  caste  relationships,  the  theoretical 
understanding of caste itself is still in its infancy. The explanation for this state of affairs is obvious: Social  
anthropology, and the mostly theory-adverse forms of sociology that have dominated this field in the 
past, see caste primarily as an old, primordial and localised tradition; scholarly research, therefore, has 
concentrated on historical aspects in general, and local village studies in particular. However, empirical 
11
evidence clearly shows that caste is not merely an institution of remote villages, but that it is practised in 
modern, urban settings as well. Caste plays a powerful role in India's political system and in its economy  
– thus it is all the more bewildering that relatively little attention has been paid to caste relations within  
modernity.1 It is here, at the very interface of caste and modernity, that the theoretical neglect of caste 
and the previous researchers’ obsession with the past have left a great gap that would be a Herculean 
task to fill.
Fortunately, the situation has recently improved, and there are now studies and approaches in several  
fields that are beginning to fill the void. While a real theoretical understanding of caste remains up in the  
air, there are ever more studies analysing caste in relation to modernity. Again, this should not come as a 
surprise. Against the backdrop of globalisation, both topics are increasingly interconnected, with the 
ever-faster integration of India into the world economy posing new questions on an almost daily basis.  
Moreover, the dominance of social anthropology and closely related forms of sociology has finally been 
broken, with economists, psychologists and other researchers now enthusiastically addressing the topic.  
Although these developments are unlikely to result in a unified, let alone comprehensive, theory of  
caste, they increases empirical knowledge immensely and provide a clearer perspective on this social  
institution. Thus, while both modernity and caste are still mired in controversial debate, this thesis does 
not have to start from scratch. Rather, it first has to order the known facts and theorems before relating  
them to empirical research. The first and second chapters, respectively, tackle the theoretical aspects of  
caste and modernity, while the subsequent chapters approach the relevant issue empirically. 
Analogous to the theoretical disputes over caste and modernity, the empirical reality is anything but  
straightforward  or  uncontroversial.  As  the  interconnection  of  caste  with  modernity  is  the  central  
question here, the Indian IT industry has been chosen as the research setting – essentially, because it is  
the most modern sector of the Indian economy, with an enormous influence on wider society. However,  
while the decision to concentrate on caste in the Indian IT sector is certainly justifiable, it comes at a 
cost. As the sector that is the most modern and the most open to (modernising) influences from the 
West, IT offers a unique perspective on caste, yet at the same time it is considerably removed from the  
social reality of the majority of Indians. Thus, while the analysis can hope to provide insights that are  
pertinent to India's future, it cannot claim to be relevant for the rest of India today. What is apparent in  
this elite segment of society could either be a distant glimpse of the future for the rest of society or,  
alternatively, carry no meaning at all. Caution is therefore advisable: As no one can predict the future,  
the choice of IT as a standard bearer for the further modernisation of India could, in fact, be a mistaken  
one, and India's modernisation process could take other, unforeseeable paths instead. Nevertheless, the 
choice of IT as research setting is not unwarranted and if one concentrates on the sector itself, the least  
that  one  can  expect  is  to  find  a  unique  and  highly  nuanced  setting  for  the  current  practice  and 
interpretation of caste in contemporary India. Thus, even if any attempt to generalise its results proves 
1 Modernity is understood as a specific concept here (see chpt. 2), so those studies from the post-independence era (think of  
Milton Singer, M.N. Srinivas or the Rudolphs) could serve as a reference, but start from a different perspective on modernity.
12
problematic, it should nevertheless provide an interesting and insightful analysis of an emblematically  
important case. 
As should be apparent by now, this thesis is an ambitious one, perhaps even overambitious; therefore, it  
is only to be expected that some areas will be covered only superficially. Of course, the aspirations of a 
PhD thesis are always constrained by the limited resources available, and this thesis is no exception.  
Especially because large scale quantitative sampling was not permitted by the industry, the empirical  
foundation of  some of  my  arguments  are  not  as  firm as  would have  been the  case in  more  ideal  
circumstances.  At  the same time,  however,  the qualitative methods used here  allow clear,  if  as  yet  
provisional,  conclusions  to  be  reached,  even  if  final  confirmation  is  still  required  in  some  cases. 
Understandably,  this  thesis  will  not  be  the  last  word  on the  issues  that  it  addresses,  and in  many 
instances it asks more questions than it could ever hope to answer. Despite these limitations, the thesis’  
vaunting ambitions provide perhaps the greatest potential of this work: This project, and especially the  
theoretical model developed within it, could be profitably used as a springboard for future research. All  
academic enquiries, after all,  remain valid only until newer research renders them obsolete; yet it is 
hoped that this endeavour will  at least provide a spark that ignites a more vigorous and less sterile 
debate on caste in the future. 
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1. Towards an adequate theory of Caste
1.1. The conventional interpretation of Caste
1.1.1. Introduction – the problem with a theory of Caste
Anyone  attempting  to  understand  caste  sociologically  faces  a  vexed  problem:  Despite  decades  of 
research, a striking contrast remains between a wealth of empirical knowledge on the subject and a  
dearth of theoretical understanding. There are countless anthropological studies on caste in empirical 
settings,  innumerable  writings  on  caste  relations  in  villages  or  restricted  localities  and  numerous 
personal insiders’ descriptions, in addition to more scholarly accounts. A large number of scholars have  
earned their stripes in this field, and hundreds, if not thousands, of case studies have been added to the  
existing knowledge. Unfortunately, this abundance of empirical information does not correspond well  
with a theoretic understanding of caste as a unique social institution  (for an overview, see U. Sharma 
1999). In particular, no comprehensive theory exists that would help to understand caste in modernity. 2 
This  issue  is  all  the  more  pressing  as  a  great  many  issues  surrounding  the  phenomenon  demand 
clarification,  especially  the  fact  that  caste  does  not  appear  to  vanish  with  modernisation.  For  the  
moment, it is a telling statement for our discipline to acknowledge that a full sociological penetration of 
caste is thus far absent. Hence, a theory that might help bring order to the complexity of known facts is  
urgently  needed,  particularly  as  the  caste  puzzle  becomes  more baffling  the more  it  is  exposed  to  
competing social concepts within India, as well as within a globalised Indian Diaspora.
Of course, theories of caste have been articulated before – but aside from a few notable exceptions, the 
resulting theories have never fully left the descriptive fold  (Quigley 1993, chpt. 1-3; U. Sharma 1999, 
chpt. 2). If a more systematic approach has been tried, it has often failed to find approval in the eyes of  
critical empiricists. The result is a contradiction: Whereas Louis Dumont (Dumont 1980; Khare 1971) is 
still  considered  the  most  eminent  (if  not  undisputed)  theoretician  in  this  area,  most  empirical 
researchers tend to disagree with the consequences of his systematic approach to caste: Where he sees 
a  caste  system as  a  pyramid-like  hierarchy  based  on  religious  ideas  that  are  shared  by  everyone, 
empirical fieldwork does not seem to support the holistic unity that he postulates (Barnett et al. 1976; D. 
Gupta 2000; Madan 1999, 2001; M. N. Srinivas 2002 [1984]).3 But instead of replacing Dumont's theory 
with an account of caste that is more in sync with contemporary empirical findings, most scholars in this  
area have simply abandoned the theoretical field altogether, often in favour of empirical findings that 
are piece-meal at best and a mass of contradictory facts and details at worst. This plethora of empirical  
2 The historical  origin  of  caste  is  still  not  fully  understood and no time should  be wasted  here  contributing  to  further 
speculations upon its genesis. Perhaps there will never be a conclusive answer to this question, especially as its scientific  
value is doubtful at best. How would an exact account of caste’s ancient history help to understand this institution in the 21 st 
century?
3 Historical accounts of the colonial era do not seem to support Dumont’s view either:  Frank F. Conlon, 'Caste, Community, 
and Colonialism',  Journal  of  Urban History, 11/2 (February  1, 1985 1985),  181-208, Nicholas  B.  Dirks,  Castes  of  Mind:  
Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton University Press, 2001).
14
findings does not add up to a better understanding of caste and it is therefore not surprising that the  
wealth of field research is yet to result in a theory able to accommodate anomalous facts – that is, those  
facts that do not fit  neatly  into the Dumontian scheme. The question “What is  Caste?” can still  be 
interpreted and answered quite differently, depending on the methodological preferences of individual  
researchers. Nevertheless, this question is a legitimate one, which needs to be answered systematically.  
Audacious as it may sound, this chapter is a first attempt to re-write a theory of caste and to develop 
one that is compatible with the empirical findings about caste in modernity.
1.1.2. Conventional theoretical approaches to Caste
Despite the difficulties, a theory of caste is not unattainable. Sound and comprehensive definitions of  
caste as a social institution have been tried several times before, with a number of useful versions as  
proof of this endeavour. Unfortunately, the inherent contradictions of caste are more often than not  
neglected  or  even  ignored  in  these  definitions,4 although  they  can  at  least  be  used  to  filter  those 
elements that are deemed essential for caste as a social institution. Thus, by looking at conventional  
definitions of caste, one can isolate the building blocks that could be recombined to produce a workable  
theory of caste.
Conventional definitions of caste can be broadly classified as (quasi-)deductive or (quasi-)inductive. The 
former starts from abstract principles and comes to a theory by logical deduction; the latter begins with  
empirical observations and tries to find a common denominator in these findings that then qualifies as a 
theoretical postulate. The definition of caste given by M.N. Srinivas – perhaps the best-known empirical  
scholar in this  area – belongs clearly  to the indicative fold,  and sums up much of  the conventional 
wisdom about caste:
Caste  is  a  hereditary,  endogamous,  usually  localized  group,  having  a  traditional  association  with  an  
occupation, and a particular position in the hierarchy of castes. Relations between castes are governed,  
among other  things,  by the  concepts  of  pollution  and  purity,  and generally,  maximum commensality 
occurs within the caste. (M. N. Srinivas 1962: 3)
An alternative approach, and clearly in the deductive fold, is formulated by Dumont himself (essentially  
based on the definition developed by Bouglé (1971 [1908]): 
The caste system divides the whole society into a large number of hereditary groups, distinguished from 
one another  and connected together  by three characteristics:  separation in  matters  of  marriage and 
contact, whether direct or indirect (food); division of labour, each group having, in theory or by tradition, a 
profession from which their member can depart only within certain limits; and finally  hierarchy, which 
ranks the groups as relatively superior or inferior to one another. (Dumont 1980: 21 emphasis in original) 
4 Abundant reasons for this can be found: Since most theorists of caste have also been concerned with an explanation of its  
origin, any definition necessarily takes a fundamentalist turn (i.e. becomes strongly aligned to one position or another). In 
exploring the ‘true nature’  of  caste,  any  such  definition involves  an  alignment  with  the prevalent  academic  and non-
academic camps that dominate the field. By looking for an ultimate ‘one-and-only’ answer, the scope and diversity of the 
phenomenon is easily lost to a rather narrow, reduced or truncated interpretation. By siding with one camp or another,  
alternative perspectives are lost and a false harmony disguises the theoretic and empiric fault lines that characterise caste.
15
With  these  two  definitions,  one  has  already  a  good overview  on  caste,  within  which  all  the  basic  
elements of caste – the buildings blocks for a theory – are formulated. Both the definitions and the  
theories they project need qualifying, but both are nevertheless useful for a basic understanding of  
caste. Srinivas' definition is perhaps too vague and not selective enough to separate caste from other 
phenomenon.5 Dumont's approach, meanwhile, has attracted the most academic controversy. His theory 
of  a  system that  encompasses  the whole  society,  and which  forms a  clear  hierarchy  based on  the 
concept of pollution, is convincingly elegant; however, it is characterised by empirical contradictions, and 
has  been  much  criticised  by  fellow  anthropologists.  The  controversial  discussion  of  whether  Lower 
Castes accept or challenge their low status, for example, still fills books (D. Gupta 2000; U. Sharma 1999: 
chpt.4). As this theory implies that all members of caste society share the basic notion of hierarchy, itself  
attached to concepts of purity and pollution, Dumont appears to be contradicted by empirical findings 
that such values are not shared by all, let alone a majority.
Still, the problem with Dumont runs deeper than this: Because he sees castes as a religiously-inspired 
system, he deliberately projects it as an indivisible entity. Whenever there is a discrepancy between his  
theoretical  assumptions  and  the  empirical  reality,  this  is  explained  away  as  a  failure  to  properly  
implement the concept of caste in that particular context. And even where he takes account of non-
systematic developments within caste – he calls it Substantialisation6 – he is unaware of or unreceptive 
to underlying frictions imminent in the institution of caste. For Dumont, caste is a solid system, governed  
by principles that are relevant for all members of a society. This contradicts with an empirical reality,  
described by countless scholars (see references above), that indicates less continuity, much more conflict 
and, above all, an underlying tension within caste itself.
To take these tensions into account,  one would need to formulate a theory that acknowledges this 
conflict  and  places  it  in  the  centre  of  analysis,  instead  of  rejecting  it  as  an  idiosyncratic  empirical  
discrepancy. Fortunately for the development of a comprehensive theory of caste, there is at least one  
approach that reflects these underlying conflicts. For Declan Quigley, caste results 
from an uneasy stalemate between the pull of localised lineage organisation and the forces of political, 
ritual and economic centralisation encapsulated in monarchical institutions. (Quigley 1994: 25) 
With this simple formulation, and for the first time, caste is defined not as a monolithic institution, but  
as one that systematically connects a number of different elements. The centrality Quigley attributes to  
the  monarch7 (or  king)  might  not  be  fully  shared  by  other  scholars,8 but  his  definition  has  wider 
implications. His ‘stalemate’ implies that caste is not an institution that rests on stable foundations but  
5 His definition is mainly designed to bring in all empirical forms of caste, thereby undermining its usefulness for a more  
discriminatory theory of caste.
6 The substantialisation theorem was originally developed by G.S. Ghyrye, but is mostly attributed to his student M.N. Srinivas 
today.
7 The relevant research took place mainly in Nepal, a long-time official ‘Hindu-Kingdom’ where the interconnection of caste 
with worldly power is much more pronounced than in officially secular India.
8 Quigley  was  strongly,  and often  unfairly,  criticised  for  his  unorthodox  approach;  for  an example  see  Mckim Marriott, 
'Review: India without Hindu Concepts?', Journal of the American Oriental Society, 118/3 (1998), 377-80.
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one that sits uneasily on conflicting ones. For him, these two essential, constitutive elements of caste are 
governed by conflicting rationales: The centralising one of legitimate authority, on the one hand, and the  
dispersive or splintering effect of social alignment on ethnic lines, on the other. The defining stalemate  
thus indicates the contradictions and conflicts that lie beneath caste’s surface. Following Quigley, caste is 
seen as a social compromise, made up of conflicting elements. His elements might be open to dispute, 
but the very formulation of this conflict provides us with a model to which may be added additional  
elements. Unfortunately, Quigley does not elaborate further on his own theory of caste; he asks more  
questions than he answers and when he leaves the theoretic field for the empiric, he leaves unfinished 
business behind.9  
1.1.3. The building blocks for a theory of Caste
However inconclusive the conventional definitions of caste might be, they at least provide the basis for a  
more convincing theory. Based on the available literature, one is equipped with all the ingredients for a 
theory of caste. If the elements from Srinivas' and Dumont's definitions are distilled, caste would consist  
of the following:
• a hereditary element within caste, resulting in endogamy;
• a traditional association of each caste with an occupation, resulting in inter-caste division of  
labour;
• a notion of hierarchy – whether or not shared by all;
• a concept of purity and pollution, one that informs interactions between castes;
• a complex system of inter-caste relations, between commensality (see Srinivas) and separation 
(Dumont);
• a form of rationalisation, that is either merely traditional (Srinivas) or taken from religious values 
(Dumont).
If this is combined with Quigley's analysis of caste in relation to underlying conflicting elements, what  
arises is a theory of caste that is both more analytical – and therefore more receptive to the tensions  
within caste  – and more applicable  to different circumstances,  since it  is  abstracted from concrete,  
empirical findings.
9 Declan Quigley has always been treated as an outsider to his discipline, social anthropology. Unfortunately, in 2002 he left  
academia for good – a great loss for the theoretical understanding of caste.
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1.1.4. Transcending the conventional Models of Caste
It is important to recapitulate what has thus far been established, and to discuss what is at stake. The  
conventional models of caste have failed to establish a consensus on caste in modern circumstances. It  
would be futile to add another chapter to the old conflict between those who locate the study of caste 
at the crossroad of sociology and Indology (Dumont and others) and those from the historical school  
(Dirks 1997; Inden 1986), who see caste as a historically informed entity, formed by colonial or post-
colonial  knowledge  systems.  Similarly,  it  would  be  pointless  to  follow  the  fragmented  findings  of  
contemporary sociological and anthropological schools. The numerous contributions from sociologists 
and social anthropologists should not be ignored – there are some accounts that are very useful for a 
theory (Raheja 1989) – but their findings are too often simply not abstract enough for a viable theory of  
caste that is independent of local context and accessible to scholars outside the discipline. The study of 
caste is too important to leave to a single discipline; thus, the hegemony of social anthropology and its  
numerous idiosyncrasies needs to be challenged at the same time that its empirical contributions should 
be duly acknowledged. 
For these reasons, a completely new theory would need to be written in order to synthesise all the 
established knowledge about caste. While this  is  a daunting task,  it  is  possible once a high level of 
abstraction and an open mind are combined. The six elements distilled from the literature are important 
‘building  blocks’  for  a  theory  of  caste,  but  they require  further  consideration.  Not  all  elements  are 
relevant at the same time, and most are not abstract enough to be incorporated into a comprehensive 
theory.  It  is  therefore necessary  to  take them one by one,  assess their  relevance and their  deeper  
meaning, and combine them anew. The building blocks will be taken to a higher level of abstraction first:  
‘hereditary element’ will be become ‘biological element’, ‘caste-wise division of labour’ will henceforth 
be  ‘economic  element’  and  the  numerous  forms  of  making  sense  of  caste  will  simply  be  called  
‘rationalisation’ or the ‘ideational element’. The second step will be the recombination of the central  
elements and the formulation of a new model of caste. While some of the ‘building blocks’ (1.1.3.) are  
central for any analysis of caste, others are only relevant in specific interpretation of caste. 
One possible result  of  this  process is  discussed below, but alternative models of  recombination are  
perceivable.  The  specific  nexus  between  economic  and  biological  assumptions  is  very  much 
characteristic of caste, and is differently legitimised by narratives that pertain to the religious sphere (or 
at least transcend daily life). Since the belief system that binds economy and biology is contextual, the  
resulting amalgam can, in fact, be mixed differently. Nevertheless, caste would not be caste if one of  
these ingredients were missing.
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1.2. An abstract model of Caste
In the following, it will be argued that caste arises from the intersection of three main elements that  
sometimes  conflict,  but  nevertheless  make  an  essential  contribution  to  this  institution.  In  its  most  
fundamental  form,  the  institution  of  caste  systematically  connects  the  economic  and  biological 
livelihood of people with a specific form of rationalisation:
1.2.1. The economical nexus – Caste and traditional occupation
Caste is associated with traditional occupations, even in the present day. This does not mean that every  
caste member was or is employed in this occupation, but that caste as an economic unit is, in the eyes of  
its  members  and  in  those  of  observers,  symbolically  connected  to  a  specific  profession.  This  is  
incontrovertibly  established  in  the  literature;  the  connection  of  Jati and Varna with  a  traditional 
occupation is almost universally seen as essential for caste (Dumont 1980: chpt.4; Karanth 1996). Every 
community still associates (and is associated) with a traditional occupation, however symbolic or weak 
this  link  might  be  in  real  economic  terms  (Sahay  2004).  The  empirical  proof  is  equally  simple  and 
plausible: Even today, after considerable change and under fundamentally altered economic conditions, 
their traditional occupation is still known to caste members and others living in local proximity.
Although  the  exact  historical  events  cannot  be  reconstructed,  this  connection  between  caste  and 
occupation  is  seen  as  steeped  in  tradition,  at  least  in  popular  opinion.  Likewise,  traditional  village 
institutions like Jajmani or Panchayat appear to indicate the long-established nature of caste. According 
to the Jajmani system, every caste has a place in the economic structure of a locality. Within this locality, 
a variety of castes with distinct and indispensable functions constitute a mesh of mutual dependencies.  
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Biological Element
Recruitment by birth
=> Caste endogamy
Economic Element
traditional occupation
=> Division of Labour
Rationalisation
Religion (Dumont)
Tradition (Srinivas)
However  deep  this  interconnection  might  be  in  the  specific  circumstances,  the  very  fact  of  this  
specialisation  suggests  that  caste  can  only  exist  in  the  plural:  Wherever  one  caste  exists,  it  needs  
exchange with other castes to survive economically. However, individual members of a particular caste 
are not necessarily required to work in the associated profession, and women do not invariably perform 
the same tasks that men do; thus, it might well be that considerably less than half of a caste’s population  
actually practised their calling, even in pre-modern times (Rocher 1975).
For the theoretical model of caste, the economic dimension is of particular importance as it is a source 
of hierarchisation – itself a building block for the theory. With the division of labour, the hierarchical 
nature of castes is already pre-established: Not only are members of every caste publicly associated with 
a particular profession, they are also crudely ranked according to the prestige given to the tasks that 
have to be performed within their occupation. Without any further consideration of religious, ritual,  
mythological  or  ideological  rationalisations,  the underlying  economic  structure  promotes  differences 
that are easily ranked into stages of prestige and hierarchy: Before any (ritually established) notions of  
purity  and  pollution  come  into  play,  a  general  disdain  for  physical  labour  and  a  high  regard  for 
administrative and intellectual work are evident from the outset. In other words, a hierarchy of different 
professions precedes the hierarchy that bases itself on notions of purity and pollution. Of course, the  
ranking of occupations is intrinsically connected to the status attached to this occupation, and this status  
is charged with ritual and/or cultural values. In social practice, then, the ranking is done in conjunction  
with a rationalisation of the ritual elements of caste. But since this rationalisation can be done differently  
(see  1.2.3.),  the  economic  element  within  caste  has  an  importance  for  hierarchy  that  cannot  be  
underestimated.
What are the consequences of this for an empirical analysis of caste? First, caste is based on economic  
presuppositions.  It  can only be sustained in a society with differentiated divisions of  labour,  a  high 
degree of economic specialisation, and a level of development that can sustain ‘unproductive’ parts of 
society.10 As Quigley notes, caste cannot exist in subsistence economies and it loses its grip on society 
wherever marginal areas do not support more than a basic form of economic survival (Quigley 1994: 39). 
Second, a caste is very easily and clearly distinguishable from a tribe, even though the latter might share  
some of the other essential elements. While a tribe is, at least potentially, a self-sustaining unit which 
could survive relatively well in economic isolation, a caste relies upon the existence of other castes. The 
often-heard narrative  that caste  is  an institution designed for a  village society is  not  totally  wrong, 
although it fallaciously implies that caste is a traditional, primordial institution. The economic element, 
by contrast, tells a different tale: Caste cannot have a tradition that extends back beyond a certain level 
of social development. It is also misleading to think of caste as ‘organic’ or ‘traditional’; it should rather  
be seen as an elaborate  and sophisticated institution that needs a complex  set  of  requirements  to  
sustain itself. With regard to the economic element at least, caste is a relatively modern phenomenon; it  
10 That is, castes that are specialised in areas that do not directly produce added value; most notably – of course – priests and  
intellectuals.
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tells of a professional differentiation that pre-dates industrialisation, but one that cannot have arisen in a  
primitive or ancient society based on subsistence economy (cf. Washbrook 2007).
1.2.2. The biological nexus – Caste as a quasi-ethnic social unit
With  the  division  of  labour,  caste  has  one  essential  precondition.  This  is  undisputed  and  hence 
uncontroversial  within  the  scholarly  field.  The  separation  of  labour  between  castes,  though,  is  
insufficient  to  explain  the  phenomenon.11 A  ‘biological’  element  that  complements  the  economic 
element is also needed to explain this institution theoretically. Caste is simply unthinkable without a  
deep-seated notion of inheritance and social separation on the basis of birth. Generally, there is no 
recruitment  into  a  caste  other  than  through  birth,  with  the  prevention  of  inter-caste  marriages 
guaranteeing the exclusivity of this arrangement. Whether or not this biological separation is strictly 
enforced in practice, the very idea of caste rests upon there being essential differences that must be  
maintained by separation. This notion is already captured in the very first description of caste as Varna: 
The Rig Veda tells of the genesis of caste by explaining the origin of the four Varnas out of different body 
parts of Purusa (Bayly 1999: 13). Thus, although the different Varnas originate from the same source, it 
is from qualitatively different parts of it. Inevitably, they are separated qualitatively and this separation  
can only be maintained by preventing their members from mixing their bloodlines. For Jatis, meanwhile, 
there is no such thing as a religious narrative concerning origin. However, as Jatis are the ‘everyday units’ 
of castes,  and a mixing of  Jati-bloodlines is  a  far more realistic possibility,  the genetics of caste are 
rigorously  enforced:  To  this  day,  Jati only  constitutes  Jati if  membership  is  exclusive  to  born  Jati 
members.12 In fact, caste has no institutional ‘recruitment’ process at all; it grows organically with the 
reproduction of its actual membership.
Although the biological element of caste is established in the literature, it is not described as a ‘biological  
element’,  with this  nomenclature making it  far more controversial  than it  would be otherwise.  This 
needs some discussion: No serious scholar would contend that caste is not hereditary and that caste 
endogamy is not central to the institution. Both Dumont and Srinivas define caste as hereditary (see 
1.1.2.), and therefore clearly acknowledge that caste carries biological connotations. In the early days of  
Indian sociology, it was anything but controversial to discuss caste in the context of race – and therefore  
biology.13 The classic work of G.S. Ghurye, Caste and Race in India (1932), treats caste as a primarily 
defined by endogamy and later rationalised in cultural terms (cf. Celarent 2011). 
Today, however, the underlying biological element is largely lost in the academic discourse and the very 
11 If division of labour was the only element of caste, it would resemble a guild, given that entry into the guild-protected  
profession is not attached to birthrights.
12 With the notable exception of hypergamy, where caste membership follows patrilineal patterns while variation is permitted  
on the maternal side, one cannot join a caste unless both parents are already members of it. That there are exceptions to  
the general rule of biological separation between caste, has been discussed in the literature since a very long time: Pierre L. 
Van Den Berghe, 'Hypergamy, Hypergenation, and Miscegenation', Human Relations, 13/1 (1960), 83-91.
13 In biological terms, the concept of race is even more dubious than the concept of caste. However, both share the same 
belief that individual and social differences have their base in inherited traits. So, even while both concepts have an uneasy 
relationship with scientifically established facts, they share basic features in elective affinity.
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mention of a biological element to caste can cause reactions ranging from mild head-shaking to outright  
moral indignation.14 The explanation for this is complex, but can be broadly classified in two ways. Firstly, 
the biological element is hidden behind the term ‘ethnicity’ – or kinship – and is therefore simply not 
understood  by  those  who  narrowly  understand  ethnicity  as  merely  cultural.  Secondly,  and  more  
problematically, there is a general reluctance – especially in some quarters of the social sciences (Skinner 
2007) – to even consider biological claims as worthy of discussion (S. C. Michael 2005).15 The very term 
ethnicity is cleansed of its intrinsic biological connotations and restricted to the ‘cultural field’, thereby 
taking the ‘political sting’ out of it (B. Anderson 1991; Eipper 1983; Smith 1992: 438).16 Thus, while the 
ethnic side of caste is readily acknowledged, its biological basis is either not noticed or is ignored for  
normative reasons (cf. U. Sharma 1999: 71-73). Nevertheless, any unbiased analyst would accept the fact 
that ethnicity has a biological side and that caste, in turn, is inconceivable if the biological aspect (or  
claim) is not taken into account. 
What exactly is meant by the biological claim? Essentially, that caste endogamy reflects the idea that 
different castes have different inherited characteristics,17 and that those different characteristics need to 
be kept biologically separate in order to preserve them.18 If  this were not the case, recruitment into 
castes could be via simple entry rituals, based on aptitude tests for the profession that the specific caste  
is  associated  with.  Instead,  caste  membership  is  inherited  and  castes  are  vigorously  kept  apart  in  
biological  terms, most notably through restrictions on inter-caste marriage  (Chowdhry 2004; Tanabe 
2006). Depending on context, numerous rules concerning exogamy and endogamy govern a system that 
is based on the premise of inherited – that is, ‘genetic’ – differences between castes, even if this is not 
explicitly expressed. Even though – or perhaps because – almost no caste apologist would phrase it in  
such blunt terms, caste thrives on the conviction that social characteristics have their basis in inherited 
differences, that a person is ultimately formed and limited by his or her genetic endowment. As striking  
the implications are for the view on the human condition, as central it is for the concept and practise of  
caste.  If  this  belief  would  not  be  in  place,  recruitment  into  a  caste  could  be  done  by  aptitude  or  
14 The question of whether caste has real-life ethnic dimensions is a heated one in India, not least because it carries political  
consequences. See: Deepa S. Reddy, 'The Ethnicity of Caste', Anthropological Quarterly, 78/3 (2005), 543-84. However, this 
chapter is not concerned with the question of whether castes are indeed biologically distinct ethnicities, but whether caste 
as a theoretical concept is based on a notion of biological separation, resembling ethnicities. Unfortunately, those who are  
not able to distinguish the difference between these approaches often tend to react with unwarranted hostility.
15 This is perhaps due to misguided notions of ‘Political Correctness’ - if social concepts are analyses in terms of their biological  
claims, they are often seen as egregious or hurtful for human equality. See, for example, the use of the social concept ‘race’  
in  contemporary  social-science  debate;  Michael  Banton,  'The  Vertical  and  Horizontal  Dimensions  of  the  Word  Race', 
Ethnicities, 10/1 (2010),  127-40. and in medical context:  Koffi  N. Maglo, 'Genomics and the Conundrum of Race: Some 
Epistemic and Ethical Considerations', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 53/ 3 (2010), 357-72.
16 Compare with the statement on ‘Race’ – issued by the American Anthropological Association in May 1998. Troy Duster, The 
Sociology of Science and the Revolution in Molecular Biology (The Blackwell Companion to Sociology: Blackwell Publishing 
Ltd, 2008) 213-26.
17 This is intrinsic to caste, and not necessarily to the view of the author of this thesis.
18 Caste, in connecting the economic and the biological,  could even be seen as a crude form of pre-modern eugenics:  If 
endogamous groups of people have a connection with a profession by birth, it would be easy to assume that these groups  
are pre-destined for that particular profession because preferred traits have been literally bred into them over generations.  
This is, of course, scientifically suspect. But biological consequences of the caste-wise division of labour are apparent in –  
among others – differing, caste-specific body sizes: Rajesh K. Gautam, 'Traditional Occupations and Nutritional Adaptation 
among Central Indian Caste Populations', Journal of Biosocial Science, 40/5 (2008), 697.
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inclination.  The  absurdity  of  a  ‘training  period’  for  anyone  to become a  Brahmin or  a  Vaishya,  for 
example, clearly indicates the strong belief in (proto-)genetics. 
As hinted above, with the biological element there is an apparent gap between what is easily understood 
by abstract, logical reasoning, and what is believed by the people who practise caste. On an analytical  
level,  the whole  complex  of  marriage rules  and restrictions has its  function and legitimation in the  
preservation of the gene pool of the group. But a ‘gene pool’ (or its equivalent) is never mentioned in  
any writing on caste and most caste members would not even understand any such discussion about the  
biological  claims  of  caste.  In  fact,  caste  members  tend  to  give  very  different  explanations  for  this  
biological separation, mostly in traditional or cultural terms (cf.  Tanabe 2006: 773).  In theoretic terms, 
this gap is easily explained: First of all, the biological element is part of an abstract theoretical model of  
caste,  and  this  finds  no  fully  congruent  transliteration  into  the  every-day  rationalisations  of  caste 
members.  Second,  caste itself  developed in pre-modern time;  it  pre-dates any scientific  findings on  
biology or genetics. For this reason alone, it would be surprising if caste would be rationalised in terms 
of modern biology, let alone genetics.19 However, a basic comprehension of animal breeding that was 
available when caste became endogamous (according to legend20) seems to be reflected in the rules that 
govern caste in terms of marriage and inheritance. Finally, since those disciplines that are concerned  
with the study of caste – mainly social anthropology and related social sciences – are not receptive to  
biological claims,21 the systematic study of possible biological elements is neglected at best and ignored 
at worst.
For all these reasons, one is again faced with a dilemma. Logically, there is no doubt that caste indeed 
has  a  biological  side:  If  caste  rules  and  regulations  are  scrutinised,  a  crude  but  powerful  piece  of 
reasoning about biological coherence appears. In fact, the belief that different castes are constituted by 
qualitatively different people lies at the very heart of this phenomenon. But the academic discussion has 
ignored this so thoroughly that almost no literature about it exists.  Furthermore, there is almost no 
19 Caste rules are not fully compatible with what is understood by geneticists today. Given the pre-scientific character, the 
resulting rules are relatively crude and sometimes even counterproductive in terms of modern genetics. But considering the  
state of available knowledge, some rules seem surprisingly useful. For instance the prevention of inbreeding by the rule of  
gotra-exogamy might have helped to sustain a group that would otherwise be endangered by a restricted gene pool. Other  
rules, and especially endogamy for very small populations are more likely to be counter-productive in the long term. As it is  
hard to establish how strict these endogamous rules have been implemented historically, it would be interesting to see if  
there are genetic traces of this separation visible in the Indian population today. Recent research shows a mixed picture. 
Without  going  into  detail,  it  could  be  stated  that  against  the  backdrop  of  an  overwhelming  genetic  unity  of  India’s 
population: (Gutala Venkata Ramana et al., 'Y-Chromosome Snp Haplotypes Suggest Evidence of Gene Flow among Caste, 
Tribe, and the Migrant Siddi Populations of Andhra Pradesh, South India',  European Journal of Human Genetics, 9 (2001), 
695-700. Partha P Majumder, 'Ethnic Populations of India as Seen from an Evolutionary Perspective', Journal of Biosciences  
26/4 (November 2001 2001), 533-45.) minor traces of caste separation are identifiable (Ws Watkins et al., 'Genetic Variation 
in South Indian Castes: Evidence from Y-Chromosome, Mitochondrial, and Autosomal Polymorphisms', BMC Genetics, 9/86 
(2008), Tatiana Zerjal et al., 'Y-Chromosomal Insights into the Genetic Impact of the Caste System in India', Human Genetics, 
121 (2007), 137-44.) although these traces are often negligible (Analabha Basu, Namita Mukherjee, and Et Al. Sangita Roy, 
'Ethnic India: A Genomic View, with Special Reference to Peopling and Structure', Genome Research, 13 (2003), 2277-90.).
20 As said before, there is no historically exact account about the origin of caste, and speculation about it is rather futile in the  
context of this thesis.
21 The tendency in anthropology and related disciplines, “to priviledge the cultural as the key diacritic in many practices"  
(Appadurai,  Arjun  (2000),  Modernity  at  large  :  cultural  dimensions  of  globalization (Minneapolis,:  Univ.  of  Minnesota 
Press),11) is largely to blame for it. 
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direct relevant empirical work available, while empirical study  (cf. Mahalingam 2003)22 only brings up 
indirect proofs of the biological claim, for reasons discussed above. While this dearth of knowledge is  
frustrating, there is at least some hope on the horizon: As soon as the theoretical connection between  
caste and biology is fully understood in academic circles, empirical studies about it are bound to arise.
While academia has largely ignored the biological side of caste, there is one notable exception to this  
rule: The work pioneered by B.R. Ambedkar. Although this connection is rarely mentioned, let alone 
scrutinised theoretically over the last 90 years, Ambedkar makes strong statements regarding the ethnic  
characteristics of caste as early as 191623 (Ambedkar 2002, 2002 [1916]). He sees caste clearly resting on 
a  biological  foundation,  and  he  provides  powerful  arguments  about  why  the  practice  of  caste  is  
inseparably connected to biological assumptions. Whilst he does not undertake a large empirical study 
about the social translation of biological concepts, he proves it indirectly by scrutinising caste endogamy  
with regard to its consequences. In turn, within these consequences, he finds an explanation for both 
the biological side of caste and its translation into social praxis. Ambedkar’s argument is thus worth brief  
discussion.
Most scholars take endogamy for granted, without further concern about its implications. This absence 
of analysis is all the more surprisingly when considering the consequences of endogamy. That is, if caste  
is based on the separation of endogamous units that bear a resemblance to tribes, the survival of these  
units is nonetheless much less assured than that of a tribe. Whereas tribes live, more often than not,  
spatially  separated from potential  admixture with outsiders,  castes are not insulated by distance or  
absence of social contact. As all castes are by their very nature (see 1.2.1) forced to live in daily contact  
with other castes, the chances of sexual liaisons between members of different castes, and therefore 
genetic admixture, becomes an imminent threat. As a result, sexual control and containment are crucial  
tools for the survival of a caste: 
[T]here is a tendency in all groups lying in close contact with one another to assimilate and amalgamate,  
and thus consolidate into a homogenous society. If this tendency is to be strongly counteracted in the 
interest of caste formation, it  is absolutely necessary to circumscribe a circle outside of which people  
should not contract marriages.(Ambedkar 2002 [1916]: 247)24
Here lies a test for the biological aspect of caste: With the very notion of endogamy and the situation of  
many endogamous units living in close proximity and in daily social contact, strict control of reproductive  
sources, a non-permissive moral coding of sexuality and a severe sanctioning of violations are to be  
expected, if caste is indeed based on biological separation.
And these rules are indeed visible wherever caste is of any concern. There is no doubt that a non-
22 Mahalingam’s  example is primarily based on the essentialist view on caste – even if he calls it class. Given the dearth of  
relevant studies, however, it provides a notable exception in the way that it empirically researches the theoretical premise in  
question.
23 This is no coincidence. Ambedkar was writing at a time when ‘Political Correctness’ was of no concern – hence his freedom  
to see the obvious and to discuss the consequences.
24 For Ambedkar, marriage was a precondition for sexual reproduction. However, it should be clear that there is indeed the  
option of sexual reproduction prior or outside of marriage contexts.
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permissive sexual ethic governs all members of ‘respectable’ castes, focusing most especially on women 
(K. Banerjee 1999; Kapur 2001; S. Radhakrishnan 2009). The reasons for this can only be explained by 
invoking the biological foundation of caste: As any other social entity that bases its membership on birth,  
caste has to have a strong concern about the group’s chances of reproduction. As caste membership is  
defined by birth, the survival of caste depends on the successful reproduction of its members as all  
alternative modes of recruitment would inflict upon caste endogamy. In order to secure caste endogamy 
(that is, biological exclusivity), the caste can only draw from a limited pool of members (of reproductive  
age), with a particular caste’s survival as a social group dependent upon their  reproductive success.  
Consequently, norms regarding the control of sexuality, and the vigorous enforcement of these norms, 
are needed to uphold caste endogamy and, in turn, caste itself as a biological unit. The idea of caste and  
the practice of caste endogamy can therefore help to explain the prevalence of non-permissive norms 
regarding sexuality in India.
Moreover,  caste  endogamy and  its  consequences could  also help  to  explain  the variance  of  norms  
between particular castes. Generally, sexual restrictions (or the sanctions for their violation) become 
more severe the smaller the group is, as biological survival, which in turn determines cultural survival,  
becomes ever  more daunting  the smaller  the resources  are  (cf.  Etzioni  2000;  Hexmoor et  al.  2006; 
Kolstad 2007). Two major possibilities could imperil the survival of a caste: Either caste members could 
simply fail to reproduce or they could conceive children with outsiders. In the latter case, the caste could  
ostracise the violator and the child, and thereby lose two members, offspring and parent. Since this may 
be a serious loss to a small group, a compromise would be to accept the child into the caste; mostly 
patrilineal examples of this practice exist in the form of hypergamy (Gray 1980; Van Den Berghe 1960; 
Varma 2000). The norm, however, would be to exclude this inter-caste child or, better still, prevent any 
violation of endogamous caste rules from the very beginning.
As already stated, these rules are gendered, with more restrictions placed on women (Ambedkar 2002 
[1916]: 248/49).25 Since women are far more important for the biological survival of any group than men, 
they  are  the  main  focus  of  moral  attitudes  regarding  sexuality.  The  very  fact  that  the  chances  of  
reproduction are limited by the number of fertile female caste members gives them a special status.  
That does not necessarily reflect on their social status and prestige, but it nevertheless entails protection 
and containment  to  various  degrees.  Fertile,  unmarried women are  seen as  the most  valuable  and 
vulnerable part of the group, consequentially they face the greatest restrictions.26 This is confirmed, for 
25 A simple example highlights why this makes sense under the given circumstances: If a caste member conceives a child with 
an outsider, this reduces reproductive opportunities, albeit differently depending on gender. First of all, a child takes up 
more resources from its mother than from its father.  Moreover, under patrilineal norms, the offspring of a male caste  
member could be integrated into the fold, the child of a female caste member would be lost, since it either joins the caste of  
the father or gets ostracised from both castes. In any case, an inter-caste relationship is worse for the woman’s caste, and  
consequentially more sexual restrictions are placed on women. 
26 This seems to be in contrast to the emphasis on the male bloodline that is prevalent in much of India: Leela Dube, 'Seed and 
Earth: The Symbolism of Biological Reproduction and Sexual Relations of Production', in Leela Dube, Eleanor Leacock, and  
Shirley Ardener (eds.), Visibility and Power: Essays on Women in Society and Development (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 22-53. However, a biological explanation, underlying the cultural one, directly points to the difference between men 
and women in regard to their reproductive potential; thus, the bottleneck is necessarily with females. 
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example, by the empirical observation that unmarried women are generally separated from unrelated 
men and are monitored in all situations that involve contact with adult males (Desai and Andrist 2010; S. 
A. Raman 2009; Sodhi et al. 2004).27 To ensure their reproductive potential is channelled into the family  
and caste group, and to prevent disputes about paternity, women traditionally get married at a very  
early  age.  Moreover,  within  marriage,  they  face  stronger  controls  and  more  restrictive  moral 
expectations than men (Ahmed-Ghosh 2009). In cases of extra-marital sexual relationships, sanctions are 
more rigorously applied to women than they are to men. Should a child be born from an illegitimate  
relationship, it is usually the mother who faces the more severe consequences that the group puts on  
this violation of norms.
All  this  would not  make  sense if  caste  was just  a  social  institution  without  a  biological  element.  If  
membership  of  castes  was not through birth,  the recruitment  base would be much larger,  and the  
control of reproductive resources much less significant. Of course, the control of reproductive resources  
is of concern in basically all ‘traditional’ societies, but the basis of this varies widely. For caste in India,  
the units for any such control are the most salient indicator of the biological aspect of caste. The single  
caste,  Jati, is seen as the basic unit for sexual reproduction; hence the control of reproduction takes 
place within the caste in opposition to all other castes. Thus, wherever there is empirical evidence for a 
preference  for  intra-caste  reproduction,  coupled  with  restrictions  on  inter-caste  reproduction,  the  
biological foundation of caste is clearly manifested. 
1.2.3. The ideational nexus – the rationalisation of Caste
Caste does not exist without a narrative that transcends the empirical facts to provide an explanation for  
its existence. This narrative comes in various shapes and forms, but it  is highly unlikely that caste is 
practised without any reflection upon its meaning. From the classic ‘Brahminic’ tradition, which traces 
this phenomenon back to the Rig Veda, to the most simple ‘us versus the rest of society’ attitude, caste 
is also a belief-system that would not exist if this element were missing. Obviously, this is a truism: No 
social institution exists without some form of rationalisation. But since this rationalisation can vary, a 
variety of consequences are theoretically imaginable, with a great diversity empirically observable. 28 In 
the case under consideration, it might appear as if there is a spectrum, ranging from a very orthodox,  
religiously inspired caste ideology, to a liberal approach that sees caste as only related to the family.  
Nevertheless, if there is a spectrum, it is a least bipolar – the fundamental distinction is not between a 
strong and a soft version of the same idea. On the contrary, the ‘holistic version’ of caste as a religiously 
inspired system fundamentally contrasts with the ‘substantial view’ that caste is basically the extension 
of a family into a kinship network. In both versions there might be scope for deviation or dilution, but  
the difference is  that  they take their  legitimation from different  sources.  If  one contrasts  the basic 
27 Known under the name of ‘Purdah’ – this practise is not at all confined to India’s Muslim minority, as the name would 
indicate. 
28 Analytically, there needs to be a distinction between a reflected and a non-reflecting rationalisation of caste. The academic  
rationalisations often find scant or no correspondence in the everyday rationalisations of actual caste members. This fact 
alone helps to explain a great deal about the controversy surrounding Dumont's theory of caste.
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distinction between a holistic, systematic approach – the ‘book view’ most famously associated with  
Dumont's  theory  –  with  the alternative,  a  view of  caste  that  starts  from a  specific  empirical  caste  
constellation – the ‘field view’, associated with M.N. Srinivas – then a number of issues arise.
The religious interpretation of caste is perhaps best known as the ‘book view’, ‘Brahminic interpretation’ 
or ‘holistic approach’. Since Hinduism is not based on a central, constitutive text, it is always contentious  
to  trace  caste  ideologies  from  religious  teachings.  Its  ‘remarkable  flexibility  in  assimilation  of  even 
contradictory  religious  and  philosophical  concepts’  (Jaiswal  1998:  225) makes  it  impossible  to 
categorically assign caste to a single source. Within the variety of teachings summarised as ‘Hinduism’, 
there are justifications for both an egalitarian society and a worldview that is based on caste differences.  
Perhaps the most prominent source for a religious legitimation of caste is the Manusmriti (part of the 
Dharmaśāstras);29 but even here the concept of caste is primarily one of Varna instead of Jati. The text 
tells of the division into four categories of people and the hierarchy between them, along with their  
religious and day-to-day duties. It is not a description of the division into Jatis, and it lacks the category 
of sub-Shudras or Untouchables altogether. The religious rationalisation for caste is therefore selective 
and patchy at best, and is not easily deducible from religious texts or practises. Dumont has tried to find  
a solution for this dilemma (1.3.1), but even he concedes that religion cannot fully explain caste in all its  
aspects (Dumont 1980: 24-29).
The opposite perspective, associated with the ‘field view’(R. Guha 1989), would have it that caste is 
analytically a kinship system; an extended family network with a distinct cultural tradition. Since every 
family network has very different and incompatible cultural traditions, marriage partners from different 
caste backgrounds are unacceptable because they would interfere with the proper upbringing of the  
next generation. In order to preserve the family’s traditions, marriages have to be within this network of 
shared norms and values, especially as culture is acquired by birth and birth alone. If the family is the  
underlying unit of caste, then caste does not originate as a system from above, but begins with single  
castes in a local context. Understanding of caste outside the locality is limited, and religious notions of  
caste duties are a vague idea in what is primarily a self-centred reference system.
The consequences of different rationalisations of caste are apparent: One of the most salient factors that 
distinguishes  these  contrasting  views  is  the  relationship  to  hierarchy.  If  the  ‘Brahminic’  version  is 
adopted in a sociological analysis, as in the prominent case of Bouglé and Dumont, caste is a system that  
subdivides and organises the whole of society into one hierarchy. Brahmins come at the top, while castes 
with menial occupations and/or polluting habits find their place at the bottom of the social scale. Every  
hierarchical level in between is allocated according to the purity/pollution distinction, with the accident  
of  birth being  justified by  the concept  of  Karma.  The individual  members  of  each caste  accept  the 
29 Most clearly, a caste ideology becomes established in the text known as Laws of Manu, or Manusmriti. Here the hierarchy is 
clearly  established between the  veneration  of  the  Brahmin and  the  contempt  for  the  Shudra,  with  the duties  of  the 
Kshatriyas and Vaishyas in between. But the Manusmriti are not a descriptive source for the understanding of caste.  The 
very possibility that these texts were written in order to strengthen a certain position, to proclaim a holy order or to  
influence a debate, should put a sceptical brake on use of them as historical sources.
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mechanism of the system, even if they would challenge their own caste’s particular position within the 
hierarchy. By contrast, the alternative view can fundamentally function without hierarchy. In its most  
condensed form, this rationalisation thrives on a distinction between in- and out-group, which does not  
necessarily involve hierarchy. Rather, it implies that one caste’s value system can at least be contrasted 
with a generalised ‘other’ and that, consequently, society is made up of exclusive, mutually repellent  
social units. Indeed, this could be fully rational even if all castes considered themselves on the same 
status level, although in reality there is often a tendency to rank one caste in comparison to another. The  
result is not a comprehensive hierarchy that has validity for the whole society but rather a wealth of  
competing claims to status without much connection to the whole. This is, in essence, what is found  
most often in empirical studies about caste, hence the popular tag ‘field view’.
It needs to be kept in mind that this distinction into the Brahminic interpretation of caste and its ‘ethnic 
counter version’ are analytical abstractions. Between these two extreme positions, rationalisations of  
caste can have all kinds of phenotypes. An overwhelming majority of narratives feature some kind of  
hierarchy,  but  never  one  that  can  be  viewed  empirically  as  uncomplicated  or  undisputed. 30 The 
purity/pollution scheme seems to offer a rough guide for most caste members, but what constitutes 
pollution seems to be answered differently according to context. Different local traditions – for example,  
the challenge arising from left-hand ideologies (Appadurai 1974; Mattison 1982), or of deviating rules for 
public and private spheres – all complicate any attempt to rank castes into one single hierarchy. To see  
this as the result of empirical deviation from the classical text would be over-simplistic. Whether the 
classical text sources of Hinduism are known and/or relevant to the wider public is already doubtful 
(Hatcher 1999; Ramanujan 1989); that they hold the final explanation for caste hierarchy is unlikely, to 
say the least. And however useful the religious texts may be for the theoretical analysis of caste, the 
religious rationalisation is only one of a number of options that could explain the existence of caste. 
Empirically, an explanation or justification of caste will most likely draw on religious as well as ethnic or  
purely traditional motifs. For the model developed here, the rationalisation can be analysed with more  
clarity in the concrete interpretations of caste discussed below.
30 The most common indicator of status, the assumption that a vegetarian lifestyle corresponds to high rank, is only partially  
useful. Certainly, the perceived purity of vegetarianism, including abstinence from alcohol and sexual pleasures, is seen as 
an ideal that is widely admired amongst devout Hindus. But it does not automatically correspond to high status per se. The  
earliest mention of the Varna scheme in the Rig Veda already undermines any naïve interpretation of hierarchy based on 
purity since it gives a high position to the Kshatriyas, even though their lifestyle is anything but vegetarian. No matter that 
Brahmins or Kshatriyas are seen on the top of the social pyramid, an alcohol-consuming, meat-eating, sexually permissive 
Kshatriya is authorised in the classical texts to claim a higher status then a teetotal  Vaishya  or  Shudra.  Rather than a 
hierarchy based on a single principle, the Varnas offer a compromise between religious and political authority, although this 
is still a vague concept.
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1.2.4. Implications of this model of Caste
The model thus far is a theoretical skeleton which needs to be fleshed out and any discussion of its  
implications would, therefore, need to employ empirical examples. As far as this thesis is concerned, this 
will be done in greater detail in the empirical chapters to follow. From the very design of this model, 
however, a number of consequences are already obvious.
Caste,  as depicted here, is  not a homogeneous phenomenon, but a systematic connection between 
elements with often quite contrary rationales. This helps to explain the intrinsic inconsistencies of caste,  
those that make it so difficult to establish one and only one rationale for caste. To take a simple example: 
The Ezhavas of Kerala, researched in great detail by Osella and Osella (2000), are traditionally a toddy-
tapping caste at the lower end of the traditional social order. However, in the last century, and due to 
their changing occupation within modernisation, they have climbed the prestige ladder considerably;  
today  often  representing  the respectable,  even  dominant  community  in  their  area.  But  since  caste  
endogamy is  still  largely  intact,  there  are  two perspectives  on  their  upward  mobility:  Either,  when  
emphasis is put on the economical nexus, they are recognised in their new, elevated status, or, when the 
biological element is taken into account, they are still seen as members of a lowly, unclean caste. Both 
perspectives are invoked on different occasions, but only the competing nature of these elements of 
caste made their upward mobility possible.
Examples aside, on a theoretical level it should be clear that there are frictions between the elements of  
caste. This internal friction is the source of most of the disputes regarding caste, be it between actual  
castes or between scholars arguing over caste. A prime example is the social mobility of castes, situated  
exactly on the fault line between the relevant elements. Sanskritisation (Charsley 1998; M. N. Srinivas 
2002 [1956], 2002 [1967]) can only work because the rationale of the economic element competes with 
that of the biological element: If a caste takes up a ‘cleaner’ occupation and changes its lifestyle, the 
rationale  of  the  economic  element  would  validate  this  change,  while  the  biological  side  remains 
unchanged. Because the rationality of the economic elements gradually overturns the biological one, 
social mobility is possible in the form of Sanskritisation. Max Weber, for example, who did not see this  
internal conflict in caste and over-emphasised the biological rationale, rejected the very idea of social  
mobility for castes (Weber 1958), and was justifiably criticised for this mistake (Fuchs 1987; Kantowsky 
1986). As this model implies, anyone who sees caste as an institution with only one underlying rationale  
underestimates the complexity that exists between the elements central to caste.
As already suggested in the example above, one central question that can be solved by this model is that  
involving hierarchy and caste. This has been a vexed problem for most scholars in this area, resulting in a  
flood of  inconclusive  research  (D.  Gupta  2000,  2004b;  U.  Sharma 1999:  52-58;  M.  N.  Srinivas  2002 
[1984]).  The  model  developed  here,  by  contrast,  offers  an  elegant,  yet  still  complex,  solution.  
Rationalisation aside, only the economic element has an intrinsic relation to hierarchy, the biological 
element is fundamentally based on autonomy, not hierarchy. Thus, whenever the biological element 
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receives more emphasis than the economic one, hierarchy is less of concern, and vice versa. This would  
explain a number of examples, even more so since it is captured in the modern interpretation of caste 
(discussed under 1.3.3). If, for example, a Low Caste family rejects a marriage proposal from a High Caste  
bridegroom for one of their daughters, it also rejects the principle of hierarchy. The explanation for this  
can only be found in the biological  element of  caste;  manifested in the fact  that this  family  values  
endogamy higher than hierarchy. This minor example points to an issue that is attached to caste in all 
empirical situations: For every caste-related empirical problem, there are competing rationales that are 
the logical result of the elements described. In every concrete situation these competing rationales could 
be invoked, with the result often not fully predictable. This explains the different interpretations of caste 
(the main ones to be discussed below) and the controversies surrounding this social institution. 
1.3. The competing interpretations of Caste
According  to  the  model  developed  here,  caste  is  a  systematic  connection  between  economic  and 
biological  elements,  coupled  by  a  specific  form  of  rationalisation.  So  none  of  the  three  elements  
discussed  above  makes  up  caste  in  isolation;  instead,  the  interaction  of  all  three  constitutes  the 
institution known as caste. In fact, caste can be actively re-interpreted in numerous ways using these 
three elements. As the rationalisation process is already quite fluid, a number of interpretations of caste  
are imaginable. But above all, it is mainly the emphasis given to these elements that determines which  
particular theory of caste is adopted. It is clear when examining the literature that individual scholars  
emphasise these elements and their reciprocal inter-connections differently, and that their positions are, 
in turn, the result of these differences in emphasis. 
Herein lays the value of the model developed above. Being a very abstract version of caste theory, or 
even a meta-theory of caste, it allows us to analyse the positions that have been adopted by scholars in  
the field. More specifically, it allows us to differentiate the positions within the scholarly field according  
to the emphasis they attribute to the separate elements of caste.31 In the following, the three most 
relevant  interpretations  of  caste  will  be  analysed,  using  the model  developed here  as  a  theoretical  
framework.
31 Furthermore, the model also helps to highlight the parallels caste has with other social phenomenon, such as race, class and 
the like. In no other historical circumstance has something like caste evolved. So any comparison with race, class, estate or  
guild is limited beyond a very abstract level. However, with the model’s essential elements and their interconnections, it is  
quite easy to indicate where possible parallels to other social institutions could be found.
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1.3.1. The Classical interpretation of Caste – Dumont and the ‘book view’
The interpretation of  caste famously associated with Dumont (already alluded in1.2.3.)  will  here be  
systematically  analysed.  This  model  of  caste  presents  a  strong  connection  between  the  economic 
element and a (religious) form of rationalisation, and while the connection to the biological element is 
present, it is systematically weaker than all others:
According to this scheme, caste is  essentially a belief system that finds its empirical expression in a 
system of economic organisation; that is, the division of labour between the castes (cf. Rocher 1975). In 
Dumont's and Bouglé's view of caste, the conflict between lofty ideas and brute realities is resolved in  
favour of imagination over economic reality (or biological dictates). In the words of Bouglé, “all observers 
are agreed on this: caste is basically a religious institution”(Bouglé 1971 [1908]: 65). In contrast to more 
materialistic  interpretations  of  the  phenomenon,  the  role  of  Hindu  religion  and  the  reality-shaping  
power of beliefs in hierarchy based on purity are emphasised, with other aspects mentioned only in  
passing.32 According to Dumont, caste is essentially a belief system that generates and ranks different 
stages of ritual purity, which then finds its expression in the labour market. Moreover, caste is not simply  
“a state of mind”  (Dumont 1980: 34) but is itself unthinkable without a permeating sense of shared 
values, an ideology that refers to society as a whole. The biological element is indeed mentioned as it is  
part of the ‘separation’ element, but it does not feature as essential for the constitution of caste. Even  
the economic element is regarded only as an outcome of the prevailing mindset, with Dumont seeing a  
mere symbolic nexus of castes with their traditional occupation. Here, caste as a phenomenon is taken  
to be primarily in the ideational world.
32 Apparently, the emphasis on purity and pollution does not seem to be entirely justified with reference to the classical texts:  
Patrick Olivelle, 'Caste and Purity: A Study in the Language of the Dharma Literature', Contributions to Indian Sociology, 32/2 
(November 1, 1998 1998), 189-216.
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As logically consistent as this is, it is still an active interpretation of reality, one guided by the interests of  
those employing the concept. It is not just by chance that Dumont, who interprets caste primarily as  
rooted  in  the  religious  or  spiritual  sphere,  bases  himself  on  Brahmins’  accounts  –  hence  this 
interpretation is called the “Brahmins’ view on caste”  (Berreman 1971). This perspective emasculates 
the concept of caste by greatly reducing its potential for conflict. For Dumont this might simply create an  
elegant theoretic  system, while for  Brahminic interpreters  it  offers a  legitimisation of  a  system that 
provides them with an elevated social position; from both perspectives, it covers fault lines by reducing 
stumbling blocks. When caste is based on shared notions of purity and pollution, membership in castes 
is  not only voluntary but also natural:  Castes in this  interpretation are mere expressions of  already  
existing moral beliefs. If everyone shares these beliefs, there is no scope for opposition, and caste can be 
seen as a harmonious way of organising society in line with shared understandings. Moreover, if these 
caste notions find religious legitimisation then any opposition is not merely immoral but also heretical.  
Allocating caste to the ideational world negates the power struggles and the economic and biological 
necessities that complicate the phenomenon theoretically, and drag it into the muddle of the real world.  
Instead, all conflicts and frictions, and all converging claims about caste, arise only from the imperfect 
implementation  of  an  intrinsically  harmonious  system.  Understandably,  in  this  perspective  caste  is 
conceived rather than enforced; and ultimately, is a social ideal rather than a moral scandal. The contrast  
to the ‘subaltern’ interpretation (discussed below) could not be greater.
32
1.3.2. The Subaltern interpretation of Caste – Ambedkar's version
This interpretation of caste, developed by B.R. Ambedkar in his earlier writings (Ambedkar 2002 [1916]), 
develops a model in which the connection between economy and biology is of central concern. The  
rationalisation is still essential for this model, but it comes second – it is an a posteriori rationalisation of 
precedents that have been created in the materialist sphere:
For  Ambedkar,  caste  developed  primarily  from  the  solidification  of  professions  on  hereditary  lines.  
Starting from the Brahmins, who first made entry to their profession exclusive to born Brahmins, Lower 
Castes were gradually excluded as other professions isolated themselves through endogamy. Religious 
explanations are thus a means to cover up this enforced Ethnicisation, which went hand in hand with the 
division of labour that pressed weak members of society into menial professions and status categories.
We shall be well advised to recall at the outset that the Hindu society, in common with other societies,  
was composed of classes […] this was essentially a class system, in which individuals, when qualified, could 
change their class, and therefore classes did change their personnel. At some time in the history of Hindus, 
the priestly class socially detached itself from the rest of the body of people and through a closed-door  
policy became a caste by itself. The other classes being subject to the law of social division of labour 
underwent differentiation,  some into large,  others into very minute groups.  […] This sub-division of  a 
society is quite natural. But the unnatural thing about these sub-divisions is that they have lost the open-
door character of the class system and have become self-enclosed units called caste. The question is: were 
they compelled to close their doors and become endogamous, or did they close on their own accord? I 
submit that there is a double line of answer: Some closed the door: Others found it closed against them.  
(Ambedkar 2002 [1916]: 256-57)
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From this perspective33, caste is neither an incarnation of an abstract idea about an ideal society nor a 
manifestation  of  pre-existing  moral  or  religious  notions  that  existed  before  any social  setting  could  
invoke them. Rather, it is the result of a concrete (i.e. materialist) interaction between interests that 
evolved gradually. Thus, economic specialisation results from the development of the material base of 
society, while the endogamous element represents the very real need for groups to protect their means  
of income.
By situating this institution in the midst of real-world interest struggles, it is automatically exposed to 
scrutiny  and potential  critique.  It  is  hardly  surprisingly,  therefore,  that  B.R.  Ambedkar  favoured this 
perspective. Against a ‘Brahminic’ perspective, that instead hides the interests of the castes involved, 
here the interests behind the ideal-typical actors are exposed. Caste is no longer an ideal system, but the 
result of power differences, with negative consequences for the losers in the social struggle. On this  
view, any idealised rationalisation of caste (as in the classical interpretation) is consequently expounded 
as an apologist legitimisation, with little to do with real-world consequences. The ‘Brahminic version’, 
therefore, is not much more than a thin veil to cover up the brutal use of force – the repression and  
economic exploitation that is central to caste. Of course, this is a normative component of Ambedkar's 
interpretation of caste, as part of a political struggle for the revision of the social position of his own 
community – those who had been classified by mainstream society as ‘Untouchables’. 34 But while this 
normative component is not central for an analytical model of caste, Ambedkar's version nevertheless  
has immense value: He provides a materialistic interpretation of caste, which in turn provides a critical 
perspective on it (A. Sharma 2005). Furthermore, since the rationalisation of caste is seen as secondary 
to the economic-ethnic nexus, a variety of interpretations are possible, all of which tend to be more 
compatible with empirical research.
1.3.3. The Modern interpretation of Caste – Caste as quasi-ethnic entity
The previous interpretations were both explicitly formulated and associated with well-known scholars in 
the field. Unfortunately, this cannot be said for the third interpretation, despite it being perhaps the  
most relevant for any analysis of caste under modern circumstances. It is not that this interpretation is  
unknown, but rather that it has yet to be explicitly formulated. However, as most scholars have not  
invested much effort into a theory of caste, one is left with writings that all tend to criticise Dumont 
(though much less  Ambedkar,  whose theory  is  much less  known and discussed),  but  which do not  
formulate an alternative theory of caste themselves: 
If modern scholarship on India is united in its chorus against a religion-based hierarchy in Indian caste  
structure, it fractures into a cacophony of sounds when it comes to defining the nature of caste in modern 
India. While few scholars claim a demise of caste, there is an increasing tendency to view caste as a form  
33 Obviously, Ambedkar’s is not a historically exact account, but rather a pointed and highly abridged version of the origin of  
caste. Nevertheless, whatever the actual historical circumstances, it is a logical construct with great theoretical cohesion and 
important consequences.
34 For a disambiguation of the concept of ‘Untouchability’ see:  Simon Charsley, '`Untouchable': What Is in a Name?',  The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 2/1 (1996), 1-23.
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of ethnicity in which castes compete with each other for power and proudly brandish their own narratives  
of origin, with even the lowest castes claiming a place in the national history characterized by valor and  
accomplishment. (Desai 2008: 19)
This view, a synthesised abstract of contemporary accounts on caste, will here be called the modern 
reinterpretation  of  caste;  even  though  it  does  not  as  yet  add  up  to  a  consistent  theory  of  caste.  
Presenting a more comprehensive model for caste in modernity is therefore one that will be attempted 
for the first time here. The framework is straightforward: Caste here is basically an extension of the  
family, with a binding notion of shared cultural norms. Endogamy is practised and rationalised under the  
premise that  the family’s  cultural  tradition needs to  be preserved.  The traditional  profession is  still  
known  but  has  no  practical  relevance,  and  notions  of  hierarchy  or  purity/pollution  are  diminished 
(although they do reappear in certain situations). In this model, then, caste would be analysed in the  
following way:
The biological element in the form of ethnicity is the most central element in this interpretation, with 
scant reference to economic reality, which provides only a weak backdrop. Any rationalisation of caste is  
primarily  done by  invoking  family  traditions  rather  than through religious  justification,  even though  
religion provides a frame of reference for these family traditions. Here, caste is based primarily on the  
connection  between  the  ideational  element  and  the  biological  one,  with  the  economical  element 
lingering in the background.
This leaves few, if any, options for a rationalisation of caste that takes the whole society into account. 
The question would be what kind of rationalisation could be adapted to act as a justification for the 
separation of society on quasi-ethnic caste lines. A religious justification would find almost no support  
within the Hindu fold. Certainly, the religious texts within Hinduism were not written with the idea of  
Jati as substantial,  independent units of society in mind. As the binding factor of shared beliefs and 
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values vanishes from caste as idea, so too do religious interpretations diminish. A fully autonomous,  
ethnic interpretation of caste cannot be explained by a religious notion that rests upon a common link 
between the castes. So if a sense of religious tradition is invoked in the rationalisation of caste, it is not  
thoroughly thought through by those who employ the concept of caste. While caste here appears a 
crude and often contradictory mishmash of beliefs, this is hardly surprising given that this is an everyday, 
not academic, rationalisation of caste.
What remains is the rationalisation of caste that starts from the family and sees it as an autonomous unit 
of  socialisation  without  a  hierarchy  or  necessary  economic  interdependence.  With  the  concept  of  
Substantialisation, described by Fuller as the “breakdown in hierarchical interdependence between […] 
two castes” (Fuller 1996: 14), the interpretation of castes as structurally independent units is not entirely 
new or unusual. The process is discussed by Dumont  (1980: 222) and has featured in the debate ever 
since. In describing the decreasing interconnectivity between castes, it  involves the loss of a shared  
notion of  hierarchy and the de-legitimisation of  religious  explanations for caste.  It  also implies that  
economic specialisation of specific castes becomes largely irrelevant, as the traditional occupation loses 
its economic importance. After caste has left the web of mutual interdependence, it takes the form of  
largely self-sufficient, mutually repellent and economically competing entities in a society that survives  
without a shared notion of caste hierarchy.
This perspective also equates well with the more commonly shared notion of caste that can be found in 
the field among Lower Castes, as expressed in M.N. Srinivas’ definition of caste (see 1.1.2). Here, caste is  
not necessarily a system, with a number of different explanations possible to account for its existence. 
Often, little is known about the customs of other groups, but one’s own group is defended in terms of  
ritual, habit or professional tradition. Caste is not seen as part of a comprehensive system, although it is  
still situated in relation to a variety of other castes.
From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  however,  this  interpretation  is  surely  the  weakest  of  the  possible 
interpretations of caste. The distinction between caste and tribe is almost non-existent here since the  
crucial  distinctive  feature,  the  division  of  labour  between  endogamous  groups,  fades  into  the  
background. A great deal depends on the shared notion of traditional occupation. As long as the link 
between a caste and a traditional occupation remains perceptible, caste has not expired. But the weaker  
this link gets, the closer castes comes to absorption into the larger fold of ethnic-based social groupings.  
This would not mean that caste no longer has impact on people’s life – even under this premise, caste  
considerations can still be vital, especially when marriages and family connections are concerned – but 
its theoretical significance would be diminished; it would have lost its unique characteristics. When caste 
is based on the convergence of the three elements described here, the absence of one would undermine  
the whole. The question then becomes: To what extent is caste still caste when one of the essential  
elements  is  weakened beyond recognition?  Certainly,  a  truncated version of  caste  would no longer 
represent the full meaning of the institution. Nevertheless, it does not automatically imply that caste  
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itself is weakened in empirical terms, although it does indicate that caste is losing its unique features and  
is taking on the characteristics of ethnic units such as a tribe. 
This development inevitably opens the debate on the future of caste. Does this reduction in theoretic 
complexity already anticipate the dissolution of caste as a social institution? In other words; is caste 
surviving in modernity?  As Béteille  (1996) points  out,  especially  amongst the influential  new Indian 
middle classes, caste has largely lost its legitimacy. When it is practised, it is with regard to the family and 
not seen as a hierarchical  system within an economic field.  The traditional  nexus to a profession is  
replaced by an emphasis on professional qualifications within the ideology of meritocracy. But this is still  
compatible  with  the  model  of  caste  developed  here.  This  model  helps  reveal  more  clearly  the 
development  that  Béteille  identifies.  Within  modernity,  caste  is  first  and  foremost  centred  on  the 
element of ethnic separation. However vague the rationalisation may be in the empirical case, caste 
stands and falls  with  the practice of  endogamy.  Thus,  an empirical  test  for  the ‘vitality’  of  caste  in 
modernity should not centre on its legitimisation or on the rationalisation of caste,35 but instead on the 
practise of endogamy. And as long as 94 per cent of marriages in India take place inside the caste (Desai 
et al. 2007), any speculation about the end of caste is premature. Caste is not about to vanish anytime 
soon; rather caste is re-interpreted and practised under modern circumstances. The more modernisation 
takes hold in India, the more the modern interpretation of caste is likely to replace the previous models.
1.4. Conclusion: The use of this conception of Caste
That the model developed above is theoretically coherent should be clear by now, as is its potential use 
in guiding empirical research. But the specific circumstances in which it may be valuable to research on 
caste needs some final  consideration – first, with regard to caste studies in general,  and second, in 
relation to the specific topic of this thesis. 
1.4.1. The model’s relevance to an understanding of Caste
In its theoretical design, this model offers an opportunity to understand caste quite differently from that  
presented  by  conventional  definitions.  It  breaks  the  institution  of  caste  down  into  its  essential  
ingredients, and, in the analysis of specific arrangement of these ingredients, it allows for a theoretical 
account of caste in more than just one way. Hence, it  can provide the theoretical tools for a meta-
analysis of all interpretations of caste: All previous scholarly accounts of caste can be analysed by using 
the three-fold scheme discussed here. While this is perhaps an academic exercise in the sociology of  
knowledge, there are other inherent implications of this model. With its wide scope, it allows for an 
interpretation of caste that can be adapted to more than one situation. The ‘building blocks’ of caste  
(see 1.1.3), those that are conventionally seen as essential for caste, can be appraised analytically with  
35 The practice of caste does not necessarily rely on an official legitimisation; indeed, caste is most often practised without  
invoking any consistent moral or religious justification. (cf. chpt. 3). 
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regard to their specific value for caste in differing circumstances – an analysis that has never been done  
before.  The most salient  result  of  this  re-appraisal  has been that some of  those ‘building blocks’  –  
notably the notions of hierarchy and of purity/pollution – are not essential for caste in all cases, but only  
under specific  interpretations  (1.3.1  and 1.3.2)  This  has,  in  turn,  far-reaching consequences for  the  
understanding of caste both inside and outside academia.
In the interpretation labelled ‘modern’ (chpt. 1.3.3), a theory of caste is visible that is not based on 
hierarchy, and which does not invoke the purity/pollution scheme. It is, in a sense, freed from traditional  
ritual-based connotations and is much more adaptable to the requirements of modernity, even if it is still  
not fully  compatible  with modernity in its  widest  sense (chpt.  2.3.3).  Inside academia,  this  offers  a  
theoretical basis for all the empirical works that indicate a weakening of the ritual foundation of caste (V. 
Das 1990; D. Gupta 2004a); in addition, it also reconciles these findings with the fact that caste in its de-
ritualised form still seems practised in modern India. Outside academia, this interpretation provides an 
account of caste that transcends the usual contradictions – that is, the fact that that caste seems to be  
weakening and yet still practised at the same time. Instead of just stating this obvious discrepancy, this 
interpretation  invites  a  new  perspective:  Caste  itself  is  not  weakening;  instead  caste  gets  a  new 
interpretation in which the ritual side – that mainly involving the purity/pollution distinction and the  
consequent hierarchy – is greatly diminished to the point of irrelevance. Only time will  tell  if  this is 
confirmed by other scholars, but in the scheme developed above, the possibility of a complete new 
perspective on caste is laid out. 
1.4.2. The model’s relevance to this thesis
For the thesis  at hand, this theoretical model of caste will  be employed, in general terms, to make  
theoretical sense of the empirical findings to be discussed in the respective chapters. At a more concrete  
level, it will be used to provide a theoretical frame for the changing practice of caste against the wider  
background of modernisation. The interpretation of caste discussed under 1.3.3, in particular, will be 
central to all further proceedings; however, it would be pre-mature to conclude that this is the last word 
on caste in modernity. First, this theoretical model is only an outline map with which to explore the field,  
and not the final answer to all theoretical problems. More work has to be put into a general theory on 
caste in modernity, and the model discussed here can only hope to be the first step. Aside from these 
meta-theoretical considerations, there are also problems concerning the relationship between caste and  
modernity. In the following chapter, modernity and modernisation will be discussed in more detail, and 
the compatibility of caste with modernity will be sketched out. Thus, if this chapter has established the  
intrinsic  tensions  within  caste  –  originating  from  the  competing  elements  of  caste  –  the  following  
chapter aims to establish the tension between caste and modernity. 
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2. The Concept of Modernity; India and Modernity; Caste and Modernity
Modernity  remains  one  of  the  most  highly  contested  concepts  in  the  social  sciences;  theoretical 
approaches to the subject are multi-dimensional and often contradictory, with any real consensus still a  
distant prospect. In addition, India is unique in its trajectory towards modernity. It is therefore beyond  
the scope of this thesis to consider modernity in its entirety, or to analyse the relevant historical, political  
and socio-cultural aspects of modernity in any great detail. Nevertheless, there are certain elements of  
modernity – or conflicts within the modernisation process – that are relevant to the present context.  
Examining how features of modernity/modernisation impact on the lives of contemporary Indians would  
be especially insightful here. The specific question of caste and modernity will be discussed at the end of  
this chapter. As caste is clearly a relevant phenomenon in modernising India, the theoretical implications  
of caste in modernity need to be sketched out. Subsequent chapters will  then apply the theoretical  
considerations raised below to the empirical realm. 
2.1. Main elements of Modernity / Conflicts of Modernisation
Depending on approach, modernity can be described and interpreted as a concrete historical epoch or,  
to the contrary, as an abstract ideational process, independent of any particular empirical society. Some  
scholars,  with  Habermas  perhaps  the  most  outspoken,  see  modernity  as  a  normative  concept;  the 
majority view, however, is either unaware of the normative implications of modernity, or deems them 
irrelevant.  Following Foucault  (Foucault  1984),  it  is  possible to argue that modernity is  primarily  an 
attitude and perspective, rather than a concrete event. An alternative perspective, though, would see  
modernity in its empirical forms as simply incomprehensible without acknowledging the influence of the 
18th century European Enlightenment (Venn 2006) and later Industrial Revolution (Beaudoin 2000; Ward 
1994). The challenge in the following, therefore, lies not in the want of relevant perspectives, but much 
more in the lack of clarity, given all those contradictory arguments. 
Of course, the concept of modernity is too complex to be squeezed into a 10-page overview without a 
high level of abstraction and some adjustments are necessary to keep this section within manageable  
limits. The following, therefore, will not be a comprehensive overview on the sociological use of the 
term modernity. Rather, it will attempt to explore modernity by reconstructing the main arguments – or  
theoretical  fault  lines  –  that  appear  to  characterise  modernity  and  to  inform  the  process  of 
modernisation. Since modernity is understood quite differently within academia, there is no shortage of  
theoretical  and  empirical  arguments.36 The  five  conflicts/disputes  that  have  received  the  most 
36 This,  in  turn,  is  mirrored  in  the  empirical  world,  for  an  example  see:  Peter  Wagner,  'The  Resistance  That  Modernity 
Constantly Provokes: Europe, America and Social Theory', Thesis Eleven, 58/1 (August 1, 1999 1999), 35-58.
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sociological attention will be sketched out here, plus an additional concept that presents a plausible, yet  
unchallenged hypothesis. All of the theoretical conflict zones are interconnected and occasional cross-
reference  will  try  to  establish  the  most  obvious  links.  The  discussion  cannot  claim  to  capture  all 
theoretical arguments within the concept of modernity, but by breaking modernity down into five areas  
of dispute it aims to provide the theoretical framework to access modernity in India.
2.1.1. Individualisation vs. Standardisation
The  value  of  human  equality,  based  on  the  concept  of  the  individual,  has  been  projected  in  the 
ideational  sphere  and  then  the  political  arena  since  the  Enlightenment  and  the  French  Revolution 
respectively  (Castoriadis 1990; Post 2006). Although, empirically, the egalitarian ideal has always been 
challenged,37 it  nevertheless  remains  a  key  element  for  modernity  in  its  normative  dimension. 38 In 
analytical terms, the social perspective that takes individuals, and not groups, as the basis for society is  
empirically very much connected with the heightened role of the individual within modernisation. In 
fact, individualisation is  itself  a hallmark of modernity,  albeit not one that goes unchallenged either  
(Jordan 2005). At the same time, the economic changes that accompanied modernisation historically 
have also resulted in a visible increase in standardisation (Kratzer 2005; Wagner 1994).
From  the  very  beginning  of  sociological  debate,  the  tensions  between  individualisation  and 
modernisation’s  anti-individual  tendencies  have  been  much  discussed.  When  the  Enlightenment 
movement put the liberation of the individual at its heart, historical developments appeared to follow 
suit. Ferdinand Toennies' “Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft” (1887), for example, describes a society that 
changes its primary mode of interaction from one based on emotional bonds between persons known to 
each  other,  towards  one  that  is  connected  by  impersonal  and  goal-oriented  interactions  between 
strangers. Amongst other things, this implies the weakening or disappearance of the traditional bonds 
that keep an individual tied to social customs, traditions and the influence of social peers. For Émile  
Durkheim,  the  changing  economic  mode  of  production  within  modernity  means  that  a  “mechanic 
solidarity”  is  increasingly  replaced  by  an  “organic  solidarity”  (Durkheim 1964  [1893]).  The  “organic 
solidarity” that entails under such circumstances is not founded on similarities between people, but on 
functional  differences,  and  on  the  mutual  dependency  that  economic  specialisation  brings  with  it.  
Individuals who were controlled and protected in the pre-modern society are now left on their own;  
such individuals are therefore much more vulnerable, potentially prone to drop out of society if they fail  
to fulfil an economic function. One of the results of modernisation, therefore, can be seen in a higher 
rate of suicide, which Durkheim deemed the result of anomie (Durkheim 1997 [1897]).
37 From the beginning of modern democracy, voting rights were awarded to only a few, economically privileged citizens. Full  
elective franchise, including women, was only achieved much later. For an overview on the discourse of citizenship, albeit  
written  in  a  slightly  different  context,  see:  Abowitz  Kathleen  Knight  and  Harnish  Jason,  'Contemporary  Discourses  of 
Citizenship', Review of Educational Research, 76/4 (2006), 653. 
38 Equality is surely one of the most contested concepts within the debate of modernity. In the discussion here, this issue will  
be sidelined for the simple reason that a normative discussion is not the focus of the thesis. Analytically, the notion of 
equality is  both the basis for  the concept of the individual  here,  and is  behind modernity’s affinity with democracy – 
discussed in 2.1.3.
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The individual  in modernity,  according to Georg Simmel,  is  partially  liberated from the demands of  
tradition, but, at the same time, is increasingly at the centre of overlapping social responsibilities and 
competing identities. With his “Kreuzung sozialer Kreise”(Simmel 1955 [1922]), Simmel states that the 
individual is continually oscillating between different, and at times competing, social roles and identities,  
and that the society that provides the individual’s point of reference is, at one and the same time, more  
stable, more in flux and more open to individual choices. In modernity, society becomes increasingly  
complex and contextual, and is not – contra Karl Marx – reducible to a single dimension, even if the 
economy and the place of the individual in it is the most prominent factor. In “die Grossstaedte und das  
Geistesleben”(Simmel  1903),  Simmel  further  observes how the plethora of  information and sensory 
inputs in the modern metropolis gives rise to a detached and ostensibly disinterested personality state, 
one that he deems characteristic for the human condition under modern conditions.
However, as indicated above, there is also a strong counter-current of ongoing standardisation that is as 
much a part of modernity as is individualisation. Max Weber early recognised the friction between the 
liberation and the subjugation of the individual in modernity. The individual, liberated from the waning 
influence of tradition, religion and irrationality, becomes trapped in the “iron cage” of ever-increasing 
control  of  all  aspects of  life.  The puritanical  forms of  Protestantism that,  according to Weber,  have 
worked as unintentional midwives for the birth of modern, industrial capitalism  (Weber 1958 [1905]) 
have, subsequently, extended their reach, with human beings themselves no longer excepted from the 
rational  subjugation of  the world.  While Weber shares  with Durkheim a deep scepticism about the 
consequences  of  modernity  and  modernisation  on  the  individual,  he  sees  the  fundamental  threat 
coming  from  the  opposite  direction:  The  individual  is  not  so  much  challenged  by  the  absence  of  
structures that bind and guide the individual, but rather is entrapped in a new cage of dependencies,  
which go much deeper because rationalisation has not kept its promise of liberalisation.
The dialectics of  the individual’s  liberalisation and subjugation have been strongly connected to the 
process of modernisation from its very beginning, and have shaped it ever since. Peter Wagner proposes  
the following rough timescale for the Western countries where modernity first  took hold:  From the 
French Revolution until 1890, he sees the rise of individual liberalisation, with standardisation taking 
over between 1890 and 1970. More recently,  contingency and the autonomy of  the individual  have 
returned to the fore (Wagner 2010b). And while this is only one attempt to order the facts, it indicates 
that this tension remains fundamental for modernity – a fact that features more or less indirectly in the 
subsequent discussion.
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2.1.2. Rationalisation, Secularisation vs. Traditions
Also stemming from the Enlightenment, and intrinsic to modernity, is the concept of rationality – that all  
knowledge must be based on methodologically assessed empirical facts and logical argument (Honneth 
1987).39 Neither the capitalistic takeover of the world nor the industrial revolution would have been 
imaginable  without  a  rational  basis  in  cost/benefits  calculations  and the worldview that  enabled it  
(Gates and Steane 2007). Famously,  Weber  (Weber 1958 [1905]) discerns a deeper and more crucial 
reason  for  the  rise  of  rationality  and  capitalism  in  the  Occident:  The  Worldly  Asceticism most 
prominently  heralded  by  puritanical  forms  of  Protestantism,  such  as  Calvinism and  North-American 
religious sects. By asking why the ascent of rationality, exemplified by empirical science and universal  
rational reasoning, has historically only occurred within the Western hemisphere, Weber systematically 
scrutinises the other so-called ‘world religions’ – Judaism, Confucianism/Taoism, Hinduism/ Buddhism 
and Islam – for their potential to develop equal or similar forms of rationalising elements. Condensed in  
the “Vorbemerkung” and “Zwischenbetrachtung”  (Weber 1988 [1920]),  Weber concludes that  while 
several independent elements are traceable in these religions’ circumstances, no other world religion  
was able to develop anything approaching the form of rationality found under Protestantism.
In addition to the question of pre-conditions of rationality, the results and consequences of this rise in 
rationality also need to be considered. In the ‘classical’ period of sociology, there was a widespread 
expectation that irrationality, and with it religion, would wither away under the onslaught of rationality. 40 
The  secularisation  of  society  –  in  Weber's  terms,  ‘disenchantment  of  the  world’  (S.  Michael  2004; 
Walsham 2008) – seemed a natural evolutionary process. Yet today, this expectation has not been met, 
and the secularisation thesis41 needs reformulation (Koshul 2005; Schroeder 1995). For the moment, it 
remains unclear whether rationality will prevail in the context of a strong emphasis on religion in many 
(often quite  modern)  societies  on this  planet.  The most  likely  outcome is  a  co-existence of  secular  
rationality and religious irrationality, with this conflict likely to remain at the heart of modernity for some  
time to come. 
Notwithstanding this conflict, the secularisation issue points towards a greater complexity. Modernity is  
often set (or is constructed to set) against ‘tradition’, whatever that may mean in concrete terms. This  
contrast – of which rationality versus religion is only one instance – needs to be transcended in order to  
fully understand modernity. Anthony Giddens is perhaps the scholar who has most prominently rejected 
the dualism of modernity and tradition, claiming that modernity is characterised by the acquisition of  
invented traditions, of a plurality of traditions and of a coexistence of competing lines of interpretations.  
39 For  an  insightful  discussion  of  the  relation  between  culture(s)  and  rationality:  Harvey  Siegel,  'Multiculturalism  and 
Rationality', Theory and Research in Education, 5/2 (July 1, 2007), 203-23.
40 Without entering this debate, it should be clear that any religion is ultimately irrational in the way that it is not based on  
empirical knowledge and logical argument. For a balanced view: Michael H. Barnes, 'Rationality in Religion', Religion, 27/4 
(1997), 375-90.
41 For  a  short  disambiguation  in  a  philosophical  context,  see  Graham  Gordon,  'Religion,  Secularization  and  Modernity', 
Philosophy, 67/260 (1992), 183-97.
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Tradition itself is not to be understood as static, but provides only the context for its re-formulation in  
modern  circumstances  (Giddens  1990).  Within  this  interpretation,  an  ‘invented’  tradition  is 
systematically used and interpreted to legitimise current uses of power and dominion. Modernity in this  
context needs to be understood as a reflexive complex – in constant negotiation between the past, the 
present  and the future.  This  has  its  correspondence in  concrete  history:  With the establishment  of  
nation states and democratisation in the 19th and 20th centuries, the societies in question entered the 
modern stage; formerly local communities were thus integrated into the national system, breaking the 
continuity both in time and space (Giddens 1994). Since this time, tradition has been integrated into a 
complex,  institutionally  reflexive process of  dissociating with the past  (and with past  traditions)  – a  
process that is even more radicalised and accelerated through globalisation, which is itself a form of 
radicalised modernisation.
2.1.3. Market-based Economy vs. Democratic Representation
The European Enlightenment  is  one of  modernity’s  two main ideational  sources;  the other,  no less 
important although perhaps more controversial, is the Industrial Revolution, starting in England in the 
middle of the 18th century and spreading to the rest of Western Europe thereafter (Beaudoin 2000). The 
historical  sequence of  events is  beyond the scope of  the analysis  here,  but the results  are  obvious 
nevertheless. There is no denying that all social and cultural developments within the modernisation  
process were enabled and fostered by the economic expansion consequent to the industrial revolution.  
The individualisation discussed above, for example, is inconceivable without an economic break from the  
feudal  past,  where  trade  guilds  and  severe  restrictions  on  commercial  activity  prevented  a  liberal  
exchange  of  services  and  goods.  On  the  other  hand,  the  movement  towards  a  capitalistic  form of 
economy  can  equally  be  attributed  to  the  rationalisation  of  all  aspects  of  life.  Without  a  rational  
approach  to  business  –  described  most  notably  by  Weber  with  regard  to  double-entry  accounting 
standards (Weber 1922) – the enormous expansion of economic activities would have been impossible. 
Through reciprocal changes in the social and economic sphere, modernity as such was both enabled and 
driven at the same time. The genuine achievement of the Industrial Revolution, the relative double-
independence of the economy – from moral and political restraints in the theoretical sphere, and the  
partial  escape from natural  limitations42 – has,  like  no other development,  enabled the societal  sea 
change associated with modernisation. 
What does this  imply for the relationship between modernity and the economy? Is  modernity only 
imaginable  in  coexistence  with  a  capitalistic  economy?43 What  place  would  socialist  models  –  that 
constitute, according to Marx, a more rational development stage after and beyond capitalism  (Marx 
1906  [1867]) –  have  in  a  theory  of  modernity?  Most  theoreticians  in  the  tradition  of  classical 
42 In both dimensions, this independence is, of course, only a relative one. No economic theory is completely free from social  
and moral values and implications; human dependency on nature is also undisputed once narrow economic approaches are  
left behind.
43 For a discussion about the sociological consequences, see Peter Wagner, 'Modernity, Capitalism and Critique', Thesis Eleven, 
66/1 (2001), 1-31.
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modernisation theories44 would respond that,  for them, modernisation is simply synonymous with a 
capitalistic development.45 The critiques and counter-theories of modernisation discourse, meanwhile, 
would rather  question  this  equation.  The dependence  theories,  and within  them the  world  system 
theory  of  Immanuel  Wallerstein  (1974),  do  not  simply  oppose  the  most  naïve  assumptions  of 
modernisation theories, but point towards systematic obstacles to underdeveloped nations’ progress.46 
For both modernisation theorists and their critics, it is still a highly controversial question if and how  
modernity can be thought of without capitalism.47 For the moment, let us simply state that modernity is 
overwhelmingly associated with a market-based economy, while historic cases, like the Soviet Union or 
India from 1947-1991, serve as a reminder that this relationship is not an unequivocal one. Whether  
these  two  examples  are  an  exception  to  the  rule,  or  are  the  counterexample  that  proves  the 
modernity/capitalism nexus wrong, depends on the perspective of the analyst.  
Similar  comments  may  be  made  about  democratic  representation.  The famous  Lipset  thesis  (Lipset 
1959) – according to which rising economic prosperity increases the chance of a nation becoming a 
democracy  –  is  only  one  expression  of  this  relationship.  Fundamentally,  the  rationalisation  that  is 
intrinsic  to  modernity  already  implies  that  political  power  needs  legitimisation  from  the  people  it  
governs, especially as previous modes of government, most notably the doctrine of divine right, are no  
longer feasible. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution both emphasised the role of  juridical  
equality, that pre-dates democracy,48 although it has not been achieved in real terms for a long time. 
Empirically,  the relationship between democracy and modernity is  complex,  and some cases – most 
prominently China – seem to indicate that modernity can function well without democracy, if only for  
the time being. When modernity is seen as a normative concept, or even a project  (Habermas 1988 
[1980]), democracy is, of course, an essential core element of modernity. But once modernity is not  
defined as a normative concept per se, the relationship between modernisation and democratisation is 
much less resilient than it looks at first sight.
44 The most exemplary of these writings is perhaps: Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist  
Manifesto  (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960). in which he describes fixed and distinct stages of 
economic  development  that  each  society  has  to  go  through  in  order  to  become  a  fully-developed  (that  is,  modern)  
capitalistic  economy.  First  and foremost,  this  takes an institutional  approach  and is  focussed on a  range of  necessary  
changes from a traditional society to a modern – capitalistic – one. In unilinear fashion, beginning with underdeveloped  
traditional  societies  and  ending  with  modernity,  a  development  was  described and actively  encouraged that  tried  to  
decouple the Western modernisation path from its  unique historical  foundation.  And while this is  the first  attempt to  
develop a truly global grasp on the topic of modernisation, it is often seen as a failed attempt to claim universality for what  
was, after all, a unique historical process: Zaheer Baber, 'Modernization Theory and the Cold War', Journal of Contemporary  
Asia, 31/1 (2001), 71-85. 
45 Most modernisation theories take an institutional approach towards their analysis, but not exclusively so. Compare Daniel 
Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958). 
46 Legitimate  as  this  has  been,  it  also  has  also  lead  to  a  general  decline  in  interest  in  modernisation.  The  very  term  
modernisation itself became delegitimised once it was connected to a seemingly disproved and outdated paradigm. Alberto 
Martinelli, Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity (London: Sage, 2005).
47 Capitalism itself is imaginable in differing ways under the topic of ‘varieties of capitalism’ Peter A. Hall and David Soskice 
(eds.),  Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001).
48 Democracy has an uneasy relationship with equality – a key factor in the concept of individuality. If equality is defined in a  
distributive way, it stands in contrast to the concept of democracy, which is itself based on an equality of fundamental rights  
plus the assumption of equal democratic agency. For a discussion, see Robert Post, 'Democracy and Equality', The ANNALS  
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 603/1 (2006), 24-36. 
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Even more fundamental than the empirical question of democratic representation and modernisation, is  
the tension between capitalistic economy and democracy. A capitalistic economy has historically enabled 
the democratic participation of more people than ever before. But it could, by contrast, also marginalise 
sections of society to the extent that they are no longer able to exert  their  democratic  rights,  thus  
preventing full participation. Democracy is based on the assumption that all people (or at least all voters)  
have  equal  rights,  whereas  capitalism  continually  generates  inequalities  and  is  therefore  prone  to 
undermine the egalitarian ideals of democracy. Empirically, the conflict is most often resolved through a  
compromise that equality is assumed in the legal and political sphere, and inequality is confined to the  
economic sphere.49 But since these subsystems or value spheres are not completely independent (see 
2.1.4), the underlying conflict remains.
2.1.4. Functional differentiation, Bureaucratisation, Juridification vs. the 
Rationale of the Life-World
Functional differentiation is a hallmark of modernisation and no sensible sociologist would disagree with 
this premise  (Hagen 2000; Luhmann 1997b; Weber 1922).  In a fully modern society,  all  social life  is 
structured into spheres or (sub)systems – legal, scientific, religious, economic, ethical, aesthetic, etc. –  
that are internally interconnected but structurally distinct, and, to a certain extent,  autonomous. All 
subsystems of society, to borrow the Luhmann term  (Luhmann 1997a), are marked by a difference in 
communication  between  system  and  environment  and  function  according  to  their  own,  distinct 
rationale.  But  these  value  spheres  (Weber)  or  societal  subsystems  (Luhmann)  are  not  completely 
autonomous,  they  tend  to  influence  each  other  and  at  times  to  impose  their  rationale  on  their  
respective opposites. One of these conflicts – the one between the equality underlying democracy and  
the inequality generated by capitalism – has already been discussed above (2.1.3) and other tensions are  
imaginable. Such conflicts would not have been possible before this stage of functional differentiation, 
and that is what makes them fundamentally modern conflicts. 
The bureaucratisation and juridification of all aspects of life, already captured in Weber's “iron cage”  
argument (Weber 1958 [1905]), describes a strong tendency within the modernisation process, but one 
which undercuts functional differentiation: Those value spheres or sub-systems that are not originally 
informed by bureaucratic or juristic rationales increasingly lose their autonomy and are colonised in the  
process. No one has captured this aspect of modernity better than Juergen Habermas. He can be seen as  
the scholar most emphatically connected to the “project of modernity” (Habermas 1988 [1980]), which 
he traces back to the European Enlightenment and which he defines as a liberating and humanitarian 
tradition. For Habermas, modernity has a strong and explicit  normative dimension50 and he defends 
modernity as an ongoing project or movement, in contrast to other philosophical beliefs about the end  
49 For a contrasting, yet insightful view, see:  John E. Roemer, 'Will Democracy Engender Equality?',  Economic Theory, 25/1 
(2005), 217-34.
50 A number of theories of modernity discussed here have this normative dimension, but none is as explicit as the one by  
Habermas.
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of modernity. In Habermas’ main work – the theory of communicative action  (Habermas 1981) – he 
describes modernisation in terms of a frictional relation between the development of the capitalistic  
economy and the “Lebenswelt” or life-world of the autonomous citizen. The rationale of the economic 
sphere, based on purpose-relational action, tends to become increasingly copied by, or fully subsumed 
within  the  life-world,  where  it  potentially  violates  the  structural  principles  of  “communicative 
rationality”. Ideally, the life-world would be immune to the capitalist rationale, but in modernity it is, in 
fact, in danger of being colonised by purpose-relational motivations.51
Modernity itself is characterised by this relationship: It is unthinkable without the market economy (see  
2.1.3) that provides the individual with the economic basis for potential autonomy. But the colonising 
tendency of economic, bureaucratic and juridical rationales put this conflict at the base of modernity,  
since it undermines functional differentiation. A number of empirical conflicts 52 are the manifestation of 
the tension between subsystems or value spheres, and modernity itself is informed by such faultlines.  
Any further  analysis  would  need concrete,  empirical  examples,  but  the outline  of  the conflict  itself  
should be established by now.
2.1.5. The Endpoint of Modernity vs. ever-remaining Contingency
The final conflict or paradox to be discussed here is again a complex one. Very briefly: The rationality  
characterised by modernity (chpt. 2.1.1) has brought about a conquest of nature inconceivable in any 
earlier  epoch,  and  one  with  no  parallel  in  history.  This  raises  the  question  of  an  endpoint,  once 
modernity has reached all corners of this planet. And this question could directly lead to a more abstract  
one: Is the world in modernity rationally controllable, or is a certain amount (possibly even a great deal)  
of contingency essential for the modern condition? For Weber, it would have appeared as if the world  
would  soon  substitute  rationality  for  (religious)  irrationality.  However,  contemporary  times  and 
contemporary scholars would refute this claim.
Ulrich  Beck,  while  a  prominent  figure,  is  only  one amongst  many who try  to  explore  the  limits  of  
modernity  and  its  underlying  claim of  rationality.  Beck  asks  how the  formerly  undisputed  limits  of  
modernisation can be thought of today, where institutions, such as the family or the nation state, are  
undermined by a radicalisation of modernity, without stepping out of the context of modernity itself 
(Beck et al. 2001). Against the claims of post-modernists,53 Beck postulates that the Western world is 
51 And while Habermas is often criticised as standing too much in the tradition of German Idealism – and therefore being  
prone to anti-empiric statements – he sees the friction and the fragility of individualism in modernity clearer than most  
other authors.
52 For example, any civil rights movement that challenges decisions that are formally/legally agreed upon.
53 Associated  with the names of  Jean-François  Lyotard,  The Postmodern Condition:  A Report  on  Knowledge,  ed.  Frederic 
Jameson, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984 [1979]).  Jacques 
Derrida  Jaques Derrida,  Basic Writings, ed. Barry Stocker (New York: Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2007). Jean Baudrillard 
Jean Baudrillard,  Selected Writings,  ed.  Mark Poster,  trans.  Jacques Mourrain (2;  Cambridge: Stanford University Press, 
2002)., Michel Foucault Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London, New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2002 [1966]). and many more, post-modernism can be seen as intellectual movement that incorporates 
ideas from a number of sources into a radical questioning of established theories and theorems about the meaning of  
‘modern’. The underlying assumptions of modernity – in the idea of progress, in the technological subjugation of nature and 
humans' independence from it, in the perfectibility of the human condition and in the consequent rationalisation of the  
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entering a phase of a second modernity, where the deepening of modern tendencies goes together with  
a new consciousness of the fundamental requirements of human existence.54 With the ‘discovery’ of the 
limits of natural resources, with the awareness of risks (such as environmental degradation) that are a 
given  within  modernity,  any  naïve  assumption  about  human dominance  over  nature  is  increasingly  
questionable  (Beck et al. 1994). According to Beck, there is no teleological endpoint of modernisation 
and no full control of processes within modernisation is imaginable.
Another, perhaps surprising, protagonist for the claim of increasing contingency in modernity is Niklas  
Luhmann. He categorically rejects the modern/post-modern divide  (Luhmann 1998), claiming instead 
that modernity itself (and not post-modernity) is defined by “an unusual measure of contingency” (1998: 
44). Modernisation, according to Luhmann, is not leading to the increasing controllability of society (or  
the  world),  but  rather  to  an  increase  in  complexity,  and  a  related  decrease  in  certainty.  While  he  
consequentially insists that we all are living in a world society, and therefore modernisation can only be 
thought of globally (cf. Dirlik 2003; Luhmann 1975), this does not provide any indication of an end to the 
process. Even if the whole social world is fully modern – and for him this would be the case once all  
spatially distant societies are interconnected by communication – it would not be the end for modernity.  
As Luhmann does not interpret modernity as a normative project, as Habermas does (Habermas 1988 
[1980]),  it  poses  no  normative  problem  to  insist  on  the  fundamental  contingency  of  modernity. 
According to Luhmann, society will never be fully rational, the natural world will not be fully subjugated,  
and human existence will be more uncertain than before.
Thus, the fundamental conflict remains: While mankind is constantly struggling to rationally conquer 
nature, both inside and outside of the human body, and indeed wins battles every day, the war itself, as  
a matter of principle, is unwinnable. The process called modernisation today will not come to an end, 
even if the generations to come apply a new name to it. There will always be aspects of human existence 
that are not entirely controlled or understood in rational terms. But, dialectically, the quest to analyse 
the world in rational terms will prevail as long as the trend towards rationalisation, visible today, finds a 
basis in society.
world – are exposed as beliefs with no or little justification on empirical grounds. The postulate of modernisation, according  
to the post-modernists, is a ‘great narrative’ and ultimately based in a Hegelian conception of history, one that sees history  
as endowed with a teleological sense, and which is ultimately a secularised version of the Judeo-Christian expectation of 
salvation. These meta-narratives – and modernity, plus its basis in the Enlightenment, is one of them – need to be de-
constructed, their inconsistencies exposed and the legitimacy of their ideologies questioned. 
54 For an affirmative appraisal of post-modernism, see  Zygmunt Bauman, 'A Sociological Theory of Postmodernity',  Thesis  
Eleven, 29/1  (1991),  33-46. For  a  critical  discussion,  see  Peter  Wagner,  'Liberty  and  Discipline:  Making  Sense  of 
Postmodernity, or, Once Again, toward a Sociohistorical Understanding of Modernity', Theory and Society, 21/4 (1992), 467-
92. and Raymond L.M. Lee, 'Reinventing Modernity: Reflexive Modernization Vs Liquid Modernity Vs Multiple Modernities',  
European Journal of Social Theory, 9/3 (August 1, 2006 2006), 355-68.
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2.1.6. The element of Reflexivity
Modernisation and theoretical approaches to the concept of modernity have come a long way, with no 
consensus position yet in sight. Most, if not all, elements of modernity have a corresponding counter-
current,  and  the  history  of  modernisation  is  riddled  with  apparent  contradictions.  The  preceding 
discussion  of  the  main  elements  of  modernity  has,  hopefully,  highlighted  the  inner  fractures  of 
modernity in a manner that cautions against simplistic reduction of the complexity involved in the term.  
But it  would also be wrong to reduce modernity to an insoluble net of tensions and contradictions.  
Certain  aspects  of  modernity  have  indeed  come  to  the  fore,  while  others  have  faded  into  the 
background. Since modernity took its first form in the 18 th century, the knowledge base of society has 
greatly  expanded,  and  this  should  not  be  underestimated.  With  sociology  being  the  brain  child  of  
modernity, society’s self-awareness has dramatically increased, in turn enabling an empirically-based 
societal reflexivity. Altogether, reflexivity as a core component of modernity can clearly be seen as the 
one issue that has consistently progressed, unlike the other elements.
But  the  concept  of  reflexivity  is  not  necessarily  straightforward  either.  It  is  generally  defined  as  a  
feedback system, one that systematically puts the position of the observer into the observation itself, 
thereby  qualifying  the  observer's  observation  in  relation  to  his  position  (Salzman  2002).  But  the 
consequences of this process are controversial. In a radical interpretation, reflexivity could be employed 
to counter the value of all ‘truths’ – as they are only relative to the position of those who search for or  
proclaim such ‘truths’:
Reflexive knowing is usually predicated upon a constructivist or performative view of conceptualization 
that emphasizes the mutually constitutive nature of accounts and reality; it  is critical of an 'iconic' or  
'mimetic' account which is geared towards the faithful observational recording of allegedly pre-existing  
facts. (Pels 2000: 3) 
But whether reflexivity, per se, involves a commitment to a certain philosophical, or sociological position, 
as Pels imagines it,  remains doubtful  (Salzman 2002).  For our purposes here, reflexivity  in its social 
embeddedness is more relevant than the concept of reflexivity in academia. And because the societal 
use of the concept mirrors the use in academic discussion (Mesny 1998), it is worthwhile to note that it 
is  not used in a consistent way there either:  As social  sciences,  social  theory and social  philosophy 
analyse  modern  society  in  ever-increasing  detail,  so  too  does everyday reflexivity  increase  (Holland 
1999; Hopkins 1986).
In  society,  reflexivity  can therefore  only  be  described  in  broad  terms  unless  and  until  an  empirical  
example is considered. Ulrich Beck speaks about it as the main feature of his second modernity (Beck et 
al. 2001), indicating that it is a surviving paradigm of modernity, increasingly associated with the end of  
the “first modernity”. As Scott Lash puts it:
This is perhaps the key to understanding reflexivity in the second modernity. It has little to do with the 
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reflection of structure on agency. It equally has little to do with the (partial) determinacy of agency by 
structure. Indeed, it is not about reflection at all. First modernity reflexivity was a matter of reflection. [...]  
Second modernity  reflexivity  is  about  the emergent  demise  of  the distinction between structure  and 
agency altogether. It is not about reflection at all. I also do not think it is predominantly about reflex. 
Second  modernity  reflexivity  presumes  a  move  towards  immanence  that  breaks  with  the  dualism of 
structure and agency. (Lash 2003: 49/50)
While both Beck and Lash have concrete society in mind when speaking about reflexive modernity, their  
concept is still too abstract for empirical application.55 However, the immanence of structure and agency 
that Lash speaks of is perhaps closer to the every-day experience of people living in modern societies.
If  one assumes that sociological  concepts are slowly but steadily  trickling into the discourse of  “lay  
people” (Mesny 1998), than reflexivity is surely a candidate for widespread acceptance.
[T]he omnipresence and pluralism of  expertise mean that expert  knowledge in general is open to re-
appropriation  more  than  ever  before,  and  that  people  have  no  choice  but  to  appropriate  expert  
knowledge on a routine and continuous basis. While the re-appropriation of expert knowledge by non-
experts has been studied with respect  to natural  science and technological  knowledge,  social  science 
knowledge, to a large extent, has been left aside of these studies. In my view, however, social science 
knowledge is crucially involved in the "problematisation" of day-to-day life, and in the routine construction  
and reconstruction of self-identity. (Mesny 1998: 161).
The ongoing penetration of  social  reflexivity into ever more aspects of  human life  is  nevertheless a 
development clearly visible beneath the proto-philosophical concept discussed earlier.  Thus, for all the 
dialectics in the modernisation process, the one thing that seems truly evolutionary is the potential, and  
increasing, use of reflexivity in respect of social relationships from the macro to the micro level.
2.2. Modernity in India
2.2.1. Parenthesis: Does Modernisation equal Westernisation?
Most  of  the  elements  discussed  above  have  been  based  on  observations  from  the  societies  that  
modernised first – that is, the Western nations on both sides of the Atlantic. And because social science  
is not context-free, the relevant theorists have naturally focused primarily on their own societies, the 
Western ones. In consequence, and unfortunately so, their theoretical advances have not thus far borne 
much fruit in relation to non-Western societies. Even the theories that are most explicitly global in scope  
are not especially relevant here: Neither Eisenstadt's  multiple modernity paradigm  (Eisenstadt 1973, 
2000,  2001),  nor  the classical  modernisation theories56 provide convincing answers  to this  problem; 
55 For a critique of Ulrich Beck’s main concept, see Anthony Elliott, 'Beck's Sociology of Risk: A Critical Assessment', Sociology, 
36/2 (2002), 293-315.
56 For a critical reformulation of modernisation theories’ main ideas see: Christian Welzel, Ronald Inglehart, and Hans-Dieter 
Kligemann, 'The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis',  European Journal of Political Research, 42/3 
(2003), 341-79.
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indeed, their respective answers are diametrically opposed.57 Unfortunately, in discussing non-Western 
societies, there is no established position on modernity. Those who are concerned with modernity in this  
context  use  weak  or  ill-defined  concepts  (for  India  cf.  Appadurai  2000;  Niranjana  et  al.  1993; 
Sivaramakrishnan and Agarwal 2003), and those who deliver fitting theories are not concerned with non-
Western countries.
Historically, modernity as we know it today has its origin in those few countries on either side of the  
North Atlantic  Ocean, popularly  lumped together and labelled ‘the West’.  Thus any reflection upon  
modernity as such is deeply influenced by the cultural predispositions of these societies. Some authors,  
perhaps the best  known being Weber  (Weber 1958 [1905]),  would argue that  modernisation  in  its 
capitalistic trajectory was culturally enabled by the specific circumstances of the countries in question.  
What, then, does this imply for societies outside of the West? Is modernity possible outside the cultural  
matrix that has, according to Weber and others, helped to bring modernity to life?58 Does modernisation 
in  a  non-Western  society  necessarily  emulate  the  trajectories  pioneered  by  the  forerunners  of  
modernity? 
Once one enters this debate, more specific questions come to mind. Can we speak of ‘individualisation’  
in societies lacking a long history of Christian cultural dominance, such as that which has influenced the 
West's concept of the individual? What happens in economies that are integrated into the ever more  
connected world  market,  while  the institutions  of  the respective  societies  – both economically  and  
politically – are formed mainly by pre-modern, pre-market traditions? Can the concept of secularisation 59 
– which historically arose from the contrast between an other-worldly religion and the challenges of the 
mundane world – be translated into contexts where the main expression of religion does not in fact 
contrast with every-day life (Veer 2001)?
Moreover, there are normative issues beneath the questions posed above. For Weber, finding similar  
patterns of capitalistic development in non-Western societies as those that had historically occurred  
exclusively in the West was a non-normative issue. Today, a hundred years later, the Weberian question  
itself – can capitalism be adopted by non-Western societies? – is still not satisfactory answered. After  
considerable  historical  change,  theoretical  developments  and  normative  challenge  to  ‘Eurocentric’ 
theory,  its  normative  undercurrents  continues  to  be  a  source  of  controversy.  For  the  American 
modernisation theorists of the 1950s and 1960s, it was taken for granted that developing nations would 
eventually follow in the footsteps of the United States, as the standard bearer of modern capitalism. The 
57 While the modernisation theories (and their contemporary successors) are based on the assumption that there is at least a  
convergence in modernisation trajectories for all modernising societies, Eisenstadt and his followers would fundamentally  
deny this.
58 This question, affirmatively answered by Weber with regard to China, but not with regard to India, is of minor concern 
today, not least because forms of modernity are visible in all societies and countries on earth. Max Weber, The Religion of  
India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, trans. Hans H Gerth and Don Martindale (New York: The Free Press 1958),  
Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, ed. Hans H. Gerth, trans. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe Free Press, 
1968 [1920]).
59 For a short disambiguation in a philosophical context, see Gordon, Graham (1992), 'Religion, Secularization and Modernity',  
Philosophy, 67 (260), 183-97 
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other  extreme,  ironically  in  a  reformulation  of  Weber's  programme,  was  developed  in  Eisenstadt's  
multiple modernity theorem (Eisenstadt 1973, 2000, 2001), according to which modernity is necessarily 
in the plural, and essentially independent from any Western notion of modernisation. While the earlier  
modernisation theorists  had a narrow, economistic and a-historical  view that has proven empirically 
rather naïve, Eisenstadt and his followers are likewise fallacious in their loose, theoretically ill-defined 
concept of modernity, their over-emphasis on culture, and in their arbitrary focus on random elements 
of modernity (Schmidt 2006).60
While this problem could be solved with a more accommodating theoretical approach, there are more 
fundamental issues that render this discussion problematic. From the perspective of subaltern or post-
colonial theories (Bhabha 1994; Chakrabarty 2000; S. Hall 1997; Pieterse 2009),61 the notion of a conflict-
free re-enactment of Western trajectories towards modernity are seriously challenged by the events of  
recent  history,  events  that  seem to  indicate  little  convergence  between Western  and  non-Western  
modernisation processes. Moreover, for quite a few authors, the equivalence of Westernisation with 
modernisation, and vice versa, becomes more than just a theoretical problem62 – which it surely is – but 
also a normative attempt to impose a Western way of theorising on the rest of the world. Martin Fuchs,  
for example, writes:
Especially insidious is the interlocking of modernization and Westernization. Modernist projects claim and 
promise the universalism of their values and purposes. But then, they tend to lean almost completely on 
Western  traditions  of  knowledge,  shunning  debates  with  other  knowledge  traditions  whose  validity  
claims, often universalistic as well, are not taken up. They also tend, when applying concepts and models  
in analysis as well as action, to discriminate between members of Western societies and other civilisations.  
Modernity's universalism undercuts its own claims. (Fuchs 1994: v/vi)
Here, some potent arguments are thrown together with other, much less valid ones. The general context 
is undisputed. Sociology and the neighbouring disciplines have indeed tended to neglect non-Western  
societies, and – even today – often simply consign them to the anthropological field. 63 But the assertion 
that non-Western knowledge traditions with universalistic claims are ignored is empirically weak and 
theoretically  dubious.64 And  any  discrimination  between  members  of  Western  and  non-Western 
societies,  as  claimed  by  Fuchs  above,  while  perhaps  a  problem  in  empirical  circumstances,  is  not  
60 If everything that happens in contemporary societies is deemed modern, than there is no benchmark for an operational  
comparision – neither within one nor between different societies.
61 For interesting discussion, see the founding work: Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1978)., or, for a 
much shorter essay on the practical implications of post-colonial thoughts, see Eric Bain-Selbo, 'Understanding the Other: 
The Challenge of Post-Colonial Theory to the Comparative Study of Religion', Religious Studies and Theology, 18/1 (June  
1999 1999), 60 - 109.
62 In some cases, the critics use a concept of modernity that is not only out-dated by at least 30 years, but also deliberately  
simplistic.  See,  for  a  cautionary  example:  Satish  Deshpande,  'Modernization',  in  Veena  Das  (ed.),  The  Oxford  India  
Companion to Sociology and Social Anthropology (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003b), 63-98.
63 Anthropology  has  for  a  very  long  time  ignored modernity,  and is  only  slowly  coming  to  terms  with  it.  Joel  S.  Khan, 
'Anthropology  and  Modernity',  Current  Anthropology, 42/5  (2001),  651-80. See  also:  Harri  Englund  and  James  Leach, 
'Ethnography and the Meta-Narratives of Modernity', Current Anthropology, 41/2 (2000), 225-39.
64 The claim of universalism itself does not provide a reason for a “knowledge tradition” to be taken up. Rather, the usefulness  
and applicability of a “knowledge tradition” is the criterion for its success in the global context, and this can only be judged  
from those who apply it, not from those who represent this “knowledge tradition”.
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reflected in the theoretical works on modernity today.65 All in all, it seems that underlying normative 
elements  in  this  argument66 do  more to  obscure than clarify  the  factual  problems that  arise  when 
applying the concept of modernity to non-Western contexts.
Nevertheless, the paradigm of post-colonialism does indeed contain some arguments that would survive  
close scrutiny. The claim that non-Western societies are mainly analysed from a Western standpoint 
holds true in most cases. This is mainly due to brute historical fact – modernity was born in the West –  
and is therefore not necessarily a normative problem. But it can indeed be problematic if it is the pretext 
for over-generalisations about or neglect of the inner-rationale of the non-Western societies in question. 
The  radicalised  position  of  the  post-colonial  school  would,  if  taken  seriously,  undermine  much  of 
sociology's methodological basis (McLennan 2003). But, in essence, it is fundamentally a reformulation 
of  one  of  the  main  problems  that  has  plagued  social  science  since  its  foundations,  namely  the 
inescapable conflict between empirical reality and theoretical concept. Gregor McLennan writes that
[…] this is just the latest form of the old complaint that the grey paint of theory fails to do justice to the 
green fields of life. Its superficiality lies in thinking that it is possible for any distinctive analytical discourse 
– and in spite of its ‘energistic’ terminology, postcolonialism is  one of these – fully to ‘capture’ the raw 
edge of life as it is actually felt and lived. Constitutively, all theories and categories ‘reduce’ experience to  
their own conceptual priorities, and rigorously exclude rival theories/categories which counteract those 
central abstract foci. Postcolonialism is no different in that regard (McLennan 2003: 82; italics in original). 
Following  this  argument,  post-colonialism involves  a  new twist  to  the  old  problem that  theoretical  
concepts are never fully congruent with empirical reality in all its shapes and forms (cf. Adorno 1966). 
For a sociologist working on empirical facts, there is a need to reflect upon the problem that concept and 
reality (whether Western or not) do not always (if ever) dovetail nicely. But it would indeed be throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater if the consequence of this was to leave all (meta-)theory behind and 
focus  exclusively  on  the  empirical  side,67 or  –  the  other  extreme  –  to  cling  to  a  theory  without 
considering the empirical facts.68
For  the  question  at  hand,  I  would  cautiously  suggest  that  India  shows  signs  of  a  convergence  of  
modernisation trajectories  with  that  of  Western societies,  but  that  India  has,  of  course,  a  different  
history  and different  underlying  conditions  for  modernisation.  And if  modernisation is  not  first  and 
foremost regarded as normatively charged project, then finding a non-Western society modernising in 
ways resembling the West presents no theoretical problem. Strictly speaking, India’s trajectory could still  
vary wildly from that of the Western societies (Wagner 2010a) but still follow roughly the same patterns, 
65 The ‘dominant’ – over-systematized and over-integrated – image of society that Fuchs associates with Parsons was neither  
the main nor unchallenged paradigm in sociology even at the time of writing. The teleological versions of a historical theory  
of modernity have been largely criticised in sociology, history and philosophy, and is not representative of the disciplines 
involved.
66 Behind all these claims appears an argument against ‘Western intellectual imperialism’, which is not fully developed and  
only partially understandable through logical reasoning, but which must - according to the authors who diagnose it – still be 
repudiated on moral grounds.
67 Some, if not most social anthropologists seem to be trapped in this sterile way of thinking.
68 This ‘theoretical autism’ is a problem for some sociologists, mainly of French or German background.  
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simply because certain features – such as local culture,69 religious traditions, and so on – are either 
immaterial  or neutral  to the question  (Schmidt 2006).  If  normative definitions of  modernity can be 
avoided, the preconditions for a sober comparative analysis of non-Western societies such as India are in  
place. A contextual model that takes the example of the West as an informative backdrop, and not as  
deterministic role model for modernisation elsewhere  (Linkenbach 2000), would avoid and transcend 
both cultural  relativism and  Eurocentric  views.  The vexed and emotionally  charged  question of  the 
relationship between modernisation and Westernisation would than lose its sting considerably. 
2.2.2. The Elements and Tensions of Modernity in India
In the following, the elements and tensions of modernity discussed above will be applied to the Indian  
context. Such an undertaking is not uncontroversial because it must address a number of problems70 – 
not  least  methodological  ones  regarding  the  applicability  of  Western  concepts  to  non-Western 
contexts.71 Because sociological interpretations of India are not yet as advanced as those in Western  
societies, the empirical and theoretical basis for this discussion is noticeably less robust than it would be  
for a Western society. Some of the topics are more relevant to the Indian context than others, with a few  
needing to be suitably adjusted to the Indian context.  The following discussion, then, refers back to 
issues raised in 2.2.1.1 – 2.2.1.6 above.  It  will  provide a sketch without any claim to completeness,  
although hopefully an informative sketch nevertheless.
2.2.2.1. The Individual and Standardisation in India 
While  individualisation  is  one of  the  main  features  of  modernisation in  Western  societies,  this  has 
completely different connotations in India. In the most general terms, the basic social units are families 
in India, rather than individuals (R. Lee 1994; Patel 2005; A. M. Shah 1998), even though this is gradually 
changing (Rajen K. Gupta and Panda 2003; Tuli and Chaudhary 2010). Here, the consequences of India's 
trajectory  to  modernity  are  visible  with  clarity  absent  elsewhere.  According  to  Sudipta  Kaviraj,  and  
despite  the  country’s  democratic  credentials,  group  identities  trump  individual  ones  in  India,  and  
individuality is not a political concept, nor a cultural one  (Kaviraj 2000). The pre-modern social order 
conflicts with the modern institution implanted into India, and this contrast will – in all likelihood – stay 
with India for a long time to come. India’s political constitution and its legal system are, given their  
mainly British origin, squarely based on the rights of the individual  (Baird 1998).  The right to voting 
ensures that individual members of societies, not groups, are the core units of the political sphere as  
69 For a discussion of the problems of comparing inter-societal cultures, see Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner, 'When `the 
Light of the Great Cultural Problems Moves on': On the Possibility of a Cultural Theory of Modernity', Thesis Eleven, 61/1 
(2000), 25-40.
70 In doing so, an abstract, proto-philosophical model will be empirically tested, and some ‘frictional loss’ in applying theory to 
practice is to be expected. The differing levels of abstraction all have their own rationales and prerequisites and no simple 
translation is possible. But since the potential insights are immense, it is nevertheless justifiable.
71 The alternative, the approach of many anthropologists who exclusively employ concepts that are indigenous for the 
societies where their research takes place, seems much more appropriate. However, for a comparison of societies with 
different cultural backgrounds, this is a theoretical dead-end as those indigenous concepts are never fully ‘translatable’ to 
different cultural contexts. 
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well.  But practically speaking, most representation of interest is done on the basis of groups and is  
directed at groups (Hasan 2006). The famous phrase ‘vote bank’ (famously attributed to M.N. Srinivas, cf. 
Alam 1999; Heller 2009) implies nothing less than the assumption that people would generally vote en 
bloc,  rather  than  through  single,  individual  decision-making.  As  family  obligations,  traditional 
connections and religious associations all undermine the role of the individual, it is not surprising to find  
that the individual’s role is marginal.
Empirical  research  in  psychology  appears  to  further  support  the  view  that  collectivism  trumps 
individualism in India (Panda and Gupta 2004; Sinha et al. 2002): 
Indians are more collectivists than individualists, but depending on the desha (place such as family versus 
non-family),  kaal (time constraint e.g. the urgency of accepting a job offer) and  paatra (person having 
personalised  versus  contractual  relationships),  they  combine  individualist  behaviour  or  intention  to 
collectivist behaviour in varying degree. However, they rarely opt for an individualist behaviour with an  
individualist intention. This was probably the reason that C&I (a mix of both collectivist and individualist  
behaviour and intention) was the most endorsed combination. (Sinha et al. 2002: 21/22)
These findings do not support the generalisation that Indians are anti-individualistic per se. Rather, they 
point to the fact that individual motives are balanced by collectivistic counter-motives and will mostly be  
compromised as a consequence. The expression of individual motives – and therefore individuality – in a 
pure and undiluted form is unlikely to be encountered: Hence, ‘individualisation’ in India (of which only 
incipient stages exist) is much less pronounced than in Western societies. 
On the other  hand,  standardisation,  the counter-current  to  individualisation,  is  perhaps even more  
irrelevant here, simply because the integration of Indian society has never overcome the underlying 
heterogeneity (see 2.2.2.5).72 One could fill books by discussing the implications of this, but for the sake 
of brevity, one can conclude that the concept of the individual (within Western modernisation) is alien to  
India,  and  individualistic  notions  rarely  find  expression  there.  There  is  a  conflict  between  political  
institutions – based on the notion of individuals – and general social practice where the individual is not  
seen as central category. Therefore, one cannot speak of individualisation in India with Western concepts 
in  mind.  Likewise,  claims  of  strong  standardisation in  India  at  the  national  or  state  level  would  be  
unfounded: If  standardisation is  visible,  it  will  occur within much smaller  entities – in communities,  
castes and within the extended family. (In the empirical chapters to follow, the consequences of these  
specifics of Indian society will be considered more fully.)
2.2.2.2. Rationalisation, Secularisation and India's cultural traditions
As with most other  modernising societies,  India has a complex and often contradictory relationship 
between institutions that are clearly based on a rational outlook and, on the other hand, those with 
strong tendencies for irrational patterns of thought – with the latter potentially undermining the former.  
72 Contrary to widespread expectations, the societal macro level is much less integrated, let alone standardised, than the  
intermediate level; that is, the family or community in India.
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And at the same time that India is officially a secular democracy, it boasts a diverse society, in which 
numerous  forms  of  religion,  astrology,  superstition  and  other  non-rational  world  views  still  remain 
popular, with no signs of weakening (Assayag 2003). Nevertheless, these irrational elements live side-by-
side with rational ideas, and do not seem to obstruct them. Science is highly regarded and the nation is 
explicitly founded on ideals of secularism (Assayag 2003; Judith 1997). There is, then, more of a (mainly) 
peaceful coexistence between both sides rather than the dominance of one over the other, with the  
same also being true for the European Enlightenment. Even though India, as a society, was not directly  
affected by  the Enlightenment  movement,  indirectly  it  has a borrowed heritage from it.  The Indian 
independence movement was dominated by an elite with rational, (Western) education, through which 
Enlightenment attitudes were transferred in various ways to the subcontinent – for example, in Nehru’s  
version of socialism; in the rationality of science; in the ideal of secularism (even though it is a different  
version than that  of  the West  (B.  Rao 2006)73);  and in  the imposed,  but  increasingly  lived form of 
democracy.
Since independence, there have been major trends with regard to the appreciation of rationality. While  
the first decades of India's existence as an independent country saw an imposition of rational ideas from 
above,  the  following  years  witnessed  a  decline  in  this  tendency.  The  Indian  constitution,  plus  the  
institutions that were inherited from British rule, were borrowed and implemented without much regard  
for the overwhelming majority of people for whom these institutions were alien concepts and who had 
no regard for rationality as an ideal or as applicable patterns of thought. The institutions of modernity, 
notably the legal system, representative democracy plus the binding power of pan-Indian nationalism, 
were  literally  imposed  by  the elite,  and have only  reluctantly  been  endowed with  meaning  by  the  
general population  (Chatterjee 1986). These institutions were subsequently challenged by regional or 
linguistic jingoism, local quasi-feudal power relations and by pressure groups whose membership was 
exclusively based on caste or religious identity  (Kaviraj 2000). The short term result was an imperfect 
implementation of modern institutions, which were explicitly or implicitly undermined by loyalties to  
pre-modern or anti-modern institutions. In the long run, however, a subtle trend towards accepting and 
accommodating  these institutions  is  evident,  and there  is  no doubt  that  India  today is  much more  
modern than it was in 1950. Thus, in unexpected and contradictory ways, and influenced by an amalgam 
of pre-modern and modern institutions, modernisation has taken hold in India.
Nonetheless, the special circumstances of this imposed rationality have left their mark. A notable divide 
is  apparent  between  the  urbanised,  Western-oriented  middle  classes,  who  cautiously  embrace 
modernity and rationality, and a much greater majority of people for whom modernity is of no especial 
concern. Of course, there are outspoken critics of modernity, most often found amongst the religiously-
73 While Western nations define secularism mainly in the separation between church and state – with varying degrees in 
practical implementation – secularism in India is understood in an equidistance the state keeps to all religions. The result is  
an officially declared tolerance and often even embrace of the religions popular in India. And even though religions enjoy 
certain  autonomy  from  direct  state  control,  the  situation  is  by  no  means  characterised  by  an  absence  of  mutual 
interference.  
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inspired (neo-)orthodox. And while the political rise of the Hindu nationalist movement (Jaffrelot 1996; 
Madan 1997), whose explicit intent was to regenerate the notion of citizenship with a particular religious 
belief and identity (Bannerji 2006), has ebbed for the moment, it is by no means a spent force (Kinnvall 
and Svensson 2010). In spite of the seeming tolerance of divergent religious ideas in India, there are 
strong social trends undermining rationality; that is, in the identification of citizens with their religious  
upbringing,  in  the  inconsistency  of  secularism  that  conflates  religion  with  mundane  aspects  of  life  
(Majeed  2010),  and  in  the  survival  and  popularity  of  irrational  beliefs,  such  as  astrology.  So  while 
rationality  is  clearly  the basis  of  India's  political  institutions,  in the wider population rationality  is  a  
contested, disregarded or unfamiliar concept. Indeed, this is the case in most societies, not least the 
Western ones.
2.2.2.3. Democracy and Capitalism in India
India is the largest democracy on this planet and has had a democratic tradition, interrupted only by the  
emergency status from 25 June 1975 to 21 March 1977, since independence in 1947. The newly founded 
country quickly adopted a constitution and democratic institutions that were, in many respects, more 
modern  than  those  of  ‘advanced’  Western  nations:  India’s  democratic  institutions  were  abruptly 
imposed, were not in competition with monarchic or religious claimants for power, and did not exclude  
women (as in Switzerland) or racial minorities (as in the United States) (Dreze and Sen 2002). From the 
beginning  of  Indian  independence,  however,  it  has  remained  an  open  question  about  how  deeply  
ingrained this  ‘imposed’  democracy would become in  a  country  with  a  highly  non-egalitarian social  
tradition and a mostly illiterate, uneducated population.
The main limitations of Indian democracy do not, however, relate so much to democratic institutions as to 
democratic practice. […] while Indian elections are formally "free and fair" in most cases, their effective 
fairness has been compromised by nepotism, the criminalization of politics, and pervasive inequalities in 
electoral opportunities as a result of disparities in economic wealth and social privileges. (Dreze and Sen 
2002: 8; italics in original) 
Sixty years after independence, this gap between institutions and practice still poses problems for any 
straightforward analysis (R. Guha 2009b; Jayal 1999). On the surface, democracy has clearly taken root; 
voter turnout is consistently higher than 50 per cent  (Nikolenyi 2010); and, less-educated and poorer 
people tend to vote more than their richer, better educated counterparts (perhaps not surprising given 
the re-distributive benefits for the former that result from popular democracy) (D. Gupta 2007; Thachil 
2009). Politically and ideologically diverse governments have been voted in and out of power, with the  
country only briefly close to falling under autocratic or authoritarian rule. Given all this, though, the  
Indian democracy  is  still  not  a shining  success  story.  Despite  a  deepening of  democracy  across  the  
board,74 persistent pockets of anti-democratic features remain stubbornly entrenched in India's political  
74 See the rise in power of formerly marginalised sections of society, the better legal protection of minorities and women, the 
decentralisation of democratic government, the general rise of women in politics, etc.
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fabric. Not entirely coincidentally, the political party most powerful in India's democratic tradition, the 
Congress Party, is dominated by one family, and is even now on the verge of transferring power to the  
fourth generation (Adams 2007; Swamy 2001).75 Even though elections appear to be fair and open, the 
campaigns of parties and subsequent government actions are, in essence, not directed at individuals,  
but at social groups (see 2.2.2.1). The most salient development in the last decade, the rise of political  
parties catering to Dalits  (Rao 2009) showcases the problem: Clearly aimed at uplifting those at the 
socio-economic  bottom,  the movement  is  not  modern  in  the proper  meaning  of  the  word  since  it 
employs anti-individualistic group identities and vote bank policies.  Given all these developments, and 
considering the objections to a claim to modernity, India seems clearly moving in a modern direction,  
albeit at rather glacial speed. For the time being, an immense gap exists between the aspiration of the 
constitution and the design of political institutions, on the one hand, and the every-day politics and the 
lived reality of the majority population, on the other. This gap is narrowing, but closure is not to be  
expected any time soon.
Equally  frictional  is  India's  relation  with  capitalism.  In  early  modernity,  India  had  already  a  highly  
elaborate market-based economy, even though the system was geared towards subsistence exchange 
rather than profit maximisation (Washbrook 2007). In the first (Nehruvian) decades after independence, 
official policy flirted with socialism, and developed a heavily state-centred, technology-driven version of  
developmentalism  (Bassett  2009a,  2009b).  Only  after  the resulting  license-permit-raj  was found too 
restrictive for economic development did India slowly begin to change course in the early 1980s, before  
largely liberalising its economy from 1991 onwards (Rosser and Rosser 2005). So at least since the early 
1990s, India has had an increasingly market-oriented economy, and is still going through a major societal 
transition (S. Kothari 1997). If placed within a ‘varieties-of-capitalism’ spectrum,76 India’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals would still count as leaning heavily on state-control, although the fundamental working of  
the market is now been embraced, rather than opposed. The result is a mixed economy, and, with that,  
India would rank in the mainstream of most developed countries, even if some aspects of the economy –  
the price control on fuel  (2008),  the inconsistent regulation of economic competition  (Bhattacharjea 
2008) and the restriction on capital flows (Chaisse et al. 2009) – make it seem like an outlier. 
Nevertheless, the issue of the penetration of the market is as much a qualitative question as one of  
institutions. While India's on-going international integration into the capital market is inconclusive and 
patchy  (Misra and Mahakud 2009), the domestic situation is even more contradictory. The size of the 
informal  economy  (Harriss-White  2002,  2003b;  Kannan 2010) prevents  an  unconditional  affirmative 
answer to the question of whether India is integrated with a market-based economy.
75 In  this  respect,  the  Congress  Party  exhibits  a  dynastic  line  of  succession  that  resembles  a  monarchy  better  than  a  
democracy.
76 For a critical discussion of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ theorem, see Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, 'Variegated Capitalism', 
Progress in Human Geography, 31/6 (2007), 731-72.
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Table 2.2.2.3. Labour productivity and employment shares by institutional sector (OECD 2007)
Level of productivity 
(net product per person, 1999/2000 prices, rupees)
Share of employment
(per cent of total employment)
Institutional sector 1993 2003 1993 2003
INFORMAL 20 721 27 958 92.6 94.0
     Agricultural 14 745 17 431 63.9 57.7
     Other 33 989 44 674 28.8 36.3
FORMAL 139 663 308 099 7.4 6.0
     Private Companies 174 220 431 699 2.1 1.9
     Public Enterprises 148 215 319 883 2.7 2.0
     Public Services 101 756 186 891 2.5 2.1
WHOLE ECONOMY 29 475 44 706 100.0 100.0
In this regard, modernity in India stands and falls on the question of the reach and penetration of the  
market.  On  a  political  rather  than analytical  level,  the  inclusivity  of  India’s  economy is  a  politically  
charged  question,  particularly  as  the  slogan  ‘inclusive  growth’  became popular  in  the  last  election 
campaign  (Chandra  2010;  Dev  2008).  In  terms  of  modernity,  however,  a  slightly  different  form  of 
‘inclusiveness’ is the focus of interest; not so much as regards whether rapid macroeconomic growth is 
reaching  the  poorer  members  of  society,  but  rather  whether  all  parts  of  society  are  economically 
interconnected.  The  largest  part  of  the  Indian  economy,  in  respect  of  numbers  employed,  is  still  
agriculture (M. Ghosh 2010; Valli and Saccone 2009).Estimates vary, but it can be safely assumed that a 
considerable proportion of Indian agriculture is still  on a subsistence level  (cf. K. Basu and Maertens 
2007; Bhaskar and Gupta 2007)77, which means these farmers are not connected to the rest of economy 
by a market. On the other hand, it is also clear that more and more of these subsistence peasants are 
being rapidly included in the market.  This  will  ultimately determine how integrated – and therefore 
modern – the Indian economy becomes; at the moment, agriculture has modernised only to a limited  
extent.
77 Comparing the productivity levels of (informal) agricultural production in Table 2.2.2.3 with all over sectors, the precarious  
nature of this mode of income should be evident.
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2.2.2.4. Functional differentiation, Bureaucratisation, Juridification and the 
Rationale of the Life-World in India
Since India has borrowed much of its political institutions from the former British masters,78 the formal 
differentiation of the political sphere has been high since independence (Dwivedi et al. 1989). Even prior 
to  the  colonial  period,  much  of  modern  India's  territory  consisted  of  political  entities  with  highly  
developed economies  (O'Hanlon 2007; Subrahmanyam 1986); thus economic differentiation was also 
relatively high – apart from peripheral territories with subsistence economies – well before the British  
seized control of the subcontinent (T. Roy 2002).79 Nonetheless, even today there are major gaps in the 
extent to which modernity has been adopted within social, economic and political institutions. Neither  
the market-based economy (see 2.2.2.3), nor the bureaucratic or legal system have the socio-cultural 
penetration  that  would  make  them  truly  on  par  with  the  life-world rationale  of  most  of  India's 
population. Whether this negates normative concerns, such as those raised by Habermas, is a different 
question – one that could only be answered after a deeper analysis than is possible here. But at least the  
socio-economic penetration of the bureaucratic and juridical system can be sketched out.
The bureaucratic tradition that India inherited from the British colonial administration took British ideas  
about good and effective governance and applied them to the newly independent Indian state. The very  
idea  of  an  ‘impartial’  or  ‘neutral’  and,  most  of  all,  ‘a-political’  bureaucracy  (on  the  British  model)  
appeared  to  be  a  consequence  of  a  parliamentary  democracy  in  which  the  administration  served 
constantly  fluctuating  governments  without  ever  engaging  in  politics  itself  (Jain  1993).  A  certain 
detachment from the worldly affairs of the state was therefore not only accepted but seen as desirable.  
With  the  rapid  expansion  of  economic  planning  after  1965,  the  Indian  state  bureaucracy  heavily 
expanded in number as well as in ambition. Driven by the rhetoric of social redistribution in the name of  
justice, the state became omnipresent; it would not only monopolise the tasks of economic planning and  
productions but also take over functions that were once neglected or left to institutions of civil society  
(Kaviraj 1991). The result was a powerful if slow-moving colossus that strangled the private enterprise 
economy and became known by the name of ‘license permit raj’ (cf. Reed 2002). 
But this is only the official part of the story. Contrary to these narratives, the reach and authority of the  
Indian state has been limited even in the economic sphere where it claimed supremacy. In spite of its  
high ideals and presumptuous aspirations, the state was never fully able to establish its sovereignty 
78 Modernity in the Western sense came to India primarily from above, first by the direct colonial rule of a more modern  
country,  later  by an elite that  was educated and trained by this  very same colonial  power.  All  subsequent  indigenous  
movements for the modernisation of India and Indian society were heavily influenced by the colonial experience and the  
apparent superiority of the colonisers’ methods and ethics. Without the embarrassing admission that the territories that 
now comprise India fell easily and with little resistance into British hands, Indian modernisation is not understandable. The  
embarrassment of colonial subjugation explains, even today, both the pleaded contempt for the deeds of the coloniser and  
the (more or less) covert admiration for Western culture and societies – not least the British. Compare: Peter Van Der Veer, 
Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
79 It should not be forgotten, that independence for India was essentially the founding of a new nation state. There were no 
historical precedents as the British colonial empire in India was a patchwork of directly controlled territories and princely 
states with limited autonomy. Compare chapter 9 “Does India exist?” in: Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, Unthinking Social  
Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms (2nd edn.; Philadelphia Temple University Press, 2001).
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domestically. As Sudipta Kaviraj observes:
The  state  would  occupy  […]  a  kind  of  high  ground  in  the  middle  of  this  circle  of  circles  [each 
neighbourhood  intersection  of  caste,  religion  and  occupation  being  a  circle  B.L.].  It  enjoyed  great 
ceremonial  eminence,  but  in  fact  it  had rather  limited powers  to  interfere  with  the social  segments’  
internal  organisation.  Its  classical  economic  relation  with  these  communities  over  which  it  formally 
presided would be in terms of tax and rent. And while its rent demands would fluctuate […], it could not 
[…] restructure the productive or occupational organisation of these social groups. (Kaviraj 1991: 75)
While  the state seemed powerless  in face of  the huge informal sector,  it  asserted an authoritarian  
control over the parts of economy that were within the reach of regulation. If there is a colonisation 
visible here, than it is perhaps one of the economy by the bureaucracy. 80 However, this development 
happened  largely  before  liberalisation  and  the  bureaucratic  system  has  since  ceded  powers  in  the 
economy. But it still has a tight grip on those parts of society that are within official reach and under  
formal regulation.
The situation is  slightly  different when it  comes to the juridical  sphere.  As already stated, the legal  
system is  by and large an institutional leftover from the British,  with some important additions and  
adaptations  to  the  Indian  context  (Dwivedi  et  al.  1989).  And  while  the  constitution  provides  and 
guarantees legal rights to all citizens, this is not reflected in reality. First and foremost, access to the legal  
system is not as straightforward as imagined in the constitution, and the enforceability of legal rulings,  
laws or simple contracts is often dismal.
Legal proceedings can take years (if not decades) to be completed, and are often far from intelligible for  
the average citizen. For this and other reasons, legal protection tends to remain beyond the effective reach 
of most, especially the poor. In fact, the legal system can also be used as an instrument of harassment 
(rather than as an efficient means of dispensing justice). Those at the receiving end of the system can end  
up suffering terrible injustice. (Dreze and Sen 2002: 8/9)
With few exceptions, it is reasonable to assume that most people in India would be unable to enforce 
their rights via the legal system. Therefore, the modernity associated with the legal system rings hollow 
as soon as the practical  implementation of  the law in everyday contexts is  taken into account.  The 
modernity that is attached to the penetration of the legal system into Indian society exists mainly on 
paper (Jayanth 2003). 
Without  stretching  the topic  beyond the scope of  this  overview,  it  can be assumed that  functional 
differentiation is, as in all other societies, a concept that has relatively little scope on the ground in India.  
80 This conflicting situation had direct consequences for the relation between state and society, on the one hand, and private  
ethics, on the other. The contrast could not be more striking in a state that proclaimed the welfare of its people as its  
highest goal but failed to deliver basic necessities, and proved an obstacle to economic development and social change 
more  often  than  not.  The  reaction  can  be  called  schizophrenic  but  is  essentially  consistent  with  the  prevailing 
circumstances. Rather than challenging the state directly (even though this happened and is still happening in India today)  
the state was largely undermined by a private disregard for its institutions and concepts by a large share of its population. 
Passively opposing the regulations by bypassing them and actively undermining the state’s authority by bribing officials, the  
disillusion  was  not  limited  to  the  citizens  only.  Bureaucrats  themselves,  frustrated  by  low  pay  and  meagre  career 
expectations, started to adopt the widespread cynicism whereby the state is just the bounty of various interest groups.
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The colonisation of the  life-world that Habermas sees as a threat in Western societies, is perhaps not 
accentuated here, but the incursion of the rationale of one subsystem into another one is very visible in  
the  extent  to  which  the  bureaucracy  has  extended  its  reach.  So,  while  the  conditions  and  actual  
workings of the social sub-systems are different in the Indian context, the contested nature of functional  
differentiation (a fundamental condition of modernity) is as obvious in India as in any other modernising  
society.
2.2.2.5. The Indian road to Modernity and the problem of Contingency
To proclaim an endpoint of modernity in a society that is – like the Indian one – in the midst of an  
accelerated phase of modernisation, is pointless. And while any speculation about an end of modernity  
is rather academic in all societies, the question is even more out of place here. That leaves the issue of  
contingency. 
In social and cultural terms, an unusually high level of contingency is readily apparent in Indian society.  
According to a concept of modernity where contingency is the main defining feature (Luhmann 1998), 
Indian society would have had modern aspects from a very early time. In striking contrast, India has long  
been depicted as a matrix of stable and unchanging cultural settings by authors from the West (Curtis 
2009). Due to the compartmentalised co-existence of mutually contradictory world views 81 – in religious 
denominations or on a community basis – Indian society has never been unified or informed by a single  
principle. Culturally, Hinduism is too diverse and inconsistent to provide a cultural frame for society, and 
the division into countless sects, castes and ethnic sub-population does not provide a population that 
regards itself as a social unit either (Adeney and Lall 2005). At independence, nationalism played a role 
only for a tiny fraction of Western-educated Indians (Seth 1992), and even today most Indians would not 
identify themselves as Indians in the first place (Sathyamurthy 1997). The rise of Hindu Nationalism can 
indeed be interpreted as an attempt to overcome the fundamental heterogeneity and contingency of  
Indian society (Pardesi and Oetken 2008), but this movement has not yet met with lasting success.
While the diversity of India's population and the often missing common identity might be the macro-
sociological  basis  for  contingency,  there  are  corresponding  features  much  closer  to  the  individual.  
Fundamental ethical questions can be evaluated only in passing here. Nevertheless, the argument shall 
be made that an ethic prevails in India, which is very much in line with a high amount of contingency. 
The basic feature of this ethic, according to Kakar and Kakar, who trace it back to Hindu tradition, is “a 
pronounced ethical relativism”  (Kakar and Kakar 2007: 186). According to them, there is no absolute 
certainty, no moral imperative that would rule some sort of actions out while allowing others:
Instead, an Indian’s actions are governed by a more permissive and gentle, but more ambiguous, thou-
canst-but-try ethos. On the one hand, this basic uncertainty makes possible the taking of unconventional 
and risky actions; on the other hand, actions are accompanied by a pervasive doubt as to the wisdom of  
81 One, amongst a myriad of examples, would be the different views on cow slaughter. See  Daphne Barak-Erez, 'Symbolic 
Constitutionalism: On Sacred Cows and Abominable Pigs', Law, Culture & the Humanities, 6/3 (2010), 420-35.
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individual  initiative,  making  independent  voluntary  action  rare  for  many  who  look  for  psychological 
security by acting as one’s ancestor did in the past and as one’s social group – primarily the caste – does at 
present. (Kakar and Kakar 2007: 187)
If one follows this argument, and there are good reasons to do so, then Indian society is, above and  
beyond any actual situation, indeed informed by an amount of contingency that finds no parallel in the 
West. The tension between an end of modernity and the ever-remaining contingency that is relevant for  
the first modernising societies, is not only irrelevant to India because there is no end for modernisation  
in  sight,  but  also  because  the  contingency  within  Indian  society  is  nowhere  near  exhaustion.  
Corresponding to 2.2.2.4, the actualisation of modern institutions and ideas is not nearly as deep as to  
provide a balance, or even a contender, to contingency. For all these reasons, India will remain a special  
case in the global spectrum of modernising societies.
2.2.2.6. India and the rise of Reflexivity
At this point, one is again faced with a great number of contrasts and contradictions. When reflexivity is  
understood not merely as a concept in academia, but as a lived reality in society – and this will be the  
basis of this section – then one has to look at phenomena that hint at reflexivity in social contexts. India  
is  unevenly  developed  and  this  has  obvious  consequences  for  the  potential  for  reflexivity.  A  few 
empirical contrasts could perhaps provide a glimpse of the situation as regards reflexivity: While India is  
home to world-famous intellectuals,  a significant portion of  its  population remains illiterate,  and its  
education system continues to fail  to provide the majority with a decent education  (Chudgar 2009; 
Kingdon 2007; Narayana 2009). The media, largely free and often critical of political power, is surprisingly 
under-informed about social conflicts, not least caste (see chpt. 3), so a general awareness of societal  
context is often low, and reflexivity is at times simply absent. While the fundamental facts about society  
are clearly understood by intellectual elements of society, the extent and influence of the intelligentsia 
would  be  guesswork  at  best  (Malik  1977;  Pollock  2008).  The  arts  and  humanities  are  even  more 
neglected  in  relation  to  the  natural  sciences  than  they  are  elsewhere,  so  even  academia  has  
comparatively little to offer for a reflexivity of society in modernity (Welz 2009). On the other hand, the 
experience of difference, caused by the heterogeneity of society, already anticipates an awareness of the 
cultural practices of one’s own group in relation to others, and therefore provides a starting point for  
reflexivity.
In this context, it is perhaps presumptuous to discuss reflexivity in the abstract, and some examples  
would very probably help to explain what reflexivity could mean in social practice. Martin Fuchs cites the  
example of Neo-Buddhism as a deliberate re-invention of an ethical religion by a convinced rationalist 
with an agenda for the societal reintegration of India's Dalits (Fuchs 2000). Following this interpretation, 
the  re-invention  of  a  religion  is  indeed  an  indicator  of  a  high  amount  of  reflexivity.  A  deliberate  
(re-)construction of a religion in order to find an expression for everyday problems is a prime example of  
a reflexive understanding of humans' position in society. But this example can be attributed to mainly  
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one prominent public intellectual, B.R. Ambedkar, and it remains unclear to what extent his reflexivity is  
shared or even understood amongst his followers. 
Another example could perhaps be found in the ethical relativism discussed under 2.2.2.5.  It  would 
require a certain ability to reflect upon one's own position in order to adapt one's ethical position to  
every context. In a wider perspective, the contingency within India's heterogeneous society would also 
prevent a narrow mono-dimensional and therefore anti-reflexive perspective on social issues and society 
as a whole. But this amounts to not much more than educated guesswork. The issue of social reflexivity 
in India has not received the scrutiny it deserves, and the argument here remains a weak one. Perhaps  
the best indication of social reflexivity, or the potential for social reflexivity in India, is the direction of 
development this society is taking. However one assesses the amount or potential of social reflexivity  
today, it is beyond doubt that it is increasing. A positive feedback loop is created as the necessary pre-
conditions for reflexivity become established – the growing number of  educated Indians,  the media 
finding  new  channels  to  communicate,  the  Internet  opening  up  possibilities  for  a  more  direct  
communication between the increasing share of population that has access to it, and even politicians  
becoming more receptive to the demands of their voters (the pre-stage for reflexivity). In sum, even if  
the starting point for reflexivity in India is far from ideal, the direction of development is as expected. 
Social reflexivity in Indian society is surely rising, and so is its modernity.
2.3. Caste and Modernity
In the final section of this chapter, the relationship between caste and modernity will be briefly explored.  
In essence, the three models of caste from the first chapter shall be expounded against the backdrop of  
the modernity explored earlier in this chapter. That is, each interpretation of caste will be singled out  
and  analysed  with  regard  to  its  compatibility  with  modernity.  The  theoretical  implications  will  be  
sketched  out  here,  before  the  third  chapter  begins  to  empirically  address  the  question  of  caste  in  
modernity. Initially, the outcome of this exercise should not be surprising. Since one interpretation of 
caste is already called ‘modern’ in the theoretical model, the compatibility of this interpretation with  
modernity is expected to be much greater than that of the others. But, as it turns out, the compatibility  
of caste in any interpretation is never fully perfect, and it is well worthwhile discussing the areas of 
tensions  that  each  interpretation  has  with  modernity.  Once  the  relevant  elements  and  conflicts  of  
modernity are seen against the features and consequences of caste, a more nuanced picture emerges.  
The aim of this section, then, is to locate these conflicts, to analyse the underlying tensions and to bring  
caste into the context of modernising India.
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2.3.1. Modernity and Caste in the ‘Classical’ interpretation
This model, at first glance, contrasts most with the conceptualisation of modernisation discussed above.  
For those elements of modernity that are relevant for caste in this interpretation, the model’s basic  
assumptions are in open conflict with the rationale of modernity: It is opposed to the individualisation 
deemed modern, since it takes groups and not individuals as social agents. The religious legitimisation of  
caste appears to be incompatible with modern rationalism, and its division of labour out of sync with  
capitalistic development. For the problem of functional differentiation, or the complexes surrounding 
contingency and reflexivity, it is either ambivalent or not fully relevant. But the strongest conflict lies  
beneath these complexes: The systematic hierarchisation of the whole of society, which is the hallmark  
of this mode of interpretation, appears completely impossible within a complex, modern society – if it  
was indeed ever possible in any society. In sum, caste in this interpretation is basically a contradiction of 
all what is deemed modern by contemporary scholars. This would be the short version of a conventional  
interpretation, but as already intimated, this conclusion would be premature. There are grey areas, not 
least  because  modernity  is  not  confined  to  a  narrow definition.  However,  there  are  other  obvious  
conflicts between modernity and this mode of interpreting caste.
First  of  all,  caste is  incompatible  with any notion of  individualisation, let  alone the egalitarian ideal 
underneath  it.  Caste,  and  this  holds  true  for  all  three  interpretations,  is  fundamentally  anti-
individualistic. As basic attributes are acquired by birth and are beyond the scope of the individual, caste  
puts a limit to all forms of individual self-actualisation. The basic units for social interaction – and this is  
relevant for all interpretations – are not reduced to the individual, but remain on a group level. So the  
very idea of caste is  already a contradiction of  any notion of  individual agency.  On the other hand, 
standardisation (the antithesis of individualisation in Western societies) can only work on a much smaller  
scales in  caste societies,  which provide relatively small  units  of  association.  Instead,  standardisation 
would be achieved via the hierarchical concept that orders society through the contrast of pure and  
impure in all its fine-tuned differentiations. According to this model – and it is worthwhile remembering  
that it is a model, not empirical description82 – society is fully integrated by a comprehensive caste order. 
The  conflict  between  individualisation  and  standardisation  is  not  realised  here  –  society  is  all 
standardised and individualisation is deemed impossible.
This model of caste is internally rational, but this rationality remains incomplete since it is not based on 
empirically  gained  knowledge,  but  on religious  texts,  with  little  regard  to  actual  circumstances  and 
logical argument. If modernity is indeed linked to a trend towards secularisation, then this interpretation 
of caste is clearly handicapped by its emphasis on religious legitimisation. Factually, 83 modernity is less in 
opposition to religion than previously thought, and the re-invention of traditions according to Giddens 
82 The hierarchy that is intrinsic to this model has empirically never been comprehensive. So even in this regard, the conflict  
here is more between concept and empirical reality in general, than between this specific concept and modernity.
83 It is understood here as contrast to an ideational notion of modernity that is often charged with normative values.
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(see 2.1.2) would leave room for an embrace of caste in modern circumstances. But since the religious 
legitimisation is so central to this interpretation of caste, any loss of importance for religion would have 
consequences for caste itself: If religion was generally undermined – and so far, there is no indication of 
this in contemporary India – this mode of interpreting caste would be undermined along with it. But 
even  if  religion  remains  in  general  high  esteem,  any  rise  in  rationality  could  challenge  religious 
explanations for the societal division of labour.
The strongest conflict, however, can be seen with regard to the modern relation between capitalism and 
democracy; this model of caste is in strong opposition to both of them. When economic specialisation 
and division of labour is not only religiously legitimised, but also pre-ordained at birth, and therefore 
unrelated to actual aptitude, it precipitates an economic order that is fundamentally hostile to change. 
The  division  of  labour  imagined  here,84 is  attached  to  birth  in  a  certain  caste  and  fundamentally 
inflexible. It therefore creates a conflict with the requirements of a changing, modern economy. And 
with  this,  caste’s  economic  consequences  are  clearly  in  contradiction  to  the  economic  conditions 
deemed  modern.  Capitalism,  with  its  ever-changing  economic  circumstances,  requires  flexibility  for  
adaptation that, in turn, is enabled both by this flexibility and by a broad skill set. If this interpretation of  
caste ever had an ideal-typical economic expression, it would have been a society based on agriculture, 
with a (mercantilist) economy and wide artisan specialisation, but with little economic change. It is in  
most obvious contrast to modern capitalism.
Much the same can be said with regard to democracy. This interpretation of caste conflicts with the 
concept  of  democracy,  not  least  since  it  denies  the  fundamental  equality  of  people  upon  which 
democracy is based. Furthermore, it is incompatible with the idea of political change, also intrinsic to 
democracy:  The  social  order  imagined  in  this  interpretation  of  caste  is  unchanging  and  guided  by  
religious, other-worldly principles. Democratic principles of social organisation are grounded in the real 
world,  which  makes  them  negotiable  and  ultimately  changeable;  otherwise  political  agitation, 
democratic  elections  and  changes  of  leadership  or  policy  would  be  either  a  sin  or  a  meaningless 
endeavour. Whichever way one looks at it, this interpretation of caste is incompatible with the basic 
rationales of democracy.
Functional differentiation, on the other hand, is already envisaged in the division of labour. In a crude 
and  pre-modern  form,  the  economic  specialisation  of  castes  predates  the  economic  modernisation 
developed much later in capitalist terms. And since it is a pre-capitalistic and pre-modern functional  
differentiation,  it  is  again  in tension with modernity  in its  empirical  form. Moreover,  the functional  
differentiation of other sections of society – and with it bureaucratisation and juridification – are not  
covered  in  this  interpretation.  This  concept  of  caste  proceeds  from the  assumption  that  society  is 
primarily  agriculture-based  and  is  not  much  concerned  with  political  or  administrative  ideals.  Even 
though this classical interpretation of caste is the most comprehensive one, and the only one providing a 
84 Empirically, the economic specialisation was never as extensive as imagined in this interpretation. See chapter 1.2.1. 
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model for society, it does not systematically describe or prescribe society. It remains a limited model for  
societal organisation, and is inadequate as the basis for any society, modern or not. However, despite  
these reservations, this most traditional interpretation of caste is already quite modern with regard to 
functional differentiation. 
Finally, the remaining points – contingency and reflexivity – deserve brief consideration. Since this model  
of  caste  assumes  that  society  is  governed  by  certain  basic  principles,  there  is  little  scope  for  
contingency.85 At least in its own terms, this model tries to extinguish social contingency by subsuming  
social complexity into an internally rational, coherent system. The underlying tension is solved, or rather 
supressed in a pre-modern solution that contributes little to the modern conflict between rationalisation 
and the still-remaining contingency. For reflexivity, on the other hand, two positions are imaginable, in  
accordance with the distinction between internal rationality and rationality in the modern, radical sense.  
Based on the former, it could be argued that this form of explaining caste constitutes a contribution 
towards  social  reflexivity,  however  crude  this  might  be.  But  once  rationality  is  based  on  empirical 
knowledge,  this  model  becomes  the  very  opposite  of  reflexivity;  indeed,  it  prevents  reflexivity  by 
projecting mundane, social problems onto a religious plane – and therefore outside the realm of rational  
argument.
2.3.2. Modernity and Caste in the Subaltern interpretation
The subaltern interpretation of caste, compared to the classical one, is less of a radical re-interpretation  
of  caste and more a shift  in emphasis  (chpt.  1).  While the main argument shifts  from the religious  
explanation (central in the classical interpretation) to one based on ethnicity, the economic element – 
the caste-based division of labour – still connects the subaltern with the classical interpretation of caste. 
The basic conflict between caste in this interpretation and the elements and tensions of modernity are 
essentially the same as those in the classical interpretation. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss these  
points again.
However, there is one salient difference in this model; not in the way it analyses caste, but with the  
intention behind it. In its Ambedkarian version, it is already a reflexive and critical perspective on caste,  
much in sync with modern reflexivity. This interpretation is an active reflection upon the origin of caste 
as a social institution. In replacing an a-historical, religious explanation for caste with one that tries to  
put it in a historical context and aligns its origin with the concrete, rational interests of social groups, 86 it 
is more modern than both the alternative versions. This model of caste is more rational, since it provides  
a non-religious, logical explanation for caste instead of obscure reference to religion. Furthermore, it is 
more reflexive, because it is an active, interest-guided reinterpretation that analyses caste as a real-life  
85 At closer examination, there is indeed contingency, even in this model – the figure of the Renouncer, and the conflict  
between economic and ritual requirements would all provide room for contingency. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to  
point out that contingency is systematically subdued here, even if not in all cases successfully.
86 Of course, this version is still an imagined one, not a meticulous historical study on the origin of caste. However, it takes the  
question  of  the  origin  of  caste  into  discussion,  something  that  the  alternative  versions  would  not  do:  The  classical  
interpretation leaves it to religion, the ethnic interpretation does not even ask this question.  
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struggle  for  recognition  in  historic  and  contemporary  times.  This  concept,  at  least  in  its  tangible 
formulation by Ambedkar, is more than an academic concept – above all,  it  is  a politically powerful  
attempt to open up caste for contemporary debate. In this regard, it is perhaps the most modern of the  
three interpretations of caste discussed here.
The issue of democracy is especially revealing: Caste in this mode is incompatible with the egalitarian 
ideals that are the underlying rationale for a democracy. (With regard to its features, the relationship is 
the same as for the classical interpretation.) Furthermore, the comprehensive social hierarchy described 
in the model cannot possibly coexist with the contingent power struggle of a democracy based on the  
idea  of  social  mobility.  For  these  reasons  alone,  this  model  of  caste  is  a  clear  contradiction  of  all  
democratic ideals.87 But to follow this argument, one would have to assume that these are positive (i.e., 
legitimising) descriptions of caste. And this, especially in the case of Ambedkar, would be a complete 
misinterpretation of the model. Behind the description is a clearly articulated rejection of caste, and in 
this rejection lies the model’s compatibility with democracy. Hence, there are two ways of relating this  
model with democratic ideals: Either that no compatibility exists (as might be assumed on first glance),  
or that, when informed about the intentions of this model, there is a clear alignment. This model of  
caste has been developed to intellectually undermine caste in favour of a more democratic society – this  
is the only way one can make sense of Ambedkar's intentions.
2.3.3. Modernity and Caste in the Ethnic or 'Modern' interpretation
As this interpretation is already an adaptation of caste towards modernity, compared to the alternative 
modes of description, it is most compatible with modernity. Indeed, in many respects, it is undeniably  
more adapted to the concept of modernity: The dissolving of a comprehensive hierarchy provides the  
opportunity  for  social  mobility  (still  group-based,  not  individual),  the  dissociation  with  a  historical  
concept of division of labour facilitates the economic transition to capitalism, and the reduced focus on 
purity/pollution makes the whole idea of caste more flexible in social and economic circumstances. 
However, as already mentioned, no model of caste is compatible with the idea of individuality, and this  
one  is  no  exception.  Even  if  the  over-arching  hierarchy  is  dissolved  in  favour  of  a  quasi-ethnic 
compartmentalisation of society, this still does not conform with the idea that individuals are the basis of 
society. Castes, even if ‘substantialised’ and therefore relatively independent of each other, are still per  
se social actors above the individual level. Groups and not individuals are the basis for society here – and  
the fact that membership of caste is by birth only reaffirms its incompatibility with individual agency. On 
the  other  hand,  this  model  does  not  correspond  with  the  standardising  counter-current  to 
individualisation  either.  Seen  on  a  societal  level,  caste  in  this  mode  is  not  the  precursor  for  
standardisation: Its compartmentalisation of society into a multitude of subgroups is the opposite of 
standardisation.  Admittedly,  on  the  intra-caste  level,  and  to  a  limited  extent,  this  model  may 
87 The whole description is indeed based on an ideal of democracy that is informed by normative elements. If democracy is 
primarily defined in empirical terms – and therefore not seen as an ideal but as a messy reality – the contrast between caste  
(in all three interpretations) and democracy would be much less contrasted, but nevertheless still be there.
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accommodate standardisation of individuals within particular castes. But on the inter-caste level, it lacks  
the authority or power of a caste hierarchy projected (or imagined) in the classical and, to a lesser  
extent, in the subaltern interpretations.
Certainly, in contrast to the classical interpretation, this model is more modern because it is essentially 
more  secular.  Religion  is  not  needed to  explain  caste  here,  and  it  works  relatively  independent  of  
religion, even if religion is invoked as a (weak) reference sometimes. Consequently, the rationality is  
more stringent, since no reference to irrational belief systems are needed. In chapter three the manner  
in which caste is rationally employed in practical circumstances will be discussed, but here it is sufficient  
to note that the absence of religion is already an indicator of increased rationality. Modernity is informed 
both by increasing rationality and the survival of tradition that cannot be fully explained by rational  
argument; hence caste is a paradigm example: The everyday invocation of tradition that is evident even 
in this interpretation goes together with the fully rational use of this institution in modern circumstances  
(see chpt. 3).
Nevertheless, caste even in this interpretation is still not fully compatible with the democratic elements  
in modernity, since it puts the group before the individual. That it integrates so well with contemporary 
Indian democracy (chpt. 3) is perhaps due to an imperfect implementation of democracy, rather than to  
a harmonious relationship with democracy as a concept. However, caste in this interpretation is also  
amazingly adaptable to changing circumstances – the hallmark of modern capitalism. Even if capitalism 
is, as an ideal, based on individual competition and endeavour, caste in this interpretation is an ideal  
adaptation for the insecurities of capitalism (chpt. 3). Since the traditional division of labour is weak or  
irrelevant here, it does not hold back the individual from adaptation to new modes of production or 
income.  That  makes  it  adaptable  to  a  wide  variety  of  economic  circumstances.  And  even  if  some  
reservation regarding tradition rules might exist in day-to-day circumstances,88 the model provides no 
systematic opposition to capitalist forms of economy. Rather, caste provides the individual with a back-
up  system  that,  potentially,  provides  aid  and  resources  for  success  in  such  an  economy.  This  
interpretation of caste is, therefore, quite modern in its adaptability to an economy that is based on the  
market. 
Rather more neutral is the model’s relationship with functional differentiation. The issue here differs  
from that with the classical interpretation: Since the division of labour is largely irrelevant here, the 
functional  differentiation  that  is  intrinsic  to  modern  society  is  not  of  much  concern  here.  The 
compartmentalisation of  society  that  is  the result  of  this  interpretation can perhaps be seen as  an 
analogy for functional differentiation, but this model provides no solution to the fundamental problem 
of organising society. While caste in the classical interpretation was an ordering principle for society as a  
whole, here it is rather practised without much regard for its implications. Caste in this interpretation is  
thus both more compatible with modernity and with a reduction of social complexity at the same time. 
While  the  classical  interpretation  would  work  only  in  a  relatively  highly-developed  society  with  a  
88 Purity rules are still relevant for some castes, mostly the ones at the extreme ends of the spectrum – see chapter three.
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complex division of labour, this interpretation would also be compatible with a subsistence economy. 
Ironically, this reduction of complexity is exactly the element that makes caste compatible with the most 
complex economy today; the modern, capitalistic one.
With the loss of cohesiveness, caste in this interpretation also loses it power to interpret society, and to  
reduce complexity for the people involved. While both the alternative interpretations provide an idea of  
society, here it is either lacking or piecemeal at best.89 This makes it more able to adapt to changing 
social developments and enhances its chances of survival in modernity. But it provides no solution to the  
modern problem of contingency; it increases societal contingency without providing a rational counter-
balance. Since this model is not an academic interpretation of caste, but rather of what is meant by caste  
in everyday interactions, it cannot be expected to provide explanations for society at large. Even if it still  
produces meaning for those who practise it, caste in this version is no longer comprehensive enough to 
have an ideal of society at large. Compared to the classical interpretation, this is a reduced, shortened 
and less ambitious model, with little scope to take society into account. Hence, it is also pointless to  
analyse the model with regard to the last aspect of modernity, reflexivity. The bottom line, then, is that  
caste, in all its interpretations, and modernity are in most important respects incompatible – and often  
outright opposed. Even the modern interpretation of caste is not in sync with modernity's underlying 
notions of individuality and equality.  In consequence, caste will  always have an uneasy relation with 
modernity. If and how it is able to adapt to modernisation in empirical terms will be discussed in the 
next chapter. That there is always a residual conflict when caste comes in contact with modernity should,  
however, be rudimentarily clear.
89 If there are any abstracts ideas of society attached to this interpretation, they take society to be ordered in small  and  
economically unrelated units whose membership is assigned by birth. Loyalty to these societal units is important, but an  
idea how this group-loyalty relates to other social obligations is not given.
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3. Caste in contemporary India 
After the previous chapters explored the theoretical dimensions of caste and the relationship of caste  
and  modernity,  this  chapter  will  focus  on  empirical  concerns.  The  guiding  question  will  be:  ‘What  
functions does caste fulfil for people who consider it a factor in their everyday life?’ As these functions 
can be diverse, it is necessary to limit the analysis to the most relevant in our context, namely caste in 
public discourse, in the political and economic sphere and, finally, in connection with the family. Based 
on the available literature, it will be argued that caste has vital functions in all these contexts and is 
therefore more than a mere tradition for the people who employ the concept. This will, in turn, further  
clarify  what  is  meant  by  caste  in  a  modern reinterpretation.  Neither  the  classic,  nor  the  subaltern 
interpretations are relevant here, and it would be pointless to interpret caste as a religiously-inspired 
phenomenon in this context. 
Since caste rests on pre-existing socio-economic foundations, and is in some cases becoming stronger 
within the process of modernisation, a view of caste that sees it in its socio-economic context would 
contribute considerably to a further understanding of this social institution. In other words, because 
caste holds significant value for the people concerned, it  cannot be expected to wither away under  
modern circumstances. However, since the changes accompanying the modernisation of India have an 
impact within the various contexts in which caste functions, caste itself by necessity must adapt to these  
changing circumstances. 
3.1. Introduction: Caste at Independence, and Caste today
In  the  initial  decades  after  independence,  caste  had  a  shadow  existence  in  India.  The  prevailing 
expectation at this time was that caste was an ancient and outdated relic, not in accordance with the 
new republic’s ideals, and unsustainable under modern circumstances. With the death of M.K. Gandhi,  
the last public voice that was openly trying to defend the idea of caste – though not the reality as he  
found it on the ground – was lost (Pankaj 2007; Pillai 1982). 
During  the  Nehruvian  era,  the  national  consensus  on  caste  seemed  much  more  comprehensive  and 
durable than the one on secularism. Caste – unlike religion – was among a few ‘traditional’ institutions  
that  were presented as all  bad,  as ‘social evils’  without any redeeming features. It  was as if  the only  
civilized response to caste was to urge its  abolition. And in the 1950s and ‘60s it  seemed as though  
everyone was civilized, for no one argued otherwise. (Deshpande 2003a: 98)
Since most observers agreed that economic development and mass education would wipe out caste 
traditions, it was anticipated that the days of caste would come to an end as soon as modernisation 
reached all corners of India. What was – deliberately or not – overlooked in these assessments was that  
caste had functions that were still vital for large portions of the population. Biased by perspectives that  
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placed caste either in a non-economic, religious sphere or saw its environment exclusively in traditional 
rural  settings,  the  accounts  failed  to  see  its  functional  value  in  a  variety  of  circumstances,  both 
traditional and modern. Therefore, the continued and obvious survival of caste has come much to the 
surprise of academic and non-academic observers, even though the  substantialising trends for caste, 
which allowed the phenomenon to survive  in  modernity,  were well  documented  (Dumont 1980;  D. 
Gupta 2000).
Seen in hindsight, it is not at all surprising that the institution of caste thrived after independence. Not 
only did the narrative of an egalitarian modernisation have little or no relevance for the majority of  
population, but state institution themselves were – beneath the surface – anything but caste-neutral. As  
Susan Bayly argues:
The expectation was that India would thereby [by central planning and the permit Raj B.L.] combine rapid  
economic growth with a move towards casteless egalitarianism. Yet,  in  the short  term at  least,  these 
policies tended to preserve or even reinforce the differentials of caste in everyday life. In order to operate 
the system’s quotas, licences and protective labour laws, both central and state government recruited far 
larger official bureaucracies than those of the colonial era. Not surprisingly, given the stringent educational  
qualifications required for senior posts in state service, those at the higher administrative levels remained 
predominantly of high-caste origin, just as they had done under British rule. (Bayly 1999: 321)
Thus, the positions at the centre of Nehru’s administration – and therefore at the top of the public  
prestige  scale  –  were  securely  in  the  hands  of  an  educated  elite  with  Brahmin and  High  Caste 
backgrounds. Indeed, for a long time, the traditional caste hierarchy found its equivalent in the levels of  
bureaucratic prestige. With few exceptions, those at the helm of the new nation were almost exclusively  
recruited from a highly educated minority, whose success rested squarely on their intellectual tradition  
and  the  ability  to  pay  for  an  extensive  education.  Needless  to  say,  this  minority  reflected  historic 
inequalities in the accumulation of wealth that, in turn, largely correlated with caste status (Dreze 2003). 
For the first few decades after independence, then, as far as government institutions were concerned, 
caste hierarchy survived relatively unchanged from its pre-independence form. 
This tradition was eventually undermined by two interconnected processes, both of which contributed  
to the demise of the ‘Brahminical’ hierarchy within the various bureaucracies. First, affirmative action in 
the  form  of  reserved  jobs  in  public  institutions  –  inaugurated  at  independence,  but  marginal  and  
meaningless in practice for the first few decades – resulted in a tiny, but growing number of government 
employees from SC and ST background (Desai and Kulkarni 2008; Thorat et al. 2009). Although not an 
immediate success, the reservation system has now resulted in a public workforce that is much more  
diverse in its caste background than it was at the time of independence. Second, with the weakening of  
the political dominance of the Congress Party in the 1980s,90 the greater assertiveness of Low-Caste-
90 The dominance of the Congress Party can generally be described as based on a patronage system where the established 
elite (from High Caste or Local Dominant Castes) would dominate the party even though political rhetoric would be directed  
at social progress, an inclusive society and an emphasis on the reduction of poverty. This proved a viable model for a long 
time, attracted the votes of Lower Castes and religious minorities, and only started to unravel once former supporters took 
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politics began to impact on the political system (Rao 2009). Especially in North India, where even today 
caste inequalities are much more pronounced than in the South, the rise of political parties focused on 
ameliorating  the  condition  of  Lower  Castes  has  had  a  tremendous  impact  on  the  political  system 
(Jaffrelot 2003). Both these trends have challenged the traditional hierarchies within the government 
sector: Employees are recruited from a much wider spectrum of castes, and governments or political 
parties can no longer ignore the Lower Castes, particularly SC and ST.
While the changes within the administration reflect a change in society, the specifics of this change are  
complex and cannot be reduced to one-dimensional explanations. It is therefore necessary to ask: Is 
caste still relevant today? From the outset, it is clear that caste still plays a role in India today. Almost no  
sphere of Indian life can be separated from caste and its implications, from electioneering and the filling 
of government posts to the discussion of reservations and the educational and economic opportunities  
of individuals. Inter-caste socio-economic inequalities are still apparent, most especially the significant  
gap between SC and ST, on the one hand, and the rest of society, on the other  (Borooah 2005; Desai 
2008; Gang et al. 2002; Karnataka 2006; Kijima 2006; Thorat et al. 2009).91 While living standards for SC 
and ST remain lower than the average, the socioeconomic condition of many other sub-populations 
cannot be easily assessed due to limited or low quality data.92 In general, because the official census 
dropped the question of caste in 1931,93 one is left with only piecemeal demographic information and 
very broad caste classifications. The best source of data at the moment is the one from the IHDS but the  
limitations are also quite obvious:94
to  more  direct  means  of  articulating  their  political  needs.  Zoya  Hasan,  'Constitutional  Equality  and  the  Politics  of 
Representation in India', Diogenes, 53/4 (November 1, 2006 2006), 54-68, Anirudh Krishna, 'What Is Happening to Caste? A 
View from Some North Indian Villages', The Journal of Asian Studies, 62/4 (2003), 1171-93.
91 For an empirical  assessment on the connection between child mortality  and caste,  see  Premchand Dommaraju,  Victor 
Agadjanian,  and Scott  Yabiku,  'The Pervasive  and Persistent  Influence of  Caste on Child  Mortality  in  India',  Population 
Research & Policy Review, 27/4 (2008), 477-95.
92 The official statistic classification of the Indian population into “SC”, “ST”, “OBC”, “General Category Hindu”, and “Religious 
Minority” is too loose to provide insights into the economic condition of particular castes. Moreover, since the classification 
is all too often subject to political lobbying, an official “OBC” status can, for example, empirically translate into membership  
in a Dominant Agricultural Caste – as is the case with Vokkaligas / Gowdas in the state of Karnataka.  P Radhakrishnan, 
'Backward Castes/Classes as Legal and Political Entities', in Veena Das (ed.), The Oxford India Companion to Sociology and  
Social Anthropology (New Delhi, 2003), 1474 - 93. Chengappa Raj et al., 'Obc Who Are They?; What Are the Norms to Decide 
an Obc? Why Should They Get a 27 Per Cent Reservation? Can the New Formula Be Implemented?', India Today, Jul 17, 2006 
2006 p. 36.
93 The census of 2011 will include a question related to caste, so the data situation is likely to improve. However, the very  
move to include the caste category was met with widespread public  controversy.  Krishna Pokharel,  'India Shifts Policy, 
Adding Caste Query to 2011 Census', Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, 256/60 (2010), A12. Priya Sahgal, 'The Caste Curse 
', India Today, May 24 2010.
94 The IHDS data is superior to the official Indian census data since it at least distinguishes between Brahmins and Forward 
Castes. However, all these classifications follow administrative rationales and have only limited reference to caste on the Jati 
level. 
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TABLE 3.1. Caste and communities in India, according to IHDS HH3 1.13-15 (Desai et al. 2007)
unweighed frequencies weighted percentage
1 Brahmins 2,421 5.1%
2 Forward Castes 7,151 15.5%
3 OBCs 14,068 35.7%
4 Dalits (SC) 8,333 22.0%
5 Adivasis (ST) 3,439 7.8%
6 Muslims 4,708 11.2%
7 Sikhs, Jains 683 1.1%
8 Christians 751 1.7%
The dearth of accurate nationwide data leaves room for interpretation, but the fundamentals are clear: 
Those born into the opposite ends of the caste spectrum (that is, either in Brahmin or SC/ST categories) 
have statistically significant differences in life outcomes.95 The picture might be more obscure in the 
middle  levels  of  society,  but  caste  is  still  undeniably  relevant  in  people's  lives  today,  in  whatever 
circumstances the concept might be employed. 
3.2. Caste in public discourse
Put simply, caste is a highly controversial topic in public discourse in India. It is contested in fundamental  
ways; for example, while some groups or advocates for groups claim it is slowly dying and already mainly  
irrelevant for urban professional middle classes (cf. Béteille 1996), others would insist that caste is the 
hidden,  but  nevertheless  ubiquitous,  structure  behind  all  social  interaction  in  India  today  (Lancy 
Fernandes and Bhatkal 1999). Both claims have some validity, but neither one comprehensively captures 
the true situation.  For the present,  let  us simply state that the phenomenon of  caste is  often seen 
contrarily in Indian discourse, with no consensus position. Since it has strong political and economic  
implications (see 3.3 and 3.4), caste is inextricably linked with individuals’ and groups’ interests. In this  
process, the official bureaucratic classifications, such as SC, ST or OBC, develop a life on their own and 
have come to eclipse more traditional caste identities subsumed under them. Not surprisingly, the caste  
debate is dominated by interest groups who see and define caste mainly in regard to the economic 
costs/benefits of affirmative action policies. Caste is all too often narrowed down to the pros and cons of  
95 “A second systematic and robust result is the existence of statistical discrimination in the outcomes of the allocation process  
for medical services on the basis of caste and religion. A higher proportion of Muslims or scheduled castes in the rural areas 
of a district leads to a lowering of the public input in each equation for every model specification and with both estimation  
methods. This discrimination is the consequence of decisions by the state governments.”  Roger Betancourt and Suzanne 
Gleason, 'The Allocation of Publicly-Provided Goods to Rural Households in India: On Some Consequences of Caste, Religion 
and Democracy', World Development, 28/12 (2000), 2169-82 at 2177.
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reservations policies – a process which badly underestimates and misrepresents the phenomenon. 
In more personal contexts, and in every-day interactions, caste is in most cases avoided as a topic of  
conversation, due to the sheer potential for offence and embarrassment that it carries. Especially in the 
new middle classes, caste is barely addressed at all, with caste identity only revealed to those who are  
considered trustworthy. As Jan Nijman puts it: “The avoidance of caste as a topic of discussion reflects 
some deep sensitivities and a desire to circumvent possible prejudice (both for higher and lower castes)” 
(Nijman 2006:  762).  If  two strangers  were to announce their  caste  identity to each other,  it  would 
immediately position one towards the other in relation to their respective caste backgrounds – with  
possibly  embarrassing  results  for  both  parties.96 With  such  sensitivities  attached  to  personal  caste 
background – not least because caste is connected to the private identity of the persons concerned – it is  
jealously protected by a veil of secrecy, one that may appear impenetrable. The topic of caste is all-too 
often downplayed, or not considered appropriate for open discussions, and usually deliberately avoided. 
The  only  factions  likely  to  bring  caste  back  into  open  discussion  are  usually  advocates  for,  or  are  
themselves, politically-minded Dalits, who see and use caste as their main vehicle in the struggle for 
greater social equality  (cf. Omvedt 1991). For the overwhelming majority, however, caste is a private 
issue, rarely discussed in public. Even a foreigner, without personal attachment to any caste, would find 
it difficult to openly address questions about caste relations. If one only follows public debate, it would  
appear – at least for naïve observers  – as if the question of caste is somewhat ghostlike; while it is  
always  lurking  in  the  background,  it  is  most  often  unmentionable  in  one-to-one  conversation,  and 
remains covered in an impenetrable layer of mystery and denial (Sheth 1999).97
On the other hand, this concealing and denial of caste is only meaningful up to a certain point. Caste is  
undeniably part of people's identity, and therefore becomes embodied by individuals, to some extent at 
least.  Bourdieu's  concept of  habitus is  perhaps too rigid  to capture the embodiment of  caste in all  
possible cases (Gorringe and Rafanell 2007), but the stereotypical view of castes certainly has an impact 
on how individuals are seen. There is, after all, a widely-shared image of an ideal-typical  Brahmin or 
Vaishya, even if particular individuals do not always fit into this pre-conception. The way caste is invoked 
in public can, by its very nature, only be based on stereotypes of castes, and they necessarily have a  
social impact. It would be interesting to investigate how the Indian public perceives what it takes to be  
an ideal-typical Brahmin, Dalit, Lingayat, Reddy, and so on. Unfortunately, and again characteristic of the 
topic, the lack of relevant studies prevents an informed assessment of such caste stereotypes. What is  
possible, though, is to investigate how caste is covered in the media – and therefore reproduced in the  
public imagination. 
96 The guiding principle of this relationship is not necessarily the traditional hierarchy – political and economic consideration  
could well be a factor. For example, a Brahmin, who would be considered high in the traditional hierarchy, could well be  
belittled by someone from a Dominant Agricultural Caste, who considers Brahmins as paid stooges in the service of his  
caste.  The  situation  would  even  be  more  complicated  if  the  counterpart  of  the  Brahmin  is  from  a  politicised  Dalit  
background, who may view Brahmins as the source of societal evil in India. 
97 The reasons could be political, see the example of Kerala: J. Devika, 'Egalitarian Developmentalism, Communist Mobilization, 
and the Question of Caste in Kerala State, India', The Journal of Asian Studies, 69/03 (2010), 799-820.
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3.2.1. Caste in the (printed) public discourse 
Even  a  non-scientific,  non-systematic  study  of  the  English-medium  regional  or  supra-regional 
newspapers  and magazines reveals  a striking ambiguity about caste;  that is,  caste is  portrayed as a  
scandalous remnant of the past, downplayed yet still acknowledged and accepted as an everyday fact of  
life. Regular reading the Times of India (ToI) and Deccan Herald (DH), and occasionally browsing through 
the Hindu (H), Daily News Analysis (DNA), or the magazines Outlook (O) and India Today (IT), provides a 
complex and contradictory picture. On one hand, the importance of caste appears (at least subjectively)  
to be underrated in relation to descriptions and analysis of everyday life, with this in keeping with a  
general neglect of social inequality when analysing day-to-day issues. On the other hand, if violence 
results from caste conflict, for example, the subject of caste is suddenly highlighted and emphasised as 
an embarrassing,  scandalous and painful  reminder  of  India's  darker  past.  However enlightened and  
reflective  the examples  of  the Indian media  might  claim to be,  the apparent  bias  in  reporting  and 
commentary provides a contrary conclusion.98 
Coverage of  events with an inherent caste basis,  such as social  conflicts,  often disregards  the caste 
dimension,  with  the  news  reports  lacking  reference  or  recognition  of  the  fact  that  caste  underlies 
seemingly caste-neutral issues. Metropolitan issues especially tend to be portrayed as independent of 
caste, thereby implying that caste is a factor only pertinent to the rural hinterland. While it is commonly  
acknowledged that the slum population is overwhelmingly composed of SC/ST members and Muslims, 
the correlation between social origin and economic status is consistently underplayed in reporting slum 
clearances and related events. The predominant coverage, focusing on enforcement of municipal law 
and order,  along with reflections on poverty,  is  strikingly blind to the fact  that a population with a 
specific caste (or religious) background is at the centre of actual issue. 
In contrast, caste outside the metropolis is repeatedly brought up in connection with honour killings, 
lynch justice and patriarchal structures. As an example, the ToI dedicated an entire page to a portrayal of 
‘medieval’  caste  relations  in  the  countryside,  complete  with  negatively  connoted  stereotypes  of  
traditional caste Panchayats and the honour code they pursue. 
Boycotts. Killings. Lynchings. All in the name of honour and kinship. That's justice – khap style – and it  
flourishes in vast stretches of India's hinterland. An hour drive from the capital is all it takes to go back a  
few centuries. (Arshad et al. 2009)
In this depiction, caste is rooted in ancient belief systems and, in consequence, is outdated in modern, 
metropolitan circumstances: India has changed not only economically but also morally. This depiction of 
caste, as straight from a horror story, may not always be far from the truth; nevertheless, presenting  
caste as a dark and exotic phenomenon, utterly alien to the educated readership in the cities, obscures  
the wider realities. Thus, caste is associated solely with the fringes of society, with no real influence on  
98 It should be noted here that, because all these newspapers are published in English, and therefore aimed at the educated  
middle classes, it is necessary to analyse these writings in the context of a middle class ideology that often claims to have 
moved beyond caste.
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the lives of the (educated) readers themselves. And through caste being actively pushed into specific  
areas, such as politics, or charged with connotations, such as underdevelopment, the life world of the 
readership is sanitised, at the same time that cultural notions of the opposite end of Indian society are  
reinforced. The view of caste as something exclusively associated with rural, underdeveloped areas or  
social segments that are not seen as bearers of modernity is biased in two ways: It cleanses caste from 
India's narrative of  capitalistic  modernisation, thereby hiding it  from the light of public  (journalistic)  
reflection, and it projects an urban-rural divide that is, even if often justified in factual terms, unhelpful  
for an understanding of Indian society.  
The same goes for the occasional stories about the sufferings of SC / Dalit communities. In a different  
article in the Times of India, the subject of Dalits vis-a-vis their Upper Caste counterparts is placed, as 
per routine, in rural settings and crammed with gory details that point to the distance between the  
readership and those being reported upon:
No social boycott could perhaps be so harsh and shameful than this one in the land of the Chalukyas.  
About 40 dalit families of the remote Jagalur village are living under duress after being ostracised by upper  
caste land-holders. For the past four days, provisions, vegetables, hotels and transport have been out of 
bounds for them. Worse, the dalits of this little heard-of village, located about 40 km from the district  
headquarters, are not even allowed to relieve themselves freely. (D'Souza 2009)
Without dismissing the compassionate motives of the writer, the issue of caste is further portrayed as an 
exotic, half-forgotten feature from India's past. According to this perception, caste has no place in the  
cities, still less in India's future. 
Contradictory as it may seem, however, caste also regularly surfaces within specific newspapers reports,  
with the implicit suggestion that there is no cure for it, even if a cure would be welcome: Whenever  
elections are to be covered, or public posts have to be filled, the caste membership of the candidate is  
analysed with the same rigour as the potential caste-based vote banks are predicted. The opening line of  
a DH article,  one of many possible examples,  already covers the essence of the whole piece (which 
discusses the exact caste membership of the three main parties standing for the general  Lok Shaba  
election): 
The BJP has again proved that it is a pro-Lingayat party, compared to other parties, while the Congress is  
still a party which gives primacy to Other Backward Classes and Minorities. The JD(S), true to its image, has 
remained faithful to its vote bank – Vokkaliga. (DH 2009) 
The text,  at  times openly  cynical  about  the political  power of  caste and family  clan connections,  is  
explicit about two things: That caste loyalties are both a menace in Indian politics and, at the same time,  
immensely powerful, and hence unavoidable. The problem is that, while caste continues to be a vexed  
issue  in  daily  life,  modern  or  ‘progressive’  Indians  –  and newspaper  reporters  are  generally  in  this  
category – appear embarrassed by its persistent refusal to vanish from Indian society. 
All  things  considered,  the  rationale  behind  the  newspaper  coverage  of  caste  is  still  informed  by  a  
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surprisingly obvious bias: Caste is a matter primarily confined to stories of the depressed or those at the  
fringe  of  society,  economically  or  spatially.  Caste  has  no  positive  connotations,  and  there  is  no 
appreciation of caste as a factor in modern life. That caste is an important factor in establishing self-
image and in underpinning economic relations, as it crucially does in the informal sector, is also not 
acknowledged. Needless to say, this portrayal in the contemporary English-speaking press is anything but  
comprehensive  or  accurate;  in  fact,  it  serves  merely  to mystify  and conceal  the phenomenon. And, 
unsurprisingly as it is, this is not due to any media conspiracy, but rather it reflects the deep-seated  
denial of the on-going existence of caste by the middle classes, who criticise caste in public with the 
same nonchalance as they practise it  in  private  (Frøystad 2001;  Fuller  and Narasimhan 2008;  Sheth 
1999).99 In the English-language newspapers at least, caste appears a slippery concept, difficult to pin  
down. Fortunately, there are other ways of assessing caste, and the following sections will be concerned  
with caste in politics and economics, where the issues are more clearly distinguishable. 
3.3. Caste in the political sphere
Obviously,  as  fully  documented in  the literature,  caste  is  one of  the most  important  factors  in  any 
election in India today. Historically, caste always had a political dimension and the notion that it was 
once an a-political,  purely sacral  institution is  nothing more than an anthropological  myth  (S.  Guha 
2003). The colonial administration, for example, engaged with a variety of caste associations that had 
secular agendas (amongst others) to project (Rudolph and Rudolph 1960; Rudolph 1965). However, with 
independence  and  the  advent  of  democracy,  the  situation  changed  dramatically;  caste  and  caste 
association now had direct political input into elections and elsewhere. Since the early 1980s at the 
latest,100 caste has become an increasingly important factor in political circles, resulting in the rise of  
politicians and political parties that openly agitate for the interests of castes or caste alliances (Jaffrelot 
2003; R. Kothari 1970a; Lucia 2009; Mitra 1994). Individual politicians with strong caste identity and 
caste alliances or lobbying groups often have an enormous influence, with caste used to garner favours  
that can be translated in economic benefits.  This, though, does not imply that caste associations as  
political pressure groups are necessarily a negative aspect of the Indian democracy 101 – in more than one 
case they operate as the sole mouthpiece for otherwise neglected social groups, who would have little 
alternative means of influencing political debate (Alam 1999).102 
99 As an illustrative account from a non-academic source: “The world of a naive believer in caste is limited; their intentions are  
obvious; their cruelty towards the Lower Castes is clear. But there is a greater danger from those who declare that casteism  
is bad, but view people of all other castes except their own with enormous suspicion. The caste that resides in their own 
mind poisons their entire being. The more they try to cover it up, the more they seethe from within. It is a state of mind that  
is incapable of any love. You can fight with a naive casteist, but not with urban Brahmins who may have abandoned all  
religious practises, but are strong believers in caste at heart.”  U.R. Ananthamurthy, 'I,  a Brahmin',  New Internationalist,, 
380/20-21 (July 2005) at 20.
100 Caste has played a role in politics before: Rajni Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics (Hyderabad: Orient Black Swan, 1970b), 
but has only become a direct force in elections with the reduced dominance of the Congress Party in the 1970s.
101 For a caste-conscious analysis of political strategies in the 1990s, see Eswaran Sridharan, 'Coalitions and Party Strategies in 
India's Parliamentary Federation', Publius, 33/4 (2003), 135-52.
102 Empirical analysis clearly indicates that political lobbying of historically marginal communities has had positive effects on 
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3.3.1. Caste and the politics of Reservations 
Even though caste has always had political leverage, the institution would not be so powerful today  
without a specific system to incorporate caste into the political fold and promote real economic benefits  
for caste membership. Since independence, India has adopted a unique scheme to address the pre-
democratic inequalities inherited in its traditional social order. With caste discrimination identified as a  
major obstacle to a democratic and egalitarian understanding of citizenship, the official policy has been 
to smooth over its social consequences,  despite its  complete eradication being neither declared nor 
attempted. In a bid to balance socio-economic disparities between the ‘mainstream’ and those who 
were subjected to the most severe forms of discrimination – those of SC and ST origin – the so-called 
‘reservation system’ was implemented in the Indian constitution. Under this scheme, hiring quotas for all  
jobs in public services were introduced, as well as reserved seats in all regional and federal parliaments.  
In addition, educational institutions that are financially dependent on state's assistance have reserved 
places  according  to  the  SC  and  ST  share  of  the  population  –  at  present,  22.5  per  cent.  Originally  
envisaged as a 10 year plan, this system of compensatory or positive discrimination has proved to be 
more enduring than initially imagined, and has been expanded and intensified over the years. 
While  the  original  reservation  policy  was  only  partially  carried  out,  the  situation  has  changed 
dramatically in recent years; implementation has been much more consistent, with the eligibility criteria  
significantly  expanded.  Over the course  of  the years,  and significantly  accelerated after  the Mandal  
commission's recommendations  (P. Radhakrishnan 1996), more than half of India's population, those 
categorised as SC, ST or OBC, is eligible to receive the benefits of this scheme (Mohanty 2006). Especially 
in the recent past, further extension of the reservation system in the educational system has led to bitter  
protests from those who are not eligible and who feel marginalised by its exclusionary tendencies (Louis 
2003). Nevertheless, while the supreme court of India has ultimately limited the extent of reserved seats 
to  50  per  cent  of  all  available  seats,  the  debate  over  reservation  is  not  yet  over  (Overland  2004; 
Zachariah  1986).  With  the  rise  of  the  private  sector  and  the  diminishing  significance  of  public 
employment, some advocates now lobby for an extension of caste-based quotas in the private sector.
Politically, the arguments over caste quotas often seem polarised between proponents and opponents. 
Unfortunately,  sober  cost-benefit  analysis  are  rare  and  often  fragmentary,  although  not  altogether 
absent. And while the quota system attracts a great deal of criticism – that it reinforces caste identity;  
that it leads to the formation of small groups of beneficiaries – “the creamy layer” (Chaudhury 2004) – 
while failing to reach the masses; that it reduces the performance of the institutions in which it operates  
– the system is not completely unsuccessful. In broad statistical terms, though, the benefits are rather  
murky: Research shows signs of improvement for all segments of society, but recent analysis reveals 
their share of public goods. Abhijit Banerjee and Rohini Somanathan, 'The Political Economy of Public Goods: Some Evidence 
from India', Journal of Development Economics, 82/2 (2007), 287-314, Rohini Pande, 'Can Mandated Political Representation 
Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India',  The American Economic Review, 
93/4 (2003), 1132-51.
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that,  60 years after independence, SC and ST members still  lag significantly  behind in all  measured 
indicators (Planning and Statistics Department 2006). 
Diagram 3.3.1. Socioeconomic Status of Caste Groups 
(according to Karnataka Human Development Report, Table 2.8 A)
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However, supporters of the reservation system usually point to its achievements; to the integration of 
different  castes  in  state-owned  industries  (Parry  1999),  the  opening-up  of  new  careers  for  the 
disadvantaged (Drèze and Sen 2002), to the on-going commitment to social justice (Bajpai 2010), and to 
the successes achieved in the creation of a small Low Caste middle class  (Säävälä 2001). Rather than 
reaching out to a large number of beneficiaries, the system appears to have empowered a small number  
of Low Caste members who act as advocates and role models for the much larger pool of Low Caste 
members who have not directly benefited from reservations. In this way, in the admission of different 
castes  to  government  employment  and  in  the  creation  of  advocates  from and  for  Lower  Castes  in 
position of power, the quota system may indeed be the reason for the change in Low Caste assertiveness  
since the 1970s (Jaffrelot 2003; Pande 2003). The resulting prominence of Lower Castes in the political 
sphere, the agenda-setting power of Low Caste advocates, and as a result, the impossibility of abolishing 
the reservation system itself demonstrates the vigorous nature of this system.
However, the downsides of the current reservation system loom large in the eyes of the Indian public.  
The  supposed  correlation  between  caste  reservations  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  public  sector  is  
frequently  emphasised  in  the  public  debate,  even  though  the  claim  is  hard  to  prove  empirically. 
Nevertheless, this presumed connection provides potent arguments against the expansion of the system 
into private industry. Every interested observer of the Indian public service (as repeatedly confirmed in  
my  interviews  with  those  both  within  and  with-out  the  public  sector)  knows  the  infamous  80/20 
equation, according to which 80 per cent of the public employees are literally idle while the remaining 
20 per cent have to compensate for the majority's lack of commitment. Since government jobs are highly  
protected – employment is seen as a life-long guarantee and dismissals are difficult or near-impossible –  
an attitude of unaccountability and lethargy is traditionally associated with public sector employees,  
whether justified or not. It is a common refrain (again confirmed in my interviews) that many public  
sector employees confuse their hiring date with their retiring date, and are therefore on ‘mental holiday’ 
as soon as they take up their life-long job. 
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What does the caste quota system have to do with all this? At face value, such sloth and cynicism is  
possible regardless of any caste considerations, and, of course, not all lazy public employees are the 
result of a caste quota ticket. However, and this is most important, in public debate the dismal state of  
the public sector is often explained by, or blamed upon, the reservation system (cf. Spectator 2007; cf. T. 
Economist  2007;  Upadhyaya  1998).  Hence,  in  the  arguments  of  those  lobbying  against  the 
implementation of  reservations in private industry,  the public  sector  serves as a warning about the  
consequences of the elimination of performance-based recruitment schemes.103 
3.3.2. The consequences of the politicisation of Caste
The controversial issue of reservations has effectively cemented the legitimacy of caste as a factor in the 
political system of India. Despite its mixed over-all results  (Desai and Kulkarni 2008; Upadhyaya 1998; 
Weisskopf 2004), the issue is too much part of electoral politics today for its abolishment to be expected 
in  the  near  future,  if  at  all.  Factually,  the  reservation  system  has  strengthened  caste  identity  and 
institutionalised  caste-related  subsidies,  thereby  creating  new  identities,  such  as  the  official  caste 
categories, with attached benefits. Indeed, the issue of financial rewards has poisoned the debate about  
caste  in  India,  because  caste  status  is  now  even  more  directly  linked  to  economic  benefits.  The  
reservation of  seats in institutes of  higher learning has,  more than anything else,  ignited a popular  
backlash against reservations amongst those not entitled to them. The educational elite, those most  
likely to have a High Caste background, feels  more and more squeezed out by the seemingly ever-
increasing share of reserved seats in relation to ‘general’ (i.e., competitive) ones. Again, the reservation 
issue has also contributed to a narrowing of the caste phenomenon in the public perception, where 
caste is seen almost exclusively through the lens of socio-economic deprivation and possible remedies 
(cf. Jeffrey 2010). This, in turn, creates an excessively restricted view of this complex phenomenon. All in 
all, the reservation policies since Indian independence have crystallised the formerly fluid institution of  
caste like no other single development. 
In consequence, the political use of caste has implications both for the political system and caste itself; 
at the same time that the political system has to accommodate the influence of castes, caste becomes  
redefined within the political sphere. The so-called ‘Ethnicisation of politics’104 goes hand in hand with 
the politicisation of  castes,  though caste is  only one factor amongst many other – such as religion,  
103 There might be some fundamental truth to this claim – reservation could and does mean that people are hired not by their  
qualifications but according to their social background. In order to fulfil quota requirements, many government-affiliated  
departments and institutes are over-staffed with people who have no obvious function but who are needed to fulfil the  
requirements for the social composition of the workforce. As Ramachandra Guha complains, the qualifications for higher  
office are often not even considered anymore since the filling of a post is seen as an act in the power play between larger  
caste  groups  (plus  the  occasional  religious  minority)  for  influence  -  Ramachandra  Guha,  'The  Chancellors'  Vice',  India  
Together, 04 July 2009 2009a, sec. Opinion: Higher Education. However, agitation against the reservation scheme could also 
be interpreted in less benign ways. Behind the equalisation of caste reservation and corruption could be a hidden element  
of aversion against the Low Castes’ rise in power, or against Low Castes in general, although open hostility against Lower  
Castes is considered an immense political risk in India today. 
104 The alternative, but more pejorative, term for this phenomenon would be ‘identity politics’. It touches upon the complex  
relationship between concepts of individual citizenship, as understood in political terms, and the existence of pre-political 
communities – with caste as an example of the latter. Compare Dulali Nag, 'A Post-Colonial End to History? A Reflection on 
the Relation between Democracy and Communitarianism', Contributions to Indian Sociology, 36/3 (2002), 525-49.
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language, regional or state nationalism – that could play a role in an ethnically-defined electorate. For  
caste, it amplifies the substantialisation that has been discussed before (chpt. 1) in the way that it brings 
castes  and  caste-alliances  into  horizontal  competition  (Pick  and  Dayaram  2006),  in  contrast  to  the 
traditional view of caste as a hierarchical system. This analysis, not surprisingly, is very much in line with 
the modern interpretation that sees caste primarily  as ethnic  units  (in extension of the family  unit)  
without much reference to hierarchy or overarching religious legitimisation. When caste is seen as a  
political entity – and caste alliances and other caste-based organisations can only be interpreted in this  
way – then it is an explicit rejection of both the classical, Dumontian interpretation, and the subaltern,  
Ambedkarian interpretation of caste, because this also implies a rejection of comprehensive hierarchy. 
Caste in politics, and the politicised version of caste, can only be thought of in terms of independent, 
quasi-ethnic groups, which in turn is essentially the modern interpretation of caste. 
This  relationship  has  been  discussed  in  the  literature,  albeit  on  different  theoretical  terms  (Gould 
2003).105 However,  the basic  implication – that the notion of  caste as ethnicity involves an inherent 
challenge  to  any  hierarchical  notion  of  castes  as  a  system  –  is  a  widely  accepted  consequence. 
Christophe Jaffrelot, for example, writes: 
Therefore the primary implication of ethnicization of caste consists in providing alternative nonhierarchical  
social imaginaires. This is a key issue so far as the emancipatory potential of the low caste movements is  
concerned since in their case, the ethnicization process provides an egalitarian alternative identity. Besides  
intermarriages, the ethnicization of the low castes, for efficiently questioning social hierarchies, therefore, 
must imply the invention of a separate, cultural identity and more especially a collective history. (Jaffrelot 
2000: 758) 
In  effect,  the more  political  caste  or  caste  alliances  become,  the less  one can  speak of  caste  as  a 
comprehensive and hierarchical system. But while Jaffrelot situates this process primarily in the Lower 
Castes, the implications are pertinent for all castes. Once the Lower Castes are outside the hierarchical 
system, the system of hierarchy itself breaks apart. 
For  those who see caste in the traditional,  systematic  way,  it  would appear legitimate to ask:  How 
authentic is caste when it is reinterpreted in ways deemed untraditional? Is caste as a social institution 
still the ‘same’ when it is seen as political pressure group? This can be answered in two ways: First, caste 
was always subject to change, and historical research shows that it has been reinterpreted before, most  
significantly in the colonial period (Dirks 2001). It is therefore an institution that is constantly in flux and 
readily  adapted  to  the  prevailing  political,  socio-economic  and  cultural  conditions  that  provide  its  
societal background. Second, the change is, in most cases, not radical realignment, but rather a shift in  
emphasis  of the elements that make up caste (chpt. 1).  The politicisation of  caste, to return to the 
concrete example,  employs  certain pre-existing elements of  caste (such as identity,  as well  as caste 
solidarity and awareness), and introduces them into a different context. And since caste has always had a 
105 However, since the classification of caste into three main interpretations is a unique feature of this thesis, this is not to  
denigrate other scholars.
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political dimension, the shift is even less radical than it seems at first sight: In the end, it comes down to  
a spatial proliferation of caste politics beyond the local;106 a transgression of the boundaries between 
castes in similar socio-economic conditions; and – last but not least – the employment of new ways to  
project power, no longer exclusively by local economic and political means, but also by numerical force 
in democratic, nation-wide elections. 
It could be argued that the politicisation of caste has little to do with the individual’s traditional caste 
identity that existed before caste became a factor in elections. According to this view, the new, political 
form of caste is artificially imposed, or even created to suit the needs of politicians to garner support and 
to mould an electorate on supposedly pre-modern lines. Indeed, there may be some incidental truth to 
this claim. But this interpretation seriously underestimates the personal attachment of people to their  
caste identity and, at  the same time, overlooks the hard facts that make invoking caste identity an 
attractive option politically. As Susan Bayly argues:
Despite all  that the politicians and the law-makers have done to make caste real for modern Indians,  
awareness of jati  and varna distinctions has come from within as well  as outside and above the local 
environment. It has been the pressures and insecurities of everyday life in both towns and villages that 
have kept the sacred thread and the caste purana in widespread use across so much of the subcontinent.  
(Bayly 1999: 316)
Thus,  the  politicisation  of  caste  takes  old  identities  and  loyalties,  and  moulds  them  in  a  manner  
compatible with the socio-economic circumstances of Indian modernity. Categories such as SC, ST or 
OBC take over more traditional identities and the reason for this is quite obvious: It simply pays for the 
members of a numerically important caste (or of caste alliances in the case of smaller ones) to increase 
their  bargaining  power  by  invoking  caste  solidarity  in  the  political  arena.  But  the  “pressures  and 
insecurities of everyday life” are a much more fundamental basis for caste in modernity. The other main  
reasons that caste has such a significant presence in contemporary India are to be found beneath the 
political  sphere;  that  is,  it  is  the  economic  reality  of  contemporary  India  that  provides  the  rigid, 
elementary basis for caste. 
106 There have been attempts by Dalit activists to bring caste-based discrimination to a wider, international audience, most  
prominently  at  the  2001  UN  World  Conference  Against  Racism.  Cf.  Visvanathan,  Shiv  (2001),  'The  Race  for  Caste: 
Prolegomena to the Durban Conference', Economic and political weekly, 36 (27), 2512-16.
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3.4. Caste in economic circumstances
Despite  all  the  hype  about  being  a  rising  superpower,  exemplified  by  the  ‘Shining  India’  label,  the  
economic reality for the overwhelming majority of Indians is either of personal experiences of poverty,  
or of the possibility of reduced circumstances in the future. Even with the recent successes in alleviating 
poverty (Kathuria 2008; Kochar 2008; Siggel 2010), India is still home to the largest absolute number of 
people below the poverty line in the world,107 with 41.6 per cent of its population living on less than USD 
1.25 a day (Antony and Laxmaiah 2008; WorldBank 2009). Even for those who are economically well off, 
poverty is visible everywhere and in almost all circumstances. Moreover, with very few exceptions (in  
government  services  or  in  higher  positions  in  private  industry),  the  unpredictability  of  economic 
existence means that poverty could become a reality for many who are statistically not counted as poor  
(cf. Chatterjee 2008). India has no welfare system to speak of, with the state failing all those beyond the 
reach of its poverty alleviation programmes, and the most immediate safety net for the individual is the  
family. This implies that the family in India has essential economic functions as a social and economic  
safety net, and also helps explain why the family is considered such an integral part of life by most 
Indians. And, finally, through highlighting the institution that is seen as the extension of the core family,  
this reveals the economic foundation of caste. 
India’ economy is, then, still largely characterised by scarcity and unpredictability. Basic necessities are in 
short supply and the general perception is of massive competition in all facets of life, from education to  
employment. Income as well as wealth distribution is perceived as highly unequal, even though official  
numbers do not necessarily support this perception(Claudia 2006; Jha 2000). As large numbers of the 
population are living at or close to the subsistence level,  rising food prices or shortages can have a 
critical impact on millions of people  (Kiresur et al. 2006). The hikes in food prices in 2007 and 2008 
(Singh 2009) forced the government to take emergency steps to prevent a hunger crisis. Thus, it is a  
pressing reality  for a majority of  the population that income is  all-too often uncertain,  in the large 
informal economy as well as elsewhere. Since India's economy is for the large part neither regulated nor 
taxed but, rather, informal (Harriss-White 2002; Kundu and Sharma 2001; Maiti and Sen 2010; Mathew 
1995),108 economic insecurity is not counter-balanced by a reliable institutional fall back for those who 
subsist there. The well-documented policy initiatives to address this problem – namely the National  
Rural  Employment  Guarantee  Scheme  and  the  Social  Security  for  Unorganised  (Informal)  Workers 
(Kannan 2010) – have reduced the hardships of insecurity somewhat, but this is still far from a solution 
for the fundamental dilemma. 
107 The  measurement  of  ‘below-poverty-line’  status  itself  is  politically  contested,  see:  Bina  Fernandez,  'Poor  Practices: 
Contestations around ‘Below Poverty Line’ Status in India', Third World Quarterly, 31/3 (2010), 415 - 30.
108 For an overview of the literature on the multidimensional consequences of the ‘in-formalisation’ of India's economy, see 
Barbara Harriss-White, 'Work and Wellbeing in Informal Economies: The Regulative Roles of Institutions of Identity and the  
State', World Development, 38/2 (2010), 170-83.
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Even if famines are unlikely nowadays, the insecurity of the market economy, and the general fact that  
for a large number of Indians the loss of livelihood is a real possibility, make a security net a necessary. 
One very common consequence is the strategy of employing caste both as a marker of a shared identity,  
to create a base for solidarity with other members of the same or a similar caste, and to exploit network  
connections based on caste associations. 
Indeed, in uncertain times, a wide range of ‘modern’ Indian businesses have continued to find that profit  
margins can be protected or enhanced by pooling assets and sharing information within established kin 
and caste networks. (Bayly 1999: 321)
In  very  basic  and simplified terms,  caste  and caste  organisations  are  an adaptation to this  state  of 
economic  unpredictability.  Structurally  situated  between  families  and  the  state,  caste  organisations 
bridge a gap that neither families nor state organisations are able or willing to cover. Because they pool  
the resources of more members, caste organisations are clearly better at providing a safety net than  
simple family connections, even if individual members could expect more loyalty from their own families 
(cf. 3.5). While a family is in most cases simply unable to exert any political influence, caste associations,  
especially those of large and powerful caste or caste groups, are a powerful force in the struggle for  
public  resources.  Thus,  India’s  economic  circumstances,  plus  the  pre-existing  caste  identities  and 
loyalties, are the prerequisites for the political use of caste and caste alliances as the means to achieve  
greater individual and collective bargaining power. 
But the caste associations’ role is not confined solely to the exercise of political pressure:
As education and entrepreneurship emerge as twin pillars of advancement in modern India, historically  
wealthy castes play an interesting, often covert, role in shaping opportunities. Caste associations organize 
private schools, colleges and charitable trusts through which members obtain scholarships and loans for  
higher education. While these schools are ostensibly open to all, members of the caste that established  
the school often receive priority. Scholarships are given based on recommendations from members of the 
caste-based governing body. For rural students, educational opportunities in cities are governed by their  
ability  to  obtain  subsidized  dormitory  accommodations.  A  search  of  hostels  in  Mumbai  turns  up 
dormitories with such identifiable caste names as “Lad Baniya” and “Modh Baniya.” In addition to caste-
based educational  opportunities,  many  caste  organizations  have also  managed to  set  up cooperative 
banks, initially set up to serve caste members, and where caste members continue to retain considerable  
clout. The tiny caste of Saraswat Brahmins is associated with a surprisingly large number of banks. This 
access to capital is reflected in the fact that when IHDS enumerated the source of loans obtained in the  
preceding five years, of the households that took out a loan, 39% of the Brahmins borrowed from a bank  
or credit society while only 18% of the dalit households did so. Among dalits, an overwhelming number  
resorted to private moneylenders, paying a considerably higher rate of interest than if they had been able 
to borrow from a bank. These are just a few examples of the way in which castes manage to parlay their  
historical  privileges  into  opportunities  for  their  members  and  often  use  the  vehicles  –  such  as  tax-
deductible status – provided by the Indian state. (Desai 2008: 26) 
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Without invoking traditional caste hierarchies, economic disparities between castes can – as portrayed 
above – survive in a modern, market-based economy. 
Since it offers its members real economic benefits, caste is more than a residual institution, but an active  
agent  in  modernising  India.  Some  theoretical  economists  see  caste  primarily  as  means  to  enforce 
contracts in the wider sense  (Freitas 2008).109 Depending on the actual  interaction between groups, 
caste can exert pressure on its members by controlling social goods, e.g. access to a marriage network,  
that provide considerable benefits. Depending on circumstances, caste can therefore have a disciplining  
effect on its members. More generally, a shared caste identity potentially provides mutual recognition as 
equals and a basis for trust relationships. As Barbara Harris-White puts it: 
Caste membership still affords the trust necessary for informal or illegal dealings, both within the formal  
sector and between the formal sector and the State. It still provides the network necessary for contacts, 
for subcontracting and for labour recruitment within the informal economy. (Harriss-White 2003a: 178)
As trust  is  a  precious and essential  prerequisite for  business dealings  (Bachmann and Zaheer 2006; 
Huemer 1998), and even more so in a largely informal economy (Harriss-White 2003b), membership of a 
caste, which helps to establish this trust, is a real asset for the individual concerned. 
All this has implications beyond domestic dealings within a caste. In the face of the sheer diversity and  
pluralism of Indian society, caste functions as a marker of identity that structures and reduces chaos and  
complexity for all parties concerned. Once caste gets interpreted in an essentialist way (Bhatia and Stam 
2005;  Gil-White  2001;  Mahalingam  2003),110 it  conflates  socially-induced  perceptions  about  specific 
castes with the members of those specific castes, thereby reducing complexity. Against a backdrop of  
general contingency, it provides preformed expectations of people that are not personally known to each 
other.  And  this,  in  turn,  can  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  economic  behaviour  of  the  parties 
concerned (Hoff and Pandey 2004, 2005). Since caste carries notions of quite distinct characteristics – 
i.e. that a person from a  Brahmin caste would be well-mannered and gentle, with natural authority, 
while a non-vegetarian Shudra would perhaps be immoral and untrustworthy – the classifying of people 
into castes implies a concurrent categorising of their personal characteristics. As long as the actual Jati 
can be allocated to some position in the social matrix (perhaps informed by Varna), existing perceptions 
or prejudices are automatically applied to individuals within that Jati.
Thus, it would be fair to assume that caste has a real role in the economy of India today. However, while  
virtually nobody would contest the economic function of the family in India, the situation is different for 
caste, and this requires further consideration. Caste is certainly subordinated in importance to the family 
in most economic respects. Caste has neither direct control over the individual nor can it provide the 
immediate support that a family can. André Béteille is thus correct when he states 
109 Contract enforcement in India is a problem not exclusively confined to the informal sector. 
110 It is indeed a highly controversial and, regrettably, under-researched question the extent to which caste is interpreted in 
essentialist ways. The relevant studies, most often based on socio-psychological methodology, provide a mixed picture. But  
it can safely be assumed that an essentialist view on caste is one important perspective (amongst others) in India.  
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that the family plays a far more active role than caste in reproducing the inequalities associated with the  
new occupational system (Béteille 1991: 13). 
Nevertheless, aside from the most modern sectors of the Indian economy, caste is vital not only for its 
function within political pressure groups, but also as a back-up system for families with small and limited 
resources. Once the resources of the family have reached their limit, the caste (or caste association) is  
often the only leverage that remains. Used in the political sphere, a powerful caste association can lobby  
for  economic  benefits,  with  macro-economic  effects  on economic  and spatial  mobility  (Munshi  and 
Rosenzweig 2009). As long as the membership of castes or caste networks results in economic gains for 
the individual, it becomes risky to leave a caste by intermarriage, or to move to a place where the caste's  
influence is irrelevant. And while caste is already a highly potent force in the rent-seeking behaviours 
prevalent  in  political  circles  (Osborne  2001),111 it  is  not  just  political  lobbying  that  makes  caste 
membership and caste organisations economically attractive. In addition to the survival of supposedly 
traditional  caste  status  stages  –  and  the  rediscovery  of  caste  as  part  of  a  religious  revival 112 –  the 
economy itself provides more than adequate reasons to keep this institution alive. 
However, to further test this assumption, one would need to assess empirical examples. This will  be  
briefly done in the following two sections: First, the changing social prestige of certain castes will be  
related to changes in economic clout in the context of modernisation. Second, the role of castes in  
Indian businesses will be briefly explored, thereby testing the thesis that caste connections provide a 
vital catalyst for business operations. Both examples are somewhat arbitrary, and many others could be  
included, if space and time permitted – although all would eventually confirm the fact that caste plays a  
vital role in India's economy today. 
3.4.1. Interaction between economic changes and Caste perceptions 
The inter-linkage between caste and economy is  fundamentally  reciprocal;  changes in the economic 
circumstances of castes must be accompanied by changes in the way castes are perceived socially. The  
modernisation of the Indian economy cannot be separated from the changing relations between castes,  
and of the social status that is the consequence of, and the basis for, these relationships. The result is a  
mix of traditional and novel perceptions about specific castes and their respective economic role. So, for 
example, the high status generally attributed to clean, non-polluting office work, suited the identity of  
Brahmins,  Vaishyas and  Sanskritisised castes, while at the opposite end, menial jobs that involve the 
handling of polluting substances, remained firmly in the hands of castes traditionally associated with 
each role. The traditional affinity of  Brahmin and Higher Castes to ‘intellectual occupations’ finds its 
expression in their greater representation in jobs in the New Economy (see chpt. 4). On the other hand, 
111 Apparently, this behaviour has a long history, dating back to colonial times. See: Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer, and Rohini 
Somanathan, 'History, Social Divisions, and Public Goods in Rural India', Journal of the European Economic Association, 3/2/3 
(2005), 639-47.
112 Even in the modern interpretation of  caste,  a weak but perceptible connection to the traditional,  religiously-connoted 
interpretation of caste is relevant. See chapter one for details. 
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occupations  considered  polluting  are  still  often exclusively  the  domain  of  Lower  Castes  or  Muslims 
(Bhowmik 2004: 87; Knorringa 1999). 
In the space between the two extremes, however, a transformation has taken place that was as much 
related to the opening up of new possibilities as it was by changing attitudes. The Ezhavas of Kerala 
(equivalent  to  the  Nadars  in  Tamil  Nadu),  whose  traditional  occupation  was  toddy  tapping  –  the 
production of  arrack from coconut palms – are a textbook example  (Osella  and Osella  2000).  Their 
status,  mainly  accorded to them by their  physical  work  and  the  handling  of  a  polluting  substance, 
alcohol, was merely one step above Untouchables before modernisation. However, with a greater social  
tolerance  towards  alcohol,  and  economic  opportunities  in  other  areas,  their  status  rose  as  their 
economic situation improved. Nowadays, Ezhavas are often powerful castes in their respective localities,  
and tend to dominate villages. Due to the power of numbers, they are a considerable political force in 
Kerala, as well as in Tamil Nadu. 
Examples like this one can be found all over India; the point is that caste, and the situation for people  
who consider themselves as caste members, is changing dramatically. Nevertheless, it does not follow 
from this that caste itself is likely to dissolve. Rather, the balance is shifting – though more in the centre  
than at the extreme ends of the caste spectrum – towards more private interpretations, where questions  
of  ethnic  belonging  are  emphasised  while  the  traditional  occupation  loses  importance.  While  the 
economic and political justifications for caste remain strong, the way caste can be practised in modernity  
is fundamentally different.  The idea of a caste system, where every caste has its position vis-á-vis all 
other castes, is functionally connected to a locality where the caste membership is publicly known. The 
anonymity of increasingly urbanised India explains why traditional occupations have increasingly lost 
their  meaning  in  modernity.  In  a  few  cases,  entry  restrictions  or  social  stigma tend  to  keep  some 
occupations exclusive to specific castes:  Priestly positions are still  the domain of  Brahmins,  whereas 
sweepers  are  only  recruited  from  the  lowest  rungs  of  society.  But  in  India’s  modern  sectors  such 
consideration are not an immediate concern. Religious considerations are increasingly overlooked, even 
though the Indian secularism is far from excluding religion out of public life (chpt. 2). 
3.4.2. Caste in business settings 
Although caste undoubtedly plays a role in Indian businesses today, demonstrating this is difficult  –  
especially as limited empirical analysis has been undertaken on the caste and socioeconomic background 
of India’s business elites. However, what research there is seems to point to two parallel developments.  
First, the supposed economic influence of traditional trading castes, associated with the Vaishya Varna, 
is no longer supported by empirical evidence (if, indeed, if it was ever as strong as believed). Second,  
Indian business is dominated by people from higher or landowning castes, who inherit material and non-
material forms of capital (cf. Bourdieu 1986). Nafziger’s study of an industrialising city in coastal Andhra 
Pradesh and the background of 54 entrepreneurs reveals an overrepresentation of  twice-born Higher 
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Castes,  and  –  interestingly  –  Muslims,113 against  an  under-representation  of  Shudra and  Harijans 
(Nafziger 1975, 1978). Nafziger points to the advantages enjoyed by those born into castes and families 
with wealthy backgrounds: 
A period of rapid industrial growth and economic modernization, as in India’s independence era, does not 
remove  the  advantages  of  ascribed  status,  even  in  entrepreneurial  activity  in  manufacturing.  The  
traditional  Indian  upper  classes  –  local  rulers  and  administrators,  landlords,  and  Brahmins  –  whose 
strength is a legacy of the feudal and colonial periods, have allied, and in some cases overlapped, with the  
capitalist, political and bureaucratic elites, most of whom originated from high-income families, to control 
much of the access to key business positions. Families and communities with wealth and position use the 
monopoly advantage resulting from ready access to capital, greater information and mobility, superior 
education and training, privileged access to licenses and concession from government, and the luxury of a  
longer planning horizon, to become industrial entrepreneurs in disproportionate numbers. (Nafziger 1978: 
63)
Thirty years after this research, the extensive study on the caste background of India’s businesses by 
Harish Damodaran (Damodaran 2008), while pointing to changes, confirms the fundamental facts. 
[C]apitalism in India has evolved a long way since Independence and today is fairly well diversified not just  
in  terms of  production profile  […] but  also social  base.  Capital  is  not  the privileged bastion of  a few  
mercantile castes the way it was; its base has expanded to incorporate a wide spectrum of communities. 
However, this ‘inclusive capitalism’ has been more a feature of southern and, to some extent, western 
India. […] This is not so in the North, where businessmen tend to be uniformly Bania-Marwaris or Khatris.  
[…] The group that has, nevertheless, been bypassed in this churning of capital and widening of its social  
base are the Dalits. In our study we did not come across a single Dalit industrialist even  in the South. 
(Damodaran 2008: 312-15)
What Damodaran omits to mention, but which is clearly visible from his landmark study, is a pronounced 
distinction  between dealings  within  a  caste  or  community  and  dealings  with  outsiders.  Most  cases  
described  in  his  book  have  started  out  either  as  family  or  caste-based  enterprise,  with  many  also  
retaining a certain attachment to their social origin. So, for all the widening of the social base, it is still 
overwhelmingly the case that business dealings are enabled and facilitated by the trust resources of the  
social in-group, most often defined in caste terms. 
The  considerable  degree  of  social  mobility  within  India’s  modernisation  has  allowed  previously 
marginalised communities to enter formerly exclusive business circles; even so, success depends a great 
deal  on  the  capital  endowment  of  the  caste  and  family  group  of  the  entrepreneur.  And  while  
communities like the Nadars of Tamil Nadu  (Templeman 1996) or Ezhavas of Kerala  (Chandramohan 
113 The case of Andhra Pradesh is indeed atypical for the rest of India. What is now Andhra Pradesh had been ruled by a  
Muslim, the Nizzam of Hyderabad, before independence. Therefore, Muslims are part of the traditional elite in Andhra  
Pradesh, whereas in the rest of India they are primarily seen as economically marginal religious minority. See:  C.V. Subba 
Rao,  Hyderabad: The Social Context of Industrialisation, 1875-1948 (New Delhi:  Orient Longman, 2007). and  Eric Lewis 
Beverley, 'Muslim Modern: Hyderabad State, 1883--1948', Ph.D. diss (Harvard University (publication number AAT 3285574),  
2007).
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1987; Osella and Osella 2000), that would be considered low in the traditional hierarchy, have emerged 
as powerful business groups, the absence of SC / ST businesses is in need of explanation. Furthermore, 
while the influence of traditional trading castes was never as strong in Southern and Eastern India as in 
their traditional stronghold of North Western India, there are still areas where they dominate the local 
economies. 
Within ongoing modernisation, (higher) education is seen as increasingly important, with such education 
often seen as a road to social  mobility.  However,  as is  already obvious,  all  occupations that require  
tertiary education tend to be dominated by Hindu Higher Castes.114 A look at NSSO data of 1999-2000 on 
the caste composition115 of Indian graduates reveals a clear trend: Hindu Upper Castes, who make up 
36.9  per  cent  of  India's  urban  population,  make  up  62.1  to  66.8  per  cent  of  graduates  in  tertiary  
education, depending on the subject (Deshpande 2006: 2439). Even if the ‘Hindu Upper Caste’ is taken 
as a residual category, calculated by excluding all other options,116 and is not clearly defined,117 the sheer 
size of this over-representation indicates the survival of economic inequalities along caste lines. Thus, if  
exact data on caste were be available, it would (with a probability bordering on certainty) reveal the 
same basic facts: Historically advantaged castes can translate their economic power into success in the 
skill-based economy by financing  the education of  their  children,  something less  advantaged castes 
struggle to afford. The whole procedure of affirmative action has not fundamentally changed this fact, 
even if some successes are visible in historical perspective. Higher education, and the financial means to  
afford it,  acts as filter for occupations in the knowledge-based economy, and this filter is  not caste-
neutral. 
3.5. Concentric circles: The relationship of Caste and Family 
The economic role of the family has been raised before, and its vital function in Indian society cannot be  
underestimated (Uberoi 2003). What is missing, however, is a clear disambiguation that distinguishes the 
role of the family from that of caste. There has been considerable confusion about this issue, most of it  
based on a somewhat outdated (or completely missing) theoretical model of caste. In the contemporary 
debate, an argument is presented that caste is losing its economic functions in the family, as the latter  
provides a much more close-knit and flexible form of economic back-up for the individual. There is some  
114 The caste composition of the IT industry, which is at the heart of this thesis, will be described in chapter four, and need not  
be discussed here.
115 Unfortunately, official Indian statistics only reveal the categories of SC, ST, OBC and General Caste (or Forward Caste) for  
Hindus, plus religious minorities. 
116 The NSSO does not ask for specific castes, so “Hindu Upper Caste” here means essentially  NOT SC, ST or OBC, NOR Non-
Hindu. There is indeed some room for possible statistical error here, but since the overall trend is so clear greater statistical  
accuracy would not change the wider picture.
117 It could well be that some  Shudra caste, who are not entitled to benefits under the OBC label, feature here as “Upper 
Castes” since they would be classified as “General Category” as long as they are not part of any other category. Therefore, 
the classification used in official Indian statistics is somewhat inaccurate in caste terms. But since economic conditions are 
the basis for classifications of castes into OBC or general category, the general category should comprise only castes that are  
economically relatively well off. 
90
truth to this claim, but I would contend that the contrast between caste and family is not as theoretically  
significant as it first appears.118 When André Béteille, one of the most distinguished living sociologists of 
India, writes about caste, he appears to contrast it with family:
But all things considered, it will be safe to say that the family plays a far more active role than caste in  
reproducing the inequalities associated with the new occupational  system. The retreat  of  caste as an  
active agent for the reproduction of inequality at the upper levels, and the continuing, if not increasing,  
importance of  the family constitute two of the most striking features of  contemporary Indian society. 
(Béteille 1991: 13)
While he portrays them as opposing forces, a complementary co-existence between family and caste  
would be a much better analysis of their mutual relationship. Families are, of course, not at the same 
societal level as castes – they can be seen as a subdivision of caste, or, vice-versa, the basic building 
blocks for caste. In both cases, their social role in the reproduction of inequalities, as well as elsewhere,  
depends on their respective weight, and since families are much closer to the individual, they serve 
much better as institutions in an individualised working environment. So the core of Béteille's argument  
would be that in a more individualistic society, where the economic benefits are closer to the individual,  
the more the family gains importance over caste.  The change that Béteille  describes is  a change of 
emphasis,  not a fundamental  change in the structure in the relation between caste and family.  The 
connection of caste and family can be explored further by empirical means, thereby establishing the  
crucial  links  without  reference  to  the  theoretical  model.  The  institution  of  dowry  serves  as  an  
illuminating example. 
3.5.1. Caste and Dowry 
The  one  phenomenon  where  caste-,  family-  and  economic  considerations  are  most  obviously 
interconnected is the dowry system. Although it has a long tradition in India and elsewhere (S. Anderson 
2003), dowry has specific significance in contemporary India, with the spread of this practice indicating  
that it (and caste itself) is unlikely to lose its social and economic importance with modernisation in 
India. Arguably, the growing importance of dowry, visible both in the spatial spread of the institution and 
the increasing  amounts  of  money involved,  proves  that  caste  is  indeed a crucial  factor  in  marriage 
decisions, in addition to family and economics. 
Siwan  Anderson  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  rise  of  dowry  payments  cannot  be  explained  by  
modernisation alone, but by the combination of modernisation and the survival of caste: 
The model developed here contrasts caste- and non-caste-based societies. In the former, there exists an 
inherited component to status (caste) that is independent of wealth; in the latter, wealth is the primary  
determinant of status. Modernization comprises two components: an increase in average wealth across 
the society and increased wealth dispersion within status groups. The paper's main result is that, in the 
118 In the modern interpretation of caste, where the family is seen as the originator of caste, the distinction is indeed artificial  
as caste is simply an agglomeration of a number of families. However, the alternative modes of interpretation, most notably  
the classic model, provide a much clearer distinction between the two institutions. 
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caste case, the increased dispersion in wealth accompanying modernization necessarily leads to increases 
in dowry payments,  whereas in the non-caste case,  increased dispersion has no real  effect  on dowry 
payments and increasing average wealth causes the payments to decline. (S. Anderson 2003: 273)
Without going into detail,119 it can safely be assumed that dowry is a prevalent custom in most parts of 
India today.120 Sharada Srinivasan, for example, argues that, while dowry was historically restricted to the 
Upper Caste spectrum in South India, it has now become an all-caste phenomenon (S. Srinivasan 2005). 
Despite opposition from women's advocates and the women concerned (P. Srinivasan and Lee 2004), the 
institution of dowry is gaining ground in India. Economic growth is largely cited as reason for an inflation  
of dowry, but the spread of the practice to formerly unaffected parts of India (Self and Grabowski 2009), 
seems  to  indicate  a  role  for  other  factors.  Since  dowry  practice  is  in  obvious  contrast  to  Indian 
demographics – that is, with men in the majority and women in short supply, this should boost bride 
prices  rather  than  dowry  –  social  factors  and  not  demographics  must  be  employed  to  explain  its  
existence (K. Banerjee 1999; compare Botticini and Siow 2003). 
Analytically, most authors argue that earning differentials between men and women, and, in the case of  
hypergamy, status differences between castes, are the primary motives for the practice. Both caste and  
family are,  at least for those who practise dowry, seen as economic in-groups, with restricted entry  
conditions and benefits for the members of the groups. For the individual, economic benefits are more 
directly  attached to the family,  with  caste  being  primarily  a  status  reservoir;  nonetheless,  both are  
essentially seen as economic assets to be protected from outsiders. In fact, the role of social prestige in 
dowry practices should not be underestimated, as Marguarite Roulet indicates:
Dowry  [...]  is  not  merely  an  institution  confined  to  the  valorisation  of  marriage,  but  serves  more  
importantly as a central institution to define social prestige and status and thus becomes an important  
dimension of people’s representations of themselves and others.(Roulet 1996: 91)
Apart from the few cases of inter-caste marriages,121 marriage restrictions are a mean to control access 
to the economic benefits of membership in caste networks  (Luke et al. 2004; Munshi and Rosenzweig 
2006), with the rising dowry prices only underlining the economic importance of gaining access to these 
networks. Even if caste-based networks’ influence would eventually decline in the future, they still have  
a viable function, especially for economically weak members of society with otherwise limited means 
(Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005). Be it prestige, or be it the earning potential of the husband-to-be (and in 
a few cases the wife-to-be), the dowry is a reflection of the value of marriage, not as a romantic bonding  
of two individuals; but overwhelmingly as an alliance of two families within the framework of a shared 
119 Carol Upadhya provides a discussion of anthropological theories on the meaning of dowry in India: Carol Boyack Upadhya, 
'Dowry and Women's Property in Coastal Andhra Pradesh', Contributions to Indian Sociology, 24/1 (1990), 29-59.
120 Dowry costs  provide one of  the main explanations for  the widespread abortion of  female foetuses,  and the resulting  
unequal gender composition of India's population.
121 Empirically,  only around 6 per cent  of marriages in India are inter-caste marriages.  Sonalde Desai  et al.,  'India  Human 
Development Survey (Ihds) [Computer File]', in Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [Distributor]  
(ed.), ICPSR22626-v8 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Maryland and National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi 
[producers], 2007). 
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caste identity.122 As long as caste considerations play a role in marriages – and the fact that 94 per cent of  
marriages amongst Hindus in India are intra-caste marriages  (Desai et al. 2007) strongly indicates this 
role – the practice of dowry reveals the connection between caste and family, on the one hand, and 
economic  and  prestige  considerations,  on  the  other.  Dowry  is  indeed  imaginable  without  a  caste 
dimension, as comparative history indicates (S. Anderson 2003), but in its current form in India, it is an 
indicator of both the power of family and caste, and of the relative strength of the latter.
3.6. Conclusion
As discussed in this chapter, caste had a function before the liberalisation of the Indian economy and, 
today, continues to fulfil a vital role in the lives of many, if not most, Indians. Rather than being a hollow  
tradition  or  a  fading  remnant  of  past  social  conventions,  it  is  still  intrinsically  linked  to  India’s 
modernising society. But because caste operates on different levels, in various circumstances, and is not  
always  immediately  obvious,  often  only  a  partial  assessment  is  possible.  Nevertheless,  the  above 
discussion of how caste operates in politics, the economy, the family and, specifically, in the practices of  
dowry should be sufficient to highlight the importance and impact of caste in daily life. Even if changes in  
the economic working of society deeply affect caste, it cannot be expected to wither away in the near 
future. In the economic sphere, caste often provides an exclusive, if improvised, safeguard against the 
vagaries of existence for millions of Indians. In the economy, as well as in politics, associations based on  
caste membership find their niche in the relative vacuum left by other institutions. The lack of economic 
certainty, the impotence of the judicial system in enforcing contracts, the absence of an equalitarian and  
comprehensive  education system affordable  to  all,  and  the  dearth  of  alternative  means  of  political  
representation  for  marginal  castes  and  communities,  all  open  the  door  for  a  social  role  for  caste.  
Consequently, caste association or political parties based on caste tend to bridge this gap. 
In the modern reinterpretation of caste, the institution acts first and foremost as an extension of the 
family.  This  helps  to  explain  the  institutionalisation  of  economic  inequalities  over  generations,  as 
indicated by the different success rates of castes in the tertiary education system. It also provides the  
background for the survival and recent extension of dowry practices. By restricting and controlling access 
to valuable status levels and marriage networks, caste has a crucial importance in preserving economic 
benefits over the course of generations. For individuals, caste provides a marker of identity both for  
themselves  and  for  generalised  others  who  encounter  them.  Knowing  the  caste  origins  of  those  
encountered in public  helps to reduce contingency by relying on caste  stereotypes. Regardless of how 
accurate these preconceptions are, they nevertheless smooth everyday interaction between people with  
no previous knowledge of each other. This fact would also help to explain why caste is often hidden in  
the  public  sphere.  For  the  individual,  caste  can  be  either  a  source  of  personal  reassurance  or  
122 Again, this is relevant for the large majority of intra-caste marriages only. 
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embarrassment, depending on the status and history of the respective caste. For those from Higher  
Caste background, caste is often invoked to create a sense of time-honoured rootedness in history and 
culture, in contrast to the bewildering and ever-changing modern environment. Equally, caste can be a 
reminder of a dark and embarrassing past for those from Lower Castes, with all its negative connotations 
still alive in the public consciousness. In both cases, caste has an identifying function that is independent 
of actual socio-economic circumstances. 
Overall, it appears highly unlikely that caste will vanish from Indian society anytime soon. The roles it  
fulfils are still needed today, and will continue to be in the near future. The perspective taken here does  
allow for predictions about the future of caste, albeit not a concrete timeframe. Once an individual 
defines his or her identity in different terms than that of caste, the institution of caste significantly loses  
its authority. When the public debate acknowledges and identifies a person not by reference to his or  
her caste but by, say, professional achievements, educational qualifications and the like, then caste loses  
yet  another  of  its  socio-economic  supports.  If,  after  further  economic  and  political  change,  caste 
associations become unnecessary because other institutions replace them, caste will certainly retreat 
from the public sphere. And were the political and legal benefits accruing to caste membership to be  
abolished, another lifeline would be lost. Generally speaking, if the overlap of caste and class, or the  
connection of economic status with caste position, was reduced towards insignificance, caste would lose 
most of its economic and political clout. If,  in the end, private decisions were to follow in the same  
direction, caste would lose its most important control mechanism; that is, if  marriage alliances were 
based on criteria other than caste considerations – or, more radically, sexual norms were liberalised so 
that sexual partners could be freely and exclusively chosen by individual consent – caste would be gone  
within a generation. 
Nevertheless, these remain distant possibilities. Many of the necessary social adjustments are not even  
under way, while others are only just visible in a very small sub-section of the Indian population; thus, a  
variety of scenarios with regard to caste seem imaginable. How caste develops within a specific segment 
of society much depends on the convergence of all the factors discussed above. India’s most advanced 
industries – the torch-bearers of  modernisation in the new middle classes – could provide valuable  
insights into the future of caste. And because IT (and, to a lesser extent, ITES) can arguably be seen as 
symbols for a particular version of India’s future, an analysis of the role of caste in this context would  
provide an estimate of the direction of change this country is likely to take. This will be the topic of the  
empirical chapters to come. 
94
4. Focussing on the Empirical Research 
In the following chapter, the topic of this thesis will be framed within its socio-political, economic and 
spatial contexts. First, the social milieu of the research setting, the new Indian middle classes, will be 
sketched out and then analysed in respect of its socio-cultural significance within Indian society. Second,  
the Indian IT industry will be examined – first, in relation to its societal role, and then, with regard to its  
internal workings. The IT industry and the new middle classes are, of course, not identical; they are,  
though, intrinsically linked in that the former has come to symbolically represent the latter, and the 
latter, in turn, provides the social backdrop for the former. Together, their recent rise and prominence 
represents  a  decisive  break  with  India's  past,  and  this  could  provide  interesting  insights  into  how 
seemingly traditional institutions like caste operate in this new environment. A short appraisal of the  
relevance of caste will follow, to link the discussion to the general topic of this thesis. This will not be  
overly detailed – due to the lack of data and the available space here – but it will nevertheless ground 
the empirical research in the chapters to follow. 
Following that discussion, the spatial setting of this study – the South Indian city of Bangalore – will be  
examined. The specifics of this (perceived or real) centre of the Indian IT industry require consideration 
as it is distinct from other localities in several ways. The term ‘Bangalore’ itself has come to symbolise 
India’s IT development, even though less than half of India’s IT output is generated in Karnataka’s capital.  
Up until the present, and with the exception of a few enclaves in the North and the West, India’s IT  
sector is mainly clustered in half a dozen cities or so in the South, with Bangalore still being by far the  
biggest.  The  city,  which  is  still  regarded  as  synonymous  with  Indian  IT  by  the  outside  world  and  
domestically, is not only home to the headquarters of two of India’s top five IT companies, but is perhaps 
the most ‘all-Indian’ centre of IT, due to its supra-regional attraction of talent. Bangalore is thus a human 
magnet, drawing technical graduates from all over India and throwing them into a melting pot where  
nearly every cultural background can find its niche. Since the teeming city is not dominated by any  
particular community it  provides open pastures (metaphorically)  for most newcomers.  On the other  
hand, the rising cost of living threatens those residents who cannot compete with the salaries prevalent  
in the IT sector. Finally, since I lived in the BTM layout for most of the research, the specifics of this  
particular quarter will be briefly discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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4.1. India's new middle classes 
While the IT industry and its employees remain the primary focus of this study, the new middle classes 
deserve attention for a variety of reasons: First and foremost, the 70-250 million people making up the 
new middle classes123 include IT or ITES employees, who number roughly 2 million. And even though 
these IT employees make up only a small share of the diverse middle classes, IT tends to symbolise the  
apparent differences between the new and the established middle classes. Moreover, since the new 
middle classes are unthinkable without the role of private industry, and IT has come to epitomise their  
new prominence, they exist in a kind of symbolic symbiosis. IT is a status-bearing reference system and, 
incidentally,  a  recruitment  base  for  these  classes,  as  well  as  providing  the  industry  with  a  social 
foundation for leverage in the political struggle for influence. To the Indian public, both the IT industry  
and the new middle classes act as symbols and trailblazers for a more-capitalistic, less state-centred 
vision of India’s future. Their intermingling in the private service sector puts them in stark contrast to the  
established, traditionally-oriented middle class, who were mainly recruited from the ranks of the middle 
and higher bureaucracy. Because this carries with it numerous social implications, a short appraisal of 
the middle classes seems justifiable in the context of this thesis. 
4.1.1. What is ‘new’ in the new middle classes?
The modernisation of  India is  economically  and symbolically  connected to the emergence of  a  new 
sociological category, distinct from the traditional Indian middle classes. This new class is distinguished 
most obviously  by  its  growing size and buying  power.  According to  the ‘economist  cheerleaders’  of  
McKinsey, the new middle classes are expected to grow from five per cent of the population to more 
than 40 per cent by 2025, which would equate to nothing less than 583 million people  (Beinhocker 
2007).  A  more sober analysis  puts their  number today at  somewhere between 70 and 250 million, 
depending on the how the class is defined and which purchasing power parity (PPP) model is applied  
(Sridharan 2004: 405). And whichever of the numerous academic definitions of ‘middle class’ is adopted 
– most commonly households with at least a third of income disposable (Eisenhauer 2008) – the empiric 
reality in India is hard to access. However small the middle classes’ share of the total population might 
be, their socio-cultural significance far outweighs their economic clout. 
Despite the cultural importance of this new group in setting forth a new image of India, the highly mobile 
and  skilled  “knowledge  workers”  who  constitute  the  new  middle  class  to  a  large  extent,  form 
proportionally what can only be understood as an elite. (S. Radhakrishnan 2007: 149)
As  a  class  of  people,  they  represent  both  the  advocates  and  perceived  beneficiaries  of  economic 
liberalisation. Politically, the class appears ambivalent about the Congress Party, with the apparent swing  
123 The term class is not used in the precise and selective Marxian sense here. It rather refers to a vague concept based on  
mode of income (in the service sector), educational level and social orientation. However, since the term ‘middle classes’ is  
widely adopted in the literature, it will be used in this sense here with the acknowledgment that it is a popular, not scientific  
concept.
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towards the BJP seeming temporary, at least from today's perspective. However, the most distinctive 
feature of the new middle classes is still very clear: Socio-economically, as well as culturally, their rise  
presents  a  fundamental  shift  from  state-centred  developmentalism  to  a  privatised  ideal  of  the 
consumer-citizen. 
The  most  common founding  myth  about  the  new middle  classes  traces  its  emergence  to  the  split  
between the traditional middle class and the Indian state in the early 1980s, when electoral politics were 
becoming increasingly influenced by identity politics, ostensible favouring hitherto neglected minorities,  
such as SCs, STs, Muslims or OBCs (Jaffrelot 2001, 2003). At the same time, the cautious enactment of 
more business-friendly policies under Indira and, later, Rajiv Gandhi, and the subsequent accelerated 
economic growth, opened up opportunities for those who found themselves ousted from their previous  
domain, the government service. While the old middle class, tiny in size but highly influential on the  
national character of India, was oriented towards the Nehruvian ideal of self-denying service for the 
good of society, the new middle classes were of the opinion that these political policies had failed; if the  
Nehruvian vision of Indian development had been feasible, the results would have shown after three 
decades of independence. Moreover, the new middle classes, angered by ‘identity politics’,124 cronyism, 
corruption  and  the  staggering  inefficiencies  in  the  public  sector,  began  to  regard  official  politics 
increasingly as merely a battle-ground for the redistribution of resources  (cf. Chhibber and Eldersveld 
2000;  Economist  1997).  And  because  the  new  middle  classes,  as  well  as  the  old  one,  were 
overwhelmingly recruited from High Caste backgrounds  (Deshpande 2003a;  Sheth 1999),  they could 
neither claim the influence of large numbers nor the privileges of affirmative action. In consequence, 
bitter at the demise of their former domain, they eagerly embraced the promise of the market economy. 
While this founding myth is not just plucked from thin air, neither is it a historically accurate account. As  
with any founding myth, it shows signs of deliberate creation and therefore cannot be taken at face  
value. For example, the juxtaposition of traditional and new middle classes is, at times, so excessively  
inflated that the two seem to take mutually irreconcilable positions in an embittered ideological conflict.  
Upon closer examination, however, a more gradual generational change is apparent between the two 
camps; indeed, the separation of ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ Indian middle classes is somewhat artificial,  
since both have much in common, not least their recruitment base. However, at least in theoretical  
terms, the new middle classes are economically based in the private sector, whereas the traditional ones  
are/were mainly composed of government employees. 
4.1.2. Beyond the hype – who are the new Indian middle classes?
The considerable emphasis on the ‘new’ Indian middle classes, both inside and outside academia, tends  
to  oversimplify  the  picture;  presenting  the  new  middle  classes  as  monolithic,  with  a  single  socio-
124 That is, essentially, all politics that are not directed at universal political objectives, but enacted or promoted to attract  
followers of a certain social identity in favour of others.
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economic orientation.125 By the most common definition, anyone who works in the private service sector 
is  a  member  of  the  middle  classes  (Arabandi  2009),  although  this  somewhat  underestimates  the 
complexity of the middle classes. With only a little exaggeration, it appears legitimate to attribute the  
creation of the new middle class image to the media and the marketing industry; as Leela Fernandes 
observes:
Advertising and media images have contributed to the creation of an image of a “new” Indian middle 
class, one that has left behind its dependency on austerity and state protection and has embraced an open 
India that is at ease with broader processes of globalization. In this image, the newness of the middle class  
rest on its embrace of social practices of taste and commodity consumption that mark a new cultural  
standard that is specifically associated with liberalization and the opening of the Indian market to the  
global economy. […] In this process, the new (urban) Indian middle class becomes a central agent for the 
revisioning of the Indian nation in the context of globalization. (Leela Fernandes 2000: 89)
Economists,  especially  those  with  a  Western  background,  often  (over-)emphasise  the  potential  of 
modern India as an outlet for consumer products.126 The alignment of research with the commercial 
interest of companies tends to simplify the picture, biasing it towards a non-analytical and uncritical  
assessment of this social class. On closer examination, it would be more accurate to describe the term 
‘new middle classes’ as relating as much to aspirations as to actual grounding in economic prosperity. 
Against the simplistic view equating the new middle classes with the highest income percentiles, and  
automatically with abundant purchasing power, empirical evidence indicates that large numbers of the 
self-declared middle classes actually live on incomes that barely allow a middle class lifestyle. Fernandes,  
for example, points to the aspiring members of the middle classes in Mumbai who survive on salaries of  
little more than INR4000, and who work under conditions that are nothing like the image of empowered,  
professional work environments (Leela Fernandes 2000).127 Caught between the rising costs of living and 
the (costly) aspirations associated with the very term ‘middle class’, the economic conditions of many  
middle class members are both more wretched and more vulnerable than most (economic) observers  
acknowledge. Compared with the Indian median income, the new middle classes certainly enjoy greater 
affluence. However, while even optimistic estimates128 assume that only 6 million households in India 
have an income above INR215,000 per annum (with an average household size of 4.8 members), it is  
clear that even the richest members of the middle classes cannot afford profligate lifestyles, much less 
its poorer members (Lange et al. 2009: 284).
125 For an attempt to disambiguate the numerous definitions of ‘middle classes’, and the inherent impossibility of finding a 
common  denominator,  see:  Section  16.2.2  “How  Homogeneous  or  Heterogeneous  are  the  ‘New  Middle  Classes’?”  in 
Hellmuth Lange, Lars Meier, and N. S. Anuradha, 'Highly Qualified Employees in Bangalore, India: Consumerist Predators?', 
in Lars Meier and Hellmuth Lange (eds.), The New Middle Classes (Springer Netherlands, 2009), 281-98. 
126 Indeed, many economic assessments seem exclusively motivated by this market potential; see for example, the study by 
McKinsey  Eric D;  Farrell  Beinhocker, Diana;  and Zainulbhai,  Adil  S.  ,  'Tracking the Growth of India's Middle Class',  The 
McKinsey Quarterly, /3 (2007), 50 - 83.
127 While salaries have risen since 2000 (when the study was conducted), a large number of young IT engineers still live in  
shared rooms as paying guests, in contrast to the standard assumption that a prestigious middle class profession equals a  
luxurious lifestyle
128 These estimates are for 2005/2006 and are, admittedly, somewhat dubious. 
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Moreover, the new middle classes’ relatively high level of affluence comes with an economic insecurity 
that was unknown to their predecessors. While jobs in government service (broadly defined) provided 
low-paying  but  stable  career  paths  for  the  traditional  middle  classes,  the  advent  of  more  market-
oriented  business  models  has  eroded  one  of  the  fundamental  aspects  of  the  old  middle  classes;  
economic  predictability.  And  whereas  consumerist  aspirations  provide  the  impetus  to  embrace  
capitalism, the downside is an instability and unpredictability most severely felt amongst the new middle  
classes. Furthermore, the change from a state- to a market-centred model of society cannot adequately  
be described as voluntary; rather, it was the result of an economic emergency – the crisis of 1991 (Cerra 
and Saxena 2002; Nayak et al. 2005). Thus, the popular notion that economic liberalisation was brought 
about by the aspiring middle classes is mistaken in its confusion of cause and effect  (Raj Nayar 2002). 
And  even  today,  that  most  revered  amongst  members  of  the  middle  classes  is  economic  stability, 
provided that a certain level  of affluence has already been achieved.  In effect, this  complicates any 
simple conclusions about the (supposed) symbiotic co-evolution of Indian capitalism and its new middle  
classes. 
In  a  nutshell,  the  new middle  classes  in  India  are  neither  the ideological  adherents  of  Manchester  
capitalism, nor the economically powerful new force in the global consumer market. Against all contrary  
claims by cheerleading economists, the rise of the new middle classes signifies a gradual re-orientation 
of values rather than a cultural revolution. 
4.1.3. The symbolic impact and social role of the new middle classes
As argued above, it would be wrong to portray the middle classes as a homogeneous block of people  
with the same worldview, orientations  or  aspirations.  In reality,  no overarching  ideology appears  to 
accord  with  the  sheer  diversity  of  the  class.  However,  concurrent  with  the  fundamental  change  in  
economic conditions has been a shift in certain parameters of cultural and socio-economic identity. One 
common  refrain  is  disillusionment  with  state  services  and  with  the  workings  of  democracy; 
consequently, voter turnout in urban, professional constituencies is consistently lower than in rural India 
(D. Gupta 2007; Nikolenyi 2010; Thachil 2009). Another theme is the ostentatious dismissal of identity 
politics, in particular the invocation of caste for political purposes. Justified by the seemingly enlightened 
position that caste is not part of the political power struggle because it is pre-modern, outdated and 
embarrassing, the consensus middle class position is that caste politics as such are illegitimate  (Leela 
Fernandes and Heller 2006). And from a middle class perspective, this makes a great deal of sense: In  
politics based on caste or religious identity, and which put a premium on ‘backwardness’, someone from 
a relatively well-off, High Caste background always loses out. Thus, while the political outlook of the  
middle classes is not necessarily in accord with the Hindu nationalism preached by the BJP and its allies,  
the  latter’s  stand  against  further  caste  quotas  has  ensured  the  support  of  the  middle  classes,  and 
brought them to power in the 1990s (Chandhoke 1999; Raj Nayar 2002).
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Despite popular opinion, however, the contrast between the Indian state and the new middle classes is  
less pronounced than it appears – in fact, the new middle classes are very much in keeping with India’s 
official policies. As Satish Deshpande points out, the prevalent notion of development in India, coupled 
with respective “political ideologies” has changed, and contrasts now with the early Nehruvian, state-
centred vision (Deshpande 1998). The popularity of Marxism and its Indian adaptations in sections of the 
political establishment, not to mention in academia, has ebbed, making way for a cautious embrace of  
capitalism, although not entirely on the Anglo-American model.  The break with the past is obvious in 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s declaration that “it is our ambition to integrate our country 
into the evolving global economy. We accept the logic of globalization”(Rajat K. Gupta 2005: 130). The 
supposed ideological split between the Indian state and the private interests of the new middle classes is 
therefore  mainly  rhetorical,  with  their  fundamental  ideological  alignment  very  much  in  the  same 
direction.129 
Culturally, as visible in popular advertising, the new middle classes are often deliberately portrayed in a  
way that distinguishes them from the traditional image of India, both inside and outside the country. The  
middle classes, in effect, are a consciously created, sanitised contrast to the chaos and poverty that is  
synonymous with India. Not surprisingly, the ideal of neatly ordered domesticity is set against public 
overcrowding and chaos, the nuclear against the extended family, and the globalised outlook against the 
focus on national interest (Leela Fernandes 2006). In a sense, the middle classes are at times burdened 
with unrealistic expectations, and are seen as the antidote to anything that appears wrong or unethical 
in India (Dasgupta 2008).130 Many of these issues are relevant to the context of this thesis, and will be 
raised either in the research chapters or discussed further below. 
4.1.3.1. Hybridity / Westernisation 
The new middle classes are not an entirely internal development in India. Instead, the transformation of  
this section of society was substantially fostered by the exchange, both personally and culturally, with 
the Anglophone nations of the West. In spite of anti-colonial rhetoric about India’s independence from 
Western ideas, a certain admiration for the former colonial rulers, and their successors on the global  
stage, has always existed in the Indian mindset (Malhotra 2001).131 Facilitated by a shared history and a 
common tongue (at least as a shared language for the elites), the bonds of the Commonwealth (and a 
passion for cricket, especially) has retained India’s closeness to the UK, while the US is regarded as role 
model  due  to  its  sheer  economic  success.  Thus,  the  new middle  classes  represent  not  only  those 
129 For this reason, parts of the new middle classes tend to see themselves as the vanguard of India's march to the capitalist  
future, and as a safeguard against a possible return to the Indian socialism of the past. 
130 This article deals with the IT industry, but has indeed implications for the whole new middle classes. 
131 Long before liberalisation, it was a source of pride for a family to have a son or daughter studying or working in either the  
UK, US or Australia. Down to the present day the holder of American Green Cards enjoy a high value at the marriage market  
and this fact gets advertised prominently in marriage advertisements. The statistical acronyms NRI (Non Resident Indian) or  
PIO (Person of Indian Origin) are widely seen as synonym with successful entrepreneurs who serve as role models for a  
significant portion of the new middle classes. The appreciating of the host societies might be very particularly restricted to 
the economic opportunities and living standard, but it nevertheless helps to sustain a positive relationship, both culturally  
and political, with the Anglophone world. 
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economically based in the private rather than the government-controlled sector, but also, to a much  
greater extent,  those leading a cultural  shift  towards a cautious embrace of  global  (and particularly  
Western) notions of the individual’s role in society. In their own eyes at least, the new middle classes are  
spearheading modernisation132 and championing India’s future. Whereas the traditional middle classes 
supposedly adopt the developmental  ideals  of  the socialist  state,  the new middle classes take their  
legitimacy from the capitalist, growth-based claim to development. As Carol Upadhya puts it: 
It must be recalled that until the late 1980s, Nehruvian socialism and autarchy remained the dominant  
economic ideology, but after liberalisation people belonging to the new middle class by and large have 
become  votaries  of  neoliberal  capitalism  and  globalisation.  This  development  paradigm  depends  on  
energy intensive, consumption-oriented economic growth. Moreover, the globalisation of the new middle  
class has meant that they aspire to replicate Western lifestyles in India. (C. Upadhya 2009a: 262)
This  attempted replication  of  Western lifestyles  goes together with  a  much more frankly  expressed 
admiration  for  certain  aspects  of  Western  culture,  or  perceived  Western  ways  of  organisation  and  
business conduct  (Nadeem 2009a).  This is fostered and  enhanced by a wave of immigration and re-
immigration, and the emergence of a very visible Indian Diaspora, both in the UK and the US, in the  
decades since independence. What started as a one-way route for those seeking greater opportunities  
elsewhere has turned into a cycle of  exchange between the Indian motherland and the expatriates 
overseas  (Lakha 1994; Saxenian 2002, 2006). A wide range of private sector initiatives have benefited 
from this steady exchange between India and the Diaspora in addition to IT, although the latter is the 
most prominent example (Leclerc and Meyer 2007; Saxenian 2005; C. Upadhya 2004). Even though most 
members  of  the new middle classes  would still  reject  Narayana Murthy’s  claim that  Europe is  “the 
legitimate, historical leader of this world”  (Murthy 2006: 9),133 and while attitudes to the West remain 
complicated, the relationship is  on more friendly terms.  The result  has been, perhaps ironically,  the 
reinterpretation of what it means to be Indian:
As urban India experiences the optimism of an economic upswing, and the diaspora increasingly engage in  
it, an ideology of ‘‘global Indianness’’ has crystallised - a set of beliefs and practices that are at once tied to 
a global lifestyle and to a deep sense of belonging to the Indian nation. Where previously, Indianness and 
Westernness were opposed to one another, a discourse of global Indianness makes the two compatible; a  
sense of ‘‘Indianness’’ sets the moral and personal boundaries for the material successes available to the 
West. (S. Radhakrishnan 2008: 9)
The new middle classes are unimaginable without the vision of modernisation in line with a perceived  
North American ideal,  although without  much of  its  inherent  complexity.134 The partial  adoption of 
132 As discussed previously (chpt.  2) the very term modernity is contested.  Furthermore, modernity does not constitute a  
single, clear-cut entity. However, in this context, modernity is established primarily in contra-distinction to a constructed  
tradition, that which is seen in India's recent, pre-liberalisation past,  and symbolised by the old elites,  the ‘traditional’  
middle classes.
133 This statement was directed at a European audience and very probably meant to please their ego. Nevertheless, it stands in  
stark  contrast  to  the  antipathy  that  many  traditionally-minded  Indians  display  towards  Western  culture  or  Western 
influence.  
134 This partial and selective adoption of Western notions of economic development tells of a context that is neither neutral in  
terms of cultural values nor in concrete economic consequences.
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Anglo-American  concepts,  most  clearly  seen  in  the  use  of  hybrid  English-Hindi  ‘Hinglish’,  is  visible 
elsewhere; in television, music and sports. Generally, a cultural affinity to the British Commonwealth, as  
well as to the USA, co-exists with the often blatant denial of any cultural influences from the West. 
As in the traditional middle class, the use of English as a lingua franca is a mark of belonging to the new  
middle classes, although with an additional practical function.
Command over English language represents both a form of cultural capital as well as a structural marker of 
middle  class  identity  since the possession of  such language skills  can be transformed into  social  and 
economic capital  in the labor market. In  other words, fluency in English marks an individual with the  
distinction of class culture and locates the individual with the new middle class in socioeconomic terms as 
such linguistic skills are a necessary component for access to the new economy and skilled jobs.  (Leela 
Fernandes 2006: 69)
English is thereby again emphasised as a status-enhancer with economic underpinnings  (Ramanathan 
1999). An advantage ever since the colonial period, English proficiency provides a crucial advantage in  
accessing and competing in global markets.
4.1.3.2. Consumption / Consumerism
The new Indian middle classes are a favourite subject of numerous – and often less than reputable – 
economic publications, with the emphasis on present and future consumption patterns  (cf. Farrell and 
Beinhocker  2007).  Membership  of  the  new  middle  classes  is,  according  to  some  scholars,  actually 
defined by  such consumption,135 and equating  the middle  classes  with  consumers  appears  obvious. 
Indeed, the emergence of the new middle classes in India has been enabled – and caused in large part – 
by economic growth after liberalisation. Membership in the new middle classes is thus often primarily  
defined  by  rising  levels  of  affluence  and  conspicuous  patterns  of  consumption.  The  visible  rise  in 
consumerism has  been accompanied by  a marked  opposition from left-leaning critics  of  capitalism, 
orthodox religious leaders and Indian nationalists,  who reject  this  development as Western cultural  
imperialism and/or an obscene display of affluence in the face of wide-spread poverty (Chandhoke 1999; 
Surendra 2010). Nevertheless, the popular myth of the affluent, free-spending, conspicuously consuming 
member of the new middle classes requires further qualification. 
Empirically, there are often surprising disparities between the image of middle-class consumerism and 
reality: Carol Upadhya, in a sample of 132 IT employees, found that only 75 per cent own a mobile 
phone  (a  ubiquitous  item in  India  today),  a  motorcycle  or  a  car  is  owned  by  52  and  42  per  cent  
respectively, whereas 42 per cent possessed real estate, with a further 21 per cent planning to invest in 
that sector (C. Upadhya 2009a: 258). Rather than confirming reckless consumption of non-durables, this 
indicates  a  conscious  safeguarding  against  future  economic  insecurities.  Thus,  as  Leela  Fernandes 
reiterates,  the  supposed  consumption  patterns  of  the  middle  classes  are  actually  extrapolated  and  
135 See, for example, Table 16.1 in Lange, Meier, and Anuradha, 'Highly Qualified Employees in Bangalore, India: Consumerist 
Predators?'.
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generalised from a tiny section of the highest echelons of the new middle classes, and often have little 
basis in the lived reality of other members of the middle classes (Leela Fernandes 2009). Of course, the 
new  middle  classes  in  general  display  different  consumption  behaviour  than  their  less  well-off 
compatriots,  but  it  would  be misguided to assume that  the middle-classes  is  comprised entirely  of  
newly-rich, free-spending hedonists (see 4.1.2). 
4.1.3.3. Gender relations in the new middle classes
The  economic  growth  since  liberalisation  and  the  subsequent  rise  of  the  new middle  classes  have  
benefited women as well as men; the participation of women in the newly emerging jobs in IT and ITES, 
especially, is much higher than their overall  share of the Indian workforce (over 30 per cent in BPO 
versus 14 per cent of the general workforce, according to relevant studies (Remesh 2008; Sandhu 2008)). 
The service sector, the economic mainstay of the new middle classes, appears more open to female 
workers than any other industry. With more women participating in higher education (Jayaweera 1997; 
Narayana 2009),  more  and more career  opportunities  are  becoming gender-neutral.  Relatively  high 
salaries  have given  women greater  economic  freedom and thus  potential  independence from their 
families. The cultural and social change that could – potentially – be triggered by this economic change,  
however, is difficult to fully appraise, with its initial implications ambiguous. 
At  first  glance,  little  change  is  visible  in  the  understanding of  women's  role  in  society,  despite  the 
heightened emphasis on education and a professional career. In the words of B.P. Arabandi, “ Traditional 
family norms have not been abandoned, but modified to suit today's context.”(Arabandi 2009: 103). 
Rather  than  discarding  old  role  models  for  women  in  India,  new  ones  –  for  example,  professional 
careerist or sophisticated consumer – have been added to the dominant one of respectable middle class  
domesticity (S. Radhakrishnan 2009). An awkward balance has been struck between the imagined global 
ideal, on the one hand, and the constructed Indian notion of 'respectable femininity', on the other, with  
women still largely expected to put their family as first priority. Thus, at the same time that jobs in the  
service sector, and especially in IT, are perceived as empowering for women  (Fuller and Narasimhan 
2007), those women who concentrate exclusively on their careers are still seen as deviating from cultural  
norms and popular expectations. 
Most women describe themselves as “not too ambitious,” and view a career as something supplemental 
to a married life with children. Women who “rise up” in the company hierarchy are admired, but are often 
thought of as having sacrificed something crucial, or as being  “aggressive.”  In these narratives, we find 
some continuity with nationalist conceptions of women as the protectors and nurturers of Indian culture  
— for these women, the role models are not the women who gave up their families for success, but those  
who manage  to  balance  the  two,  most  often  by sacrificing  the  climb  up the  company  hierarchy.  (S. 
Radhakrishnan 2009: 202)
For the moment, it is sufficient to conclude that gender relations in the new middle classes have not  
brought about radical change, even if the economic underpinnings of gender roles are increasingly in 
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flux. Between the pull of social expectations for respectable Indian middle-class women, and the push of 
the new options based on greater economic freedom, no decisive shift towards the latter is apparent. As 
yet,  the  problematic  contrast  between  these  divergent  role  expectations  is  concealed  behind  the 
compromises that most women (are still willing to) make.
4.1.4. Caste composition of the Indian middle classes
When it comes to the caste background of the new middle classes, there is both change and continuity  
in comparison to that of the traditional middle class. With regard to caste, recruitment into the new 
middle classes is not radically different to that into the old middle classes, although a shift is visible in  
both as a result of affirmative action policies (see 3.3.1) and the establishment of new business models.  
While the traditional dominance of High Caste (that is, twice-born castes) in the Indian elite is still very 
visible, a significant change towards a more inclusive social composition is also evident  (Sheth 1999: 
2509).  According  to  the  1999-2000  NSSO,  the  social  category  with  the  highest  monthly  per  capita 
consumption expenditure is 59 per cent Hindu Upper Caste. Seen against this group’s share of the total  
population – roughly 20 per cent (see Table 3.1 in chpt. 3) – this amounts to an over-representation of 
more than two to one  (Deshpande 2003a: 112-13). Other studies, however, indicate that the middle 
classes  are  increasingly  filled  by  those  with  a  (nominal)  Shudra or  Dominant  Agricultural  Caste 
background.  The  proportion  of  traditionally  deprived  communities  such  as  SCs,  STs  and  the  lower 
sections of OBCs in the new middle classes is considerably lower than their share of the total population,  
but  growing  nevertheless.  Religious  minorities  tend  to  feature  differently,  with  Jains,  Parsis  and 
Christians  over-represented,  with  the  larger  Muslim  community  considerably  under-represented 
(Sridharan 2004: 421). Thus, while the social composition of the middle classes has indeed changed, the  
continued Hindu High Caste over-representation is still the most notable feature. 
Certainly, one of the most surprising facts about caste is its absence in the discourse of the new middle 
classes. According to J.A.M. Nijman: 
In  colloquial  discourse  in  urban India,  the topic  of  caste  itself,  especially  in  relation to class,  is  often  
conspicuously absent. In academic debates about class in Mumbai, caste is often not mentioned at all. The  
avoidance of caste as a topic of discussion reflects some deep sensitivities and a desire to circumvent  
possible prejudice (both for higher and lower castes). (Nijman 2006: 762) 
Instead, the issue is dealt with in subtle, nuanced and often subconscious ways; while the topic itself is  
more often than not avoided, it is nevertheless still  present. The social reality of the middle classes  
being, in most cases,  almost identical  with High Caste origin is  denied;  at  the same time, however,  
advertisements aimed at this clientele accord closely with High Caste cultural values. Equally, the fact  
that  many middle  class  households  employ  domestic  servants,  often from considerably  lower caste 
backgrounds, is both ignored and taken for granted (Leela Fernandes 2006: 60). A deliberately idealised 
portrait of the new middle classes has been created, modelled on dominant High Caste Hindu values but  
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minus anything deemed problematic. How much of this ideal is a form of self-disguise remains to be  
explored at the individual level, but the fact that it is a very powerful image appears obvious from a  
more distant perspective. This issue is also, of course, relevant to the Indian IT industry at the centre of 
this thesis.
4.2. The Indian IT industry
The IT industry is, without doubt, the most globally exposed sector of the Indian economy, and thus a  
forerunner of social modernisation. This industry is not representative of the whole country; rather, it is  
exceptional in its elite social status,  as well  as in its  bridging function between Indian and Western  
business environments. Unlike most other sectors of the Indian economy, the main IT companies are 
neither family businesses nor government-sponsored undertakings, but are initiated and sustained by  
interchange between the global business culture (with a sizable representation of Indian expatriates) 
and  local  economic  conditions.  The  industry’s  success  is  unimaginable  without  the  interchange  of  
money, ideas and business practices across the divide separating India from the Western, most notably 
the Anglo-American, business world. Hence, IT is a clear example of globalised hybridity rather than a 
genuine home-grown development. Due to its obvious success, IT has come to represent the positive  
effects  of  globalisation  within  India,  and  continues  to  present  India’s  newly  discovered  economic 
prowess to the world. For all these reasons, the IT industry offers a unique opportunity to transcend 
contemporary Indian society; given the likelihood that India will remain on its current course of capitalist  
development, IT (and ITES) provides a glimpse into the future of India. 
As stated above, the IT industry is socially and culturally embedded in the new middle classes. A number  
of the main features of IT's social role have therefore already been discussed. But, in addition to those  
features that overlap with general tendencies within the new middle classes, the influence of IT is both 
more  specific  and  more  radical.  For  the  wider  Indian  public,  IT  serves  as  an  ambassador  for  the  
modernisation of India – a role that has been enthusiastically adopted by a number of prominent IT  
figureheads, who have come to symbolise the public image of this sector (C. Upadhya 2009b). Internally, 
IT requires its workforce to adapt to a work culture that is alien in the Indian context, and which has  
implications beyond the workplace itself. The work culture in IT, with its emphasis on flat hierarchies, 
meritocracy, short-term and team-based work assignments, requires a radical openness from employees 
that cannot be restricted to the workplace alone. The social (and societal) consequences of IT's work-
culture will be outlined in a separate section, once the public role of IT has been discussed. Finally, the 
few facts that are known about caste in the Indian IT industry will be summarised, before the research 
chapters tackle the issue in more depth. 
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4.2.1. The Indian IT industry; a short Introduction
What is meant by the Indian IT sector? First of all, it is an industry centred on the design, development,  
maintenance and testing of computer software, based in India but mainly servicing customers in the 
Western hemisphere  (Arora and Athreye 2002). While no exact data are available, it is fair to assume 
that the bulk of the sector’s income is generated by contracted, project-based service work of lower  
complexity  (C.  Upadhya  and  Vasavi  2006).  Consequently,  and  while  diverse  business  models  are  in 
operation, the main one is based on high-volume, low-margin value generation. As part of the global  
division of labour, the Indian IT sector supplies a large workforce for tasks that require high manpower 
capacities, with the offshore planning and design conducted with much lower workforce involvement. 
There is considerable effort from the Indian IT sector to move up the value chain – by switching to  
product development instead of catering to clients136 – although, as yet, this has not met with much 
success. Thus, despite its internal diversity, the Indian IT industry operates overwhelmingly on one main  
business  model  that  depends  crucially  on  the  wage  differences  between  India  and  the  customer 
countries, plus a steady supply of technical graduates.137
NASSCOM, a  non-neutral  source  of  information,138 estimates  that  the IT/ITES  sector  has  2.3  million 
employees (in the fiscal year of 2010) and generates revenue of US$73 billion. That puts the industry’s  
contribution to Indian GDP in the 6 per cent range, with its share of total Indian exports at around 26 per  
cent (NASSCOM 2010: 6). Thus, while this export share is by no means insignificant, and can be seen as  
the unique selling point within India, it nevertheless puts the whole IT phenomenon into perspective:  
While the IT industry is without doubt a major player in the Indian economy, it  is nowhere near as 
important  as  the  inflated  hype  of  its  supporters  would  suggest.  Even  with  indirect  employment, 
estimated at up to 8 million people, considerably less than 1 per cent of the Indian population have a 
direct  role  within  the  IT-based  economy,  with  this  dropping  to  less  than  0.2  per  cent  if  direct  
employment only is counted. Even in an IT hub like Bangalore, the city most famously associated with  
the rise of this industry, far less than 10 per cent of the population are directly employed by the IT or  
ITES sector (Sudhira et al. 2007). However, within the tiny proportion of the Indian economy that is made 
up of private companies (roughly 2 per cent – see table 2.2.2.3.) IT is a major player nevertheless.
The core software industry is closely related to the adjoining ITES sector – indeed, some even see IT as a 
sub-sector within ITES139 – although, in the public imagination at least, IT enjoys a status premium over 
136 The distinction has tremendous consequences in terms of work organisation: The ‘service modus’ crucially depends on  
deadlines set by the customers whereas the ‘product modus’ organises its work tasks according to its own schedule. For  
employees, working under the ‘service modus’ can frequently mean irregular hours, overtime and weekend shifts in order  
to meet deadlines, while employees in the ‘product modus’ generally enjoy reliable work schedules and regular 40-hour  
workweeks.
137 There is considerable mismatch between the supply of technical graduates and the requirements of the IT industry, despite  
high numbers of graduations every year – see Carl Dahlman and Anuja Utz, India and the Knowledge Economy: Leveraging  
Strengths and Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2005). 
138 Since NASSCOM acts as a business lobby, it naturally assumes a non-neutral, pro-industry position. Worse, the data provided 
by NASSCOM are often overtly optimistic and not verifiable by independent sources. But because few other data sources 
are available, one simply has to live with these shortcomings. 
139 Analytically speaking, the IT sector in India is indeed part of the wider ITES, since it is enabled by IT and communication links 
with its customers. However, it can also be distinguished in its history, which began before the communications links were  
106
its somewhat derided cousin, ITES.140 However, because both sub-sectors resemble the same business 
model based on outsourcing contracts, it makes sense to analyse them collectively. For the purposes of 
this thesis, IT and ITES will therefore be viewed as part of the same spectrum, with software design at 
one extreme and call centre telemarketing at the other, and a broad range in between. A large number 
of companies who offer IT services also have ITES subdivisions, and the two are often conflated in the 
economist’s dictionary. Much of the statistical data do not de-couple IT/ITES, and most social indicators  
work the same for both. In regard to this thesis, the research was carried out exclusively in the more 
narrow range of  core IT; nevertheless,  the social  implications are,  with minor deviations,  similar for  
ITES/BPO.
Not surprisingly, given its history,141 this industry is hybrid in its ownership as well as in its client base. 
Almost invariably, today’s global IT businesses seem to have Indian subsidiaries, with clients dispersed 
across  the globe.  NASSCOM, the industry's  trade body,  claims that 75 per  cent  of  the Fortune 500  
companies  are  served by  the Indian industry  (NASSCOM 2009a: 12).  While  some of  these overseas 
businesses directly establish captive units in India, the majority operate through a contracted Indian 
company providing service to an offshore location. And while the global Multi  National Corporations  
(MNCs) are increasing their market share significantly,  65-70 per cent of the service is still  provided  
directly by Indian companies (NASSCOM 2009b: 6). As Western countries dominate the customer base of 
this sector – with 62 per cent of revenue created by contracts with clients from the United States alone 
(NASSCOM 2010: 6) – this sector acts almost like an intermediary between India and the West. However, 
this also makes the industry vulnerable to political decisions in countries where it has almost no lobbying 
power; thus, the political situation in the US in particular is actively and warily monitored for changes in  
the regulation of outsourcing (Hira 2004). 
From the USA, the IT industry gets much of the inspiration, ethical beliefs and business models that  
makes it the ‘poster child’ of modernity in the Indian context  (Nadeem 2009a). The industry pioneers 
new labour relations, develops India's human capital and can, in general terms, be seen as “exemplar of 
good entrepreneurship and corporate governance to the rest of India” (Arora and Athreye 2002: 253). It 
is, together with its ITES sibling, the most prominent sector to make its profits mainly in foreign markets 
and to thrive on the exchange of  ideas,  people and, of  course, money with predominantly Western 
clients. No other Indian sector is as much exposed to globalised business values and practices nor as  
cheap  and  reliable  enough  to  enable  the  current  outsourcing  model.  For  a  detailed  account  of  the  various  ways  of  
outsourcing-based business  relations in  India,  see  Rafiq  Dossani  and Martin  Kenney,  'The Next  Wave of  Globalization: 
Relocating Service Provision to India', World Development, 35/5 (2007), 772-91.
140 ITES comprises all back-office services, from simple telemarketing by call centres to the complex filing of tax returns, that  
are enabled by software technology and communication links between international customers and the service provider in 
India. Also called BPO, Business Process Outsourcing, it thrives on the considerable wage difference for these services in 
India and involves tasks that are considered to be monotonous, repetitive and which do not require advanced qualifications.  
Compared to the supposedly ‘elite’ IT industry, ITES has an image as the poor cousin of IT, and jobs are often seen as 
stopgap rather than career options. However, there are jobs in ITES that require high cognitive ability, whereas some jobs 
falling within the IT label often do not require higher qualifications than needed for basic ITES tasks.
141 For an historical review of the beginnings of information technology in India, and the co-operation with the United States,  
see Ross Bassett, 'Aligning India in the Cold War Era: Indian Technical Elites, the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur, and 
Computing in India and the United States', Technology and Culture, 50/4 (October 2009 2009a), 783 - 810. 
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much a hybrid of Indian and Western cooperation. These factors have important consequences, both in 
IT’s relation to the world outside India, and in its position in the domestic context.
4.2.2. IT's mediating role …
By its very essence, Indian IT lives in two worlds and must constantly balance the challenges posed by  
public expectations from both. In this delicate situation, the sector plays a valuable bridging function  
between India and the global  community, particularly the West. This bridging function, or hybridity,  
results in a double-headed set of expectations regarding the industry. It is scrutinised by the public and 
by the regulatory bodies on both sides of the deal, and must comply with the unwritten rules of two 
cultural systems. If it resorts to business practices that violate international labour standards, it would 
hamper its  competitive edge in the customers’  markets;  on the other hand, it  would undermine its  
standing in India by openly challenging the social and moral beliefs of the Indian public. 
4.2.2.1. … towards the world 
To the outside world, IT is proud to claim that it has brought India back onto the global stage; that it has  
transformed  the  nation’s  image  from  one  of  dysfunctional  administration,  political  stagnation,  and 
endemic poverty, to that of an emerging economic giant with an edge in brainpower and technology. In  
its official publications, NASSCOM continually claims that IT’s success is showcasing India to the world: 
The industry has played a key role in enhancing the brand image of India, by accounting for over 10 per  
cent  of  total  FDI in  the last  decade,  over 200 cross  border acquisitions between FY2005-FY2009, and 
establishment of over 900 MNC captives in the last decade. (NASSCOM 2010: 8)
And this claim is not altogether unwarranted: While India has been welcomed to the global stage by an 
ambivalent West,  where it  is  celebrated as a democratic  balance to authoritarian China  (Richardson 
2002), it is also feared as a competitive threat to the West’s own service industries (Knights and Jones 
2007). The (sometimes euphoric) optimism that India’s on-going development has created in parts of the  
Western world (Friedman 2005) is matched by complaints of job losses and poor quality service as the 
result of outsourcing. Thus, even though the new India is not always perceived positively today, it is  
undoubtedly true that the nation is now an economic power to be reckoned with and not ridiculed. 
In terms of political influence, the Indian IT sector is delicately positioned between two very different  
value  systems  (or  modes  of  expectation),  where  it  can  play  both  sides  against  each  other  while  
depending on both of them at the same time. From the perspective of (mostly Western) clients, the 
Indian IT sector provides a cheap and tested means of business outsourcing. Nevertheless, while India  
appears to be the best choice for such outsourcing at present, it is only one amongst other alternatives;  
thus, the industry can do little more than cautiously lobby for its interests without actually having a  
strong negotiating position. Competition from countries like China, the Philippines or Vietnam provides a 
strong argument against the client countries being solely dependent on India. Politically, the outsourcing 
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business depends on acceptance from the customers’ countries and, even though the present consensus 
seems to be one of approval, this is subject to change. From the business side, the Indian IT industry is 
one voice amongst many others, with no particular influence or leverage. The clients of the IT industry,  
who are politically often extremely influential players in their home markets, are unreliable partners, in  
the  sense  that  they  could,  and  would,  choose  other  destinations  for  outsourcing  if  and  when 
circumstances change. If Indian IT has any influence on political debate in Western societies, then it is 
only conveyed indirectly through international organisations, under the general topic of free trade.
4.2.2.2. … in India's domestic context
The situation for IT looks very different in India itself. The industry has come a long way from its modest  
beginnings in the 1980s to its roaring success in the late 2000s, 142 and while it now has a great deal of 
political influence, it is at the same time not fully integrated into the local economy. Against the oft-
heard claim that it developed independently of the state, the industry was in fact boosted by massive 
Indian  government  intervention,  prioritising  IT  and  providing  legal  privileges  (Parthasarathy  2004; 
Saraswati 2008). So rather than being a purely private development, IT is better understood as the result 
of a successful cooperation between private initiative and government patronage (Balakrishnan 2006). 
And  although  this  points  to  a  close  private-public  partnership,  the  IT  sector  is  still  not  intimately 
connected to the rest of the Indian economy, where the relationship is not fully understood given its  
unique and uneven development  (D'Costa 2003).  The irregular development, and the specifics of its 
enclave-like characteristics, are thus not comparable with the oft-cited example of California's Silicon 
valley  –  especially  as  the  dense  networks  between  companies,  research  institutes  and  start  ups  
emblematic of the original Californian setting are mostly lacking in its South Asian counterpart (D'Costa 
2006).143 
While the IT industry is certainly the well-protected poster boy for successful economic projects under  
the government’s watch, its actual relation with the state administration is far from conflict-free. As IT  
creates a great deal of attention, and faces occasional opposition, the cosy relationship between (mostly  
142 Contrarily to popular belief, the Indian IT industry is not a recent and immediate success story but has a complex history of  
at least 35 years. Even though liberalisation from 1991 and the global Y2K problem mark important turning points for its  
development, they are neither starting points nor immediate breakthroughs for the industry. The very fact that IT existed 
long before 1991 in India indicates that liberalisation took many more and much smaller steps than usually imagined. And  
even though the Y2K problem might have projected Indian talent onto the global stage, the boost it provided was more  
symbolical than real in economic terms. However complex the history of IT in India might be, its cultural significance in  
Indian society is a recent phenomenon. As the original business model was the controversial Body Shopping, where Indian  
employees being paid Indian salaries were sent to the client’s site, the impact of IT in India itself was non-existent for a long  
time. Only with the improvement in communication links and the consequent turn away from body shopping to outsourcing  
– where the client is serviced from offices in India – brought IT to the centre of domestic attention. In this regard, the IT  
industry in India itself became a real factor only at the end of the 1990s. And because this study is concerned with the social  
change attributable to IT in India itself, only this time period after 1995 is of relevance here. For a history of the Indian IT  
sector, see Dinesh C. Sharma, The Long Revolution - the Birth and Growth of India's It Industry  (Noida: HarperCollins, 2009). 
See also – for a much shorter review of government policies towards IT development:  Subramanian Ramesh, 'India and 
Information Technology: A Historical & Critical Perspective',  Journal of Global Information Technology Management, 9/4 
(2006), 28.
143 For an empirically informed account of the use of Internet communications in local government in Bangalore, see Veena V. 
Raman, 'Information Technology and Participatory Democracy: A Case Study of Bangalore City', PhD. Thesis AAT: 3334015 
(The Pennsylvania State University, 2006). According to the author, its potential is largely under-used and not appreciated in  
its potential to enable citizen-bureaucracy communication in dual directions. 
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state level) politics and IT business is faced with a dilemma: The state is confronted with the assertive  
demands of a powerful business lobby, while at the same time having to cope with the potential for a 
popular backlash if any preferential treatment of the IT sector becomes too obvious amongst the non-IT 
electorate.  Sandwiched  between  these  opposing  demands,  the  weakness  of  local  government  is  
dramatically exposed, which in turn hinders any meaningful  embedding of the IT sector in the local 
economy. As Balaji Parthasarathy writes: 
The small domestic market can be understood in terms of the characteristics of the state. Even as the 
growing embeddedness of the state allowed it to take some measures of husbandry, it was confronted 
with declining autonomy. Its failure to bring about socio-economic transformation for vast  sections of 
society  led  to  challenges  from  those  sections.  The  outcome  is  weak  governance  and  insufficient 
bureaucratic  cohesion,  reflected in  the inability  to encourage the use of  productivity  enhancing IT  in 
various economic sectors since the economic restructuring that such usage will entail is likely to prove 
politically  unpalatable  to  one social  group or  another,  which  could  then undermine the government.  
(Parthasarathy 2004: 682)
So the political situation actually impedes the full integration of the IT industry in the Indian economy. 
Thus, despite all the hype and undeniable achievements, IT in India remains a phenomenon that must be  
measured against the very improbability of its existence. 
However,  the  significance  of  IT  goes  far  beyond  the  factual:  Partly  due  to  the  industry’s  symbolic 
importance,  and  partly  because  competing  lobbies  are  muted  or  missing,  IT  exerts  considerable 
influence on political debate in India. In a country with a huge problem of under- or unemployment, any  
employment  provider  naturally  receives  a  warm welcome.  Moreover,  because  IT  and ITES  generate 
earnings in much-needed foreign exchange, they are more valuable than their mere economic size would 
suggest.  Last  but  not  least,  the  symbolic  importance of  this  industry,  both as  a  flagship  for  India’s  
technical abilities and of the modernisation of its society, further increases its clout. The result is an  
inflated domestic power that is a clear contrast to its modest standing outside the country. In actual fact, 
IT and ITES account for far more than the modest 5-6 per cent of GDP would seem to suggest. Even  
though they might, in reality, be as dependent on their Indian employment base as on their Western  
clients, this is not how it is perceived in India itself. 
Due to IT’s political clout, the industry’s claims and demands have a great deal of force, especially in the  
clusters where IT is  a prominent local  force. And while these demands are (not surprisingly)  mainly  
driven by self-interest, they nevertheless create spin offs for the modernisation of the whole country. In  
this  regard,  the  IT  sector  very  much  reflects  the  recently  established  consensus  on  economic 
development goals:
Liberalisation and globalisation are now widely seen as inevitable and as a welcome change of course, in  
contrast to the ‘bad old days’ of the planning regime and the continuing depredations of a ‘corrupt’ and 
‘inefficient’  bureaucracy.  This reorientation away from Nehruvian nationalism and towards marked-led  
110
development reflects the increasing ‘hegemony of the logic of corporate capital’ (Chatterjee 2008: 62), a 
hegemony that has not come about spontaneously but has been carefully manufactured and orchestrated. 
(C. Upadhya 2009b: 90) 
With all its influence and power, IT is one of few outspoken advocates for a capitalistic reformation of 
India (Saraswati 2008). As the industry’s revenue sources are overwhelmingly outside India, its business 
model depends upon liberal and open exchange with other economies. In effect, the success of IT can be  
seen as an insurance against a possible backlash in favour of former autarchic policies: As long as this  
sector can successfully lobby for its own interests, India will remain an economically open country.144 
More indirectly, but not less importantly, IT assumes a role model function for other Indian industries:  
What is considered best practise here is almost automatically considered to be the future for the rest. 
With the implementation of international codes of conduct, IT follows norms regarding best business 
practises that,  in  turn,  prohibit  discrimination based on the socio-cultural  background of  employees  
(Dasgupta 2008, 2009). Therefore, all companies have to apply equal and transparent recruitment and 
promotion  procedures,  and  prevent  gender-  or  caste-based  discrimination  within  their  daily  work 
routines. This contrasts markedly with traditional Indian business practice, where cronyism, blood ties  
and  family  connections,  caste  quotas  and  all  manner  of  social  preferences  are  considered  to  be 
prevalent. Yet, while IT boldly and publicly challenges such behaviour by its insistence on the exclusive 
principle  of  meritocracy,  it  never  goes  so  far  as  to  openly  confront  orthodox  religious  and  social 
attitudes; due to its hybrid nature, IT is itself part of the Indian economy and society, and therefore 
cannot fully escape its social context. Thus, the IT industry ostentatiously stands for clean business codes 
of conduct at the same time as being forced to accept less-than-ideal compromises for political goodwill.  
The sector often disagrees with the political direction of the state or central government, but would  
rarely challenge the supremacy of political power.
Equally complex is IT’s relationship with the cultural environment in India. As already noted (C. Upadhya 
2009b), the industry faces opposition from various social and political quarters. This is especially so in  
Bangalore, where the industry is embroiled in a number of disputes, ranging from land use to nationalist  
demands of Kannada speakers (see 4.3). While it is sometimes portrayed by Hindu nationalists as an 
agent of foreign powers, and as a bad influence on Indian youth, the industry cannot afford to openly 
take sides, preferring instead to ride out the conflict between its role in modernisation and the resultant 
conservative  reaction.  IT  clearly  enables  young  people,  not  least  women,  to  challenge  long-hold 
traditions and family pressures (Atmavilas 2008; Chand 2008; Kelkar et al. 2002), but it is unable to take 
a public stand for fear of a backlash. Timid and often covert sniping at the repressive forces of Hindu 
orthodoxy  (as,  for  example,  in  the  advertisements  for  the  Wipro  ego  laptop145)  is  often  the  only 
144 For an in-depth analysis of the relations between the IT industry and the political sphere, see  Simanti Dasgupta, 'Bits of 
Belonging: Information Technology and the Changing Rationale of Governance and Citizenship in the Indian Silicon Plateau',  
Ph.D. diss, AAT 3355136 (New School University, New York, 2009).
145 In the “I am e.go” campaign a line says “I don’t need no moral police”. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G3EYl9W_fxw – 
accessed 28.01.2011 
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indication that the industry is fighting for its own interests in the cultural field.
In yet another twist, the political position of IT employees is not necessarily in line with the industry’s  
social role. Popular opinion suggests that many IT employees support the Hindu-nationalist BJP rather 
than the Congress Party,146 with anecdotal evidence supporting the view that a highly modern workplace 
does not necessarily bring along a modern mindset (van der Veer 2005). This results in an ambiguity that 
seems contradictory, at least at first sight: While the IT industry undermines the traditional social order  
by weakening dependencies on kinship, caste and family, it nevertheless has a workforce that is, at least  
partially, on the conservative side of Indian society. Perhaps as a result of this industry’s exposure to  
non-Indian values and ideas, and to globalisation (Nadeem 2008), the revival of tradition, rediscovery of 
ancient values, and reverence for the collectivist features of family life (Shah 2009) are popular amongst  
young IT employees. As Shehzad Nadeem puts it;
The identities and aspirations of the ICT workforce are defined increasingly with reference to the West.  
Outsourcing has emboldened a class of cultural emulators and made their protest visible. Radical in their  
rejection of old values, conspicuous in their consumption, workers construct an image of the West as a  
social utopia, which is used as a benchmark, a standard against which to measure India’s social progress.  
The infusion of new money and jobs, however, feeds popular anxieties that stretch virtue into vice: too 
much personal freedom, too much consumerism. Globalization does not herald an era of unprecedented 
personal  or  consumer freedom, a belated “modernity,”  nor does it  signify  a crisis  of  the “traditional”  
Indian family.  It  is  an Indian morality play where the pleasure principle clashes with the demands of  
custom and obligation, where kama (pleasure) and dharma (duty) meet in uneasy suspension. (Nadeem 
2008: 44)
Seen in this context, the cultural position of IT is neither consistently projected nor genuinely upheld by 
its employees. The prominent leaders of IT147 consistently lobby only for their industry’s core interest, 
namely an open, capitalistic economy, more efficient and effective state services, and a fundamental 
reform of the educational system. Aside from these fundamental issues, however, the essence of IT’s 
socio-economic position is best described in the term ‘meritocracy’.
146 For a review of the relationship between state-level politics and the IT industry, see  Narendar Pani, 'Icons and Reform 
Politics in India: The Case of S. M. Krishna', Asian Survey, 46/2 (2006), 238-56.
147 In the Indian public, the IT industry is associated with and represented by a number of prominent faces, with Subramanian  
Ramadorai (long-time CEO of Tata Consultancy Services), Shiv Nadar (chairman of HCL Technologies), Azim Premji (chairman  
of Wipro Limited), N.R. Narayana Murthy (founder and mentor of Infosys) and Nandan Nilekani (co-founder of Infosys, now 
Chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India UIDAI) amongst the best known. Perhaps the most politically active  
figureheads of IT in India, both co-founders of Infosys, are Narayana Murthy and Nandan Nilekani. The former enjoys the 
status of a public celebrity and respected voice in relation to almost all problems and occasions, e.g. Narayana Murthy, A 
Better India - a Better World (New Delhi: Allen Lane by Penguin, 2009b)., whereas the latter is author of the book “Imagining 
India”  Nandan Nilekani,  Imagining India - Ideas for the New Century (New Delhi: Allen Lane by Penguin, 2008). Nilekani 
subsequently became chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), a central government position with 
cabinet minister rank. Both are pressing hard for a modernisation along the lines of a greater accountability of the state,  
comprehensive  educational  reform,  more  space  for  private  initiative  and  responsibility.  As  apparent  from  their  book 
publications, both seem to find have adopted a role in influencing public opinion and, due to their celebrity status, have  
achieved this to some extent. 
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4.2.2.3 The concept of Meritocracy
Meritocracy is portrayed as the fundamental principle of IT, internally as well as externally. Given that IT 
is  not  a  political  movement  with  a  manifesto  to  change  society,  the  concept  of  meritocracy,  often 
advocated with missionary zeal, comes closest to an ‘ideology of IT’. It is used as a means of emphasising 
the importance of a good education, and – much more radically in India – of justifying the creation of  
wealth in combination with a strong business ethics:
In  the  Indian  context,  where  business  is  usually  associated  either  with  inheritance,  lack  of  quality 
education or amassing illicit wealth, the founding of Infosys by a group of middle class professionals based  
solely on their education and ethics is upheld as an unprecedented phenomenon. The possibility that one  
can  benefit  from  one’s  education  and  transform  it  into  wealth  without  compromising  one’s  ethical  
principles is a unique experience. The achievement of Infosys has influenced the imagination of the middle 
class because it marks a moral departure in the creation of wealth. Infosys thus acts as a metaphor for  
success exemplifying the ethical standard and professional competence exclusively of the middle class in 
India. (Dasgupta 2008: 218)148
Politically, then, as well as economically, an insistence on the general applicability of the meritocratic  
concept contrasts sharply with the Indian tradition, and is therefore highly controversial in public debate. 
The ideology of a meritocracy provides the language with which to connect the development of personal 
expertise and the improvement of the nation. In a society historically rooted in caste, class, and regional  
divisions, the ostensible meritocracy of the IT workplace provides a set of ideas about how India ought to 
be run.  Belief  in  a  meritocracy is  pervaded not  only  through the institutionalized practices  of  the IT  
workplace, but also [...] in the actions of IT workers and the industry. (S. Radhakrishnan 2007: 152) 
Meritocracy itself would not be nearly as controversial if confined solely to the workplace; however, its 
proclaimed general applicability brings it into conflict with wider Indian society. The implication that 
social  inequalities  are  only  legitimate  if  based  on  personal  difference  in  ‘merit’  –  that  is,  personal  
achievement – is nothing less than revolutionary in a society steeped in hierarchy, ascribed status and 
great  power  disparities.  Nevertheless,  radical  as  this  concept  is  in  the  Indian  context,  it  is  both  a-
historical and technocratic – or, more bluntly, socially sterile. Because IT is not a political movement, and 
its political concerns are primarily focussed on furthering and protecting its own position, the concept of  
meritocracy is narrowed to suit  these interests.  In the political arena, the concept of  meritocracy is  
mostly used to oppose any attempt to extend affirmative action policies, prevalent in the public sector,  
into the private sector in general, and IT in particular. 
The staunch opposition to reservations or affirmative action that is the dominant position of most IT (and  
other) industry leaders is closely linked to their support for liberalisation. It is this connection that has  
elevated the ideology of merit to an article of faith. (C. Upadhya 2007: 1866)
148 It  can  be  argued  that,  before  1991,  private  wealth  was  generally  considered  unethical  because  it  inevitably  involved 
corruption in a system where there was simply no ethical way to get rich. This attitude is still to some extent engrained in  
India, with the repercussions of this still evident today. 
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This showcases both the IT industry's political position (free-market-oriented) and its sense of purpose 
or mission (to pioneer a capitalist  business culture in a transforming society).  In the context of  this  
thesis, this is both a unique feature of IT in itself and characteristic of the industry’s position in the  
dispute about caste-based reservations (Madheswaran 2008; Nivedita 2009).149 
4.2.3. Work organisation in the IT industry
The IT sector worldwide  differs from more traditional workplaces in its basic beliefs about the role of 
the  employee  (Andrews  et  al.  2005;  Barrett  2005;  Dean  2007),  with  the  Indian  IT  sector  being  no 
exception.  As  IT  employees  have  considerably  more  professional  expertise  than  usual  elsewhere,  
workers’ relative autonomy is accordingly much higher. And as these pockets of autonomous expertise  
cannot  operate  in  isolation,  effective  connection  and  communication  between  employees  is  an 
economic necessity – hence the emphasis on ‘soft skills’ in the training of prospective employees (see  
chpt. 5).  With the explosion of technological knowledge and the ever-increasing complexity of work 
tasks – against the backdrop of limited human capabilities – the ideal-typical all-rounder is replaced by 
the expert in a particular area. Moreover, because on-the-ground experience develops amongst those  
closest to the problems at hand, expertise is not concentrated in the organisation but remains scattered  
in  many  small  clusters.  Thus,  a  hierarchical  top-down  model,  where  information  and  expertise  are  
concentrated at the top of a pyramid and decrease according to rank and job description, is obsolete 
here.  The new work environment,  then,  is  a  network where information is  exchanged according  to  
necessity, not hierarchy. 
In order to build a work system that efficiently connects these pockets of expertise, a comprehensive 
flow of information must operate unhindered by status differences in either direction. Therefore, the  
whole work organisation becomes based on the active participation of employees who are confident 
enough to contribute in discussions, able to express their views, and to discuss and challenge ideas from  
their superiors, and ultimately share responsibility for managerial decisions. Accepting that professional 
employees have to be involved in decision-making, and that expertise could be found at all levels of the  
organisation, results in a fundamentally egalitarian value system. Organisationally and ideologically, the 
concept  of  empowered  employees  is  a  direct  result  of  the  advances  in  technology  and  the  inter-
connected complexity of work tasks. Needless to say, this system of work organisation is no egalitarian  
utopia, and indeed would be unworkable without clearly defined managerial roles. Nonetheless, it is  
necessarily based on close cooperation between employees with diverging expertise, free information 
flow,  small  power  distances  between  superiors  and  subordinates,  and  a  generally  flattened  work 
hierarchy.
Admittedly, the Indian IT industry – with its specialisation at the lower end of the value-added chain in  
149 For  an  analysis  of  caste-based  reservations  as  form  of  rent-seeking,  see  Evan  Osborne,  'Culture,  Development,  and 
Government: Reservations in India', Economic Development and Cultural Change, 49/3 (2001), 659-85. For a non-scientific, 
but telling description of the extension of reservations, see Salil Tripathi, 'India's Creeping Caste Entitlements', Far Eastern  
Economic Review, 170/8 (October 1 2007), 49-52.
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the global division of labour – is not as much a pioneer in new work relations as the core centres of IT  
overseas, where employees enjoy considerably more autonomy (Ilavarasan 2007, 2008). But compared 
with  mainstream  Indian  work  organisations,  where  bureaucratic  hierarchies,  great  power  distances 
between superiors and subordinates, and enormous expertise concentration in the management level is 
a given, even the hybrid IT workplace is fundamentally different  (Hill  2009; Krishnan 2010).  The gap 
between the cultural environment that prospective IT employees are used to and the one prevailing in 
the sector is significant; therefore, the need for so-called soft skill training is emphasised by the industry.  
Consequently, job preparation training for a position in the Indian IT industry is dedicated to improving 
these soft skills, both in terms of language proficiency and the ability to adapt to the corporate work 
culture within the New Economy, with such skills updated regularly by intermediate training sessions. 
The research discussed in chapter five deals  with the implications of this  specific  aspect of  IT work  
practices. 
4.2.4. Caste composition of IT's workforce 
The caste composition of the IT workforce seems to present a paradox: Even though it is an open secret 
that the great majority of the workforce hails from an urban, Hindu Upper Caste background, there is  
surprisingly little data on the issue.150 Of the few small-scale, non-representative studies – none, so far, 
focusing on this thesis’ topic – the one by Carol Upadhya and A.R. Vasavi is the most comprehensive.  
Here, in a sample of 132 respondents, they find the following caste and religious distribution: 
Table 4.2.4 Caste Composition of an IT workforce sample (C. Upadhya 2006) N 132
Brahmin 48.00%
Dominant Agricultural Castes 15.00%
Vaishyas 13.00%
Kshatriyas 10.00%
Christian 5.00%
OBC 3.00%
Muslim 2.00%
Others 2.00%
Scheduled Caste 1.00%
Other studies seem to confirm these general findings. In a sample of 100 respondents, Oommen and 
Meenakshisundararajan find that 75 per cent belong to “Forward Castes”, while 20 per cent are from 
“Backward Castes”, five per cent from “Most Backward Communities”, and none to Scheduled Caste or  
Scheduled Tribe (Oommen and Meenakshisundararajan 2005). Even in the not-so-elite ITES section, the 
same situations appears the case: In Babu P. Ramesh’s sample of 278 BPO employees, 96.4 per cent are  
150 No  official  statistics  on  this  topic  are  available,  and,  because  it  has  political  implications  for  or  against  caste-based 
reservations, the industry itself is reluctant to explore it.  
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from “Forward  Castes”  and 2.2  per  cent  from “Backward  Castes”,  with  the remaining  1.4  per  cent  
classified as “others” (B. P. Ramesh 2004). The most recent addition to this small sample of research is 
the network study undertaken by Nilanjan Raghunath. In his sample of 78 IT employees in Bangalore,  
mainly drawn from middle and higher management level, he finds 23 (29 per cent) Brahmins, 19 (24 per 
cent)  Kshatriyas, 18 (23 per cent)  Vaishyas and 17 (22 per cent)  Shudras,151 while only one is from a 
religious  minority,  in  this  case  a  Muslim  (Raghunath  2010:  12).  Even  though  Raghunath’s  sample 
recruitment is not based on a random design, but rather on network effects, it offers a rare and valuable  
glimpse into the caste composition in the higher ranks of IT.
This bias in favour of Hindu Higher Castes is anything but surprising, especially given the fact that higher 
education in India is  already dominated by High Caste Hindus and Dominant Agricultural  Castes.  As 
Satish Deshpande calculates, using NSSO152 data, Hindu Upper Castes make up 36.9 per cent of India's 
urban population, but 65.7 per cent of graduates in tertiary education (Deshpande 2006). So, despite the 
small data base and the confusion about differing official classifications of caste communities, two main 
trends are clearly visible: First, the old elite of Hindu Upper Castes and Dominant Agricultural Castes is  
more  highly  represented  amongst  IT  employees  than  their  share  of  the  general  population  would 
indicate;  and  second,  the  issue  is  sensitive  and  shrouded  in  considerable  secrecy.  Although  a  
comprehensive investigation, clarifying the outstanding questions, is yet to be conducted, the (apparent)  
caste composition of the IT workforce appears to be a good indicator for the economic power of certain  
caste groups: That is, because IT offers prestigious employment, with a high entry level selection (in the 
form of cultural capital plus the expenses of a relevant technical education), those who are accepted into  
the industry can be seen as the elite of contemporary India.  The picture,  then, is of  continuity and 
change, the old elite of High Caste Hindus is as equally overrepresented as are some religious minorities  
(notably Christians), while Lower Caste Hindus and, especially, Muslims struggle to get in.
4.2.5. Conclusion: Why choose IT for a study of Caste? 
From  all  that  has  been  said,  the  Indian  IT  industry  is  a  rather  exceptional  sector  and  not  easily  
comparable to any other in contemporary India; thus, little that can be said about caste in the empirical 
chapters to follow is applicable to the rest of the country. In fact, it would be fair to assume that the 
reality  of  caste  within  the  IT  industry  contrasts  markedly  with  the lives  of  the  majority  of  Indians.  
Nevertheless,  since  the  IT  industry  is  an  active  agent  in  wider  society  and  has  a  clear  agenda,  its  
relationship with caste may provide valuable insights into future social developments in India. If this 
sector provides the blueprint for a modernisation of India along capitalistic pathways – something that  
will only be known in the decades to come – the role of caste evident already in IT would be relevant for  
the rest of India. Whatever the future might hold, it is not overly speculative to view IT as spearheading  
a particular modernisation model, with far-reaching implications for the reinterpretation of caste. 
151 This category most likely comprises Dominant Agricultural Castes, among others, so the notion that all  Shudra are ‘Low 
Caste’ is misleading. 
152 National Sample Survey Organisation http://mospi.gov.in/nsso_4aug2008/web/nsso.htm
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4.3. Bangalore
4.3.1. The city of Bangalore – before and after the IT boom
The IT industry in India is clustered mainly in the four Southern Indian states, in and around Mumbai,  
and in  the region around Delhi.  While,  contrary to popular  perception,  Bangalore might not be the 
paramount centre of IT, the city still constitutes the largest single agglomeration of IT corporation offices  
in India and hosts around 40 per cent of the total IT sector (Kambhampati 2002; Taeube 2005). In the last 
five years, a growing expansion into ‘second tier’ or ‘third tier’ Indian cities has slowed the growth of  
Bangalore, though without undermining its importance for the industry. Bangalore not only embodies IT  
symbolically, it is also dominated by the sheer presence of IT like no other city, and therefore deserves  
special  attention.  This  city  is  the ideal-typical  cluster  city,  a  feature seen as characteristic  for the IT  
industry globally, as well as in India (Grondeau 2007; Khomiakova 2007; Sonderegger 2008). Because of 
IT's dominance over other sectors in the region, the city is uniquely placed for observations on the  
changes that the recent IT boom has brought in its wake. As this city provided the primary location for 
this thesis’ research, some background information is relevant to the empirical chapters that follow.153 
For anyone studying the IT industry, the choice of Bangalore would be an obvious one. But it is too 
narrow to see Bangalore only through the lens of the relatively recent boom in IT. To adequately explore  
why and how this city came to be the symbol of IT in the Indian context, one has to go back into the 
city’s history. That “Bangalore was known to be a sleepy old town until the late 1980s and referred to as  
a ‘pensioners' paradise’; a quaint place for retired people” (Bharadwaj 2005: I) indicates how far the city 
has come. A  rather  small  and unimportant provincial  town in the British  colonial  period,  Bangalore  
experienced unprecedented growth rates after independence, acting as a magnet for migration from the  
surrounding areas. Due to its elevated position at around 920m above sea level, it has a pleasant year-
round climate, and consequently has become popular as a place for  retirement.  After a  number of 
central  government  institutions  and  educational  or  scientific  institutes  were  established,  Bangalore 
experienced a continuing influx of relatively highly educated people, mainly in government service. In  
the  60  years  from  1941,  according  to  official  census  data,  it  grew  from  411,000  to  5.69  million  
inhabitants (Nair 2005: 101). 
This rapid expansion meant that the modern city had to be designed from scratch, even though the two 
original centres, Bangalore and Cantonment, each have a century or so of history. What was left of the 
original  urban planning was soon overwhelmed,  encroached upon or  encircled by  newer and often 
unplanned  or  illegal  developments.  Land  conversions  have  meant,  among  other  things,  that  the 
ecological resources of the city have been dramatically degraded to the point of impending ecological 
collapse (Narayanan and Hanjagi 2009). The anarchic city structure and chaotic traffic, exacerbated by 
poor or non-existent planning, tell of this rapid development. The experience of Bangalore today is that  
of an uncontrollable juggernaut that may soon choke on its own developments (Heitzman 2004) 
153 For a short, yet largely uncritical, overview, see H. S. Sudhira, T. V. Ramachandra, and M. H. Bala Subrahmanya, 'Bangalore:  
City Profile', Cities, 24/5 (2007), 379-90.
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4.3.2. What makes Bangalore unique?
In social and cultural terms, Bangalore’s massive increase in population and its rapid rise in importance  
have had positive  effects.154 Without  the burden of  a  great  historical  past  and in  the absence of  a 
population  that  could  lay  claim  to  traditional  rights  to  the  city,  Bangalore  is  much  more  open  to  
newcomers  and  new  developments  than  comparable  Indian  cities.  With  the  exception  of  certain 
neighbourhoods – such as  Malleswaram,155 with  its  obvious  prevalence of  orthodox,  Brahminic and 
Kannada residents – no quarter is fully dominated by one community. With most development only a 
few decades old, and most inhabitants relative newcomers, the lack of tradition allows for more social 
freedom. This city provides niches for a wide variety of people, be it orthodox, strictly vegetarian Tamil  
Brahmins or beef-eating Muslims. It is not the case that an absolute social accord prevails amongst this  
diversity; there have been communal tensions in the past, largely centred around the issue of the status 
of Kannada in public life (Stephen 2005). However, the fact that no linguistic group, caste or community 
can claim dominance, coupled with a striking anonymity, makes for a city where a diversity of cultural  
orientations coexists in mainly peaceful, if not always harmonious, ways. 
In terms of its diverse population, Bangalore is an exceptional city in comparison with the other major  
Indian centres. With an estimated population of around 8 million in 2011,156 it is the third largest Indian 
city – admittedly, a distant third after Delhi and Mumbai. Given the proximity of all four of the Southern 
Indian states, it is not really a city that is genuinely Kannadigan. Instead, it increasingly acts as a Southern  
metropolis for the peoples of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, as well as for a smaller  
proportion of (mainly) professionals from all over India. And while Kannada is by far the most common  
language in the city,  it  is spoken by significantly less than 50 per cent of the population. Indeed, in  
Karnataka as a whole, the proportion of Kannada speakers is already as low as 65 per cent (Nair 2005: 
245). Due to the traditional orientation of Northern Kannadigans to Bombay/Mumbai, and the fact that 
the city is only 25 km from Tamil Nadu and 100 km from Andhra Pradesh, Bangalore has never been a 
centre for Kannada speakers alone. Thus, as migration is still accelerating due to the recent boom in IT  
and other service sectors, the city’s ‘melting pot’ tendencies are likely to be accelerating as well.
This diversity is strongly connected with the changing economics of this metropolis. In the years from 
independence  to  the  1980s,  Bangalore  was  regarded  as  a  city  mainly  for  scientists,  government 
bureaucrats  and  pensioners,  who  settled  there  because  of  the  relatively  cool  climate.  Important 
educational and scientific institutes, such as the Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc) and the Indian Institute  
154 Bangalore scores relatively high in terms of Human Development, if compared with the Indian or Karnataka average – for  
the numbers, see K. Devaraj and B. V. Gopalakrishna, 'Human Development in Karnataka State: An Inter-District Disparities.
(Report)', Indian Journal of Economics and Business, 9/1 (2010), 159(16).
155 “Malleswaram started out in the early 1900s as an upper-caste locality and remained largely unchanged in this respect—
something of a backwater in fact—until  the 1990s. Then came the economic boom.”  Tulasi Srinivas, 'Divine Enterprise: 
Hindu Priests and Ritual Change in Neighbourhood Hindu Temples in Bangalore', South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 
29/3 (2006), 321-43 at 326.
156 Estimates vary widely:  The official  census for 2011 is  not yet available,  while the last one in 2001 put the number of 
Bangaloreans (both rural and urban) at 6,537,124. http://www.censusindia.gov.in/PopulationFinder/Population_Finder.aspx 
accessed 28.01.2011
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of Management (IIM), as well as government undertakings like Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),157 
made this city a hub for researchers and scientists from all over India. 
The well-known Indian Institute of Management, along with major public enterprises such as Hindustan  
Aeronautics, Bharat Electronics, Hindustan Machine Tools, and the Indian Space Research Organization, 
are visible manifestations of India’s Cold-War strategy to make Bangalore the center of Indian defense and 
aerospace research and development and electronics production. (Audirac 2003: 22) 
Effectively, the city was still seen as a safe backwater for government-dominated research and education  
till the mid-1980s.158 Thus, well before the IT boom, population growth was becoming an issue, with the 
city already encroaching into water reservoirs,  which were drained, and into the surrounding areas,  
which were suburbanised.
4.3.3. The IT boom and public reaction
Development took a new form with the arrival  of  the companies that still  dominate (the image of)  
Bangalore today. In 1984, Infosys decided to move its headquarters from Bombay to Bangalore, with 
many other firms, such as Wipro and Mindtree, following suit. With the arrival of IT, city planning had to  
make  concessions  to  accommodate  this  industry,  in  addition  to  the  general  influx  of  people  from  
outside. Consequently, enclaves like Electronics City, founded in 1978 but only becoming important in  
the 1990s, and the International Tech Park (ITPB) in Whitefield (plus numerous smaller tech parks within 
the  city),  were  developed  to  provide  the  office  space  needed.  Consequently,  almost  all  parts  of  
Bangalore are now penetrated by office space that caters to IT or ITES companies, while IT employees,  
easily distinguishable by their Western dress and company logos, are to be found in every part of the  
city.
This adds to the feeling that the city has been taken over by an industry,  which creates a sense of  
alienation amongst those residents who settled there before the boom. The highly uneven distribution 
of wealth, and the reluctance to address issues that are not relevant to IT, impacts negatively on the less  
well-off parts of the population:
Issues of poverty remain submerged by the euphoria over the expansion of the information technology 
industry  and  Bangalore  is,  in  many  senses,  a  “divided”  city.  The  glass  walled  computer-ready  office  
complexes, exclusive shopping malls and entertainment facilities that rival the best in the country contrast 
with the dense squatter settlements and their very poor services in central areas of the city.  (Benjamin 
2000: 38)159 
And while IT continues to make the headlines, a major opposition is visible in the complaints about 
colonialisation of the city and the destruction of the older (if backwater) city of Bangalore. In this regard,  
IT is criticised not only for usurping the image of Bangalore, but also for the inflation of real estate and 
office rents, and even for the price rises of food and clothing. While many of these claims have validity,  
157 Established by the British administration in 1940. 
158 The main reason why so many important institutes where sited in the city was the safe distance from Pakistan and the  
enjoyable year-round climate. It is also possible, however, that exactly the absence of interfering traditions and vested  
interest made the city attractive for the central government. 
159 See also: Christoph Dittrich, 'Bangalore: Globalisation and Fragmentation in India's Hightech-Capital', Asien, 103 (April 2007 
2007), 45 - 58.
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the opposition to the IT industry also plays on the fears and prejudices of public opinion in Bangalore.  
The former elite and social agenda setters, for example, now feel threatened by a force that dominates  
the  limelight,  even  if  it  represents  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  city’s  inhabitants.  The  attention 
formerly accorded to the established educational and research institutions has been overshadowed by 
an IT industry that is punching above its actual weight. However, as long as the opposition to IT is as  
fragmented  as  it  is  today,  the  industry  will  continue  to  triumph  over  other  sectors  in  the  public  
imagination. 
Not surprisingly, similar processes can also be observed in the city’s cultural life. IT is often blamed for 
the changing attitudes of young employees, who are thought to indulge in mindless consumerism and  
over-consumption  of  alcohol,  and  to  be  overly  sexually  promiscuous.  The  moral  backlash,160 often 
expressed by an odd coalition of right wing Hindu-orthodox, who see their culture under threat, and left  
wing  socialists,  who  despise  capitalist  consumerism,  has  already  resulted  in  a  curfew,  requiring  all  
businesses to close by 11:30pm. Admittedly, because IT represents young modern individuals who earn 
more  at  the  beginning  of  their  careers  than  their  parents  at  the  end  of  theirs,  the  accusation  of  
consumerism is perhaps justified – but the notion that all IT engineers are morally liberal, easy-going 
hedonists is certainly a flawed exaggeration: 
In cities such as Bangalore, the boom in urban consumption is quite visible in the mushrooming of opulent  
apartment complexes and upscale shopping malls, hotels, and restaurants; the exponential multiplication 
of motor vehicles clogging the roads; and the growth in foreign travel and other leisure activities. Yet in 
the absence of reliable data on consumption, it is difficult to separate the hype from actual practice or to 
analyse the operations of consumption as social practice. (C. Upadhya 2009a: 256)
The issue of consumerism, and the concurrent moral questions, is perhaps best seen in the context of a 
generational shift. For those who grew up and were socialised under Nehruvian notions of austerity, it  
might indeed be a sign of the moral decline of India to see affluent young people frequenting the newly-
built malls of Bangalore – with the IT industry being the most obvious cause of this seeming decline in 
traditional values. However, at least during my stay in Bangalore, I rarely encountered anything that I  
would consider a mindless waste of money. Rather, without invoking moral beliefs, those who earn more  
than their parents have simply adapted to it by moving up in the consumption ladder – without excess,  
but without austerity either. 
4.3.2.The Future of Bangalore: Privatising the Public? 
The consumption patterns attributed to the IT boom in Bangalore have important consequences, albeit  
not so much in excessive consumerism, but in a privatisation of the formerly public domain (A. Ghosh 
2005). Because municipal services are generally weak and overstretched, private money is increasingly  
spent to compensate for their shortcomings. The most visible aspect of this can be seen in the sprawl of  
160 This discourse also occurs within the new middle classes  – with both liberal  and conservative tendencies finding their 
expression there. For an empirical example, see Margit Van Wessel, 'Talking About Consumption', Cultural Dynamics, 16/1 
(July 1, 2004 2004), 93-116.
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privately-developed  apartment  complexes  for  the  middle  classes  and  the  elites  all  over  Bangalore.  
Indeed,  Bangalore  is  now characterised by  a  multitude of  gated and guarded apartment complexes 
acting as safe compounds in a city of seeming chaos. For those who can afford it (and a wide range of 
price options are available), the retreat into a commercially-organised private zone seems an attractive 
means to escape the shortcomings of the municipality. This, in turn, undermines the idea of the public  
good itself. As predominantly richer-than-average citizens opt to forgo the struggle for public service and  
escape to the private field, the poorer masses can expect even less from local government because 
influential  advocates  are  no  longer  there.  With  the  success  of  the  privately-managed  apartment 
complexes, the state is both relieved of financial burdens and, at the same time, in danger of becoming  
redundant. As weak city management is undermined in the public eye due to its own inefficiency, the 
authority of the state at both local and national level is, ultimately, threatened. In both respects, there is  
a dramatic contrast between official proclamations of India’s rise to superpower status and the reality of  
ineffective local administration.
The real estate boom and high level of demand for housing have driven Bangalore real estate prices to 
Mumbai levels and beyond, gradually displacing the old middle class and the poor from the city. Rising 
property values and changing residential patterns are an important sign of the rise of the new middle class  
in the city.  These new residential arrangements, and the lifestyles they promote, are feeding into the  
creation  of  a  hegemonic  and  homogenised  middle  class  cultural  style,  built  on  globalised  or  hybrid 
imaginaries, as the names of various apartment complexes and their marketing campaigns testify (Palm 
Meadows, Venezia, Green Acres, Eden Gardens, etc.). Real estate advertisements emphasise their Western  
or global affinities, comparing life within these gated communities to that in Switzerland, California, or  
Scotland. They also provide privatised solutions to urban environmental degradation, such as full power 
backup systems (in case of power failure) and assured private water supply through tubewells, tanks and 
water filtration systems (in a context where most Bangalore localities receive municipal water for a few 
hours a day, if at all). Living in these globalised cocoons, the new middle class is partially shielded from the  
reality of urban life in Bangalore and so are not impelled to engage with the city’s pressing environmental 
and urban problems (except when they drive out into the traffic).(C. Upadhya 2009a: 260) 
In many respects, such as planning new ‘layouts’ or enforcing existing building codes, the administration 
is (or becomes) virtually invisible. The sovereignty of the city government, already weak to start with, is  
increasingly undermined by unenforceable legislation and the failure to provide basic necessities to its 
inhabitants.  For most residents,  some private initiative is  needed to make up for the lack of  public  
utilities, be it uninterrupted supply of electricity of the provision of tap water. Small wonder that the  
internationally renowned IT-enclaves function like islands in an ocean of mismanagement. 
In response to and in stark contrast with the rest of the city’s dearth of urban infrastructure such as water, 
electricity, sewers, roads, and parking, ITPL and Infosys City [Infosys campus within Electronic City] provide 
their own dedicated utility infrastructure including water, power, sewer, and telephone exchange, as well  
as such amenities as satellite communications; shuttle service; commercial space; and training, recreation, 
and entertainment facilities. (Audirac 2003: 22)
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Both  the  apartment  complexes  and  the  tech  parks  are  well-kept  oasis  in  a  city  that  appears  
ungovernable at times,161 and which in most cases lacks basic facilities. To what extent the rise of private 
industry and private organisation will influence the further development of the city will become more 
and more apparent in the years to come. For the moment, both worlds seem to coexist in nominally  
independent, but uneasily interconnected, parallels. 
4.4. BTM Layout, Second Stage
4.4.1. The South-West in general, and BTM Layout in particular
Although there are IT companies spread all over Bangalore, most are concentrated in the south, with  
Electronic  City  as  the  main  centre,  and  the  west,  with  Whitefield  and  the  former  airport  as  
agglomerations. As an effect of the IT boom, the economic centre of the city has shifted considerably to  
the south-west.
While a proposed IT  corridor might never see the light of the day, the vicinity of Electronic City or  
Whitefield is already having an impact on the nearby suburbs. Areas such as Koramangala or BTM Layout  
are now preferred residences not only for IT workers from Bangalore itself, but increasingly for outsiders  
to the city. The effect is visible in the abundance of Paying Guest (PG) accommodation offered there,  
often  to  defined  groups  of  customers.162 A  place  like  BTM  Layout,  which  has  little  to  offer  except 
161 In many ways, the private life of IT employees (and the countless members of the middle classes who are emulating them)  
has come to mirror the spatial seclusion and organisational superiority of the tech parks where they work.
162 In advertisings for PGs and eateries, there are clear markers for the preferred clientele – such as “North Indian Veg” or  
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proximity to Hosur Road and hence to Electronic City, is now a highly sought-after destination for IT  
employees, mainly from outside Bangalore. As the Bangaloreans who work in IT are scattered around 
the whole of Bangalore, the concentration of non-Kannadigans is most marked here: While there are  
quite a few residents from the Southern states, the presence of North Indians is most visible in the  
number of places that cater for them. The whole area, already an established quarter, is partially taken 
over  by  newer  developments;  the  newly-built  gated  apartment  blocks,  and  attendant  PGs  and 
commercial buildings, are now surrounded by established family homes with small gardens. The outer  
ring road, which connects the area with Hosur Road to the east and Bannerghatta Road to the west, is 
literally dotted with office buildings, while the ‘hinterland’ is primarily residential. Within these inner 
residential areas, countless small establishments, from restaurants, barber shops, laundry services and 
the ubiquitous PGs, cater to the IT population, although the overall character of the area is not visibly  
changed.
4.4.1. The PG experience 
During my research, I deliberately choose to stay in a PG that catered for IT employees, with the location  
proving ideal not only for the relative comfort, but also for its proximity to my research subjects. A brief  
description of this unique living environment is therefore appropriate. 
The PG scheme has evolved gradually from modest beginnings to today’s growing popularity. As A. S.  
Sandhu describes it: 
[The PG is]... a paying guest accommodation, [...] in which bachelors living in big cities away from their 
family can live with another family. What began as a relationship of people moving in to live with the  
family in return for a monthly payment for food and boarding, has transitioned to a situation in which the  
renter can rent a room by himself in dormitory-style housing, or can share a dormitory room with others.  
(Sandhu 2008: 38)
A PG, the most popular residential arrangement for IT engineers who are never sure how long they will  
remain on a project or in the city, has certain characteristics:  As a hybrid between guesthouse and  
rented apartment, it provides facilities on a medium-term base, with a supposed minimum rental period 
of three months, but often a casual arrangement regarding the termination of the stay. In my case, a 
prior  notice  of  one  week  was  sufficient  to  leave  the  room  without  losing  the  deposit.  Rooms  are 
normally shared with one or two others, and bathrooms are attached or communal, according to the 
market position of the PG and, not least, the price. Rents can range from a rock-bottom INR1.500 per 
month, providing a bed in a basic dormitory, shared with at least five others, up to INR8.000,163 where 
one can expect half of a self-contained double room, with air-conditioning, in a PG with amenities such 
as gym, eating hall or cinema. For INR3.500 to 4.000, it is realistic to expect a decent place on a double-
sharing basis in one of Bangalore's most popular IT suburbs, with a wide range of options above and 
“Andhra –Style Veg & NonVeg”.
163 This particular example is taken from Hyderabad's Madhapur area, that is – due to the local price level and its proximity to  
the Hi-Tech City, considerably more costly than the PGs in Bangalore.
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below this price.
The  popularity  of  the  PG  scheme,  which,  according  to  my  experience,  is  far  more  widespread  for  
unmarried people than a shared apartment, tells of the short time horizons that prevail in IT. The main  
alternative, the privately rented apartment, shared between two to four people, would be considerably 
more economical, but the need to pay a deposit of up to ten months rent, long fixed-term contracts, and 
a  generally  low availability,  make this  option less  attractive.  Temporary  arrangements,  as  in  the PG  
scheme, are much better suited for the IT population, where employment fluctuations,  short-notice 
postings  to  other  sites  and  a  generally  high  uncertainty  in  work-related  matters  are  prevalent  
considerations. During my time in the PG in BTM Layout, there was a constant flux of occupants, with  
departures  and  replacements  almost  every  week.  In  this  regard,  the  PG  system  is  a  near-perfect 
adaptation to the flexibility demanded in IT, although it is equally clear that it creates an existence that is  
ill-suited to fixed settlement and family life. Not surprisingly, given this setting, most inhabitants of the 
(gender segregated) PGs were bachelors from their mid-20s to early 30s, with some older exceptions.164 
4.5. Summary 
This chapter has attempted to give an outline of the Indian IT industry – from the social milieu of the  
new  middle  classes,  to  the  social  embeddedness  of  IT  itself  and,  last  but  not  least,  to  the  living 
conditions of actual IT employees themselves. This has provided a necessary background to make more 
sense of the discussion in the empirical chapters to follow. Within the middle classes, caste is often 
portrayed as an unmentionable topic, although it is very clear that old hierarchies prevail and that caste  
is practised in private. The very term “middle class” already implies that criteria such as education and 
employment or consumption patterns matter more than birth, caste or family tradition. However, since 
every individual can invoke these criteria differently according to circumstances, the relation between 
middle-class and caste background is fluid and contextual. In certain professions the match between 
cultural traditions and the job specifications is conspicuously pronounced – so the affinity between the 
'intellectual'  work  in  the  IT  sector  with  the  intellectual  tradition  of  Brahmins –  but  even  here  the 
relationship is anything but straightforward. Any individual still has to invoke this affinity and it seems 
that those who would be in the position to do so, seem rather reluctant.
The (apparent) caste composition of the IT workforce needs to be seen against this backdrop. Since this  
is the most elite workforce in India (as far as the private sector is concerned) the caste composition could 
be  seen  as  a  benchmark  for  the  economic  power  of  certain  caste  groups,  whereby  the  high  
representation  of  Hindu  High  Castes  tells  of  continuity,  while  the  concurrent  overrepresentation  of  
Christians  hints  at  social  change.  Especially  the high representation of  Brahmins could  point  to  the  
164 This should prevent an outright generalisation; the research took place amongst a certain segment of IT employees and the  
findings are therefore only relevant for this segment. 
124
cultural affinity mentioned before. However, whether this connection is seen and how it is interpreted  
by the employees themselves is not known so far. The empirical chapters to come will therefore try to 
shed some light on this question although it is already clear that the issue is anything but unidimensional  
or unambiguous. Nevertheless, the question is worth a try and could best be observed in concrete, local  
settings – with Bangalore a prime example. This Indian city – the ideal-typical melting pot – is unique in  
its capacity to accommodate all manner of castes side-by-side. If Bangalore stands for the future of India  
– and there is reason to believe that it does – then it offers a valuable vantage point from which to view  
the future reinterpretation of caste in the national context. 
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5. The Research Projects 
5.1. Introduction and methodological reflection165
The empirical research for this PhD thesis has been undertaken through four interconnected projects,  
each using differing methodology.  Given the constraints imposed by any such study, this  represents  
neither the full extent of the necessary or desirable research, nor the most exhaustive coverage of the  
problems at hand. Nevertheless, the projects do provide valuable insights to validate the theoretical  
assumptions made earlier. Moreover, as the topic is a sensitive one in the Indian context, with some data 
hard  to  come  by,166 the  research  represents  a  pragmatic  approach,  orientated towards  maximising 
coverage rather than following systematic text-book methods. One of the most urgent requirements –  
representative  quantitative  sampling  of  the  caste  composition  of  the IT  industry’s  workforce  –  is, 
unfortunately,  largely  absent.  In  the  current  political  climate,  any  investigation  into  the  caste 
composition of IT's workforce could (and would) be used in political arguments for or against quota  
reservation in private industry. Hence, in order to forestall  such debate, the IT industry is vigorously  
opposed to any research that could possible trigger it. 
For these reasons alone, the projects follow a methodologically eclectic but nevertheless triangulated 
approach (Karsten and Karen 2009), aimed at empirically assessing the issues discussed in the theoretical 
chapters. Although I originally planned to use more quantitative methods, due to lack of support and 
resources to conduct a quantitative survey on my own, the following is rather small-scale and almost 
exclusively  qualitative.  While  this  necessarily  leaves  some  questions  unanswerable,  the  completed 
research is still valuable: In the combination of mostly qualitative methods (with the exception of chpt.  
7), the factual reality of caste in the Indian IT industry is assessed in different perspectives, providing a  
deeper  and  more  complex  picture.  The  following  projects  were  conducted  between  March  and 
November 2009:
5.1.1. Project 1: Interpreting the work environment in IT 
The self-projected values of the IT industry, as indirectly assessed through the image presented in the 
training manuals of Infosys' Campus Connect initiative,167 were balanced by interviews with IT managers 
with personnel responsibility,168 and an ethnographic  film project about work conditions in IT  (Sonti 
2006). The Campus Connect bridging programme is designed to provide a smooth transition for aspiring  
165 There  is  an  expectation  that  PhD  candidates  in  sociology  should  ‘jump  through  the  hoop’  and  deliver  a  lengthy 
methodological chapter. Since this is an established tradition, I will not completely break with it, however, this procedure  
will be kept to the bare minimum here. All methods used in this thesis are standard social-science methods and will be  
further discussed in the respective chapters.
166 For the problems and difficulties of research in Indian IT, see  Carol Upadhya, 'Ethnographies of the Global Information 
Economy: Research Strategies and Methods', Economic and Political Weekly, 43/17 (2008), 64-72.
167 http://campusconnect.infosys.com/WhoWeAre.aspx  
168 The interviews – four in total – are used to provide a context and have little stand-alone value. However, since they were  
conducted with one high-ranking HR manager and three  soft skill  trainers, they provide insights about the overarching 
concept of work values in IT.
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college graduates seeking a career in IT, focussing on the skills necessary within the sector’s prevalent  
work  environment.  In  the  last  couple  of  years,  tens  of  thousands  of  aspiring  IT  employees  have 
undergone this training, and its significance should not be underestimated. Of particular relevance for 
the  research  at  hand,  the  programme’s  training  manuals  offer  an  inside-view  into  the  ethical  and  
behavioural attitudes that are passed on to would-be IT employees. An exegesis of these manuals could  
provide a valuable self-image of IT's value system, although such an approach also has limitations. While  
my  analysis  offers  an  indirect  assessment  of  some  of  IT’s  projected  values,  it  is  not  a  first-hand 
observation of empirical conditions in the workplace. In consequence, analysis of the manuals can only 
sketch out IT’s idealised value system, without providing a richer picture of actual working conditions.  
However, in combination with the interviews, and in addition to the ethnographic film, this provides a  
starting point for the interviews in chapter six. And by adding greater detail to the general descriptions 
of value systems in the New Economy, this also further outlines the cultural changes expected of anyone  
joining an Indian IT company. 
5.1.2. Project 2: The qualitative, semi-structured interviews
The social climate in the workplace, and employees' opinions about social  and political  topics, were 
accessed in heuristic, qualitative, semi-structured interviews. The basis for this approach was a study of a 
specific private-initiative affirmative action; the Special Training Programme (STP)  (Murthy 2008). This 
programme aims at improving the employability of technical graduates from SC/ST backgrounds through 
a six-month-training-period and, afterwards, invites well-known IT companies to hire their alumni. 
In total, 71 people were interviewed in the course of this project: 50 were participants of STP in its  
various forms, 14 were general employees (that is, mainly from Hindu High Caste background) and seven 
were senior-level employees. The interviews with the STP alumni, all of whom were asked the same 
questions,  followed  a  fairly  routine  pattern:  While  discussion  was  encouraged,  few  respondents 
expressed  opinions  beyond merely  replying  to  the  questions  posed.  In  stark  contrast,  the  non-STP 
interviews were less formal and less centred on a pre-determined set of questions, with the same also 
being the case for the manager interviews. While most of the STP-related interviews took place in offices  
(either close to the respondent’s workplace or in iiit-b169) and were therefore more formal, some STP-
related and most of the non-STP interviews were conducted in less formal, more personal settings.
While this research was mainly guided by the question of IT's social role in the reinterpretation of caste,  
other related subjects – such as women’s empowerment, cultural change and societal fairness – were 
covered as well. The interviews allowed comparison between the views of IT employees from SC and ST  
background, on the one hand, and those from the so-called mainstream, that is, predominantly High 
Caste IT employees, on the other. By balancing the views of the STP trainees and alumni with interviews  
169 The International Institute for Information Technology Bangalore (iiit-b) acted as provider of the STP training sessions – and  
served  as  a  meeting  place  for  most  of  the  STP-related  interviews.  http://www.infosys.com/newsroom/press-
releases/Pages/IIIT-B-improve-employability.aspx 
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with ‘general  category’  employees and managers,  the project  looked at  social  norms and the work 
environment in the industry, and how this connects to caste and other social background issues. The 
research, therefore, attempts to examine both sides of the issue: That is, how STP alumni described the  
social reality they face in their work environment, and how their views differ from the ones provided by 
the ‘general category’ employees. Altogether, this project provided a rare perspective from people of  
Low Caste or tribal background who are largely under-represented in the IT industry. The chapter also 
includes a timely analysis of a pioneering affirmative action initiative in praxis.
5.1.3. Project 3: The socio-psychological experiment
A socio-psychological experiment was conducted in Hyderabad that, although ultimately failing in its  
original intent, still provided valuable information. The experiment attempted to test the hypothesis that  
people would discriminate subconsciously against job applicants if their caste identity was known, using  
made-up IT job applicant CVs. The experiment itself was prepared and pre-tested in a large IT company 
in Hyderabad. It aimed to assess social preferences by asking participants to rate CVs that were exactly 
the same in terms of qualification, but which were from (fake) job applicants of different local origin and 
caste background (visible by their surnames and birthplace).  The expectation was that people would  
subconsciously recognise each applicant’s social background and that any resultant prejudices would be 
evident in the way the applicant’s employability was then rated. However, although the design and the  
methodology did not work in the specific setting, and the project had to be abandoned, it nevertheless  
yielded some interesting results: First, that caste is not reducible to a Brahmin-SC/ST contrast; second, 
that caste status appears to be largely anonymous in the IT workplace; and, finally, that the level of  
knowledge about caste is very low amongst IT employees. It appears that caste surnames are – with a 
few salient exceptions – not recognisable by a majority of respondents, and that considerable confusion  
and ignorance surrounds the caste phenomenon amongst young IT employees. At the same time, an  
overrepresentation of Hindu High Castes and some religious minorities was revealed, even in the limited  
sample of the pre-tests conducted. 
5.1.4. Project 4: Balancing the research with participant observations
The three formal  projects  are,  finally,  complemented by  participant  observation.  While  staying  in  a 
paying guest house (PG) in the BTM layout in Bangalore from March-June and August-November 2009, I  
had  regular  social  contact  with  IT  or  (to  a  much  lesser  extent)  ITES  employees.  On  a  number  of 
occasions, over a shared lunch or tea, in the gym, in an eatery, or simply by hanging out in the PG, it was  
possible  to  observe  not  only  the  proclaimed  attitudes  to  caste,  but  also  the  lived  reality  of  this  
phenomenon.  And,  because  the  other  projects  mainly  took  place  on  company  premises,  or  were 
otherwise  concentrated  on  the  work  environment,  this  informal  observation  (discussed  in  chpt.  8) 
provided a necessary balance to the insights of the formal research projects. As this ‘quasi-ethnographic’  
approach was more concerned with private matters, it highlighted a number of issues that had proved 
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difficult to evaluate previously.  Especially  since some of the factors that constitute caste are neither 
openly  narrated  nor  consciously  experienced,  the  position  of  an  outside  observer  is  fundamentally 
necessary to balance the personal accounts given in the formal projects. Without the insights gained by  
this method, the research would have taken a different direction and its value potentially eroded.
5.1.5. Reflection upon methodological shortcomings – outlook
All methods used in sociological research have, of course, their specific advantages and disadvantages. In 
the case of  this  particular project,  there are a number of  instances where the research could have  
yielded improved results. Some critical reflection is therefore important.
First of all, this research is not validated by any statistically representative form of data. No reliable data  
set about the caste composition of the Indian IT industry is available and this project has done nothing to  
fill  this  gap.  As  stated  before,  the  quantitative  aspect  of  my  research  project  was  not  particularly  
welcome  to  the  industry  representatives  I  had  contact  with,  and  not  all  proposed  projects  found 
approval  and  support.  The  projects  that  were  supported  are,  therefore,  more  qualitative  than 
quantitative  –  with  the  exception  of  the  planned  experiment  –  and  thus  lack  statistical  validity.  A  
(partially) relevant objection to the research is that it is overly subjective and thus lacking in objectivity.  
Since this is a problem common to all qualitative social science methods, this cannot be fully rebutted.  
However, there are three main lines of argument to address this objection: First, in all the interviews, the 
subject  of  caste  was addressed  as  neutrally  as  possible.  People  from both  sides  of  the reservation 
controversy  were interviewed and I  was always  concerned to maintain the perspective  of  a  neutral 
observer. The person of the interviewer is, of course, influential in all interviews, but I consciously tried  
to keep this influence neutral in respect of the main subject of caste. Second, the sources used as the  
basis for my analysis of the relevant situation in IT – the training material, the participant observations  
and even the pre-test for the experiment – are openly available to other researchers’ interpretation. Of 
course, any such interpretation would be differently nuanced, but I doubt that it would come to vastly  
different  conclusions.  Third,  the  research  projects  are  internally  balanced  by  the  triangulation  of  
different methods. As so many fundamentally different methods were employed in this research, the  
convergence of all  somewhat neutralises the shortcoming of each. As far as qualitative methods are 
concerned, this is the best available control mechanism to limit (if not fully exclude) the deficiencies of a  
single method. 
Interestingly, the method of the socio-psychological experiment failed in the context of this research: It  
was  both  too  narrow  to  include  the  complexity  of  caste  and  too  specific  for  this  setting.  As  an 
experiment always aims to control all variables except the one under examination, the design proved 
unsuitable  in  a  context  were  the  setting  was  unfamiliar  and  the  variables  difficult  to  manipulate.  
Similarly, the complexity of caste was not reducible to the distinction between Brahmin on the one hand 
and SC or ST on the other; nor did the participants’ knowledge of caste-related matters prove to be  
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sufficient  to  validate  the  experiment.  As  a  result,  in  its  essential  conditions  and  its  intrinsic  
methodological narrowness, this experiment proved unviable. 
At the same time, however, an interesting contrast emerged between the results of the interviews and  
the participant observations. While the meaning of caste was regularly underplayed in the interviews,  
the importance of  caste proved much more salient in the informal observations. However,  although 
methodological purists might object, this is not a real contrast resulting from the methods used, but  
rather  an example of  complementary symbiosis.  The interviews,  directed at  caste in the workplace,  
obviously produced different results from participant observations,  made in the living quarters of IT  
employees.  In  this  particular  case,  the use  of  different  methodologies  proved  advantageous  to  the  
overall  research;  neither  single  project  came  close  to  the  complexity  of  caste  within  IT,  but  the 
combination of all provided a multidimensional picture that is elaborated and internally triangulated.
Apart from the specific methodology, there are other reasonable objections to this particular approach.  
This research does not cover the IT industry in all its complexity. Rather, it relies on a non-randomly 
selected sample  and makes  no claim towards  representativeness.  In  particular,  the selection of  the  
interviewees (see chpt. 6) are biased by my focus on the STP project – therefore, many more SC/ST 
members are represented than indicated by their representation in the IT workforce. In addition, I was  
unable to recruit women outside the STP sample. This does not render the interviews meaningless, but it  
does prohibit overly broad generalisations about the whole IT workforce. With that caveat in mind, and  
without claim to representativeness, a number of the interviewees reported the same opinion and –  
with few exceptions – the interviewees could be classified in categories. Thus, while the research does 
not attempt to quantify these categories, it is doubtful if a bigger, more representative sample would 
have resulted in a very different pattern of results. The problem of underrepresentation of women still  
persists,  but  since  a  male  researcher  would  always  be  faced  with  this  problem  in  these  cultural  
circumstances, a solution would have to be left to a female researcher. 
Linked to the problem of selective sampling is one that relates to the diversity of the IT industry. The 
research was enabled to a large degree by the generosity of Infosys and its representatives, and for this 
reason alone is not representative of the rest of the industry. Infosys itself is an elite and therefore rather  
exceptional company, a hallmark of transparency and openness and – especially in the Indian context –  
an active agent for the modernisation of Indian society (Dasgupta 2008, 2009).170 Without the support of 
170 Compare the statement of Infosys on http://www.infosys.com/about/who-we-are/Pages/index.aspx - accessed 03.02.2011:
Vision:  "To  be  a  globally  respected  corporation  that  provides  best-of-breed business  solutions,  leveraging  technology,  
delivered by best-in-class people."
Mission: "To achieve our objectives in an environment of fairness, honesty, and courtesy towards our clients, employees,  
vendors and society at large."
Values: We believe that the softest pillow is a clear conscience. The values that drive us underscore our commitment to:
Customer Delight: To surpass customer expectations consistently 
Leadership by Example: To set standards in our business and transactions and be an exemplar for the industry and ourselves 
Integrity and Transparency: To be ethical, sincere and open in all our transactions 
Fairness: To be objective and transaction-oriented, and thereby earn trust and respect 
Pursuit of Excellence: To strive relentlessly, constantly improve ourselves, our teams, our services and products to become  
the best 
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Infosys the whole research would have taken a different direction.  Furthermore, the STP sample, in 
particular,  represents  a somewhat elite  selection of  people who work in Bangalore’s  best  known IT  
companies. In order to balance this, the recruitment of the non-STP sample was done independently of  
Infosys – although I would still concede that the sample in total is biased towards the upper end of the IT  
workforce. This could imply that conditions are different in smaller and less well-known IT companies;  
however, as this research is deliberately directed at a socio-economic avant-garde, this does not provide  
a fundamental  objection to the questions asked. Rather,  it  once again confirms the direction of the 
research agenda by concentrating on those who are now considered an elite role model simply because 
they are the potential vanguard of India’s future direction of development.
Finally, a more fundamental problem could be seen in the perspective on caste that the author displayed  
in the first chapters of this thesis. Guided by a particular – decisively unorthodox – perspective on caste,  
it  could  be assumed that  certain,  more traditional  aspects  of  caste  are  under-researched or  simply 
ignored. There are, indeed, some indications of this: The research is not so much centred on the ritual or 
religious aspects of caste but, rather, is more concerned with the social practices and consequences of  
this institution. Furthermore, by researching only in a particular sector of society, neither covering the 
totality of caste relations in a given locality nor all the aspects of caste in the lifecycle of an individual or  
social group, it offers a limited perspective on caste. Truth be told, this is very likely the most valuable  
objection to the findings of this research. The scope is indeed limited by the focus on the IT industry and  
the reliance on (mainly) young IT engineers living separately from their families. It therefore offers only a  
glimpse of the contemporary practise of caste in a limited context. The only claim this thesis makes,  
then, is that this narrow glimpse, this very particular perspective on caste, is indeed valuable for an  
understanding of this institution in a rapidly modernising society.
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5.2. ‘Soft Skills’ training
One of the main obstacles to becoming an IT employee is not so much the lack of technical qualifications  
but,  rather,  the  need  to  adapt  to  the  new  work  culture.  The  IT  industry  offers  a  unique  work 
environment (see chpt. 4) and for young graduates this represents something of a hurdle. (As indicated 
in the interview analysis in chapter six, the judgement by recruiters about one's cultural ability to fit in  
was often the most difficult test.) Consequently, literally thousands of aspiring IT job candidates with 
sufficient technical qualifications fail to pass the job interview – mainly because selection is based on 
communication  skills,  with  technical  qualifications  taken  for  granted.171 The  importance  of 
communication skills, often overlooked in more traditional economist analysis, is itself a result of the  
much greater emphasis on the role of the single employee in group discussions and group decisions in  
the New Economy workplace (see 4.2.3).  Investigating  the cultural  adaptation process,  both with  a  
perspective on modernisation in Indian society as a whole and the significance that this process holds for  
the practice of caste, is therefore worthwhile 
As important as communication (or ‘soft’) skills are to the IT industry, empirical research into the subject 
is not unproblematic, even if it is met with much less resistance than, say, quantitative research. The 
training sessions are regarded as confidential, the materials protected by copyrights, and participants  
restricted in divulging details. Thus, even though direct observation would have been the ideal, I was 
never in the fortunate position of being able to attend one of the training sessions in person. While not  
having the opportunity to observe the training (and, perhaps more importantly,  the reaction of the  
participants) is regrettable, given the constraints on the research the only practicable alternative was to  
use the available sources to the maximum, even if some aspects could not be fully covered. For example,  
the  NIAS  ethnographic  film project  (Sonti  2006) offered  a  behind-the-scenes  view of  team-building 
training  within  two  companies,  including  interviews  with  the  actual  soft  skills  trainer.  In  my  own 
research, I also had the chance to interview one senior HR manager of a well-known IT company and 
three of the trainers who taught soft skills and language proficiency courses within the STP programme 
in Hyderabad. Additionally, the training material of the Campus Connect initiative was made available to 
me. These manuals, the main source of this chapter, proved invaluable because they outlined not only 
the tasks of the training itself, but also the ideas behind it. With this range of sources, it was at least  
possible to reconstruct the broad details of the training. 
The following analysis is therefore based mainly on the printed training material, downloadable from the 
Campus Connect website. It comes in five parts: “Adapting to Corporate Life”(CampusConnect [2009]-d), 
“The  Art  of  Communication”([2009]-b),  “Discussions,  decisions  and  presentations”([2009]-c),  “In  the 
world of teams”([2009]-e), and “The hidden data of communication”([2009]-a). Each manual provides 
the outline of a full-day-training schedule. While these manuals have little to say about how students  
171 In most cases, those selected for a job interview have already cleared the tests on technical qualifications. 
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themselves react to the IT culture, they nevertheless offer a tremendous opportunity to analyse the IT 
industry’s projected self-image.172 Further, the manuals include rules and guidelines with far-reaching 
implications for personal behaviour in a company, with the tacit understanding that these rules have 
generalised validity. Of course, the manuals do not offer a complete view of the industry’s ethos, and 
have no stated intent beyond being a guide to a career in India's IT sector. Nevertheless, the manuals  
cannot be viewed independently from their societal background, and they often seem aware of this  
connection. In the discussion of ethical dilemmas  (CampusConnect [2009]-d:  1.11), in particular, the 
scenarios  are  not  orientated  exclusively  to  the  business  world,  but  are  applicable  to  wider  social  
contexts.
5.2.1. The manuals at first glance
Broadly speaking, the manuals appear to be somewhat generic, as if taken from a (Western) standard 
template and only superficially adapted to the Indian context. Regional or cultural characteristics are 
neither mentioned nor discussed and there is no specific link to the Indian situation. The author of the 
manuals remains anonymous and his  or her intentions can only be guessed.  Nevertheless,  the very 
construction of the manuals reflects IT's loose connection with Indian society, and the industry’s cultural  
orientation  to  the  globalised  business  environment,  based  on  a  superficial  adaptation  of  Western  
concepts. Importantly, the main challenge is not mentioned – that is, the transcultural transferal of a 
business concept based on a primarily egalitarian rationality into a society that is steeped in notions of  
hierarchy. Moreover, with its unspoken assumption that the value system can be transferred without 
major obstacles or cultural resistance, the author(s) of the manuals either ignore the problem or assume 
it will be resolved effortlessly. No background is given about the history or special situation of IT in India,  
and the specifics of the corporate model are not explained. It is taken for granted that young employees  
will simply accept the new value system and that the only thing they have to learn is how to seamlessly  
adapt. Not surprisingly, the manuals’ rules and guidelines are projected in such a way that they appear 
mere common sense, without alternatives. It seems to be assumed that most participants would be 
overwhelmed by any background discussion of corporate culture, and thus the path of least resistance 
seems to have been chosen to avoid controversial topics altogether.
Given the degree of  adaptation and reorientation expected of  the participants,  the absence of  any  
background  information  could  be  interpreted  as  an  authoritarian  assault  on  the  value  system  of 
participants; that is, it appears to disregard the participants’ cultural circumstances, even if no direct  
challenge  to  individual  values  is  posed.  Although  the  IT  boom  and  the  cultural  changes  within  its  
workforce are cause for cultural  friction within and outside the industry  (C.  Upadhya 2009b),  these 
manuals promote a strategy of side-stepping the discussion entirely. On the other hand, since IT regards  
itself as an engine of reform and is therefore motivated by a certain sense of a mission, it is possible that  
172 The ethnographic films cover some soft skill training and seem to indicate that the employees’ reaction is often lethargic,  
but  not  motivated  by  resistance  or  hostility.  Coding  Culture:  A  Set  of  Three Documentary  Films on the  It  Industry  in  
Bangalore (2006), Gautam Sonti (dir.). 
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most of the cultural changes expected of the trainees are simply seen as natural and therefore taken for  
granted. The extent to which this cultural transmission is either deliberately hidden or, by contrast, seen 
as a natural adjustment process without any alternatives, is an issue worthy of further analysis. 
5.2.2. The actual recommendations of the manuals
The strategy of avoiding areas of controversy is obvious throughout the manuals. Instead of discussing 
the participants’ own situation, a ‘blank slate’ approach is adopted, even if it is tacitly assumed that  
people start from very different cultural backgrounds. The manuals are, of course, not explicit about  
things that are merely presupposed. English, for example, is taught in specifically designated training 
sessions. However, while English is not explicitly discussed here, the importance of the language was 
established in all four relevant interviews:
We had oriented the students to English usage in a typical industry [...] Communicational skills that are 
required for their role that they are going to play in the industry. It is not about grammar, it is not about 
how good my vocabulary strength is, but business communication: How do I interact with the team, with 
the client, with the manager, mail etiquettes, telephone etiquettes... (0521M002)
The manual on corporate life, for example, appears to be aware of the cultural differences within Indian  
society, but tries to ignore them, or better yet, downplay them and merge them into a new 'corporate'  
value system:
We all live in different communities and are born into different cultures, which are often reflected in the 
clothing that we wear. When you go outside your community or culture group, others may identify you as 
being different. A business or organization is a “culture” in itself. When you work for that organization, you 
become part of that culture. When you are a member of that “culture”, you are expected to reflect the  
values of that organization. (CampusConnect [2009]-d: 1.1) 
The  first  and  most  obvious  manifestation  of  this  corporate  culture  is  in  the  dress-code  and  the 
appearance of the employees. Correspondingly, considerable effort is put into establishing standards of 
personal grooming and dress. The expectations seem to be at the lower end of the social spectrum, with 
the guidelines including advice on bathing or showering before going to a job interview (including the  
rule that nails and hands should be clean) (CampusConnect [2009]-d: 1.3). As IT engineers could come 
from diverse backgrounds, with IT assumed to be a vehicle for social mobility, it seems necessary to be  
explicit about bodily hygiene and basic dress codes. However, it does not end with this. Adapting to a 
corporate  culture  in  this  context  means  adapting  to  formal  Western  or  formal  Indian  fashion  and 
eschewing  anything  that  could  be  seen  as  too  casual  or  too  sexually  charged.  Clear  and  explicit  
guidelines are given for formal business, informal business and casual wear, with the emphasis always on 
the modest, conservative side. 
Furthermore,  the  remodelling  of  aspiring  IT  employees  does  not  only  involve  implicit  and  explicit 
compliance to a business dress code or with hygienic standards. Guidelines also detail how to behave in  
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typical work-related situations, with special attention on potential faux pas and embarrassment. In this 
context,  most  guidelines  appear  generic  and  could  have  originated  anywhere  in  a  global  business 
culture. No specific Indian cultural codes are addressed nor are specific Indian habits, like eating without  
cutlery,  even mentioned.  The cultural  origins  of  the recommended/requested practices  can only  be 
indirectly inferred – for example, when table manners and dining etiquette are discussed. Without much 
adaptation to the Indian context, different dietary requirements are ignored and the consumption of  
meat is taken for granted. While this is questionable even in a Western context, it seems even more 
inappropriate with regard to the prevailing High Caste background of the contemporary IT workforce  
(see  4.1.4),  large  sections  of  which  are  traditionally  restricted  to  a  vegetarian  diet.  Nevertheless,  
potential differences in caste background do not feature at all, with controversial cultural differences 
with regard to food being avoided by the adaptation of Western culinary rules. It seems that belonging  
to the corporate environment involves the acceptance of Western food habits, and the preferences and 
tastes that come with it. 
Q: What if I order from the menu but am served the wrong thing?
A:  If  it’s  a  big  mistake,  you  can discreetly  mention this  to  the  server  immediately  so  that  it  can be  
corrected. If the error is small […] ignore it. Fussing over food can make you look childish, finicky and 
concerned with the wrong things (no assets in a job candidate). Your goal is to appear gracious. 
Q: What is appropriate to order for dinner?
A: Simple foods that are easily eaten with a fork and a knife (meats, simple salads and soups).  Avoid  
spaghetti or other things with red sauce, huge deli sandwiches, greasy hand-held items like pizzas, and  
gassy food like beans, broccoli or cauliflower. Sometimes you may not have a choice. Follow your host's  
lead. (CampusConnect [2009]-d)
Two striking characteristics seem to be the common thread of these dining rules; a disregard for Indian  
food and an unquestioned assimilation of a formal Western style. Perhaps unintentionally, the manuals  
reveal  the  power  disparity  in  the  relationship  between  the  cultures  in  question;  one  provides  the 
example to be followed, with the other not even mentioned. 
Apart from guidelines concerning dress and Western eating etiquette, the manuals have more general  
rules of behaviour that are perhaps the most interesting for this analysis. Under the heading “Dealing 
with people”, a set of attitudes is fostered that creates an overall picture of idealised social interaction in  
the globalised India. By assuming the complete domination of market forces –  a-priori to this kind of 
corporate ideology – a view of humanity and personal conduct naturally follows. The most general rule  
can  be  summarised  in  the  guideline  ‘be  considerate  to  anyone  regardless  of  position  or  personal  
standing’ and is explicitly rationalised by the ever-changing work environment and the hidden power of 
subordinates to influence decisions. As the manual explains:
In these days of rapid advancement through technology, it is very possible that a salesman who was a  
nuisance becomes an important client, or an administrative assistant becomes a manager. Mergers and 
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acquisitions can cause a former competitor to become a co-worker.
This can make things awkward if you treat people differently depending on their “corporate standing.” If  
you show respect and courtesy to everyone, regardless of position or company, you avoid discomfort or  
damaging your chances in any unexpected turn of events. (CampusConnect [2009]-d: 35)
Needless to say, this is an almost complete reversal of traditional Indian ethics, where prestige, social  
standing and economic abilities are often instantly ranked into a form of hierarchy, and persons are 
treated very differently according to their assigned position (cf. chpt. 8). As much idealised as this might 
be, it is nothing less than an abrupt and open refusal to accept prevailing Indian social conditions and to  
live instead by the unwritten rules of globalised – or rather Westernised – business norms. Politically, it  
represents a clear departure from the submissive role that was expected from corporations under the 
licence raj; the corporation here is not subordinated to a national project or culture, but rather defines 
the cultural forms of the future according to its own needs and concepts. In terms of business ethics, it is  
an attempt to establish a pure form of performance-driven rationality that ignores all forms of social  
interference and is unreceptive to corruption or political intervention. 
In terms of work ethics, this is not much of a surprise: In most Western countries, the IT industry also 
consistently  acts  as  a  pioneer  in  new  work  management  models,  based  on  mature,  empowered 
employees. Employees are not seen as mere recipients for orders but as valuable assets, with the ability  
to contribute on an equal footing even if  status and competency differences persist.  The adaptation 
process in the Indian context is therefore quite a challenge and needs its symbolic expression as a break 
with the past. Perhaps the most striking symbol of this cultural shift is revealed in the abolition of the 
Sir/Madam salutation, replaced by the simple use of first names. According to the soft skill  trainers  
interviewed, parents of IT employees are startled when they get to know about first name usage, with 
most trainees quite hesitant about it at first. But the change is much more comprehensive than that: The  
whole concept of hierarchy needs to be reworked and the position of superiors defined anew. As the 
manual explains: 
The only thing you owe your boss, above and beyond what you owe peers and subordinates, is more 
information. Very quietly, be sure he or she knows what you're doing, is alerted as early as possible to 
issues that may arise, and is aware of outcomes and milestones. Your boss should never be surprised.  
(CampusConnect [2009]-d: 1.8)
The boss is,  according to this  work philosophy, much less distant to the employee and much more  
dependent on the information flow towards him/her. If the power differential became too great, this 
valuable information flow could be impaired or biased by the need to please superiors.  In order to  
prevent this, subordinates need to be empowered to state their position (relatively) unimpeded. 
In terms of a unified corporate culture, and as a way of facilitating team-based decisions, all levels of the  
organisation  have  to  be  in  sync  with  the  goals  and  objectives  of  the  corporation.  As  the  training 
programme says:
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If the lowest echelons of the workforce each become trained in understanding the company's objectives 
and work practices through group decision making, then each will be better able to solve work-related 
problems in general. (CampusConnect [2009]-c: 1.1)
When decisions are taken at the “lowest echelon” and in the form of group discussion, the role of the  
individual employee is both empowered and disempowered by the necessity to integrate into the group. 
For the company, this provides advantages that are economically relevant. In the euphemised words of 
the training manual:
The  group  provides  an  environment  where  the  individual's  level  of  responsibility  and  authority  is 
enhanced, and where accountability is shared: thus providing a perfect motivator through enhanced self-
esteem coupled with low stress. (CampusConnect [2009]-c: 1.1)
Here, the contrast is perhaps greatest to the observed situation with regard to work satisfaction (see  
6.5.1). While the training tells of the advantages of the new work philosophy, the obvious downsides  
(see 4.2.3) are naturally ignored or denied. In everyday practice, this model is much more likely to lead 
to greater social pressure from the group on individual team members, with stress levels only elevated 
by the increased responsibility.
This again points to the radically different work environment in IT, based on a value system that could be  
unclear or challenging for young trainees from diverse backgrounds. In order to provide guidelines, some 
examples of ethical dilemmas are discussed, with the underlying ideals obviously exposed. Of course, as  
expected in a discussion of ethical dilemmas, the need to act ethically in business situations, no matter  
how disadvantageous it might be in the short term, is emphasised. Interestingly, though, no justifications  
for ethical  behaviour are given, with references to law and religion only mentioned in passing.  The 
examples for ethical dilemmas, to be discussed by the trainees, are generic, and are presented in the 
form of short, de-contextualised descriptions of situations with value conflicts: 
Leena is head of the quality control division of a company that prides itself on its merit-based pay system.  
One of Leena's Sr. Quality Control Engineers, Aftab, has done a tremendous job all year round, and has 
saved  the  company from  many  embarrassing  situations;  he  really  deserves  recognition.  But  Aftab  is 
already at the top of the salary range for his job grade. The company has too many people in the grade 
above him, and so he cannot be promoted either. What should Leena do? (CampusConnect [2009]-d: 45)
Apart from the names, which appear to be adapted to the Indian context, this situation is unrelated to 
specific  Indian conflicts;  indeed, none of  the eight examples covers anything remotely resembling a 
typical Indian problem. Most of the portrayed situations are de-contextualised and could happen in any 
business in the world, such as the personal use of company's resources. When culture-sensitive values  
are concerned, they are not taken from an Indian context,  and must seem rather strange to Indian 
college students – for example, when asked to discuss the conflict between fundamental Christian belief  
systems  and  the  rights  of  homosexuals.  Even  the  highly  controversial  topic  of  affirmative  action  is 
situated in London and revolves around the question of whether someone with limited command of  
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English deserves to be employed because his ethnic origin (first generation Punjabi) qualifies him for  
preferential treatment under company's policies. In this way, the manual avoids controversies by only 
discussing topics with no emotional connection to the trainees. While this clearly loses out in relevance,  
it avoids alienating those who might be offended by topics that are personally relevant and emotionally  
disturbing. 
For most participants, the remaining examples are therefore nothing more than strange and somewhat 
distant scenarios without much connection to their own lives. However, this seems to be the price to pay 
if this exercise in ethics is to avoid a personalised and potentially damaging debate about more relevant  
issues. Nevertheless, this more abstract approach to ethical problems does in fact create opportunities 
for an open debate – something that is not taken for granted. At first glance, any position could be taken  
in the debates (which are indeed encouraged), and no preferences are given that would hint at the  
underlying  rationale  of  the  exercise.  Furthermore,  the  seemingly  non-controversial  nature  of  this  
particular  example  is  deceiving:  The  very  idea  of  discussing  ethical  dilemmas  with  young,  aspiring  
graduates in technical subjects is entirely novel, and contrasts dramatically with established methods, 
where individuals are almost never faced with decisions like these. These ethical discussions, then, are 
clearly in sync with IT's role in the modernisation of India.173 The fact that the trainees are deliberately 
taught to be aware of ethical dilemmas points towards their greater autonomy in the workplace. The 
design  of  these  dilemmas,  where  different  positions  are  encouraged  and  no  final  answer  is  even 
envisaged, goes against the grain of authoritarian and non-reflective ethical systems. 
In sum, the ethical discussions are a clear departure from Indian traditions. Not surprisingly, they also 
portray the company as ideal and above human fallibility. As no business objectives are discussed, it  
appears as if the sole aim of the particular company is to conduct an ethically oriented project for the 
best of mankind. Infosys’ slogan “powered by intellect – driven by values”, in addition to the countless  
social initiatives that its leaders are engaged in,  all  point to the same image projected by India's  IT 
industry: To be more than an economically oriented sector like any other, but rather an active pioneer  
for a better future India.174 And although this stance is highly idealised and might not match reality – the  
Satyam example is a warning example175 – it is a clear and open challenge to the established way of 
doing business in India. The audacious manner in which a hitherto alien and disconcerting vision of  
society  has  been  abruptly  thrust  into  a  society  following  different,  and  often  opposing,  cultural  
traditions, tells of IT's powerful presence and sense of mission. 
5.2.3. Interpretation: The ideas behind the manuals
Working within the New Economy carries a number of consequences for those opting to join. Former 
173 Compare the role of reflexivity in modernity in chapter 2.1.6.
174 Compare: Murthy, A Better India - a Better World.
175 The revelation on 7 January 2009 that Satyam Computer Services Ltd had continuously and over many years fraudulently  
inflated its balance sheet greatly damaged the reputation of India's IT sector. It highlighted the fact that this sector is not  
immune to incompetence or fraudulent practices. 
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management duties, like the calculation of work schedules, the allocation of tasks and the responsibility  
for timely project conclusions, are transferred to the group level, while controls are installed in the form 
of shared group responsibility and peer monitoring. In the case of conflicts, the fault lines are within the  
group and confrontations are most likely kept at this level without being referred to higher management. 
With this  in mind,  the stated enhancement of  self-esteem and low stress levels  turn out to be the 
opposite: High stress levels are often quoted as typical for a job in IT (C. Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), and 
potentially difficult group dynamics are not necessarily beneficial for the employees' self-esteem. Rather, 
a high level of confidence is an essential prerequisite for survival in this environment. For exactly this  
reason, the soft skill training – large parts of which are aimed at encouraging higher confidence levels – 
is conducted before the graduates join the companies. 
The training programme anticipates and pre-empts the socialisation process that is necessary to adapt to  
this environment. It aims at cushioning the shock that may result from the sudden change of the cultural  
reference system. The work environment in IT, with its reliance on project-based, often short-lived team  
assignments, requires an openness and flexibility that cannot be expected of average college graduates. 
Therefore,  the  whole  team-building  process,  facilitated  by  shared  problem-solving  tasks  under  the 
guidance of the trainer, is essentially a socialisation process for a work environment in which interaction  
with unknown persons is the norm rather than the exception. Furthermore, it is deliberately meant as a 
means to smother cultural  discrepancies  and to enable  communication flows between people  from 
diverse backgrounds. A great deal of effort is put into teaching strategies that avoid embarrassment and 
conflict – literally by inculcating compassionate, reciprocal and goal-oriented communication techniques. 
While in most Western countries a baseline of cultural homogeneity and behavioural standards can be 
expected of job candidates, the culturally diverse landscape in India, and the often dismal education 
system, means very low initial levels of behavioural homogeneity are likely. As already observed in the 
manual on expectations in the corporate world, standards are established here that elsewhere would be 
considered part of (early) childhood education under ideal circumstances. And while the diverse profile  
of job candidates might pose a challenge for the soft skill trainers, it is symbolic of the social mobility  
fostered by the IT boom. Moreover, while the modernisation process in the training is a truncated and 
necessarily incomplete, it is nevertheless a dramatic adaptation to modernity (cf. chpt. 2). 
As  was  expected from the outset,  the  whole  design of  the  manual  rests  upon an implicit  ideal  of  
meritocracy that, while not directly addressed in the training, is in keeping with the IT industry’s role in 
pioneering new ethical and remuneration models (cf. 4.2.2.3 and 4.2.3). In the words of the HR manager 
interviewed:
[...]  as  I  said,  we  live  in  competition,  we  need  meritocracy,  we  are  competing  no  longer  with  our  
neighbourhood companies, we are competing with global companies – so it becomes important that we 
raise the bar of whatever we are and not lower the bar. (0521M002) 
Meritocracy, in its Indian version and in the Indian context, is a clear challenge to both the informal,  
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family-based  model  of  the  informal  economy  –  where  personal  connections  trump  expertise  and 
performance  –  and  the  bureaucratic  model  of  the  public  sector  –  where  political  considerations, 
cronyism and alliances based on social identity all too often override the performance principle. But in  
this  unquestioned acquisition of  foreign concepts lies the danger of  glossing over the deeper,  more 
structural  deficiencies that stand in the way of any smooth transition to a post-traditional  ‘modern’ 
world. 
The projected ideal of ‘meritocracy’, that which underlies the training programme, rests on the ideal  
foundation of fairness and openness. It also – wittingly or unwittingly – assumes that everyone has had 
the same access to education, otherwise fairness would be severely impaired. In the Indian context,  
where the opportunities for a decent education are unequally distributed amongst the population, this  
ideal can only be maintained if contradictory or disturbing elements are ignored or declared irrelevant.  
In a society where cronyism, corruption and unequal access to education is a lived reality, the mere 
invoking of meritocracy will not change entrenched social divisions; access to education would still be  
the domain of the select few. For all its good intentions, an unfettered meritocratic concept in the Indian 
context could actually harden existing inequalities and thereby undermine the fairness and openness 
that it proclaims to promote.
5.2.4. The issue of Caste in the training manuals
Not surprisingly,  the word caste  does not  figure  in  any of  the training  materials.  It  is  not  quite  an  
elephant in the room, but it is remarkable that an issue that is so closely connected to the cultural  
background of the trainees is not discussed at all. The reason can only be seen in a conscious avoidance  
of any discussion of caste by the leaders of the IT sector: 
The day you apply to Infosys or any other IT organisation, you will be asked to fill the company’s profile  
form for recruitment. There is nowhere where you need to state which caste you belong to or which sub-
caste – so that is the first indication. When companies are looking for talent like Infosys, we are interested 
in  meritocracy,  we are  interested in the quality of  competence that  one possesses  – that  is  the first  
indication. Second, once that guy is in or during the time of test or interview, there is nowhere any trace or  
any indication of where are you from; which part, what sub-caste, what is your background, background in  
terms of caste. (0521M002)
For  this  reason,  and  unfortunately  so,  the training  leaves  aside  the  most  interesting  topics  for  this  
research project. By taking this exercise in ethics to a very abstract level, the training steers clear of the 
heated controversy surrounding caste reservations, women rights or the changing relations between 
individuals and families. Knowingly or not, the soft skills training process appears virtually neutral within  
the Indian cultural field. 
If caste has an influence – on entering the workforce or surviving/thriving within it – then it is more  
indirect. For example, possessing a self-confident personality, crucial for passing job interviews, might be  
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differently spread in socio-cultural communities. The STP training in particular expends much time and 
effort on raising self confidence amongst SC and ST trainees who have historically been at the bottom of  
the social hierarchy. As socio-economic conditions in India are still connected to caste status, it is only 
logical to expect caste-based differences in the level of confidence. For these reasons alone, finding the  
necessary self-confidence is unlikely amongst those who grew up under wretched conditions and with 
the tacit or explicit knowledge that they are inferior to the rest of society. This stigma, still attached to 
those who are in the double bind of low social prestige and precarious economic conditions, is without  
doubt a hindrance to developing the kind of personality expected in IT.  When following this line of 
argument, the rural-urban divide, often employed in official IT narratives,176 can then be analysed, to an 
extent, in caste terms. In urban conditions, where caste-related subjugation and the knowledge about 
one's caste status is much less common and relevant than in rural areas, those from Lower Castes might  
well be untainted by the stigma of their social origin. By contrast, in rural areas, where the knowledge of 
caste membership is still prevalent, the stigma is felt and could easily be reflected in the personality of 
job applicants. 
One different,  albeit  closely  related,  line  of  argument  is  that  concerning  the need for  openness  to  
Western influences – something that is not caste- or community-neutral either. Not entirely accidentally,  
the groups overrepresented in the work force – Christians and Hindu Upper Castes, notably  Brahmins 
(see 4.2.4)  – are  the ones that  are  most open to the cultural  influence of  the West.  However,  the 
approach to Westernisation is different for these two main groups: The influence is most direct with 
Christians, who are integrated in a religion that is, at least from an Indian perspective, globalised under 
Western leadership.177 How integrated the contact to the West is in the individual’s biography depends  
on the personal or family history of conversion, which could have happened in the person’s own lifetime,  
or  have  occurred  generations  or,  in  some cases  at  least,  millennia  ago.178 Hence,  Indian  Christians’ 
openness to the West is considerably stronger than the Indian average, and their strong representation 
in IT is not surprising. On the other hand, the openness of Higher Castes and especially Brahmins, while 
differently nuanced and motivated, shows the same general patterns. Since the upper echelons of India’s  
Hindu population are generally the best educated and therefore the most exposed to cultural influences 
from abroad, they might spearhead India's opening towards the West in cultural terms. Attracted by the  
economic success and the globally advertised cultural example of the United States, the elite of Hindu 
India seems to be quite open to Western values or, at least, partial adaptations of it. 
This, though, is not always the case, and rejection of the new work culture and its attached values is not  
unconnected to the cultural background of those who oppose it. According to the interviews with the 
176 A good number of official initiatives by the IT and ITES industry are directed at rural development and the bridging of the  
rural/urban divide, thereby evading the price and wage inflation in India’s cities. See:  Nasscom, 'Indian It/Ites Industry: 
Impacting Economy and Society 2007-08', (New Delhi: NASSCOM Deloite, 2008).
177 Christianity has a long tradition in India, dating back almost 2000 years, but is still perceived as a Western religion by most  
Indians, hence the rejection by Hindu fundamentalists. See Anurag Pandey, 'Communalism and Separatism in India', Journal  
of Asian and African Studies, 42/6 (2007), 533-49.
178 As Christian missionary work in India is in most cases connected with the offer and encouragement of education at all levels,  
social mobility is high amongst Christians and a certain appreciation of Western culture or parts of it can be expected.
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STP  trainers  in  Hyderabad,  there  had  been  one  very  significant  instant  of  refusal  to  adopt  the  
Westernised work patterns: A cohort of urban Hyderabad Muslims, who took pride in their heritage as 
the inheritors of the Nizzam culture, openly refused to acquiesce to what they perceived as cultural 
colonialisation on Western terms. In their insistence on the separation between men and women, the 
adherence to conservative Islamic dress-codes, including burqa for women and long beards for men, and 
the obvious contempt for Western cultural influences, they were the only obvious example of a group 
deliberately unable and unwilling to fit into the cultural environment of IT. As followers of a self-aware 
culture  that  sees  itself  in  conflict  with  Western  notions  of  modernity,  their  refusal  can  –  if  it  is  
generalisable – be taken as an explanation for the significant under-representation of Muslims in the IT  
workforce. Furthermore, this example perhaps indicates that the relatively smooth adaptation process of 
most  other  socio-cultural  groups  is  grounded  in  the  fundamental  openness  of  those  cultures  and 
religions that predominate in India, and their general compatibility with the Western ideas prevalent in  
IT. 
5.2.5. Conclusion
The soft-skill  training of young, prospective IT employees clearly has modernising, or even 'civilising'  
intentions. Even though it often avoids the main conflicts of Indian society, it is nevertheless a clear 
departure from everything deemed traditional in India. Walking the fine line between establishing its 
own values while not upsetting those of the trainees, the training deliberately avoids tensions within the 
Indian cultural context. By replacing unquestioned traditions with rational arguments and by reflecting  
upon  previously  ignored  ethical  dilemmas,  IT  tries  to  revolutionise  established  notions  of  business  
relations, with implications for wider society. It therefore projects and furthers a symbolic shift from the 
traditional bureaucratic, hierarchical system, which manifests itself in the public administration, to the 
globalised, team-based and less hierarchical system that is a feature of the New Economy worldwide. For 
India, this means a shift away from the formal behaviour adapted from the British before independence  
to an informal American-inspired approach, one that originated in private industry and which is more  
oriented towards goals than procedures. 
Not surprisingly, this marks a radical departure from a static personal identity, based on position in a 
hierarchy, towards a more fluid, individualised, and ultimately self-empowered, professional self-image.  
This may seem ironic considering the pressure and indignities that are associated with the IT profession 
at  the receiving  end of  global  outsourcing.  But  since jobs  are  fundamentally  insecure,  employment  
periods are much shorter than in any other Indian sector, and responsibility for skill improvement and  
qualifications rests with the individual, this is a logical consequence. As market forces are unpredictable,  
and  no  comprehensive  ideology  or  authority  is  left  to  provide  guidelines  or  parameters  for  the 
establishment of identities, the individual is solely responsible for improving his or her market value. And 
market value is clearly enhanced by a flexible, adaptable personality, and by people who, even if not  
necessarily qualified in all relevant techniques, are still able to acquire the missing knowledge in the 
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shortest  time  possible.  In  order  to  be  fully  operational  in  a  globalised  work  culture,  the  ideal  IT 
employees need personalities that can cope with being subordinated into a team and, at the same time, 
are able to speak their own minds. And while such employees might have acquired a certain sense of  
autonomy, there is little doubt that this is ultimately subordinated to the overall aim of efficiency. 
If,  and only  if,  the  training  has  lasting  influence on the trainees,  the ideal  outcome would be self-
confident  and reflexive  employees who are  able  to  fit  into a  work climate that  is  both Indian and  
globalised with a Western pre-text. A neutral and respectful understanding is envisioned between the 
teams and between colleagues, one that would enable a fluid handling of contingent events, itself a  
prerequisite of the work requirements. Caste is not addressed nor even mentioned in the manuals, but  
the respect for every person regardless of social standing that is expected would prevent discrimination 
or disrespect on the basis of caste. From other sources it is apparent (cf. chpt.6 and Dasgupta 2008) that 
discrimination based on social origin, personal appearance or gender is strictly discouraged and sharply 
sanctioned in this industry. While it is still not entirely clear why the issue of caste is omitted from the  
training, it is apparent that caste is neither an acceptable distinguishing criteria between IT employees 
nor a direct factor in recruitment process. 
Nevertheless,  caste  could  play  a more indirect  factor  even in  this  training.  The willingness  to  open 
oneself  to  the  Westernised  work  culture  in  IT  could  well  be  unequally  distributed  amongst  Indian  
communities. As long as caste is correlated with socio-economic conditions, it potentially reflects on the 
individual’s personality; therefore, some castes might be better suited to enter IT than others. However, 
if this correlation becomes weaker – and the tiny SC/ST section of the new middle classes hints at such a  
change – this line of argument would lose its force. At the moment, some castes and communities are  
clearly  overrepresented in IT  and in  openness to the West,  and their  educational  achievement and  
confidence levels might be responsible for this. But, fundamentally, this appears neither systemic nor  
unchangeable in the future. The rise of Lower Castes in politics – often Dominant Agricultural Castes – 
could well be a sign of what could happen in the IT workforce. As confident personalities and cultural  
openness to the West are not exclusive to only some communities, there is at least the potential for a  
significant change in the future. 
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6. The qualitative Interviews 
6.1. Methodology 
This chapter is based on an extensive series of interviews with people who are, in most cases, currently  
working in IT. The majority of the interviews were conducted in connection with the Special Training  
Programme (STP), a scheme that aims to increase the employability of technical graduates from SC and 
ST background within the IT industry, where they are hitherto largely absent. The support of both Infosys  
and the International Institute of Information Technologies Bangalore (iiit-b) provided an opportunity to 
engage with those who are both significantly under-represented in the IT workforce and who have been  
traditionally  subjected  to  the  harshest  forms  of  caste-based  discrimination.  The  perspectives  and 
opinions of the STP trainees, can then be compared to the views of independently-recruited High Caste 
IT employees.179 Within this context, the question of the role of caste in IT's work environment is then 
pursued from two different angles; from both the perspective of the mainstream and from that of those  
who are potentially on the receiving end of caste-based discrimination.
The  STP  project  allowed  unique  access  to  a  population  that  is  almost  impossible  to  approach  
independently – that is, IT employees with SC or ST background. I could evaluate the success of their 
training scheme and at the same time interview them about their own perception of caste in IT, their 
own experience of being from a traditionally marginalised group and their view on general social change 
in IT and beyond. In order to balance the views of the STP alumni, interviews were also conducted with  
IT  employees from general  backgrounds,  recruited independently  of  STP.  Last  but  not  least,  and to 
provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture,  trainees  from  the  ongoing  STP  group  in  Bangalore  and 
Hyderabad were interviewed, as well as managers from the industry. In total, 72 people shared their 
views in this project: 51 were participants of STP in one form or other (43 STP I alumni Bangalore, 4 STP  
II  trainees Bangalore,  4 STP II  trainees Hyderabad),  14 “general  background” 180 IT  employees,  and 7 
managers and experts from the industry itself.181 Revealingly, the recruitment method is apparent in the 
gender balance; while 18 of the STP trainees and alumni were women (35 per cent – higher than the  
industry’s average), the independently recruited general IT employees were exclusively male, with only  
one woman amongst the industry’s experts. This reflects both the male dominance amongst IT experts  
and the limitations a male interviewer is faced with in recruiting female interviewees. 
In addition to dissimilarities in gender quota, the interview location also differed between respondent 
groups: The interviews with general employees were mainly conducted in private places, often in my (or  
their)  PG room,  while  the  expert  interviews  and  most  of  the  STP  interviews  took  place  in  offices.  
179 Since the IT workforce is dominated by High Caste Hindus (chpt. 4.2.4), their view is taken as the ‘mainstream’ view.
180 ‘General Background’ refers to those who are not eligible for reservations in India – that is, those who are not SC, ST or OBC.  
In all likelihood, they are Hindu Upper Castes – in my sample this was the case with one exception, a Christian.
181 All the STP interviews were recorded and transcribed, however, one of the non-STP interviews and three of the expert  
interviews were documented by minutes only. The interviews are marked: STP stands for the first batch of STP in Bangalore,  
STP II for the second one, while GEN is for general IT employees and EXP for experts.
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Additionally, the chosen interview methodology varied somewhat. The interviews with the STP alumni 
were all conducted in a semi-structured way; that is, I asked all participants the same questions, but also  
tried to encourage an open discussion to get a narrative that was not based on preconceptions. The idea 
was therefore to allow more input from the participants themselves, although this did not work out as  
imagined.  Most  of  the  STP  interviews  ended  up  being  more  formal  than  I  would  have  liked;  the 
interviewees had no experience with open discussion, felt inhibited by my (Western) ‘oddness’ and by 
the official  atmosphere in  the office,  and consequently retreated in many cases to monosyllabic  or 
narrow answers. The participants also, unfortunately, saw the interviews as part of a formal process to 
which they had agreed out of personal gratefulness towards iiit-b, the organisation that undertook their  
training and enabled my research. Therefore, the content of approximately half of the interviews could 
potentially be biased by the interviewees’ desire to please the iiit-b institution, to portray the Indian IT  
industry as a pleasant place to work or to project a positive view of India to the outside world. 
Nonetheless, while some of the answers might be affected by these three instances of social desirability, 
this  is  balanced  by  the  views  offered  outside  the  offices,  or  by  those  interviewees  who  were 
independently recruited. Most especially, those interviews conducted outside of iiit-b, in coffee shops,  
restaurants or simply outside the work office, offered more space for in-depth discussions and enabled a  
far more discursive approach. This is clear from the recording times: Once a proper discussion ensued 
between interviewer and interviewee, the interview itself was considerably longer. The same holds true  
when the interviews were conducted not on a personal one-on-one basis, which was the norm, but in  
small groups of up to three people.182 In particular, when friends were interviewed in groups, the topics 
were  discussed  much  more  openly,  and  even  dissenting  views  were  voiced  between  different 
interviewees. 
Since both experts and general employee interviews were purely voluntary, the character of most was 
more relaxed, less dictated by my structured question and more diverse in scope. And while the average  
age in both the STP alumni and general employees was around 25 years, the experts' was above 35. This  
was reflected in how the interviews went: While it was a challenge to tease out information from the  
STP participants in most interviews, with the others I was sometimes required to redirect an uninhibited  
flow of information back towards the issues relevant for my research. All in all, there are fewer non-STP 
than  STP-related  interviews,  although  this  is  not  surprisingly  given  that  the  former  were  not 
institutionally  framed by  any  organisation.  Nevertheless,  the  absence  of  an  institutional  framework  
sometimes proved advantageous, especially as those who agreed to be interviewed did so because they 
were interested in the topic, and not because they felt obliged to do so. With all this in mind, the limited  
number of non-STP interviewees – that is, 14 people – is offset by the higher quality of data and the  
greater range of topics. As a qualitative design, this set of interviews does not claim to be representative 
for IT, but it nevertheless offers valuable insights into the perspectives and perceptions of IT employees.
182 Of the STP-related  interviews,  11  were  done  in  small  groups  of  two or  three people,  whereas  three of  the  ‘General  
Background’ and none of the expert interviews were conducted in this way.
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6.2. The wider perspective: Cultural change in contemporary 
India
6.2.1. Gender equality in IT 
The changes that the phenomenon of caste is going through are ultimately part of a larger process, in  
which India is redefining its cultural values. This process, marked by the cultural consequences of the 
capitalist reorientation of India’s economy and its increasing cultural integration into a globalised meta-
culture, heavily influenced by adapted Western concepts, has direct and indirect implications for caste.  
The interviews attempted to address more indirect factors, such as the changing role of women or the 
general perception of Westernisation, albeit with varying and not always satisfying results. Owing to the 
younger age and inexperience of most of my interviewees, the interviews often stuck to the narrower  
and clearly-defined topic of women’s empowerment, while rarely elaborating on Westernisation. 
The consistent view amongst the interviewees was that women faced no difficulties in getting into the IT  
sector, that they received equal treatment, and that there was no reason why their participation should 
be hindered in any way. 
They [women] are well off. There is no difference in the kind of pay structure, no difference in the facilities  
they get. […] initiatives have been taken in Infosys itself to have more women coming in. (0501M001-GEN)
In IT there are a lot of girls working in good position. After 4 to 5 years you can see 50-50. (0423M001-
GEN)
They are equal, they have more chances in IT. 
Why?
Because they are women. 
Why would you say that?
In  IT  sector  people  like  women  in  HR  position.  [2nd interviewee]:  You  see  nowadays  literacy  ratio  is 
increasing, they have also knowledge now. (0517M002-GEN)
Would you say that women are equal in IT? 
Yes. Lot of women are there. Chances are also 50/50. I don't know 10 years back or 15 years back what  
was the scenario but now it has been neutralised. (0425M002-GEN)
This captures the officially projected HR preference quite accurately. It also indicates the idealisation of  
many of the High Caste interviewees, who tend to be oblivious to the barriers that women face in this  
sector.183 Again, this is much in line with the industry’s official position, although the empowerment of  
women is not nearly as simple as projected in the interviews so far. 
The Indian IT industry is proud to be one of the most vocal supporters of a higher female participation in  
183 In much the same vein, this finds a parallel in the view of High Caste interviewees about the need for reservations.
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professional and public life. Countless initiatives are aimed at improving women’s status and at raising 
awareness of their specific needs and of their role in society. NASSCOM boasts that over 30 per cent of  
its total employment base are women (NASSCOM 2010) and women’s empowerment is widely discussed 
in relation to the positive role of IT. Still, the topic of female empowerment is, at the same time, very  
much in conflict with traditional perceptions of the role of women in India. Strikingly, the conservative  
world-views, where women are largely confined to the household or to a restricted locality, and the 
more recent economic pressures  to  integrate women into the productive workforce  are not openly 
debated  or  disputed  in  the  interviews.  In  the  views  of  the  interviewees,  a  highly  political  struggle  
appears to be an almost naturally-evolving process – as exemplified here:
I as a male would rather walk in straight and join the job; as for women, they have more number of factors  
to deal with. They have number of things to think before they actually join a particular job. After a couple  
or three years, what if they get married? What if they want to continue their job apart from keeping their  
family life intact? In that way, IT companies are paying a great deal of thought on this so that women after  
they are married need not resign and go back. Things like flexible work hours. You have more number of  
programmes for their kids. You have separate crèches where kids are taken care of. Women's participation  
is basically low because these factors not been dealt with. (0501M001-GEN)
Here, the problems faced by women, overwhelmingly seen in the conflict between the requirements of a 
professional  career  and  the  duties  of  the  household,  are  acknowledged,  but  not  considered 
insurmountable. Greater societal consequences – for example, that women use their financial freedom 
to question traditional role models or to demand greater autonomy in families, marriage decisions and 
so on – do not appear immediate. In line with the literature (Desai and Andrist 2010; S. Radhakrishnan 
2009), the interviews suggest that India does not seem to be on the brink of a social revolution, with  
gendered roles in every-day life as rigid as ever. The general view is that, even if greater opportunities 
exist and more freedoms should be encouraged, women are still relatively dependent on their families 
and on their boyfriends or husbands:
I have even seen in my college some who don't prefer to go to other places […] they feel […] they get 
better boyfriend if they follow the boyfriend. Still this is very less, whatever I see, in 15 girls you will see  
one who is not ready to go. […] People who don't join or leave the work after marriage, but there are also 
girls who are working after marriage. (0425M002-GEN) 
In this regard, the changing role of women is not the result of success in a political struggle, but rather of  
a naturally-evolving process, triggered by the requirements of the global business culture that, in turn, is  
based on cultural evolution in mostly Western countries. The process of adapting to this work culture,  
itself the product of historical processes, without understanding or appreciating the rationale behind it,  
comes  across  as  apolitical  and  quasi-evolutionary.  The  implications  of  these  economic  changes  on 
private life are not fully understood, nor does it appear as if they will have major consequences on the 
social role of women; even for women themselves it is an adaptation process rather than one of active 
agency. And as this process is not caused by political pressure from women themselves, the changes are 
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confined to a few, mainly economic, areas, without challenging traditional family structures. Only the  
future will tell how this economically-provided potential is translated within India's cultural setting. The 
tremendous social consequences of these changes are barely visible today and it is thus little wonder  
that the interviewees appear unaware of it. 
6.2.2. The contentious issue of Westernisation 
The  same  holds  true  for  the  even  more  ambiguous  topic  of  Westernisation.  Increasing  Western 
consumption patterns are merely the most obvious sign of a (potentially) much more comprehensive  
shift; for the moment, however, a gap is still apparent between the adaptation visible in the main IT 
companies and the largely unchanged private parts of life (that is, if Westernisation is understood not in 
the sense of availability of Western consumer goods, but as a radical individualisation in private life). And  
even if Westernisation is perceived as largely positive, its potential impact is neither fully understood nor  
appreciated. As long as this cultural influence is restricted to the workplace, it is generally accepted;  
beyond this, Westernisation is either rejected or simply deemed irrelevant for Indian society:
Would you say Westernisation is positive? 
In work: Yes! 
...and outside? 
Outside  it  is  not  working.  […]  In  my  opinion  it  is  negative  if  they  try  to  change  themselves  to  
Westernisation, it is positive if the working culture is Westernised. (0509M002-GEN)
Of course, the cultural influences of the West are understood differently, as is only natural given the  
broad spectrum of  viewpoints  available,  but  they are generally  appreciated.  While  it  is  not  a given 
amongst the Indian public to see Western influences in a positive light, a generational shift is especially  
apparent here. Whereas the reaction of those who grew up before liberalisation is perhaps influenced by 
an ambivalent attitude to the colonial past, where a dismissal of anything British goes hand in hand with  
a deep-seated admiration, those who grew up after liberalisation are possibly more influenced by North 
American popular culture. Be this as it may, the result is a visible openness to aspects of Westernisation  
that  are  deemed positive,  with  a  concurrent  rejection  of  those features  seen  as  incompatible  with 
traditional Indian culture. 
If asked in general terms about their view on the West, the response is overwhelmingly positive. With its  
rationalistic  connotations,  Westernisation is  often seen as unavoidable,  even if  some Indian cultural  
traits need to be preserved (minutes 07.04.2009). If there is resistance, then predominantly religious 
reasons are invoked – both by Hindus and those from other religions: 
I want to follow religion to the maximum extent, we believe drinking is a sin, but in Western culture – even 
in India it is becoming a casual thing now. (1008M001-STP HYD)
Even though the new virtual Western dominance is not always appreciated, the fundamental merits of  
148
this cross-cultural exchange are never questioned in the interviews.184 And whereas the contrasts with 
Indian culture (first and foremost, in my opinion, the different concepts of family and individual) are not  
discussed or even noticed, the only criticisms of Westernisation are directed at perceived excesses. Thus,  
while it is acceptable for women to become more independent, and to earn for themselves and enjoy  
some autonomy from their family, a lifestyle that undermines the family concept (that is, one that allows 
greater sexual freedoms or even challenges the authority of parents towards their children) is generally  
rejected as too liberal, or too Westernised. In this regard, the interviewees’ answers are quite uniform 
and differ only in nuance.
6.3. Background: STP in the socio-political situation in India 
Moving closer to the caste topic, it is advisable to take a look at STP first. As discussed earlier (chpt. 4),  
the Indian IT industry sees itself affected by political argument about implementation of caste-based job  
reservations for those of SC, ST or OBC background. This discussion seems to follow erratic cycles; while 
it has subsided recently, it was ferociously debated in 2006. The consistent position of the industry has  
always been that it rejects job reservation on the basis of caste because it would reduce competitiveness  
and also undermine the principle of meritocracy, whereby recruitment and promotion are based solely 
on skills and aptitude. Albeit engaged in a large number of social welfare projects (Dasgupta 2008), the 
sector is fundamentally opposed to the expansion of the quota system to private industry – a stance that  
causes some controversy in the public debate (C. Upadhya 2007). In order to maintain this position while 
offering an alternative approach, Narayana Murthy – chairman of Infosys and one of the most prominent  
faces of IT in India – devised a scheme in which BE graduates from eligible caste background 185 would 
receive specific training for six months and would thereafter face open competition for job offers in the 
market  (Murthy 2008). Thus, instead of lowering entry criteria for Lower Caste applicants, by training 
them in technical skills and polishing their ‘soft skills’, they would be brought to a level where they would  
be able to fulfil the expectations required of all other IT recruits. As an interesting side effect, this would  
also provide high-value job candidates instead of  (politically)  forcing the industry to hire those who 
might not be up to the mark.
In this way, STP was designed as an open challenge to the current reservation system, albeit not by  
denying  that  the  social  position  of  Lower  Castes  needed  to  be  improved,  but  by  addressing  the 
inadequacies in the prevalent approaches to this issue.186 And indeed, if STP was implemented on a 
184 This might be the result of the wide variety of notions that the term ‘Western’ carries. In the Indian context, the West can 
stand for anything from fast-food restaurants, consumerism, economic prosperity, to the individual freedom that is seen,  
not only in Hollywood movies, as the basis for the success of the Western model.
185 This already indicates that the sample is not taken from the poorest section of society – all STP trainees have had to afford a  
BE education beforehand.
186 Unfortunately, the political debate about caste reservations is poisoned by bitter factionalism, with any open challenge of 
the existent quota system often automatically branded as ‘against social justice’ or worse, as a ‘High Caste position’. Given 
this, the STP program itself is not prominently advertised as an alternative to the current system, even though it would not  
be imaginable without this context.
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larger scale, it would be much more radical in ousting caste as a factor in politics. It is an oft-repeated 
claim that  the reservation system puts a premium on caste  membership and thereby reinforces an  
identity that would otherwise be of much less concern in Indian society  (Osborne 2001; Upadhyaya 
1998). STP does, of course, unavoidably base its entry criteria on caste, but after the course is completed  
no entitlement is connected in any form to the caste of the applicant. According to this concept, caste  
would be an issue only up to a certain point, and of limited or no value for the persons after completion 
of an STP-type course. In this way, such an approach would hope to eliminate caste-based inequalities in 
a relatively short time, given that once education had enabled today’s generation of SC/ST members to 
finance a proper education for their  children the caste-based benefits  would cease.  Theoretically  at  
least, the whole connection between socio-economic status and caste membership could be broken by 
bringing education to those who are traditionally neglected in both socio-economic and social status 
terms. 
While a complete eradication of all historical injustices might be beyond the reach of such a small-scale 
scheme, as a pilot project and a real-time experiment it does attempt to symbolically prove the point  
that alternatives to affirmative action are not only possible but indeed practicable in a more market-
oriented way.187 Interestingly, Murthy does not elaborate on any macroeconomic failings of the existing 
reservation system (see chpt. 3.3.1). Thus, while most critics tend to emphasise societal consequences, 
Murthy hardly considers them – although he does imply downsides of the current reservation system by  
pointing to competitive disadvantages if they were applied to private industry. An  India Today article 
(Murthy 2008) gives no further clarification about his beliefs, although the main points seem clear: As a 
convinced opponent of quota regulations, he condemns attempts to implement them further. However,  
as  a  compassionate  capitalist  and  Indian  patriot  (Murthy  2009a),188 he  sees  the  need  for  social 
reconciliation and the raising up of disadvantaged sections of society. According to Murthy, STP should 
not only protect Indian companies from disadvantages in global competition (that is, those they would  
face if  they hired unsuitable job-candidates), it  should also be “a scheme, that did not diminish the 
confidence of  these youngsters  in this  highly-competitive industry.”(Murthy 2008) Consequently,  the 
approach he tests and favours is a prime example of an alignment between industry interest and that of  
the recipients in question.
187 Aside from all the political issues, the public sector example serves a negative contrast to the STP concept in terms of  
efficiency. The main criteria brought forward as the unique advantage of STP, is the fact that it complies with companies’  
hiring requirements and ultimately with a market-oriented economy. In this regard, STP seems to be future-proof whereas 
the reservation system is portrayed as an obstacle to the further development of India. The contrast could not be greater,  
even if the two systems in the end pursue the same agenda of bringing formerly marginalised caste groups into the Indian 
mainstream.  Notwithstanding the different approaches, the fundamental limitations are basically the same: STP can only  
hope to educate a small minority and thereby serve as an example for future affirmative action projects – while the unequal  
and dismal state of the general education system ensures that the general inequality in India persists. 
188 His personal success story from rags to riches, from the son of a poor government servant to a globally known billionaire, is  
a popular story in India. Obviously, he has changed his political outlook considerably – starting from Marxism and arriving at  
‘Compassionate Capitalism’ see Gurcharan Das, India Unbound: From Independence to the Global Information Age (2 edn.; 
New Delhi: Penguin, 2002) at 247.
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6.4. STP in the eyes of its participants
Naturally,  because  the  context  of  this  study  was  the  training  programme  and  the  views  of  its  
participants,  a  considerable portion of  the interviews was dedicated to questions about STP.  Hardly  
surprisingly, there was an overwhelmingly positive response to a programme that was for many the 
breakthrough into a longed-for career in IT. Out of 89 participants who graduated from the first batch of  
Bangalore's programme, 83 found placements in companies at the post-training recruitment drives, and  
an unknown number found jobs independently. Before joining STP, most of the trainees had been job 
seeking for several months (up to a year), and for this reason alone were grateful for the opportunity to  
break down barriers. The training itself was conducted in a welcoming, friendly and open atmosphere –  
again, a further reason to remember it in a positive light. The personal commitment of iiit-b's director,  
Professor Sadagopan, a well-connected and publicly known figurehead of IT,189 can be described as the 
icing on the cake. For all these reasons, the response to questions about STP was, not surprisingly, rosy in 
tone and enthusiastic in content.
Nevertheless, this needs to be seen against the social background of the trainees. Before the training, 
there seemed to be a lack of confidence, shortcomings in technical training and a general inability to 
master  job  interviews  –  otherwise  their  earlier  difficulties  in  finding  an  appropriate  job  would  be 
inexplicable.190 
One good [thing] ... I mean, one very much aspect of this industry is a good communication skill, which is  
very much required and also the knowledge like we can gain every day, if you really want to become good  
in this industry. (RES2 0407M001-STP)
Therefore, the main aim of STP was to provide a double boost in confidence and employability to enable  
the trainees to survive in the industry. Not surprisingly,  the trainees were encouraged to raise their 
aspirations and ‘dream big‘ – and this was clearly reflected in the answers of the participants. 
It was really memorable, sweet. I got many friends from there. After finishing that, I had three jobs at  
hand. Just imagine – when I finished my engineering in 2005 there was no campus interview as my college 
was very new. We were the seniors and mine was the first batch, we hardly had two companies as campus 
interview, but we were not so seriously prepared so I was not able to do that and 2005 went just like that  
after finishing my engineering. Then I attended this STP programme exam and I got through and I was  
there  for  six  months  under  training.  It  was  really  memorable.  All  were  supportive,  especially  Prof.  
Sadagopan, he is very cooperative and friendly. He knows how to handle the kids also, with the kids he will 
be at their level and with professionals he will be at their level. He is a fantastic person. (0404M001-STP
Most of the interviews followed this pattern. According to the alumni interviewed, the best parts of STP 
189 Besides  heading  the  iiit-b,  he  writes  columns  for  the  Times  of  India and  publishes  a  number  of  blogs: 
http://ssemergic.wordpress.com and  http://sadagopans.blogspot.com.  Interestingly,  he  is  also  very  visible  in  his  social 
standing and personal appearance as a prestigious Tamil Brahmin.
190 As a very simple example, a comparison of the personal appearance of the graduates of STP I with those of the (still-)  
trainees in STP II showed a clear difference in bearing and attitude. Whereas the still-trainees had the habits and attitudes  
of  college  students,  the  interviewees  with  two  years  work  experience  had  a  much  more  mature  and  professional  
demeanour. This says as much about the work environment in the IT sector as about the STP training.
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were: The high standard of training, underscored by the ‘big name’ status of Infosys and iiit-b; the group  
experience; and, the team building in the context of the soft skill training. Very often, the participants  
highlighted  the  personal  dedication  of  Professor  Sadagopan,  iiit-b's  director,  and  mentioned  the 
atmosphere of openness and encouragement. During the whole training, it was never in doubt that the  
trainees were anything but the best in their field, and could compete with anyone else on an equal  
footing.  Interestingly,  their  social  identity,  the  fact  that  they  came  from  Lower  Caste  or  tribal 
background, was never even mentioned in the training. As Prof. Sadagopan told me at the beginning of  
my research, the aim of STP is to get trainees out of their caste identity, and it would be best if they  
would forget it altogether. Patronising as this may seem from a Tamil Brahmin who openly celebrates his 
heritage, it nevertheless is very much in accordance with the general climate in IT (chpt. 5). 
6.5. Comparing the views of STP alumni with the ‘mainstream’ 
6.5.1. Work satisfaction
Aside from the STP training itself, issues such as the general attitude of the employees towards the work, 
or their experience of the social changes brought about by modernisation processes, can be discussed by 
taking  all  interviews  into  account.  Naturally,  the  interviews  with  the  ‘general’  employees  differ 
somewhat,  but only in degree, not in direction.  A lower level  of job satisfaction is  evident in these 
interviews,  as is  a  greater  assertiveness in regard to expected pay rises or  bonuses.  Of  course,  the  
average work experience is considerably higher than the two years in the STP sample, and that could  
explain the greater frustration, paired with a greater sense of entitlement. Additionally, no appreciation  
of  the  benefits  of  prior  training  sweetens  the  view  of  these  interviewees  and  the  more  private  
atmosphere  of  the  interviews  might  also  allow  for  more  critical  assertions.  However,  their  general 
employees’  views  are  still  mainly  in  line  with  those  voiced  by  the  STP  trainees.  Even  the  points 
emphasised by Upadhya and Vasavi  (C. Upadhya and Vasavi 2006), about the exploitative character of 
long work hours, the repetitious and monotonous work, the feeling of over-qualification and the related 
stress, are not seen as a major problem in the interviews: 
When I  started as  a  training engineer  in  the company,  I  used to  work  till  11  o'clock in  the night  to  
understand the things and I used to interact with people. I used to make myself uncomfortable making the  
other person comfortable just to get more knowledge – initially – but later on I understood that is not the  
way these companies work. Even if he is my senior – he is 20 years my senior to me – so well experienced  
and I should call him by name. This is Westernisation. (0509M001-GEN)
Even if it is acknowledged, it is rationalised in terms of the Indian situation of severe unemployment and 
the demands of customers:
Previously, before this IT revolution happened, there was a severe unemployment in India, even now also,  
people are in competitive mood, they have to show the competitive edge […] so people will be interested  
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to work more, put more efforts, bring the cost down – so they will go for more work. I don't know the 
work pressure of other companies but my understanding on why people work more is they want to stick  
to their deadline, impress customers – so they will be working more hours per day. (0503M001-GEN)
The general  mood of  the STP alumni  is  in  the same vein,  even though there  is  considerably  more  
enthusiasm and optimism, while the non-STP seem to be more frustrated the longer they have been in 
IT.191 Notably, apart from three engineers, all respondents from STP reported a high satisfaction level in 
their job. For many, it was simply a dream to work in this prestigious industry, with the ongoing recession 
only  reinforcing  this  feeling  of  luck.  Even  when directly  asked  about  the  long  work-hours  and  the  
perceived stress level, most considered the workload as part of the deal and more than compensated for  
by the good salary. Given the fact that most graduates of the STP scheme earn roughly three or four 
times as much as their parents, the satisfaction level can easily be put in perspective. Since most of the  
interviewees were relatively young (the average age being 25), and at the beginning of their careers,  
dissatisfaction about monotonous and repetitive work schedules might not be as high as with older  
workers.
It should also be noted that the economic climate during the research project may have influenced the 
views of the interviewees: In 2009, the consequences of a global economic crisis were still reverberating  
around India and a general feeling of anxiety could have muted any all-too open dismissal of the job 
quality in IT. The ongoing economic crisis at the time of the interviews can also be expected to have 
reinforced appreciation of holding on to a job, and to have fostered a perception of few alternatives, no 
matter how unsatisfying work might seem at the moment. As a consequence, and in contrast to the  
prevalence of  job-hopping found by  Upadhya and Vasavi  (2006),  employment  periods  are  generally 
longer and more stable. In comparison with all other available options, a job in IT is clearly losing its 
larger-than-life status as a dream job, but it is still prestigious and better-paid than most other work 
alternatives. 
6.5.2. The role of Caste in and around the workplace
6.5.2.1. Is Caste a relevant question for the IT industry?
As a matter of course, a large number of interview questions were dedicated towards the general topic  
of caste and the more specific role of caste in the workplace itself. While this seemed only natural to the  
researcher, this was not the case with participants, and the questions were often met with considerable 
consternation or outright confusion. Contrary to my expectations, caste did not seem to be an issue at all  
and would not even be considered a factor in any kind of workplace-related issue. To a large extent, this  
seems to be the result of a deliberate policy by the IT companies to make the workplace as socially 
neutral as possible (cf. chpt. 5). Even in the STP training, directed exclusively at those from a certain caste 
191 The most common refrain was: ‘it is not rocket science’ as all new jobs and projects proved very boring after the first few 
weeks.
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and tribal background, caste was never discussed or even addressed by the trainers or the participants.  
Caste  seems to  be  hidden  behind  a  wall  of  silence,  with  my  (perhaps  naïve)  questions  about  this  
phenomenon met either with unease or amused perplexity. In the words of a HR executive:
No one has any interest to find out the caste in the team that I have been working with and I am talking  
about  myself  being  here  for  the  last  13  years.  Maybe  people  are  talking  about  when  you  become 
personally very close, when I become personally very close to a friend with whom I spent lot of time 
outside work discussing not in a professional context [...] then perhaps that tag is already there they can’t  
shed away. (0521M002-EXP)
Condensed into a few words, the workplace is characterised by caste neutrality and a general anonymity  
(which could appear surprising to outsiders). No caste-related discrimination was ever felt by those who 
would be expected to be at the receiving end, and, at least according to the interviewees, no instance of  
it  was  ever  experienced,  with  even  the  likelihood  of  potential  discrimination  completely  denied.  
Altogether, caste and caste-based discrimination does not seem to be imaginable within the Indian IT 
industry.192 
This might be the result  of the policies followed by the companies to discourage any kind of  social  
misconduct and to comply with internationally-accepted best practice guidelines for behaviour in the 
corporate environment. It might also be simply the result of the mixing of people from all over India, 
whereby the social marker of caste, which is often only understood in smaller localities, is pushed to the  
background, and more visible social identities, such as local origin and vernacular language, instead fulfil  
the  function  of  social  distinction.  Furthermore,  and  this  deserves  consideration,  it  is  claimed  by 
observers  that  IT  itself  is  taking  the  form  of  a  social  identity  and  is  thereby  overriding  traditional  
associations.  This  elite  workforce,  generally  considered at  the top of  the professional  picking order, 
subsumes the traditional elite identities – in the form of High Castes and notably Brahmins – and merges  
them into a social group – or class - with a membership based on accomplishment and not birth. Of 
cause, this process does not fully eclipse the traditional forms of identification, but at least in the eyes of  
the interviewees the extinction of caste as a marker of social identity and prestige seems very successful  
in this sector.
Against this, though, the clear dominance of Higher Castes and Dominant Agricultural Castes (see 4.2.4)  
did not seem obvious to my interviewees. The explanation is a simple one: The classifications used by  
anthropologists and sociologist alike are not perceived as social units by those who practise caste,193 and 
even  less  so  when compared  to  the  obvious  markers  of  language  and  origin.  In  all  the  interviews  
conducted, the only imaginable form of preferential treatment was based on in-group recognition based 
on language, not on membership of the same or similar caste:
192 As will be discussed later – this is most relevant for the flagship companies of IT (both Indian and MNCs) – and more scope 
for caste-based discrimination is imaginably in smaller companies where anonymity is less pronounced.
193 Even seemingly clear-cut terms such as ‘High Caste’ (generally those twice born castes associated with Brahmin, Kshatriya 
or Vaishya Varna) are not entirely clear to the respondents since they include grey areas. Other terms – such as Dominant 
Agricultural Castes – are in most cases met with consternation and confusion. 
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Do you think there is a community or a group of people dominant in the IT industry?
I don't [know] exactly [if] I can say yes for this. But I can say some... not religion I can say, but some part of  
the state or some part of the country is dominating. Like if people more of Kannadigas or more Telugu  
people are there into the company then they prefer their people. If I am a Kannadiga or if I am a Telugu  
boy then I prefer only Kannada and Telugu boy. This is what happening in the present market, in the 
present companies in India. We can't say all but few companies do that.
So there is a kind of language based discrimination?
Yeah, yeah.
Is there also something like caste-based discrimination?
I  don't  think  so.  That  might  be  a  problem  with  smaller  companies  but  not  with  a  bigger  company. 
(0402M002-STP)
This interview fragment is illuminating in more than one way. On the one hand, the interviewee – who is  
employed in a smaller and therefore more discrimination-prone company – is openly claiming that there 
might be an element of preferential treatment for the co-members of a social in-group. According to his  
statements, this social in-group is not defined by caste, but by language, and with it, region of origin.  
Caste does not seem to be plausible as a defining feature to separate the in-group from outsiders, and a  
short logical thought experiment shows why. Any smaller company with less than 100 employees could  
not possibly be dominated by just one caste group (assuming that the exact caste membership is only 
revealed after recruitment) as too many subdivisions of caste exist in India – there are, after all, at least 
5000 Jati. Any attempt at preferential treatment for a certain caste would alienate a majority of those 
who are not from the preferred caste group. Caste neutrality is, for this reason alone, an imperative for  
the work climate.194 So any attempt to build a company based on specific castes, or to create an image 
that attracts only certain castes, would simply be futile.195
In the rare instances when caste differences – or the High Caste dominance within the IT workforce – are  
acknowledged, they are rationalised with historical explanations, thereby indicating that it is an issue 
that will be solved in due course: 
[Historically]  only  Brahmins  coming  from  the  very  educated  background,  [...]Brahmins  basically  in  
Hinduism means like the `purohits’ who learn and who are basically the educated community we say. So 
[...] people will be coming from the same background and now even they are brought up in the same  
manner and they will be getting the more and more amount of education.  So that is the reason why we  
can see many Brahmins educated [...] Whereas when it comes to Muslims and the Lower Caste Hindus [...]  
194 The attempt to discriminate would be further hindered by the fact that some of the employees would not reveal their  
identity; thus attempted discrimination would ultimately be foiled by the complexity and confusion that accompanies the  
caste  phenomenon  –knowledge  about  certain  castes  is  simply  too  fragmented  and  flimsy  to  provide  any  basis  for 
preferences (chpt. 7).
195 Personally, I would not eliminate caste fully as a factor in the equation. The widely held respect and admiration for Brahmins 
could  feature  positively,  whereas  the  notion  that  someone  (from Low  Caste)  came through college  with  the  help  of  
reservations, may result in negative opinions. After all, the fact that those from Lower Castes, especially, do everything in  
their power to keep their identity a secret needs to be explained in a consistent manner. 
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neither the Muslims nor the Lower Caste Hindus have been [...]  educated from a very long time.  They  
have been getting education from very recent times.  And moreover they will have be so much financially  
fit also to go to the, [...] IT industry … basic requirement is you should be an engineer or MBA or BBA  
graduate like  that.  [...]  and the Low Caste  people  or  the Muslims and all,  they will  not  be so  much 
educated or so much financially fit to that. (0425M001-STP)
According to the interviews, the influence of caste in the workplace can be almost completely ruled out,  
even if doubts regarding smaller companies and some obvious markers of identity persist. 196 If there is 
discrimination or identity-based preference, and no workplace would be fully free of this, then caste is  
submerged under identities that are more visible and, as they are based on broader categories, draw  
larger groups of followers. In the case of Bangalore, a conflict based on the disputed ‘ownership’ of the 
city tends to dominate public attention, with the caste issue further marginalised in competition with  
this  powerful  narrative of  local  dominance.197 If  anything, preferential  treatment in an industry that 
mixes people from all corners of India would be based on easily-recognisable characteristics like this,  
instead of complex and murky caste alliances: 
I should not talk like this because it might be a problem for my company. What happens is that we have  
certain practices – database practices, Java practises, Microsoft practises – things like that. There happens  
to be a particular practice, its head happens to be from a particular region, so it also happens that most of  
the people under that practise happen to be people from the same region. You cannot definitely say this is  
because of this, but you can draw inferences – saying probably this person has some kind of lenience for 
persons from that particular region. (0415M001-STP)
While language and regional origin are clearly visible, any underlying caste differences tend to be glossed 
over. 
6.5.2.2. Anonymity and Caste
The disregard for caste is accompanied, and perhaps enabled to a certain extent, by the overwhelming 
anonymity in the industry. The vast majority of the STP interviewees never spoke about their social  
background with their colleagues and also insisted that the topic of caste was never discussed in the 
workplace. 
Normal practice nowadays is we don't have last names. I don't have a last name, I have my first name and  
initials, so based on that you cannot make out who I am, I mean the community that I belong to. Generally  
we can clearly make out if it is a Christian or Hindus or Muslims. (0415M001-STP)
196 At the end of my study I accidentally came across an apparently wide-spread stereotype about people from Eastern India.  
Easily recognisable by their facial features, they are labelled as ‘Chinkies’ (for Chinese Indians), are often not perceived as 
‘real Indians’ and consequentially subjected to severe discrimination. In Bangalore, they tend to be employed in low-paid 
positions in the hospitality industry despite their often high education and good command of English.
197 A general feeling amongst those Bangaloreans of Karnataka origin (who feel that they are the rightful owners of the city) is  
the sense that too often IT jobs in the city go to outsiders from the rest of India. This perceived neglect of talent from  
Bangalore itself is much more of a concern than the inner division of caste and creed within Bangaloreans. Corresponding to  
the language dispute that erupted in the early 1990s, there is considerable tension between those who claim the city as 
their native place and those who have moved there more recently.  Janaki Nair,  The Promise of Metropolis - Bangalore's  
Twenthieth Century (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005) at chpt. 6.
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Notwithstanding this kind of protection, for the STP alumni their own caste is overwhelmingly seen as 
information that is better not shared with outsiders. For whatever reason, it seems an established rule 
that the topic itself is better avoided and that, most especially, a Low Caste origin is something of a 
burden, despite all the contrary assurances about caste-neutrality within IT. Only two of the interviewed  
43 STP alumni from the first Bangalore batch actually talked about their caste background openly, and 
only four would let their closest friends and colleagues know about it. A large majority would therefore 
prefer to hide their caste background – a precautionary measure that is facilitated by the companies' 
policies and the general lack of knowledge about caste culture apart from one's own (chpt. 7 & 8). 
It is unclear if the absence of discrimination or discomfort in respect of caste background is an effect of  
this anonymity, or if the situation would differ if the caste background of employees was known. In any  
case, it  clearly seems desirable for persons from ex-Untouchable origin to hide their background, to  
acquire a different identity and to merge into the mainstream without reference to an embarrassing 
past. The widespread 'acronymisation' of the surnames in South India, the adaptation (by Lower Castes)  
of caste-related names of traditionally higher status and the attempted avoidance of the topic of caste  
altogether all  point  to the same complex: It  appears that caste itself  is considered an embarrassing 
reminder of India's darker past, and that a Lower Caste status is still considered a disadvantage for any  
individual born into these circumstances. For all these reasons, open discussion is generally avoided in 
favour of a persistent silence: 
So far, I haven't seen any discrimination as such, but people do tend to have such feelings. It is very simple,  
I don't divulge any of my past – what exactly our caste or such things. The thing [is] that most of us – not  
just in IT, I have also spoken to lot of relatives, friends – not everyone wishes to openly say that I belong 
from this community. (0415M001-STP)
Therefore,  the  topic  of  caste  is  not  only  avoided  by  the  industry  itself,  it  is  also  shunned  by  its  
employees, and especially so if they are from a Low Caste background. In light of the prominence of  
caste in the public sector, the avoidance of caste as a topic also has a number of political connotations in  
private  industry.  Not  only  is  it  a  pre-emptive  measure  to  forestall  any  discussions  about  quota  
reservation modelled  after  the  public  sector  but,  much more than this,  the  IT  industry  (in  its  self-
perceived role as a societal moderniser) sees itself as the forerunner of a new Indian self-conception. It  
seems clear from its political stance, as well as from the utterances of its most prominent public figures,  
that the IT industry views the India of the future as one in which caste, linguistic and religious loyalties  
are more and more submerged by a general sense of Indian patriotism (chpt. 4.2.2.2).198 Consequently, 
and with overwhelming unity, the issue of caste is treated as an obstacle to be overcome. 
198 The expectation is often that technology in general, and ICTs in particular act as ‘great social leveller’, even thought this  
seems rather naive from a sociological perspective. View the foreword by Sam Pitroda in Sharma, The Long Revolution - the  
Birth and Growth of India's It Industry.
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6.4.2.3. The contrast: Caste in- and outside of the IT industry
Notwithstanding  the  above,  for  the  interviewees  from Low Caste  backgrounds  the  prevailing  social  
inequalities of India, outside of IT or outside the main cities, are still clearly apparent:
Nowadays, at least in IT industry you don't see this [caste-based discrimination] but just go about 10 km 
from here, tell that you are from a backward community – that is the end of the story. It is even practised  
today, people from certain community are not allowed to touch water from the main source. (0415M001-
STP)
Even if the tremendous changes in recent years or decades are appreciated:
What happens in my village, you know, it used to happen, you know, they were not allowed to drink water 
from the well. They are not allowed to visit temples.
Still now?
Not now. During my father's age. But now it is not seen. Now it is not like that. Now things have changed.  
People look for money. If you have money, you know, people give respect. If you don't have money, you  
know, you are not respected. Money is the criteria. […] But still if I want to get married it is very difficult.  
(0407M002-STP)
The  issue  of  social  identity  seems to be  invoked  primarily  in  situations  that  have a  strong somatic 
dimension, differently nuanced in urban or rural settings. Consequentially, the rural/urban divide could 
then be understood by the different emphasis and likelihood of interactions with such a dimension. 
When compared to other industries, the uniqueness of IT in its caste-neutrality is always mentioned, 
whereas other industries are generally considered to be much more caste-conscious199 – although it is 
often difficult to tell if the reservation issue is mixed into the general discussion of caste. But in its dual  
break with the traditional Indian situation – in its antagonism to reservations, that sets it apart from 
government service, and in the meritocracy of recruitment, which is – according to the interviews – 
never  fully  implemented in  other  private  industries  – the IT  industry  pioneers  a new, caste-neutral  
business model. Not surprisingly, this often creates an uneasy contrast with wider social conditions; that  
is, the people who work in IT are recruited from a country that is not following the vaguely egalitarian 
and meritocratic ideals preached by IT's leaders. Thus, even though I never came across any negative  
caste-based stereotypes in the interviews,200 there nevertheless seems to be a desire to prevent caste 
antagonism in the institutional framework:
If  any  of  my  colleagues  discriminates  anybody,  nobody  will  support  him.  Nobody  will  support  the  
discrimination. And if you see [his company's] policies, there are very strong rules, [against] discrimination. 
They can even terminate from your job if you discriminate. Not only in caste basis, even if someone is  
199 One of the expert interviewees hinted that something like a remnant of caste relations could be seen in the behavioural  
patterns between the IT employees and those waiters who serve them in the cafeteria (minutes 07.04.09). 
200 The closest instance was the one where my key informant from the STP trainees talked about the Brahmin’s patronising grip  
on everything deemed religious: “They think they are the shepherds and we are the sheep!” (minutes 29.09.09). 
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physically challenged, OK someone is black,  that first. You cannot discriminate anyone. This standard is 
there  in  IT  industry.  But  outside  I  don't  think.  You  know,  it  depends  upon  how mature  people  are.  
(0407M002-STP)
However, the prevention of caste-based discrimination cannot fully erase the underlying feeling that a 
particular caste background is either an asset or an embarrassment. The striking lack of confidence of  
Low Castes  –  contrasting  markedly  with  all  those High  Caste  members  who proudly  proclaim their  
family's  heritage201 –  tells  of  a  partial  survival  of  the  status  hierarchy,  albeit  one  that  is  no  longer 
systematically comprehended, but which nevertheless divides those who feel able to invoke their caste 
background and those who feel this should better be avoided. There is nothing resembling the working-
class pride that is well documented in Western societies, and the status difference between physical and 
non-physical  labour  is  still  sharply  accentuated.  As  caste  is  still  linked  to  economic  inequality,  the 
removal of both is seen as the way forward, albeit with not too much optimism.
May be I cannot tell you what is ideal, but what I can tell you is what may be better. First thing is people  
are economically independent. Regardless […] [if] you want to suppress me or not, I have opportunities in  
which I can stay independently. This brings in kind of equality. I may be of a lower caste but you are forced 
to do business with me because I have certain kinds of advantages of doing things, so this is kind of  
economic equality this has to be there. Obviously the thing is we try to remove caste, religion from as  
many things as possible, so far these are the two things I can think of. (0415M001-STP)
6.5.3. Caste and the issue of reservations
6.5.3.1. The views on reservation part I – the general category
The fundamental break between the groups of respondents comes, not fully unexpectedly,  with the  
question of reservations. At this point, the different positions diverge diametrically, with only a few signs 
of  any  possible  reconciliation  visible.  Those  interviewees  who  benefited  from  reservations  tend  to 
defend the general need for affirmative action whereas those who feel that job competition is artificially  
aggravated by the quota system point to the inherent injustice,  the widespread corruption and the  
misuse in practice of reservation  (cf. Jeffrey 2010). Interestingly, both sides reject the argument that 
caste should be the criteria for quota allocation, and both likewise prefer a financial threshold as the 
criteria  for  affirmative  policies.  And  while  the  interviewees  consider  the  underlying  caste  question  
differently depending on their own backgrounds, they agree on the notion that a coupling of caste status 
and economic conditions  would further  entrench the problem. Consequently,  the apparent  signs of  
political use (or exploitation) of the reservation system are rejected across the board. 
201 It is generally much easier to talk about caste with someone from a High Caste, since he or she would most likely be proud  
of his or her caste background. Sometimes, this self-confidence can result in surprising statements such as the one from a 
Brahmin from Rajasthan – referring to his Vaishya friend: “We are both Aryans”. 
159
Interestingly, in both groups there is astonishingly little support for the expansion of reservation into the  
private sector. In IT itself, there seems to be no need for any kind of social considerations, not least  
because recruitment is  seen as exceptionally  fair and transparent. Access to a position in IT  is  seen 
across the board as a matter of qualification and skills. The scope for personal preferences, cronyism and 
discrimination  is  said  to  be  limited  by  the  transparency  of  performance  criteria  and  the  tough  
competition in the market. Fundamentally, everyone’s chances, regardless of community or gender, are  
perceived as equal, as long as the qualification requirements are met. Of course, there are practical  
obstacles to this claimed equality, with those from rural communities perhaps oblivious to the potential  
opportunities  offered  by  the  IT  sector.  Still,  most  of  the  interviewees  flatly  deny  that  there  are 
communities  under-represented in  IT  (compare 6.4.2.1),  or  that  certain groups have a much higher  
representation  than  their  respective  share  of  the  overall  population  would  suggest.  Generally,  the 
interviewees would not acknowledge the differences between communities if not confronted with them 
by the interviewer. If pushed, their speculations on the issue are very cautious, with the IT industry’s  
generally discrimination-free work environment mentioned again and again.
See, if there are lesser Muslims, it is probably a matter of chance that they have not joined IT (0501M001-
GEN) 
There is  a  concerted effort  to  paint  a  favourable  picture  of  the situation,  even if  some differences 
between communities are, at times, acknowledged:
In Indian education system we have a lot of freedom and government has also given a lot of facilities to  
the people. Suppose if I pay 10 rupees in a general merit category but the underprivileged or reservation  
category, they have to pay only two rupees and the rest – government will take care. So there are many 
other facilities so I don't think that is ever to stop anybody from getting educated and entering into IT  
industry. […] You see so many people whose parents are agriculturalists and some of their parents are 
rearing cattle but their children are working in software industries as software engineers. So what I am  
saying is if you come to the company and find out these people, they are equally competent, to you may  
be their English is bit here and there but it is O.K. but they are equally competent from the technology 
point of view and their understanding is fantastic. (0509M002-GEN)
This  generally  rosy  view  can  only  be  summarised  as  follows:  The  reason  for  individuals’  apparent  
‘backwardness’ is not seen as an issue of (low) caste status but rather as due to the fact that their  
parents are farmers (or rather peasants) and lack education. Caste or community is always downplayed 
or  neutralised;  it  is  never  mentioned on first  acquaintance and is  generally  considered as irrelevant 
within modern India. At times in the interviews, it seems as if caste is only sustained by identity politics,  
or that the interviewer is trying to delve into something almost forgotten in Indian society. It is not clear  
to what extent this is understood by the respondents, but it is crystal clear that this argument fits neatly  
into the self-legitimising narrative of an elite that claims to be a purely meritocratic one. 
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If social differences are addressed, the divisions between castes are generally trivialised, whereas non-
Hindu religious denominations (such as Christians or Muslims) are regarded as divisions that matter. The  
shared identity of Hinduism trumps the differences between Hindu castes, and despite all integrationist 
tendencies,  the differences  between the dominant  Hindu religions  and those that  are  described as  
foreign are highlighted in social profiles.202 In this context, any preferential treatment of, for example, 
Muslims is rhetorically coupled with the question of personal responsibility:
When government provides educational facilities it does not discriminate […] If the Muslim parent does  
not send his kid to school, government cannot go to each house and pick them. Muslims are still not very  
open about sending their kids to educational institutions, they have their own way of educating. […] you  
need to take into account that your own personal effort is needed […] I can provide you only food; I can't  
make you eat – that's the way things are! (0501M001-GEN)
As a strong argument against the feasibility of government intervention, the role of the individual is  
emphasised, while structural or political arguments are ignored or not seen as relevant. 
As mentioned earlier, the question of reservation is bitterly contested. As private industry is not yet  
affected by job reservations, the topic is almost exclusively viewed in relation to cut-throat competition  
in the educational sector. And since the education system is a bottleneck for most young people in India  
–  and  perhaps  the  most  direct  point  of  contact  for  the  interviewees  with  the  quota  regulations  – 
personal attitudes to reservation can be anticipated. For those who have to compete for the shrinking  
share of ‘open competition’, that is, unreserved college placements, the reservation system is at times 
almost depicted as a conspiracy against the public. 
As of now you have people of number 3 lakh to 5 lakh sitting for merely 100 seats, so now out of 100 if  
you pass out reservation of 22.5 per cent, think of the general category who are eligible for that. If my 
father got a reservation and made sure I got good education why should I get a reservation? It absolutely  
makes no sense for me to avail reservation. (0501M001-GEN)
Some of the examples are obviously exaggerated to prove a point, or else echo arguments often heard in  
the public debate about admission to educational institutions:
[...] we were doing preparation of IIT, only six colleges are in India, we are trying to get admission because 
they are the highest level of education […], so out of 300 marks he [ from SC background] got 47, I got 108  
marks. He got admission in IIT because of reservation, I did not get so – think about that he has less talent  
than me but he is there in that college! (0423M001-GEN)
In some instances, the dispute about the fairness of reservations seems to be based on an assumption  
that those who enjoy the benefits are simply not up to the requirements of highly-qualified jobs, and  
should not be in high positions:
202 While Christians are sometimes seen as foreign incursion into India, they still enjoy certain benefits, since there associated  
with the West and their numbers are small enough not to be considered a threat to the Hindu majority. The situation is 
fundamentally different when it comes to Muslims. The official statistics, according to which Muslims make up only 12 per  
cent of the Indian population, are often questioned and the fact that India has the second-largest Islamic population on  
earth is seen as a worrisome trend.
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Think,  if  you are a doctor,  one person is coming from SC category,  he is getting reservation in doctor  
category – how can he save the life of other persons? He is not talented, he got reservation and got the  
MBBS degree!  Think about;  how he can save the life of  other person? You are  coming from general 
category without reservation, you have talent, you can save easily. (0423M001-GEN)
This equivalence of recipients of caste-based benefits with untalented, undeserving fraudsters indicates  
the stigma of Low Caste members in general and reservation-recipients in particular. But the underlying 
argument,  that  anyone  who  received  admission  under  the  reservation  scheme  is  therefore  a  less  
qualified graduate, is particularly vicious.203 Blurring the fact that, under the current reservation system, 
entry  criteria  are  lowered  but  not  the  final  examination,  this  argument  potentially  stigmatises 
reservation-recipients for the rest of their lives. And by not taking into account any social history or  
personal obstacles that have been overcome, this also devalues the progress these students have to 
make to catch up from a lower starting level. It is hard to discern the degree to which this rejection is  
fuelled by a genuine contempt towards persons of Low Caste origin, or whether it is a caste-neutral  
rejection of the perceived violation of fairness built into the idea of reservation. The self-proclaimed 
justification for expressing such opinions will always be that it is not directed against those who benefit,  
but rather against the unfair nature of the system. However, the suspicion that it serves as a pretext for a  
subliminal but deep-seated distain for the upward mobility of Lower Castes cannot be fully ruled out.204 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the controversy and emotion the topic provokes, a cautious acceptance of  
the quota system by at least some of those from the ‘general category’ is perhaps discernable. In most  
basic terms, not all those who were ineligible for reservation places showed resentment towards those 
who were eligible:
If you ask someone from Bangalore, probably he will say reservation is something I would not accept. But  
having come from remote place I still believe reservation should be there although reservation does not  
apply to me. (0509M002-GEN)
But also in this case the loopholes and the misuse of the quota system is regarded as the most serious  
objection against the current practice:
Reservation should be on a case to case basis and it should not be on anybody [of this] category. […] For  
example,  if  you  have  two candidates,  both  of  them under  reservation  category,  one  person  owns  a  
Mercedes car, other person he does not even have sufficient money to educate himself. So to whom  
should be the reservation given? Obviously [to the] person who doesn't have money to educate himself. 
(0509M002-GEN)205
203 However fallacious this argument is, I have often heard it in conversations about the reservation system and it always proves  
to be the basis for a fundamental rejection of the whole idea of affirmative action.
204 The rejection of  the existing reservation system was never justified to me as a rejection of  the rise  of  Lower Castes.  
Realistically, denying the Low Castes a well-established route to social mobility would, in effect, mean that fewer Low Caste  
members  would be  able  to  improve  their  situation.  This  contradiction  is  open to  interpretation  and deserves  further  
reflection.
205 It is perhaps a bit audacious to claim a relationship between local origin and the position on caste, but it seems that the idea  
of  affirmative action is  more familiar  and accepted in  Southern India – the interviewed above coming from Northern  
Karnataka. 
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Again,  and  notwithstanding  the  range  of  views  offered,  caste  as  a  basis  for  affirmative  action  was 
overwhelmingly disapproved of by the respondents. Revealingly, this attitude is in line with the general  
attempt to downplay caste as a socio-economic factor and to hide it from public view. And, of course, 
the degree to which caste is seen as a factor in poverty depends on individual’s political beliefs. Last but 
not least, affirmative action touches upon the sensitive issues of personal responsibility, the cultural 
construct of middle-class identity (where success is explained as the result of hard work and dedication,  
not benefits) and the notion of Indian modernity, where caste is often seen as an embarrassing relict  
from the pre-modern past. 
Since the High Caste (or ‘general category’) interviewees did not benefit from the quota system, it can 
hardly be expected that they turn out to be staunch advocates of affirmative action. But the answers are  
more nuanced than outright rejection of the quota system. The most common refrains are presented  
with different emphasis: That the reservation systems has outlived its purpose; that it should benefit the  
poor and not those with a certain caste status;  and,  that caste benefits  should not be inherited or 
skimmed off by those who apparently know how to exploit the system. If a quota system was devised  
that helped people from a poor background only, and if these quotas were restricted to a level seen as 
non-threatening for those who would not benefit, most of the interviewees would apparently support it.  
Against a backdrop of widespread poverty and of highly unequal access to education, the idea of social 
programmes to assist those who are at the bottom of the social pyramid is deemed necessary by almost  
every interviewee. But the bottom of the pyramid is not defined in terms of caste, even if empirical facts  
point to a strong correlation between Low Caste status and poverty. 
Interestingly, caste as a basis for reservation is equated with corruption and identity politics, not with  
historical  injustices  and the need for recompense.  Therefore,  the original  justification for  the quota 
system, that it provides compensation for historical injustice towards those at the bottom of the social  
hierarchy,  is  neither  understood  nor  shared.  Whether  as  a  result  of  an  education  that  neglects  to  
emphasise the official historical justifications for the reservation system or as a result of self-interest in 
an unreserved education system and labour market,  the very  lack  of  knowledge about  the issue is  
striking and needs an explanation.
6.5.3.2. The views on reservation part II – the STP alumni
For the STP participants, on the other hand, the issue of reservations is also beset with negative feelings,  
even  if  they  see  the  general  need  for  affirmative  action  as  more  pressing  than  their  High  Caste 
counterparts. Reflecting the widely held notion that reservation on the basis of caste amounts to fraud, 
the STP alumni also tend to believe that those who use the system are taking the seats of those who 
deserve them more legitimately through their achievements and potential.  In some instances, I  was 
personally  surprised by the amount  of  critical  –  and implicitly  self-critical  –  awareness in  regard to  
reservations: 
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So in the first 25 years OK, what you call reservation in government sectors didn’t happen because they 
have to be educated first.  So what they did, they just reduced the qualification I mean minimum marks,  
range, everything for backward community people, so that they could apply to some big big universities 
and government positions. [...] On the positive side we can say, lot of people you know, from backward 
community benefited from them. [...] The down side is that, you know, we are not utilising, a section of  
our community [is] not utilising their potential to the fullest. Do you get it? We are not working that hard.
So what happens, when they give us people from our community they give you all those dummy posts –  
they call it dummy posts. Posted for some particular position and it has no real significance. (0324M002-
STPII)
Consequently, the STP participants do not defend the current system, and view their own prior eligibility  
and use of the system more as a biographical stigma than a justified opportunity. Yet, however deeply 
entrenched the feeling that a reserved seat in a college translates into undeserved benefits, this attitude  
does not amount to a fundamental denial of the need for affirmative action. A paradoxical seeming 
situation becomes apparent in the interviews. While the personal use of reservations is often the subject  
of embarrassment, the general need for some kind of affirmative action is accepted and defended on 
logical  grounds.  Since most are aware that poor  people – and again,  most of the trainees are from 
relatively  well-off  families  (see  6.2)  –  face  barriers  to  successful  entry  into  professional  careers, 
provisions  that  would  ease  this  process  are  supported.  The  main  critique  that  the  interviewees 
emphasise is therefore not the principle of reservations but their basis in caste identity. If given the  
choice, they would perpetuate the system, but change the entry criteria to those based on the financial  
circumstances of the respective family. 
As for reservation in education – that is a must. Because I know... what conditions I was in and how bad it  
was... Seriously, we are provided money from the government to study […] there were times when my  
parents were unable to pay me also, for my education. So it was government, like college – they do give us 
some stipend […] so that was a lot of help. And regarding jobs, I don't think this is necessary. (0407M003-
STP)
Reservations and caste-based discrimination are intrinsically linked, according to this interviewee: 
Because it all starts at the school level. That is where you start filling in those fields called community,  
caste; whatever it is. [...] Concept of reservation came into existence because people then thought it is a 
lower community, and they were deprived of so many things. They were economically depressed. […] So  
they thought, let us keep for the lower community something called reservations, this will help them.  
Later on things have changed with that. Now I feel it should be based on their economic status. (RES3 –  
0407M001-STP)]
By preferring a form of affirmative action based on poverty thresholds rather than the current one on 
social identity, the view of the STP trainees and alumni is very much in line with those interviewees from 
‘general backgrounds’. 
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Overall,  the topic of reservation was again narrowed down to the question of fairness in education.  
There is no narrative about Dalit liberation or the greater political implications of the issue, let alone 
knowledge about the historical origins of affirmative action policies. Hardly anyone would point to the 
harsh  reality  that  no  reservation  system  could  ever  solve  the  problems  of  the  Indian  economy 
completely. Again, an exception proves the rule:
[...] the ideal situation is that we have to do something where people don't go to a position where they  
want to achieve something and not being able to do that because of something which is not their fault –  
about which they can't do anything. For example, if there is a race, at the end of the race the winner gets 
the prize, what if I put a guy who is physically disabled along with those who are physically fit? It is not  
even a race. If they say I will have reservations, problem is persons who require reservation are very poor; 
at the end of it, if they say something like you start studying then it becomes fair practice, then you can 
get job on your own – but the problem is the guy has no means of affording even food. (0415M001-STP)
In many respects, the STP alumni seem to mirror the prevalent views presented by the High Caste IT  
employees, especially the de-legitimisation of social identity as a cause or criteria for benefits. This could 
be a sign of a hegemonic discourse in India, which the STP alumni (as representatives of SC and ST  
segments of society) merely acquiesce to; alternatively, it could be taken as evidence of a sweeping shift  
in public opinion that includes those parts of the SC/ST population that have joined the new middle 
classes. Whatever the case, renunciation of caste as a factor in public and, in particular, political matters  
is a salient feature of this section of society – the most affluent, modern, and therefore trendsetting, in  
India today.
6.5.4. Consequences of Caste in the private life of the Respondents
6.5.4.1. The rural / urban divide
On the whole, personal experience of caste varied considerably, according to where the trainees grew up 
and which college they attended. As a general rule, it can be assumed that caste consciousness and 
related social  behaviour is  much more pronounced in  rural  areas,  whereas  it  appears  to  be almost 
completely absent in Bangalore itself, at least according to the views expressed in the interviews. This  
outlook could well be related to the young age of the participants – that is, those who have had limited 
experience of marriage arrangements and the accompanying caste considerations. But this perception 
must  be  taken  seriously  and  not  undermined  by  the  researcher’s  zeal  to  prove  prior  theoretical  
assumptions.  The situation in  the colleges is  also hard to  appraise – the opinions expressed in  the 
interviews range from complete ignorance of caste to a clear knowledge of castes because of the quota 
system. Altogether, one third of the STP respondents had faced discrimination based on their caste, 
either due to the fact that they grew up in rural areas, or that they were known to have benefited from  
reserved college seats. The reasons for discrimination can be quite different, but generally fall into two 
categories: Either it is based on traditional caste prejudice or, more recently, on economic competition  
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highlighted by the reservation system. This, in turn, raises an interesting question regarding the theory of  
caste, one that is directly connected to the modern reinterpretation of caste.
According to the interviewees, older, traditional or orthodox people (in rural areas) consider Scheduled 
Caste members an embarrassment and social nuisance, and try to limit social contact with them to the  
minimum. This resentment is directed against the existence of Scheduled Castes and Tribes as such, and  
the reaction ranges from avoiding social contact in general all the way up to a complete social exclusion. 
This form of caste feeling is firmly rooted in the traditional purity/impurity scheme and accords well with  
the classical interpretation of caste based on ritual notions and religious texts (see chpt. 1). The situation 
is  fundamentally different in the social setting of  the college. The conflict here is  neither religiously 
inspired nor based on a  traditional  understanding of  caste differences.  The main resentment  is  the 
perceived unfairness of reservations on the basis  of caste,  primarily an ethical  issue connected with 
economic scarcity, not perceived tradition. Conceptions of caste, in this case, are not necessarily related 
to hierarchies or pollution rules – again with the qualification that these traditional elements could play  
a residual role – but rather on economic competition.206 In effect, as long as benefits are attached to 
caste memberships, caste can be expected to survive, albeit in a much truncated form (as described in 
the Modern reinterpretation of caste in chpt. 1). However, as theoretically indicated, caste in this version 
is not the same as that portrayed in the classical interpretation, but is rather a modernised and slimmed 
down version of this malleable social institution.
The  consequences  of  this  reduced,  modern  reinterpretation  of  caste  are  very  visible  in  the  actual  
accounts given by the interviewees. First, it should be noted that most of the participants did not face  
discrimination at all in their lives. Those who did mainly reported small incidences, while others did not  
want to specify what happened. The instances of discrimination appeared not to have had much actual  
impact, with relatively few negative consequences. The only – and by no means insignificant – damage 
caused by these experiences is surely a diminished feeling of self-worth, resulting from the perpetuated 
notion that people of Lower Caste origin are not fully equal to the rest of society. This indicates that 
while  caste  hierarchy  is  clearly  losing  its  importance,  there  are  still  on-going  repercussions  –  most 
notably in the attitudes of Low or Scheduled Caste members themselves: While two thirds of the STP 
respondents had not faced obvious or actual discrimination, they overwhelmingly would still rather hide  
their social background from the public. And the very fact that virtually all STP respondents seem to  
share this feeling is telling. Caste hierarchies, even if unenforceable, contradictory and explicitly rejected,  
have an afterlife in this  most modern section of Indian society.  While caste may have lost meaning 
almost completely to those in the middle, those at the top, who still enjoy a certain prestige because of  
their heritage, and those at the bottom, who are still subjected to negative stereotyping, feel it the most. 
206 In an abstract sense, anyone who received benefits that reduced the opportunities of the general audience would face this  
resentment. In this regard, these forms of caste-consciousness are not specific to caste itself and would be evident with any  
other kind of distinguishable social characteristic linked to such a benefit.
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6.5.4.2. The issue of Caste and Marriage 
As the literature suggests, and as confirmed in the interviews, one of the strongest bastions of caste is  
marriage practice. According to the IHDS – the best data source available on the topic – only 6 per cent  
of marriages in the representative All-India sample are inter-caste marriages, while the remaining ones  
are intra-caste (Desai et al. 2007). Thus, even if there is a trend towards more autonomy and consent by 
the respective partners, the actual numbers do not indicate a general decline of arranged marriages: The  
4.94 per cent “self arranged” or love-marriages are still an exception to the rule, with 36.52 per cent 
“jointly  arranged” and 58.54 per cent arranged by the family  (23.18 per cent of  the latter with the  
consent of the bride and 35.36 per cent without) (Banerji et al. 2008). Given this background, it is indeed 
interesting to see how marriage is perceived amongst the respondents. 
These young IT engineers, mostly bachelors away from their family of origin, appear to be on the verge 
of a shift between the expectation of their parental generation and their own much more individualistic  
and horizontal concepts of family life.207 And while no clear consensus is evident on the best choice of  
marriage, whether ‘love’ or ‘arranged’, the fundamental rule of not alienating parents is virtually always  
obeyed. This can sometimes lead to a double life, where the moral standards expected by parents are  
much more relaxed amongst their children once direct parental control ceases. In general, both positions 
can be found: The claim that ‘love marriages’ do not succeed is balanced by the ‘emancipated’ belief  
that only the individual matters and that parents should agree to anyone their child chooses:
But problem is, most of this love marriages are not 100 per cent success always. Something like, physically, 
we can see it, we can attract that girl. After one year, two years, it will come out that we should go, we  
should divorce. I have seen. OK, arranged marriages are very less to go out. Because the thing when we 
are going to be arranged marriage, just we will see the family of father and mother. And what is their  
background,  what  is  their  parents,  how  they  are,  how  the  family...  We  will  see  all  these  things.  
(0426M001-STP)
On the other hand, the right to choose is emphasised, even if the choice has to be limited according to 
parental demands.
If I say my girlfriend is from a different place, different religion, I can convince my parents […] I know her  
for such a long time, my dad would say it's at your own risk. Marriage is done, this is fine for me and my  
parents, but my grandparents definitely would not be able to understand this.  They would say this is  
definitely not going to work out – forget about it, find another girl from our same religion. It is close to  
impossible to convince my grandparents. (0509M002-STP)
In the majority of interviews the shift amongst young professionals from completely arranged marriages,  
where potential spouses are recruited by their parents, to ‘parental approved’ marriages, where the 
spouses meet independently but seek approval from their parents before the wedding, is acknowledged.  
207 The horizontal concept of the family is based on the relation of the couple in question, whereas the prevalent tradition in  
India emphasises more the vertical family connection – that is, the relations between parents and offspring in the contexts  
of many generations.
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This finding is very much in keeping with the shift found in the IHDS sample mentioned above. Both in  
the IHDS and here, it is safe to assume that neither the traditional arranged marriage, where individual  
choice is severely limited, nor love marriages without the approval of both party's parents are becoming  
common amongst the most modern young Indians. As the approval of the couple’s parents is deemed 
essential, the sanctions on those who marry without it are severe, often resulting in total loss of social 
support: 
What happens if a girl from a different community wants to have a love marriage?
Inter-caste marriage see, right now [...] it would be a big problem. [...] at the end of the day the guy has to 
live with the girl. They go stay alone. That is it. They get married stay separately. It is like out of family.  
They have no connection with the family. (0418M001-STP)
This has several implications for the topic of caste. The potential for inter-caste marriages is considerably  
increased the more autonomy and discretionary competence the individuals in question have. However,  
this is in turn limited by the need for approval from parents, so the responsibility for social change rests  
primarily with the parent's generation. The kind of choice they allow, or ultimately agree to, limits the 
opportunity for inter-caste or inter-religious marriages. There is, though, considerable freedom in this: A 
number of my interviewees tell  of inter-caste marriage, where the parents, often after considerable  
resistance, ultimately agreed to unions across caste, or much more rarely, across religious allegiances.  
Nonetheless, it would be totally wrong to emphasise this as a complete liberation of choices  (cf. A. V. 
Banerjee et al. 2009b).
In relation to the caste background of interviewees, wide differences in attitude are apparent. In general  
terms, it  appears as if  freedom in marriage choices is  less likely for those on the lower tiers of the 
traditional caste hierarchy than for those from privileged backgrounds. Thus, while interviewees from 
High Caste backgrounds tend to emphasise the new freedoms and choices they have, and suggest that  
caste is rarely an issue, the STP participants’ views are markedly more sceptical:
The thing what happens is, their parents put a clause: get married to anyone, go for a love marriage, not at  
all an issue, but make sure he or she is of our caste. This is the only condition they put. Three of my very  
good friends working right now in [the interviewee's company] they say this. Lot of other things have also  
happened – he was in love with another person, everything was good but it did not work out because her  
parents put down the same clause and his parents also has put down the same clause. (0415M001-STP)
This certainly reflects the barriers faced in the marriage market, and indicates that perceived low status  
can undermine prospective grooms’ or brides’ market value, even if their social standing as IT employees  
places them in a higher bracket.208 
208 A slight shift is visible in the marriage market: IT employment no longer tops the ranks; due to the insecurity of these jobs 
and the obvious vulnerabilities to global demand curves, it is now seen as a trade off between the still exceptional pay  
structures and the realisation that these jobs are never guaranteed. Government jobs, often reviled in the boom years both  
in prestige and pay scale, are no longer seen as a second choice, and the traditional regard for public service positions has 
experienced a revival. The dominant role for IT as an aspirational model for India's new role in the world has definitely taken 
a dent; the role model for capitalistic modernisation is no longer as shining as it once was.
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If I want to marry a girl in Upper Caste, it is damn very difficult. It will come till killing me. They are even 
ready to kill me. It is like killing in the name of honour. You know, they cannot accept even in their dreams,  
you know, their daughter to me. Because I belong to Lower Caste. So that thing is still there. So if in my 
generation, if tomorrow I have kids, I think this will not go. This will diminish. Because I have maturity level  
[…] My colleague, he is Upper Caste. We can have an alliance with us, between us. But older people, my 
parents, they come from old generation. And if a girl, if I am looking to marry a girl who is of Upper Caste,  
her parents also come from old generation. So they know what is the caste difference. (0407M002-STP)
Seen against the ‘optimism’ (or euphemistic usage) of their High Caste peers, this qualifies the claim that  
caste has no meaning as long as the potential spouse comes from a ‘good family’. And ‘good family’ is, at  
least  in  the case  of  Low Castes  or  minority  religious  groups,  nothing  more than  a  codeword  for  a 
respectable Hindu with sound economic standing209 and the right origin from a pool of acceptable castes.
Nevertheless,  even  with  the  High  Caste  respondents  there  seems to  be  a  gap  between the  liberal  
attitudes that are initially expressed, and the quite severe restrictions that only become obvious after  
deeper  discussion.  One  of  the  respondents  whom  I  met  quite  regularly  first  declared  that  a  ‘love  
marriage’ would be not a problem for his parents and that he had already had several girlfriends. On 
closer examination, however, it turned out that his girlfriends were rather platonic affairs (if at all) and 
that even the tolerance of his parents towards ‘love marriages’ would have strict limits. His formula for a  
suitable bride was the usual “she has to be from a good family”, meaning (upon my further inquiry)  
someone coming from a respectable, vegetarian family from Brahmin or Vaishya Varna background (he 
being himself a Brahmin) (minutes 23.09.2009). This indicates both change and continuity: For him, this  
would already be a significant departure from orthodox tradition, in which his specific sub-caste would 
be the only suitable category. But even the range of choices he now enjoys is firmly limited; his bride 
should neither come from a poor family, nor should she belong to a different religion or a culturally  
different caste. If caste considerations are relaxed here, they are only relaxed to the extent that neither  
‘class barriers’ nor cultural borderlines are being crossed.
Consequently, it is still highly unlikely that a Hindu-Muslim union would find approval in the eyes of the  
respective parents. The same hold true for unions between partners from culturally very different castes,  
even if  marriages between spouses of  different caste but  similar  cultural  background are  becoming  
increasingly common amongst highly-educated professionals. Stochastic factors also limit the chances of  
people from very different castes even coming into close contact. The fact that the new middle classes  
are recruited mainly from Hindu Upper Castes, Dominant Agricultural Castes and the occasional Christian 
(see 4.2.4), acts as a barrier to the casual mixing of people from very diverse backgrounds. As discussed 
later in chapter eight, friendship networks are, with few exceptions, restricted to a circle of people who  
share characteristics like language, region of origin, dietary preferences and (what I would call) cultural  
209 The dowry system, discussed under 3.5.1. is a further argument against parentally non-approved love marriages. As salaries  
in IT have climbed to previously unknown heights, so have dowry expectation for the potential wives of IT employees. 
Compare  Sharmistha  Self  and  Richard  Grabowski,  'Modernization,  Inter-Caste  Marriage,  and  Dowry:  An  Analytical 
Perspective', Journal of Asian Economics, 20/1 (2009), 69-76. 
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proximity by choice. The same holds true for the IT industry: Even though this sector brings together a 
mix of people from all over India, there is a subtle pre-selection at work once the caste background is  
taken  into  account.  As  long  as  not  all  castes  and  religions  of  India  are  equally  represented  in  the  
workforce, the chances of  cultural  clashes over caste differences are as limited as the possibility  of  
encountering people from the very extreme ends of the caste spectrum. Thus, as long as the workforce 
itself is unevenly recruited from only a few sections of society, other sections are virtually cut off from  
social developments within IT. Finally, as long as the divide between a public disregard for caste, on the 
one hand, and a private observance of caste, on the other, remains in place, no social revolution should 
be expected from the mere mixing of different castes at the workplace.
With regard to the future of caste, this has several possible implications. For instance, it could mean that 
the increasing irrelevance of boundaries between castes that share roughly similar cultural patterns will  
overcome the strict restrictions imposed by  Jati, although broader cultural divides would still remain. 
Alternatively,  it  could  also  mean  that  caste  is  increasingly  in  competition  with  more  mundane, 
economically-relevant considerations. In the interviews, for example, it is clearly discernible that caste  
was never exclusively seen as the only relevant marriage criteria by participants’ parents. In the more  
liberal  families,  alternative benchmarks for a good spouse,  those that have always been considered 
alongside  caste  membership,  are  increasingly  overriding  traditional  caste  concerns;  educational 
qualifications and economic success can easily trump caste allegiance. If this were to happen over an 
extended period, caste as a social institution would diminish in importance in the next few generations. 
However, there are serious objections to any such prediction. 
First of all, inter-caste marriages are overwhelmingly seen as a second choice, as a compromise one has  
to make given changing circumstances. Even if approved by the respective parents, they are still not seen 
as ideal; the fear is always that (grand)children might not be raised according to family tradition and 
culture.  Deep-seated  opposition  to  the  idea  of  caste  intermixing  is  sometimes  voiced  even  if  it  is  
accepted in a particular individual's case. Second, any such inter-caste marriages are only thinkable (or at  
least reluctantly accepted) in some parts of the Indian population, or in states, like Kerala, which have a  
long tradition of inter-caste unions. Within the Indian middle classes, normally deemed the most liberal,  
both caste-rejecting and caste-abiding sections exist side by side, with no clear trend visible.210 Third, a 
backlash  against  inter-caste  relations  and  marriages  is  always  possible,  not  least  within  the  Hindu 
nationalist movement that discourages those relations within its “moral police” programme  (C. Shah 
2008).  Thus,  even  though  a  number  of  respondents  state  a  preference  for  love  marriage,  strong 
opposition still exists with no general consensus upon its acceptability. 
210 Modernity and technical  change can,  ironically,  give a new lease of life to pre-modern institutions:  The wildly popular 
matrimonial  online  platforms,  like  shaadi.com or  simplymarry.com,  make  it  possible  to  find  potential  spouses  exactly 
matched to caste criteria. Thereby they provide a deep pool of candidates that makes compromise on caste easily avoidable.  
In the case of simplymarry.com, it is even impossible to search for spouses without prior selection for preferred community  
and  caste.  Compare  Subhasish  Dugar,  Haimanti  Bhattacharya,  and  David  H.  Reiley,  Jr.,  'Can't  Buy  Me  Love:  A  Field 
Experiment Exploring the Trade-Off between Income and Caste-Status in an Indian Matrimonial Market',  SSRN eLibrary 
(2010).
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6.5.4.3.Consequences for Caste in Modernity 
As discussed in the first chapter, caste considerations in marriage are crucial for the survival of caste as a 
social  institution;  in the modern interpretation,  the biological  element  of  caste – epitomised in  the 
prevalent caste endogamy – is the strongest of all three; and this is therefore most telling about the 
future of caste. If inter-castes marriages suddenly become the norm rather than the exception in India,  
the  institution  of  caste  would  be  gone  within  one  generation.  The  significance  of  this  biological  
element211 is certainly appreciated by at least some of the respondents. One possible result is an open 
contrast between an idealist desire to eradicate caste, on the one hand, and pragmatic resignation that 
this will never happen, on the other:
What could be the solution for caste?
Everyone should marry out of his caste. Seriously. Caste should never be considered.
[later  in  the  interview]  I  don’t  think  my parents  will  agree  to  marry  someone  other  than  my  caste.  
Everywhere, not only in my place it happens, and 99 per cent it happens in India. (0407M003-STP)
Whatever opinion the individual respondent might have on the issue of caste, the significance of intra-
caste marriages for the survival of this social institution highlights the relevance of these interviews even  
more; that is,  even in the supposedly modern,  highly educated (in a technical  sense)  and culturally 
influential circles of the new middle classes, the survival of caste considerations in marriage points to the  
resilience of caste itself. If there is change visible here, it is change at a glacial pace:
Where would you see the institution of caste in about 20 or 50 years of time?
In  older  days,  they  used  to  differentiate  a  lot.  Now  people  are  changing  and  they  are  into  good 
qualification and good professional life – so I don't think they will think about casteism in future.
What about marriage? I talked to a lot of people who said, in my own life it doesn't matter anymore but 
when it comes to marriage my parents will look for someone of the same caste.
That's what my parents will be looking for – that I should get married to my own caste person. Maybe in  
10 or 20 years down the line I may not be looking for that for my baby. It is changing, maybe my parents or  
my grandparents were really strict about these things and when it comes to my parents it has changed, 
but still they are in that circle.
What has changed between your parents and grandparents?
My parents, they never differentiate between this person is from high community or low community, they  
never think about that. I hope that many parents do the same nowadays. So in 20 years we will be parents  
and we will not think about that. (0404M001-STP)
Given that there is a certain ambiguity about the exact position of her parents, this interview is insightful  
in  the  way  that  it  documents  a  shift  that  I  would  consider  typical  for  modernisation  in  India.  The  
211 In one instance, one of my interview partners referred to the hidden power of caste by comparing different castes to  
different breeds of dogs (he used Doberman and German Shepherd as example) – even in the crossbreeds the original traits  
(bred into these dogs) would eventually resurface in the offspring. 
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interviewee’s parents, who do not seem to care about caste hierarchy in everyday life, still consider only  
an intra-caste marriage feasible for their daughter. Thus, the parents both reject (or at least disregard) 
hierarchy and, at the same time, take caste into consideration in marriage arrangements; therein lies the 
core of the ‘modernised’ approach to caste that is encapsulated in the modern interpretation (chpt.  
1.3.3). Here, the rationalisation of caste centres on the notion that one’s own community needs to be 
preserved, no matter what position in any hierarchy it occupies. In the words of the same respondent:
[...] they do not agree for love marriage, first thing they see is caste – High Caste or Low Caste, they are 
not bothered, if he is from different caste they disagree. For example, a girl is from high community and  
boy is from low community, always problem is from girl's side family. But even if the girl's side agree – 
boy's parents may not agree even though girl is from higher community. (0404M001-STP)
The chance of ‘status gentrification’, through marrying into a family of higher status, is rejected in the  
same way that a ‘status downgrade’, through alliance with someone from lower standing, would be. The  
result, in keeping with the general trend of modernisation in India, is an unconnected, non-hierarchical  
and mutually exclusive caste fragmentation. And because the systematic nature of caste is almost absent 
here, the classical interpretation of caste (chpt. 1.3.1) loses its explanatory power almost completely.  
The modern interpretation, on the other hand, is confirmed by these accounts, even if every inter-caste  
marriage means that the whole caste idea is losing social  credibility.  As long as arranged intra-caste 
marriages  are  the  norm,  this  form of  caste  ideology  and  practice  is  expected  to  be  the  dominant  
reinterpretation of caste within modernity.  
6.6. Conclusion
As  this  chapter  has  covered  a  great  deal  of  ground,  a  simple,  straightforward  conclusion  seems 
impossible. However, a minimum baseline can be established once the main topics are considered. First  
and foremost, caste does not seem to play any role within the IT industry itself – both in the perspective  
of High Caste respondents and those from SC and ST background. Even if the workforce appears highly  
biased towards Hindu High Castes, Dominant Agricultural Castes and Christians, there seems to be no  
linkage to any particular community. No interviewee could imagine caste-based discrimination within 
the industry, with none actually experiencing caste-based discrimination either. In this respect, there was 
a general agreement between the views of the STP alumni and those of the mainstream IT workforce. 
However, there is still the issue that most Lower Caste and tribe members would not speak about their  
social background, in keeping with the industry’s policy of avoiding social conflicts. In consequence, it is  
still  an open question how far this reluctance to speak openly about caste is a result of the general  
anonymity in the IT sector, or of the persistence of the stigma attached to a ‘disrespectable’ caste (or 
tribal) background. There needs to be more research on this (as attempted, unsuccessfully, in chpt. 7).
When it  comes to the private life of  the IT workforce, caste is  apparently  of much more concern –  
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especially so once marriage decisions are considered. In accordance with other, large-scale studies, a 
picture emerges in which caste boundaries are increasingly traded off against other factors, although this  
does not warrant the conclusion that caste is losing its importance in Indian marriages. If anything, caste 
is considered one very important factor amongst others, with a strong reluctance to break with family 
traditions evident amongst the respondents. There seems to be a shift towards allowing more castes  
into the pool of eligible marriage partners, but this does not automatically mean that alliances across  
broad cultural divides (such as the vegetarian /non-vegetarian split), or even across religious boundaries,  
have become acceptable. The result could be the emergence of broad caste alliances, based on cultural  
similarities and comparable socio-economic status, although it is much too early to predict how this may  
work out in practice.  For the moment,  only incipient changes are visible with regard to marriage – 
thereby upholding the theoretical prediction that the biological element (chpt. 1.2.2) is the one most 
likely to survive under modern circumstances. 
Clearly apparent in the interviews is the contrast between the IT workplace, on the one hand, and family  
expectations, on the other. Whereas the former simply ignores caste and declares it irrelevant, the latter 
is still very much informed by caste considerations, even if they are not obvious at first glance. Young IT 
employees tend to live a split life, conforming to the workplace ethos laid out by the IT industry, while 
not totally departing from the expectations of their family of origin. So while caste considerations are 
certainly less accentuated when young employees are separated from their family, there is still at least 
one instance where they are confronted with caste and its social consequences – that is, once the issue  
of marriage arises. This poses the interesting question of the extent to which these two value spheres  
can be kept separate, an issue that surely deserves more research. Against a general background of  
ongoing cultural change in Indian society, no conclusive answer seems possible at the moment, although  
promising  avenues  for  further  research  are  apparent.  Two  of  these  are  explored  in  the  remaining  
chapters.
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7. A (failed) Experiment 
7.1. Background 
As  the  previous  chapter  has  shown,  there  are  remarkable  inconsistencies  within  the  prevalent 
arguments that caste has lost its meaning in modern/modernising India in general and the Indian IT  
sector  in  particular.  In  broad  terms,  there  seems  to  be  a  split  between  a  private  and  a  public  
interpretation of caste – with a reduced and/or vanishing importance in the public sphere, and a still  
strong existence in the private sphere. This ambiguity is clearly revealed in the answers given in the 
interviews in chapter six: On the one hand, no participants from SC or ST background described any 
negative experience within the IT industry. As surprising as this is, the interviewees consistently claimed  
that no caste discrimination, or even the scope for discrimination, seemed imaginable within IT for those  
who have historically borne the brunt of caste-based discrimination in India. On the other hand, it was  
quite apparent to me (and confirmed in the interviews) that a Low Caste or tribal identity was seen as a  
potential burden, and almost never as neutral or something to be proud of. The industry’s firm policy of  
avoiding  the  topic  of  social  origin,  and  the  consequent  hiding  of  personal  background  by  most  
interviewees in the workplace, seemed to indicate that caste is a hidden, not a resolved issue. If caste 
neutrality was indeed a general and reliable feature of the IT workforce, one's social origin should be of  
no particular concern; hence, the conspicuous avoidance of the subject, highlighted in the interviews,  
would be inexplicable under such circumstances. This suggests that the private/public divide needs to be  
artificially sustained in the workplace by a deliberate policy of restricting personal discussions to avoid a  
potential source of identity-based conflict. 
As long as caste remains relevant in private circumstances, and as long as employees have to live a dual  
existence, the apparent caste neutrality in IT appears fragile. And as neat and clean as this division of  
private and public life seems at first glance, the potential for conflict is tremendous. In certain instances,  
for  example,  if  work  colleagues  become  involved  in  personal  or  private  relationships,  the  ‘double 
framing’ of private and public potentially clash – and this is clearly seen by the interviewees in the 
previous chapter. In their statements about marriage preferences, caste always shows through – either  
as the main criteria for partner choice or as a touchy obstacle to so-called love marriages. In any case,  
these IT employees are confronted with the fact that their very identity includes caste as an important 
factor, not only on private occasions but most notably when it comes to marriage arrangements. With  
this in mind, it is legitimate to investigate whether this private caste identity leaks into the perceived 
caste-neutral work environment of the IT industry. That is, would someone who, willingly or unwillingly,  
factors caste into his or her private decision-making completely abandon this topic once he or she is in  
the  caste-neutral,  professional  environment  of  IT?  Could  it  be  that  private  caste-notions  still  show 
through in professional settings, or that antipathies or preferences, based on caste identities, influence 
seemingly unrelated or caste-neutral decisions in the workplace? And, in turn, what conclusion could be 
174
drawn about caste perceptions if such influences are verified?
Naturally, these questions require a completely different methodological approach. Most generally, it  
appears difficult to validate social preferences and antipathies in such a sensitive context. Since direct  
methods such as interviews are always liable to be biased by social desirability (in the sociological sense) 
this  method is  of  limited use here.  Furthermore,  since  often subconscious  preferences  need  to  be  
accessed, only indirect means are advisable – that is, it could well be that people are not aware of their 
actual or potential caste preferences, and would simply be unable to answer questions about it. For  
these  reasons,  a  suitable  methodological  approach  is  needed;  here  this  was  provided  by  a  socio-
psychological experiment that would provide testable results without revealing the purpose and the aim 
of the project, and potentially yield conclusions that would otherwise be unobtainable by more direct  
methods. By using an experiment with a hidden research agenda, the problem of  social  desirability 
would diminish as the actual issue being tested in the research would not be obvious to the participants.  
Such an experiment  could  offer  an interesting  look behind and beyond the self-disguise  that  many  
Indians show about caste in their personal experience. 
7.2. The Experiment 
7.2.1. Methodological blueprint and adaptation 
For the design of the experiment, a model was found in a different, but related context. The following is  
therefore based on and inspired by the famous studies on aversive racism developed by John F. Dovidio 
and  Samuel  Gaertner  (Dovidio  and  Gaertner  2000,  2004),  who  pioneered  methodological  ways  to 
investigate deep-seated partialities about race in the US. It was hoped that one of their designs could be  
adapted  to  the  Indian  context  and  –  with  modest  changes  –  replicate  the  results  that  have  been  
consistently shown in the North American setting. There, Dovidio et al. tested the hidden prejudices of  
white college students towards black peers in a two-step process. By first interviewing the white college 
students about their attitudes towards race and race relations, they established very high levels of stated 
anti-racism, a fact they tried to test further. They therefore let their participants rate fictitious CVs of  
both black and white applicants for minor positions in college administration.  The hypothesis  being  
tested was that aversions against black candidates would show in lower ratings for black candidates  
compared with equally qualified white counterparts. All fictitious CVs had been constructed to fit into  
three  pre-tested categories:  “clearly  strongly  qualified”,  “ambiguously  qualified” and  “clearly  weakly  
qualified”, with black and white candidates equally featuring in all groups. And while the results did not  
differ much in the highest and the lowest category, there was a significant difference visible in the way  
that the middle category was rated: While the white candidate got job recommendations from 76 per 
cent of the participants, the black candidate only received 45 per cent recommendations (Dovidio and 
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Gaertner 2000: 317). The authors concluded that even when racism was anathema for most participants, 
a deep-seated prejudice showed in instances when clear criteria for an appraisal were missing, and the  
results could be interpreted as revealing a form of hidden or ‘aversive’ racism against black people in the 
US.
Suitably adapted, Dovidio's design could provide a good basis for a similar experiment in the Indian  
context. A scenario needed to be devised that was readily comprehended by the participants and which  
could yield results representative of real situations in the IT industry. First and foremost, the CVs needed 
to resemble typical CVs in the IT industry. At the same time, the caste identity and the local origin of the  
fictitious job candidates had to be recognisable beyond doubt. The former was to be established by well-
known caste names with a supra-regional appeal, and which should be known and associated with the 
right caste group by most respondents. The latter could be more easily established by naming the job 
candidates’ birthplace and location of schools and colleges attended.212 Replacing the categories of white 
and black with the extreme ends of the traditional caste spectrum – i.e. Brahmins for whites and SC or 
ST members for blacks213 – it  could be reasonably assumed that negative stereotypes against  Lower 
Castes or tribal members would show in the ratings if  they existed amongst the participants of the  
experiment. It would be expected that, given unclear or ambiguous qualifications,214 participants would 
take  factors  like  social  background  into  account.215 If  caste  preferences  towards  both  ends  of  the 
spectrum were as predicted, potential prejudice against people with lower social status would show in 
significantly lower ratings of their CVs compared to those of Brahmins with equal qualifications.216 And if, 
as indicated in the interviews, preferences based on local origin are more important, they would feature 
more prominently when cross-compared to the differences on the basis of social background. 
To summarise: The whole design was based on the assumption that caste membership is recognisable 
from  surnames,  plus  other  given  hints.  Furthermore,  it  relied  on  the  presumption  that  mental  
associations with certain castes have a measurable influence when judging a person’s qualification in  
unclear circumstances. Thus, if  caste prejudices function so that those higher in the social hierarchy 
enjoy the benefit of the doubt, then those CVs in the ambiguous qualification slot would show higher  
ratings  for  Brahmins  compared  to  members  of  Low  Caste  or  tribal  communities.  However,  if  the 
participants clearly recognised the applicant’s caste (or tribal) background and yet no difference in the  
212 In both cases, the right association of the fictitious candidates to the established categories needed to be tested by pre-tests  
prior to the experiment itself.
213 This approach it not without problems: There is a considerable difference between ST and SC members in terms of social 
prestige, with ST being much less the recipient of negative stereotyping. Furthermore, membership in SC or ST castes is  
much less visible than any black / white racial categorisation, with membership in these caste and tribal groups often hidden 
in public. So the context is very different from the one found by Dovidio and Gaertner.
214 The middle category is of main concern, since qualification is most in doubt here.
215 Taking into account the experience from the interviews from chapter six, it would be fair to predict that there are differing  
expectations about performance capabilities that are roughly associated with positions in the traditional caste hierarchy. To  
be more precise: it would be safe to assume that Brahmins enjoy the benefit of the doubt in the intellectual field, whereas  
those from lower social rungs are all too often depicted as taking advantage of government’s benefits without the ability to 
perform on this level.
216 In one case the design of the experiments could be altered without any prior tests: By basing the hypothesis on the middle  
category of the “ambiguously qualified”, only one control group is needed and the “weakly qualified” category could be cut  
out to save resources. Hence, only “highly qualified” and “ambiguously qualified” job candidates were needed.
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average ratings between a Brahmin and a Low Caste/tribal from the same region was visible, then the 
hypothesis would be rejected. Popper's falsifiability criteria is taken into account, as the hypothesis is  
refuted if both Brahmins and SC / ST candidates with equal qualifications show equal average ratings.  
This result would then be compared to one based on local origin (broadly a North/South division), to 
assess  which  category  featured  more  prominently.  As  the  experiment  was  set  to  take  place  in 
Hyderabad, every candidate category was doubled to resemble an applicant from Hyderabad and one 
from the North of India. 
For practical reasons, a concept had been developed (see questionnaire in the Appendix) that polarised 
caste differences into the extremes of Brahmin and Scheduled Tribes, not Scheduled Caste.217 The choice 
for ST members over SC was simply based on the evaluated fact218 that there is no widely recognisable 
SC surname in  Andhra  Pradesh  that  clearly  identifies  members  of  a  Scheduled Caste. 219 For  the ST 
category the name “Naik” was chosen as the most common surname amongst the Scheduled Tribes 
participants of STP Hyderabad, and consequentially used as a name in the CVs to indicate an Andhra 
Pradesh  tribal  member.220 In  order  to  strengthen this  connection and  increase  the  chances of  easy 
identification of a tribal member, the language Sugali was put in the CVs as the first language for those of  
tribal origin, whereas the  Brahmin CV stated that the person could speak Sanskrit  as one of his/her 
languages. Putting a tribal  language in the CV would offer a further clue to social identity,  and this  
proved an additional argument for choosing Scheduled Tribes candidates over those with Scheduled 
Castes backgrounds.
Altogether,  the  design  allowed  testing  of  two  crucial  forms  of  social  preferences:  Given  that  the 
participants  would  recognise  the  different  social  backgrounds  in  the  CVs,  it  would  be  possible  to 
distinguish between caste-based and regional  preferences.  In the end,  eight different résumés were 
constructed in a way that portrayed a young job applicant with one of the following characteristics:
AP Brahmin
Highly qualified
Andhra Pradesh Tribal
Highly qualified
North Indian Brahmin
Highly qualified
North Indian Tribal
Highly qualified
AP Brahmin
Doubtfully qualified
Andhra Pradesh Tribal
Doubtfully qualified
North Indian Brahmin
Doubtfully qualified
North Indian Tribal
Doubtfully qualified
217 Tribes are not castes or vice-versa, therefore this interchange is a clear transgression of the original research plan. But this  
could be justified in two ways: Theoretically, they both are increasingly interchangeable once caste is interpreted in modern  
ways (chpt. 1.3.3.). Empirically, the situation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes is often equally marginal, even if the  
stigma attached to Scheduled Castes is somewhat more degrading. Considering these two arguments, the interchange is still  
a transgression, but narrowly justifiable given the methodological hurdles.
218 For this purpose, the participant list of the STP programme, conducted by IEG Hyderabad, has been used in anonymous  
form. 
219 Interestingly, it was almost impossible to find a Schedule Caste name that was recognisable. Most members of Scheduled  
Castes would avoid showing their caste background, and would either hide their caste revealing surnames or adopt names  
from different castes to disguise the – still embarrassing – social origin.
220 Admittedly, the name Naik carries a different connotation in different parts of India and can easily be mistaken for “Nair” or  
“Nayar”, which would be associated with Khsatriya castes in  most  Indian states. Only in connection with a birthplace in 
Andhra Pradesh would Naik be clearly assigned to a ST member.
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Apart  from regional  origin  and  caste  background,  all  other  qualifications  were duplicated,  with  the  
participants asked to rate the employability of the candidate in the presented résumé. Disguised as a  
study on technical qualification in IT, the respondents were left in the dark about the real aim of the 
study and could only get indirect information about the social background of the applicants: The regional  
origin  was  easily  assessable  by  the  place  of  birth  and  the  college  locality  of  the  applicant.  Caste  
background  was  detectable  by  the  surname and  languages  spoken,  although  these  had  to  be  less  
obvious in order to hide the content of the research. (See the pre-test results for further clarification,  
and the appendix for the exact questionnaires.) 
7.2.2. Pre-test I
To test the given hypothesis, the following clues about the candidates’ social backgrounds were given: 
Table 7.2.2.1. The candidates for the pre-test I, according to the social background
AP Brahmin AP Tribal North Indian Brahmin North Indian Tribal
Surname: Shastri
Language: Sanskrit
College: Hyderabad / 
AP
Surname: Naik
Language: Sugali
College: Hyderabad / 
AP
Surname: Sharma
Language: Sanskrit
College: 
Ambala/Haryana
Surname: Bangdikar
Language: Lambadi
College: 
Ambala/Haryana
Those four social categories were duplicated in two versions, thereby providing all social categories in a 
“highly qualified” and a “somewhat ambiguously qualified” version. The difference in qualification was 
as follows:
Table 7.2.2.2. Markers of Qualification in both the pre-tests
Highly qualified Ambiguously qualified
Aggregated Marks scored:
77.54 % (BE)
68.12 % (Intermediate)
83.28 % (ICSE)
Aggregated Marks scored:
57.24 % (BE)
49.12 % (Intermediate)
65.28 % (ICSE)
Languages: C, C++, Visual C++, HTML, ActionScript, 
UML, XML, Java
Languages: C#, C, HTML, Actionscript, UML, XML
In all  other respects,  the CVs were identical.  Therefore, eight different CVs were ready to be tested 
amongst 40 volunteers from the general IT workforce in Hyderabad.221 
221 Fortunately, thanks to the help of IEG contacts and the approval from vice-presidents, the research project was run in a large 
branch of a MNC in Hyderabad. The pre-test itself was conducted around lunch time in front of the cafeteria within the  
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The  first  pre-test  was  planned  with  40  participants  –  5  for  each  of  the  8  CVS  –  and  completed 
successfully by 39 of them, one questionnaire was not returned. A whole series of problems occurred in  
this test, not least the reluctance of participants to reveal their own caste or religious allegiance: 
Table 7.2.2.3. Social composition of the 39 participants in pre-test I
Community Respondents 
Brahmin 6
Christian 4
Muslim 2
OC222 2
Reddy 1
Koppuca Velama (BC-D223) 1
Capu 1
Munurcapu (BC-D) 1
Kshatriya 1
Vaishya 1
Not given 19
Table 7.2.2.4. Aggravated social composition of the 39 participants in pre-test I
Community in categories Respondents Percentage share 
Brahmin 6 15.4
High Caste – excluding Brahmin 4 10.3
Christian 4 10.3
Dominant Agricultural Castes 2 5.1
Muslim 2 5.1
Backward Community 2 5.1
Not given 19 48.7
premises of the company in Hyderabad. People were simply asked to fill out the prepared questionnaire (see appendix) that  
took approximately five minutes.  Participation was voluntarily  and induced by the offer of chocolate and my personal  
persuasiveness. This implies, of course, that the sample was self-selected; employees with higher levels of confidence, with 
more extroverted personalities or simply with more curiosity would consequentially be overrepresented in the sample. 
Whether  this  is  caste-neutral  could  be  a  hotly  debate  question,  but  can  be  left  aside  for  the  moment.  However, 
methodologically it must be clear that, since it does not select participants on a random base, this design cannot claim to be  
representative for all employees of this company, let alone of all IT employees in Hyderabad or India. However, since the  
object of the study was not revealed at the participant-selection stage, a self-selection bias by reference to their own  
attitudes to caste and social background can equally be dismissed.
222 Stands for Open Category – generally used as a signifier for Non-SC, Non-ST and Non-OBC and usually associated with  
Higher Castes. 
223 An official sub-classification of ‘Backward Communities’ in Andhra Pradesh – not relevant in other Indian states. 
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With this number in the unspecified social background category, any further reflection upon the social  
composition of the sample is meaningless. Nevertheless, at least it seemed as if the previously explored 
over-representation  of  Hindu  High  Castes,  Dominant  Agricultural  Castes  and  Christians  would  be 
confirmed in this small sample. In contrast, the gender composition is much clearer, but even here the 
problem of missing answers is apparent. From 39 participants, 30 (77per cent) were male, seven (18 per  
cent) female, with two persons not filling in the gender box. 
The most important aim of the pre-test was to examine if the participants would correctly realise where  
the  fictitious  job  candidates  came  from  and  what  their  caste  backgrounds  were.  Therefore,  two 
questions  relating  to  regional  origin  and  caste  background  were  included,  neither  of  which  would  
feature in the main experiment but which were needed in order to test  the viability of the design.  
Although the results were mixed, they pointed clearly to a general non-recognition with regard to caste: 
Table 7.2.2.5. Correct identification of the applicant’s caste and origin 
Applicant Regional origin Caste 
North Brahmin 8 out of 9 → 88.9 % 4 out of 9 → 44.4%
AP Brahmin 8 out of 10 → 80 % 2 out of 10 → 20 %
North Tribal 4 out of 10 → 40 % 3 out of 10 → 30 %
AP Tribal 9 out of 10 → 90 % 1 out of 10 → 10 %
While the regional origin was in most cases identified correctly, the overwhelming majority failed to  
point  out  the applicant’s  caste  background.  Unfortunately,  the  low number  of  respondents  in  each 
category does not allow for any further interpretation beyond the obvious, but the difference between 
region and caste is striking in its clarity. With recognition rates consistently lower than 50 per cent, the 
experiment would simply fail to deliver any meaningful result relating to the hypothesis, since the test 
rests upon the fact that caste identity is recognised by, ideally, all participants, and realistically by at least  
80 per cent. 
7.2.3. Pre-test II
For this reason, a second pre-test was designed, this time with more precautionary measures against any  
refusal to answer, and with much clearer hints about the caste background of the job candidate. First, I  
tried to keep the participation process as confidential as possible to encourage the participants to reveal  
information they  would  hide in  situations  where personal  information could  leak to  someone else. 
Observations from the first pre-test suggested that lack of confidentiality could be behind some of the  
refusals to answer sensitive and private questions: In a number of cases, questionnaire were filled out 
while others (friends and colleagues) were present, this could clearly have resulted in discomfort and 
consequent refusal to fill in personal details, such as their own caste. To avoid this kind of undesired  
breach of confidentiality, I insisted that everyone filled out the questionnaire alone. Furthermore, I made  
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clear that all prompted information was crucial for my project and that complete confidentiality was  
assured.
The other challenge, the problem that most participants seemed unable to recognise the caste of the job  
applicants by means of the clues given in the CVs, was met by increasing the hints to the extent that the  
realistic aspect of the experiment was endangered. This time, the birth place was clearly indicated and 
explicitly mentioned in the CV. Additional to the two existing hints regarding caste background, two 
further clues were integrated into the CVs that would reveal the social background of the applicant: The  
applicant from a tribal background stated that he had received a scholarship designated for “socially  
backward communities”. Additionally, he had acted as a volunteer for the tribal section of the All India  
Human Rights & Citizen Option (AIHRCO). The Brahmin applicant was obviously not a recipient of any 
scholarship,  but  had  been  a  volunteer  for  the  All  India  Brahmin  Maha  Sabha.  With  this,  more 
information about the social background of the applicants was given than could usually be expected in a  
technical CV for a position in IT. 
Table 7.2.3.1. The candidates for the pre-test II, according to the social background
AP Brahmin AP Tribal North Indian Brahmin North Indian Tribal
Surname: Shastri
Language: Sanskrit
Born: Narketpally / AP
College: Hyderabad / 
AP
# Volunteer in the All 
India Brahmin Maha 
Sabha
Surname: Naik
Language: Sugali
Born: Narketpally / AP
College: Hyderabad / 
AP
# recipient of a 
scholarship for socially 
backward communities
# Volunteer of the 
Tribal Awareness 
Section of the AIHRCO
Surname: Sharma
Language: Sanskrit
Born: Chandigarh / 
Punjab
College: 
Ambala/Haryana
# Volunteer in the All 
India Brahmin Maha 
Sabha
Surname: Rathod
Language: Lambadi
Born: Chandigarh / 
Punjab
College: 
Ambala/Haryana
# recipient of a 
scholarship for socially 
backward communities
# Volunteer of the 
Tribal Awareness 
Section of the AIHRCO
The second pre-test, this time with 32 questionnaires (of which 31 were returned) was conducted in  
much the same fashion as the first – that is, I stood in front of the cafeteria and persuaded people to fill  
out the questionnaires. However, small but significant changes had been integrated into the design to 
facilitate understanding of the crucial points. The name of the Punjabi tribal candidate was changed to 
Rathod,  in  the  hope  that  this  would  enhance  recognition  rates.  The  whole  experiment  was  also 
conducted in a more controlled way; participants were requested to fill  in the questionnaire without 
someone  looking  over  their  shoulder,  there  was  considerably  less  rush  to  get  the  questionnaires 
distributed and returned, and generally more time was allocated to every participant. 
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These changes proved to be quite effective, at least for the first problem. The rate of refusal to reveal  
one's own caste background fell dramatically and the data proved much more usable, albeit the problem  
of the very small sample size remained: 
Table 7.2.3.2. Social composition of the 31 participants in pre-test II
Community Respondents
Brahmin 8
Christian 4
Reddy 3
Kamma 3
OC 2
Vaishya 2
Kshatriya 1
Yadava (BC-D) 1
Kumbala 1
Lingayat 1
Chettiya (BC) 1
Chowdhary 1
Ezhava 1
Not given 2
Table 7.2.3.3. Aggravated social composition of the 31 participants in pre-test II
Community in categories Respondents Percentage share 
Brahmin 8 25.8
High Caste – excl. Brahmin 6 19.4
Dominant Agricultural Castes 8 25.8
Christian 4 12.9
Backward Community 3 9.7
Not given 2 6.5
Here, previous findings about the caste composition of IT's workforce finds anecdotal confirmation: With 
22 out of 31 participants (71 per cent) from Hindu High Caste or Dominant Agricultural Castes, the social  
exclusiveness  of  a  position  in  India's  IT  sector  is  visible  beyond any  reasonable  doubt.  The  gender 
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composition on the other hand closely resembles the one from pre-test I – males made up 25 (81 per  
cent) and women five (16 per cent) of the 31 participants, with one person failing to tick the gender box.  
Altogether, the social composition of the pre-test sample is remarkably consistent with the available data 
on the IT  workforce in  general,  notwithstanding the fact  that all  these data rest  on weak statistical 
foundations. 
Unfortunately for the planned project, however, it turned out that the second pre-test also failed to yield  
the expected results. Even the highlighted clues about the caste background of the job applicants did not 
result in recognition rates that could be deemed sufficient to further pursue the experiment: 
Table 7.2.2.4. Correct identification of the applicant’s caste and origin in pre-test II
Applicant Regional origin Caste 
North Brahmin 5 out of 7 → 71.4 % 4 out of 7 → 57.1%
AP Brahmin 8 out of 8 → 100 % 5 out of 8 → 62.5 %
North Tribal 8 out of 8 → 100 % 3 out of 8 → 37.5 %
AP Tribal 7 out of 8 → 87.5 % 1 out of 8 → 12.5 %
The exact place of birth, stated in the CVs, definitely increased the recognition of the regional location of 
the candidate, as did the constructed membership in the All India Brahmin Maha Sabha: The recognition 
rate regarding regional origin averaged close to 90 per cent and the Brahmins in the CVs were recognised 
with well over 50 per cent chance. On the other hand, the recognition rates for the two tribal candidates  
remained remarkably low – both scored lower than 50 per cent and in the case of the Andhra Pradesh 
tribal, the recognition rate was as low as 12.5 per cent. As with the first pre-test, it appeared that ‘lower  
communities’ and, in this case, ST members were difficult to identify by reference to their surnames, 
partially because their surnames are not known to outsiders, and partially because they try to hide their  
social background by using other surnames or acronyms. 
The results  clearly  indicate the inability  of  the majority of  experiment participants to identify social  
background  correctly,  especially  where  tribal  candidates  are  concerned.  Knowledge  about  tribal  
surnames and languages seemed almost non-existent amongst the pre-test participants. At the same 
time, the means to provide further clues about social background in the CVs appear exhausted: Given 
that the hints in the CVs are more than what can be realistically  expected in a typical  CV of  a  job  
applicant in IT, it seems impossible to proceed with this particular experiment design. With such a low 
rate  of  social  background recognition,  proceeding  further  with  the  experiment  would  only  provide  
questionable results. If – in the most extreme case – the tribal background of the fictitious applicant was  
correctly identified by a mere 12.5 per cent of the respondents, no possible variance in the appraisal of  
the applicant’s professional skills could reasonably be ascribed to prejudice about social background. If  
anything, this design would perhaps test the social appreciation of Brahmins, who had recognition rates 
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of around 60 per cent, but even this would be less than ideal methodologically, and doubtful for logical  
reasons.224 So even if  the  Brahmin candidates  had been correctly  identified by  100 per cent of  the 
respondents, the fact that the tribal applicants have not, undermines the whole design.
For all these reasons, the planned experiment had to be abandoned. It would simply be scientifically 
dishonest and methodologically unjustified to proceed while ignoring the fundamental inadequacy of  
the design in this particular research setting. As long as the recognition rates are as low as they had been 
in the pre-tests, no conclusion could be arrived at based on a connection between perceived caste status  
and  appraisal  of  professional  qualifications.  And  since  it  seems  almost  impossible  to  increase  the 
recognition rate by means that do not conflict with the general aim of the experiment – that caste or  
tribal background should be extraneous information and never explicitly addressed – the design proved 
inadequate. 
7.3. Analysis and Interpretation
As disappointing as this was, the research project did provide useful information. While the experiment 
itself  failed,  it  nevertheless  provided  additional  insights,  mainly  in  two  areas:  First,  the  social  
composition of the sample population that volunteered in the pre-tests provides hints about the social  
composition of IT's workforce in general. Second, and perhaps much more relevant to the conclusion of  
this  research  project,  there  is  evidence  of  a  perplexing  lack  of  knowledge  about  caste  and  social 
background in general, and towards that of Lower Castes and tribes in particular. According to the pre-
test alone, there seems to be a widespread anonymity and disregard for caste or social background  
amongst IT employees that is only manifested in their difficulties in identifying the social background of  
the job applicant in the experiment. Both findings deserve attention in the context of this research, and 
both are significant in their own way, with the latter more surprising than the former.
That the workforce in any profession that requires tertiary education cannot be equally recruited from 
all social groups is already evident from the NSSO data discussed in the chapter three (Deshpande 2006). 
And as acknowledged earlier, the small number of participants in the two pre-tests is not necessarily  
representative of the IT workforce. Therefore, no comprehensive claim for any extrapolation should be 
made here. However, as anecdotal evidence, it is very much in keeping with previous research about the  
caste composition of the IT workforce. In fact, some details still manage to surprise: Muslims, who make  
up around 40% of the population of Hyderabad, account for only two out of 70 respondents (2.9 per 
cent), while SC and ST members are completely absent from the sample. The OBC category, in Andhra 
Pradesh called “Backward Communities” (BC – 5 in a sample of 70), are marginally represented in the  
224 If there is an undefined comparison group – and those tribal candidates who were not correctly identified as such must be  
seen as  this –  then it  remains unclear  in  what  form the recognised Brahmins might  differ.  A clear  caste  base for  any 
difference in social appreciation can only be constructed if both sides are identified in caste terms, otherwise the difference 
could potentially be explained by a variety of external factors.
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sample, and well below their share of the population. It remains a basic fact that in order to afford the 
education necessary for the IT industry, one has to be from a family that is able to pay the tuition fees – 
and this ability is highest amongst Hindu High Castes and Dominant Agricultural Castes. Christianity, in all  
its diversity and ambiguity, seems to be a route to upward mobility, as the high representation of this  
group shows. Most likely because of their emphasis on education and cultural openness to Western 
values,  Christians  present  a  much  larger  portion  of  IT  employees  than  their  share  of  the  general  
population would suggest. Altogether, the following notion holds true (as it did before this project): In  
socio-economic, as well as caste and community-representation, the Indian IT workforce is very much 
differentiated from the general population of India. 
The second finding, lack of knowledge about caste background, also deserves closer examination. If this  
result holds true in a larger context, which of course needs to be explored in further research, then caste  
would literally be meaningless in the workplace, as long as someone would not deliberately announce 
his  or  her  caste  membership.  Due to this  apparent  anonymity,  workers  could  hide their  own caste  
identity and would be safely covered by disinformation, confusion and widespread ignorance about this  
topic. In fact, the actual situation in the workplace is rather more anonymous than the scenario given in  
the fictitious CVs. Since the experiment was constructed in a way that overemphasised the possibilities  
of caste recognition, it underplayed the factors that increase anonymity – as reported in the interviews  
(see chpt. 6). Since most people did not appear to be interested in caste identity, hardly any of their  
colleagues  would  be  expected  to  inquire  about  it.  Furthermore,  as  the  South  Indian  tradition  of  
shortening the middle and surname to the initials (such as Santosh M.N.) is in most cases printed on 
personal  identity  tags,  the  very  possibility  of  getting  to  know  someone’s  surname  is  considerably  
diminished.  And  even  if  the  surname  was  ever  revealed,  it  is  doubtful  if  it  would  be  successfully 
identified as belonging to a certain caste.  This  provides a good opportunity for anyone from Lower  
Castes or tribal background to fit into the IT workforce without ever revealing his or her social identity. 
Whatever the attitude towards caste might be in private, the high barrier between private sphere and  
professional caste-neglect offers the chance for people from Low Caste or tribal background to fit in  
without  humiliation,  embarrassment  or  discrimination.  The  only  price  to  pay  is  hiding  one's  caste 
membership.
This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no  influence  of  caste  factors  as  such,  only  that  it  is  impossible  to  
determine it with an experiment like this. The real recruiters in this industry, who have not been the 
subject of this research, might be more aware of caste and community background than ordinary IT  
employees. Furthermore, there are many more ways to get to know someone’s caste than by guessing  
from his or her surname. In private circumstances there is much less chance of hiding one’s caste than in  
the public domain or the workplace. But, in relation to the actual work environment, the results of the 
pre-tests point towards an open space where it is possible to function without any consideration of caste 
at all. 
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In terms of caste theory, the lack of interest and the generally low level of knowledge about other caste  
or tribal traditions outside one's own in-group (as revealed in the pre-tests) could well be seen as an  
indication of the diminishing role of caste in the public sphere. If caste was indeed a major issue amongst 
young IT engineers, than basic knowledge and an easy identification of the most prominent markers of  
caste  membership  should  be  expected.  On  the  contrary,  in  both  pre-tests  the  community-related 
question  of  the  applicants  in  the  CVs  caused  irritation  and  confusion.  It  seems  that  the  industry's  
attempt to eradicate caste considerations is not only shared by its workforce, but actually realised in 
widespread ignorance and refusal to discuss the issue at all. Nevertheless, an interpretation that brings 
this finding in line with the widespread practice of caste in private circumstances – e.g., the importance  
of intra-caste marriages – would provide a more nuanced explanation. In the modern interpretation of 
caste (chpt. 1.3.3), there is no knowledge about caste other than the individual necessity to practise  
caste. Caste is taken out of the public context and re-interpreted as a purely private matter, hence the 
embarrassment  when  questions  about  caste  are  asked  in  public.  But  the  fact  that  all  but  a  few  
respondents could name their own caste, often with the exact official category, such as BC-D, reveals the  
prevalence of caste in both private terms and government statistics. 
It would therefore be premature to conclude that caste has no meaning for young IT employees; the 
findings so far only support the claim that caste is being privatised – much in line with the theoretical  
expectation of caste in modernity. In professional circumstances, caste identities are very much hidden 
behind more relevant criteria, such as qualifications and experience. The question of caste, as seen in  
the research process itself and in some comments on the questionnaire, is seen as irrelevant, if  not  
irritating. In talking to the participants, the overwhelming majority of questions concerned professional 
qualifications, not the social background of the candidates. The role of caste in private life, especially in  
connection with marriage decisions and family culture, cannot be explored here. But with the findings  
established in the pre-tests, it could be assumed that the IT workplace is internally caste-neutral, as  
caste is neither visible nor relevant here. More research is indeed needed, but all the research so far (A. 
Banerjee et al. 2009a) seems to indicate that caste is only invoked once clear markers of qualifications  
are missing or not applicable – thus, not in the Indian IT industry. 
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8. Participant Observations
8.1. Introduction and Methodology
While the previous projects provided valuable insights, based on their design they also opened more 
questions than they could hope to answer. With the exception of some of the interviews, the projects 
focused more on the workplace than on the private meaning of caste, thereby overlooking one of the 
most central  aspects of  this  social  institution. And when the theoretical assumptions about caste in  
modernity  are  brought  into  the  picture,  the  shortcomings  of  the  previous  research  are  even  more  
accentuated: Once caste is reinterpreted in a modernised way, the family rather than the economic  
sphere is expected to be at the centre of caste. In this regard, the apparent gap between the virtually  
caste-neutral IT work environment and the obvious emphasis on caste in private decision-making, most 
notably the choice of potential  spouses,  still  requires further explanation. In particular,  because the  
planned experiment (chpt. 7) failed to answer the key question – how far caste considerations influence  
people’s decisions about apparently caste-free matters – the subject remains unresolved. The translation 
from a public to a private interpretation of caste in modernity is neither fully revealed by the interviews  
nor by any possible observation of the workplace alone. Thus, as long as a more personal perspective on  
caste is missing, a complete picture does not emerge from the research projects conducted so far. 
For  these  reasons,  a  less  systematic  but  more  comprehensive  approach  should  be  considered, 
incorporating any additional information, observations and background illustrations that are missing in 
the previous chapters. Drawing from participant observations and casual interviews conducted during  
my stay in Bangalore (where I lived for roughly 6 months in a PG in the BTM layout) and Hyderabad 
(staying  for  2  weeks  in  the  Madhapur  area),  the  following will  try  to  provide  a  background to the 
previous chapters and allow a deeper analysis of the research questions. 
During my research in India, in March-June and August-November 2009, I lived in an area popular with IT  
employees due to its proximity to Hosur Road (which connects Bangalore's city centre to Electronic City,  
as well as links to Whitefield). This district caters to IT employees both in accommodation and food, 
while being close to the fashionable shopping and residential area of Koramangala (see 4.4). In effect, I  
basically  lived a  life  comparable  to  IT  engineers  in  one of  the most  popular  IT  residential  areas  of  
Bangalore.  Of  course,  my  temporary  stay  there  was  very  different  from  the  experience  of  real  IT 
employees, for whom it is a more permanent place of residence. And, as with all (quasi-) ethnographic  
research, the possibility that a foreign researcher will miss details or the meaning of social practices 
cannot be completely ruled out. Notwithstanding these limitations and the difficulties of the research, 225 
the time spent in this part of Bangalore proved essential in arriving at the conclusions of this thesis.
225 Unfortunately,  because I  was not allowed to conduct ethnographic research in a company (even though I  tried to get 
admission), I was unable to observe the IT employees’ actual work experience; moreover, the family side of the picture is 
still obscure because my research concentrated on young, mostly male IT employees in their 20s, living separately from their  
families.
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Methodologically,  the approach here proved valuable in more than one way. By including the more  
casual  aspects of  the research process,  a  great deal  of  unstated and often non-reflective  every-day  
behaviour is revealed, which may never have surfaced otherwise. As most of the observed behavioural  
patterns were new to me, they could not have been included in the interview questions. Furthermore, as 
most of these attitudes are not consciously considered by those who hold them, they would never find  
their expression in a (formal) interview either. Therefore, a new dimension to the research was opened 
up by including this participant observation, with more sources of information accessible than with more 
standardised social-science methodology. Nevertheless, despite these positives, the downsides should 
not be neglected either:  In qualitative participant observations,  the scientific  ideal  of  ‘objectivity’  is  
fundamentally  compromised as the role  of  the researcher (or  ‘subjectivity’)  becomes proportionally  
more important. A different observer or researcher might have come to different conclusions, and my 
perspectives are not totally excluded from the analysis. However, since this approach is used here in  
combination with other methods, there is considerable scope for triangulation and the thesis itself bases  
its empirical conclusions on the result of all these approaches. So, even if this chapter is rather eclectic  
and does not follow rigorous methodological guidelines, its result are not completely subjective, at least  
in  the  pejorative  sense.  Objectivity,  in  the  sense  of  valid  and  reliable  knowledge,  is  protected  and 
enhanced by a constant process of self-reflection, questioning and, in the end, by the personal integrity 
of the researcher. Especially since it is much more exploratory and heuristic than the other projects –  
and this is clearly an advantage – it offers a much more nuanced perspective by taking into account 
issues  that  would  be  ignored  by  the  narrower  focus  of  standardised  social  science  methods.  In  
combination with the previous chapters, it brings this thesis to a conclusion that is more balanced than  
any single research project on its own.
8.2. Hierarchical Differences in everyday interactions
8.2.1. Observations in the BTM area
Before any caste consideration could ever come into play, it is obvious that all social life has a distinctive  
hierarchical structure. Marked status differences between people are pronounced and visible in almost 
all occasions where people interact with others from different backgrounds. Hierarchy can, of course, be  
attached to different markers, with several seemly at play in the Indian context.226 However, if there is 
one overriding rationale that is apparent on almost all occasions, then it is that attached to economic 
success.  In  the Indian context  examined here,  social  status  is  most  obviously  linked to professional  
standing, where the modern corporate world and, especially, the IT professionals mark the upper end,  
with slum dwellers and ‘sweepers’ occupying the opposite end of the status hierarchy. Interestingly, the 
226 The one obvious alternative to an economically-informed status system is one where religious values are at play, but this 
was not covered in the research at hand.
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people from the lowest stratum are almost completely outside the social order – they are persistently 
ignored, never addressed and rarely seen as status counterparts in any way; they simply exist below the  
public radar screen.227 Hierarchical differences only become contested once there is something to make 
the contest worthwhile. So hierarchical competition starts at a level above those at the bottom. 
Those one step up in the hierarchy, and therefore deemed worthy of notice and communication, are  
generally treated in an impolite and offhand manner, without the courtesy that is reserved for those 
higher up the social ranking. If, for example, someone works in a corner bakery, he is the subject of  
abrupt and unfettered demands from customers who apparently feel that their higher status entitles 
them to place orders in a somewhat military-like fashion. Requests for service are given in the form of  
orders  and no mitigating  niceties  conceal  the stark  hierarchical  differences  between customers  and 
server, which can at times turn into open disdain. Politeness, on the other hand, is reserved for those  
who are considered equally- or higher-placed in the social hierarchy. When perceived status differences  
are obviously extreme, such politeness can at times come across as excessive subservience by lower-
status individuals in the face of seemingly nonchalant arrogance on the part of those of higher status. All  
in all, it appears that the social hierarchy is widely accepted and part of an unquestioned and quasi-
natural everyday routine.
Of course, hierarchical differentiation in courtesy and respect is not uniformly applicable in all situations,  
nor is  it  met with unequivocal  acceptance from all  sides.  However,  as a general rule of  thumb, the  
bitterest struggle for status recognition is conducted by those on the lower rungs of social acceptability –  
that is, by people one step above beggars, sweepers and the like. Generally, manners are considerably  
coarser amongst the less educated, who usually enjoy less social prestige. In consequence, slight status 
differences in the lower half of the social hierarchy are more openly pronounced, and often more rudely  
demonstrated.  At  the  higher  end  of  the  spectrum,  a  lower  class  ‘earthiness’  is  replaced  by  either 
traditional aloofness or conspicuous liberal disregard for conventional differences. Among strangers who 
cannot  obviously  be  assigned  to  professions  or  status  groups,  any  potential  source  of  offence  is 
cautiously  avoided  and,  even  if  status  differences  are  clear,  no  conflict  is  sought  or  provoked. 
Westerners, as in my case, are generally treated with great, sometimes overwhelming, benevolence,  
even if certain suspicion lingers in the views of the more orthodox residents in the neighbourhood.
Overall, the hierarchy is visible in almost every situation, although it is only quietly acknowledged rather  
than enforced or tested in open conflict. In the case of BTM layout, the middle classes – clearly a social  
elite in these circumstances – rarely come in contact with the rest of the population. The apartment  
buildings,  even if  not gated and segregated like quarters further to the west of  Bangalore,  create a  
barrier to interaction with lower status residents, and everyday affairs (such as grocery shopping) are  
usually  conducted  by  servants.  Thus,  the  rich  and  affluent  rarely  feature  in  day-to-day  relations. 
227 It is a consistent observation that slums and their inhabitants are not seen as part of the municipality or of the urban 
population respectively. Moreover, the popularly used term “urban population” seems to include only the middle classes 
and thereby excludes large numbers, if not the majority, of city inhabitants. Compare Barbara Harriss-White, 'Destitution 
and the Poverty of Its Politics--with Special Reference to South Asia', World Development, 33/6 (2005), 881-91.
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However, even if public interaction does occur, the greatest status differences are not contested at all.  
An ideal-typical sweeper and an ideal-typical IT professional would, under normal circumstances, never 
clash or even meet. When the former is doing his or her work, he/she is simply ignored by the latter, and 
would never be addressed or seen as a potential subject for social conversation. This utter disregard of  
the lower social  orders  could well  be interpreted as a remnant of  old,  caste-based attitudes,  but it 
would, on the other hand, also fit into the modern reinterpretation of caste, where hierarchy plays much 
less of a role. In contrast, the harshest and most demeaning behaviour, at least in my eyes, normally 
occurs between people whose status brackets are not too distant from each other – whether in caste  
terms or not: The waiter at the eatery who takes customer orders and shouts them to the cooks and 
helpers; the corner-shop owner who lets his (often quite young) helper do the courier service for his  
older clients;  the PG attendant who happily  leaves the dirtier  tasks,  like cleaning bathrooms, to his  
younger brother – all represent minor status differences when seen against the broader hierarchy. But  
since these fine distinctions are those that are potentially in flux, they are the ones that need public  
manifestation and which are enforced by constant demonstrations.
Within this setting, IT employees do seem to occupy an unquestionably prestigious position; one that,  
while exceptional, leaves them as much outside as inside the overall status hierarchy. They do not have 
to defend their high position against challengers, so status-demonstrating behaviour is rarely seen in 
public,  apart  from the notable  signs of  group affiliation,  such as  business attire  or  the conspicuous 
display of corporate identity cards. And even though a number of IT professionals exhibit a ubiquitous  
condescension  towards  people  with  perceived  lower  status,  their  behaviour  is  still  much  more 
characterised by reticence and professional self-restraint than the open contempt shown by those who 
are not as established in social standing. The social distance between IT employees and the ones who 
come in daily contact with them – rickshaw drivers, restaurant staff, PG attendants, and so on – is so  
great that conflicts are improbable, if simply because of the lack of occasions for frictional interaction.  
Consequently,  social  contacts  between  these  groups  are  characterised  by  distant  and  impersonal 
nonchalance (on the part of IT employees) rather than by open or enforced disregard or contempt.  
Those who cater to the comparatively affluent class of professionals are also economically dependent on 
them, and this fact, in addition to a status difference that is huge and indisputable, results in social  
interaction that is apparently free of conflicts or embarrassment.
This might well be a feature of the social distance that is characteristic for IT employees in the BTM area. 
As far as I can see, IT and its numerous representatives in the quarter are both inside and outside of the  
mesh of dependencies that creates the social fabric of the area. IT employees seem to be somewhat cut 
off from the rest of the area, and theirs can be justifiably called an enclave existence. Not least because a  
good number of those IT employees residing in BTM are from the Northern states of India, and more 
often than not unable to speak Kannada, they represent an alien element to the traditional residents.  
Economically, they constitute a driving force behind the development and expansion of the area, but  
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since most of them use it solely as a place of residence while working in the IT offices nearby, they are  
not as well connected to the micro-economy as those who spend most of their day there. Consequently, 
few points of contact exist between the ‘traditional’ local residents and those who primarily use it as a 
base for eating and sleeping. The numerous PGs frequented by IT and ITES employees are simply not  
attractive to local  residents who live with their  families.  Those restaurants that advertise  ‘authentic  
North-Indian home food’ rarely attract those who would prefer local fare and, perhaps more decisively, 
do not have to frequent restaurants at all. Altogether, the IT population is widely perceived as a ‘guest’ in  
the area, welcomed and crucially important, but culturally less integrated and with only few connections  
to the locality in question.
8.2.2. Obvious markers of hierarchical differences in public
Clothing and personal  appearance make up the most distinctive markers of  one's  own place in this  
hierarchy, whereas language proficiency, posture, body language and gesture provide further indications 
of one's social standing. Habitus, as Bourdieu terms it, is certainly not totally caste-neutral, although the  
connection  is  increasingly  indirect.  Someone  in  formal  (Western)  business  dress  is  automatically 
classified in the upper echelons of society whereas someone in a rough, dirty shirt and traditional wrap  
skirt is assigned to the lowest levels. A whole catalogue of fine-tuned gradations in dress and appearance 
marks  subtle  but  distinct  differences  in  social  standing.  In  almost  every  social  setting,  hierarchical 
differences are evident in obvious and not-so-obvious demarcations: The conductors in the public buses  
are  distinguished  by  their  white  or  khaki  uniforms,  the  former  reserved  for  those  working  in  air-
conditioned buses who are therefore higher in pay and status. Auto-rickshaw drivers routinely wear  
uniform brown apparel, marking their low social status, with differences between faded and worn-out 
clothing and new and starched equivalents further fine-tuning social ranking within this bracket. The 
ubiquitous IT employees make themselves conspicuous not only by their neat and formal attire, but also 
by their publicly worn identity tags, which serve as distinct markers of superiority in a society where IT is  
seen (at least in some eyes) as the highest and most trendy lifestyle .
Interestingly, IT employees both conform to and break these unwritten rules of status-related clothing. In 
formal business attire (ironed long-sleeved shirt, formal trousers and polished leather shoes, or salwar  
kameez in women’s case), they easily fit into the accepted style concept of the highest levels of social  
standing. But this standing is not always automatically matched to their outfit. In the residential areas  
like BTM, where many live but do not work, young men with Western-style t-shirts, short trousers and 
sandals,  who  stand  out  in  their  sheer  defiance  of  Indian  clothing  conventions  and  traditions,  are 
frequently seen. Short trousers, for example, are normally only acceptable for boys under 12- or 14-
years-old. Worn by adults, such shorts would normally undermine social standing and place the wearer  
somewhere  in  the  lower  quartiles  of  the  social  scale.  However,  even  though  this  casual  and  most  
informal dress code is obviously disliked by orthodox members of the old establishment in the area, it  
nevertheless does not diminish the status of those who wear it. Since they are obviously wearing it  
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voluntarily,  and  with  a  relaxed  and  Western-influenced  attitude,  they  symbolise  a  break  from  the 
traditional style codex, thereby being spared the social disapproval that would normally come with such 
an affront. While conforming to clothing etiquette during work hours, at least some of IT's ambassadors 
radically  break  with  established  conventions  in  non-work  situations,  thereby  revealing  both  the 
situational relativity of these conventions and the symbolic uniqueness of IT. In this case at least, the 
social status IT commands clearly overrides traditional perceptions of appropriateness, indicating both 
the exceptionalism of IT and its transforming effect on social customs.
8.2.3. Caste and the social hierarchy
Caste is directly and indirectly linked to social hierarchies, although translating both measurements into 
an integrated scale is not as straightforward as commonly imagined. Apart from a few cases where caste 
is  openly  displayed (such as  in the small  shoe repair  shops that display pictures of  B.R.  Ambedkar,  
thereby  marking  SC  loyalty),  caste  membership  is  simply  unknown.  Other  than  sweepers,  who are 
exclusively recruited from SC or ST castes, or temple priests, who are easily classified as Brahmins, only 
vague  caste  attribution  is  available  for  people  in  public.  Social  status,  therefore,  is  much  more 
interconnected with openly observable features such as clothing style and profession. In most cases, a 
relatively weak caste association might still be assigned to certain  habitus and dress styles, but this is 
seldom more than popular myth or simple imagination. In conversations, for example, I was told that 
those speaking the same vernacular language could distinguish Brahmins by their speech. This, though, 
could well  be based on the popular equation of  Brahmins with educated people,  a  correlation that 
would decrease in validity as other castes become more educated. There might be subtle indices that  
still help to identify someone's caste membership, but how far they transcend local or language barriers  
is highly questionable. In all but a few cases, status differences in public are attached to the obvious  
indicators  of  clothing,  appearance  and  assertiveness,  with  little  real  connection  to  actual  caste 
membership.
Nevertheless, an outright dismissal of caste influences in the social hierarchy would be both premature 
and unwarranted.  As caste can operate subconsciously, it might survive in everyday practices, despite 
constant denial. While the experiment in chapter seven tried but failed to prove this point, the argument  
itself remains valid and in need of further consideration and research. With regard to the publicly visible 
social hierarchy, a number of factors depend on the correlation of caste with socio-economic status. In 
the modern interpretation of caste, hierarchy is no longer essential; nevertheless, as long as caste is not  
an economically neutral factor, hierarchy stands out. Although the traditional caste-based division of 
labour has largely lost meaning, connections remain – most notably at the extreme ends of the caste 
spectrum – that would prevent an easy dismissal of the economic dimension of caste. In the case of IT  
engineers, high social esteem might include a ‘secularised’ version of the idolisation of intellectual work 
– once the mainstay of Brahmins – while the other social extreme is represented by those who work at 
jobs  no  one  else  is  prepared  to  take  up.  The  more  diverse  the  caste  spectrum becomes  in  the  IT  
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workforce, the less stringent this relationship will be, although for the moment there are still  strong  
connections with old notions of hierarchy.
8.3. The public space
Following on from my observations, highly different and often contrasting lifestyles appear to co-exist, all  
flourishing in a metropolitan ‘social vacuum’ that lacks shared norms and mutually binding concepts of 
the common good. There is also a widely-felt concern about the absence of generalised trust, which, in  
turn, is intrinsically linked to the popular interpretation of the common good – the relationship between 
the individual  and society,  and the discourse  in and about the public  domain itself.  Already,  in the  
physical  dimension of  the public sphere, a void is  evident simply in the way that the commons are  
neither protected nor claimed by anyone. Due to the weak state and municipal administration, and the  
immense economic pressure from interest groups and individuals, existing space that is not privately 
owned is (mis)appropriated for illegal but tacitly-accepted private use. Even in the parts of Bangalore 
that  are  not  considered  neglected  or  particularly  rundown,  the  open  space  between  houses 
automatically becomes a rubbish dump and grazing ground for errant cows, goats or donkeys. Parkland 
or green-space that is not fenced (and therefore secured) is often used for temporary slum dwellings 
that could become permanent if no eviction is ordered. Land seizures by the poor and encroachments  
on public land in the form of small shops or makeshift housing is inevitably followed by municipality  
attempts to raze the illegal buildings, before the cycle of building and demolition begins once again. All  
in all, a low level of law enforcement and a general sense of persistent irresponsibility is apparent when 
it comes to the public good, fostered by a weak city administration and the forceful pursuit of private  
interest at the expense of the almost invisible public.
In this climate, where public space often appears a no-mans-land, with norms for its protection weak 
and  constantly  broken,  there  exists,  perhaps  inadvertently,  more  room  for  tolerance  of  divergent 
lifestyles in close proximity to each other. Here, the physical environment can easily be seen as symbolic  
for the general lack of social cohesion or binding social norms. In spatial as well as in cultural areas, 
seemingly contradictory facts and practices can exist side-by-side without (much) friction or surprise. For 
example, it is not seen as offensive or even noteworthy for a poultry stall  – where live chickens are 
slaughtered in front of the customers – to operate next-door to a cafeteria that proclaims itself purely 
vegetarian. While it would perhaps be different if beef cattle were slaughtered and sold there, in this  
case the contrast goes unnoticed and is taken for granted by those who are vegetarians by caste and 
tradition. Small markers of identity, such B.R. Ambedkar stickers at the entrance to a cyber café, are  
primarily meant as a symbol for those who share the shopkeeper's identity and are genuinely ignored by 
other customers, who might make up the majority of visitors. The general lack of awareness of other 
castes’ cultural practices (see chpt. 7) means that many potential sources of conflict are overlooked, with 
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possible tensions defused by sheer ignorance. Thus, even outwardly political statements about caste 
conflict are lost upon an oblivious audience. A Brahmin friend of mine, for example, when shown a t-
shirt with the slogan “SC/ST – Power to the People”, was neither aware of its political message nor of its  
challenge to his own cultural and social identity. Analogous to the public concept of space, the cultural 
one also seems a neglected emptiness.
In  caste  terms,  these observations  indicate  a  contingent  interpretation of  ‘publicness’,  and reveal  a 
number of social practices that are otherwise obscured by the smoke screen of non-interested tolerance.  
As long as no personal interests are compromised, the public domain is an open playing field for all and 
for every cultural peculiarity. In parallel to this public openness, though only loosely connected, is the 
fact that a city with no cultural hegemony (such as Bangalore) can accommodate a relative freedom of  
cultural  expression  that  would  be  unimaginable  in  the  countryside.  In  some cases,  the  parallel  co-
existence is  reinforced by  language barriers,  with  enclaves  of  non-Kannada speakers  living  in  a city 
without a dominant local language (Nair 2005: chpt. 6). But even within the Kannada community itself a 
disregard for cultural practices beyond one’s in-group prevents social interaction across cultural chasms.  
Caste (in the extended-Jati interpretation) would naturally be a factor, amongst others such as religious 
beliefs, education and profession, that defines the in-group. But since interlinking connections are weak,  
these various sub-groups enjoy a free-floating, quasi-autarkic existence in the cultural bubble that is  
Bangalore.
8.4. Gender relations
Even though IT  representatives  officially  boast  about the gender inclusivity  of  IT,  the overwhelming 
majority of IT employees are male (see chpt. 4.1.3.3 and 4.2). This gender imbalance appears even more 
pronounced  in  public  places,  with  traditional  gender  roles  still  obvious in  BTM.  In  general,  women 
appear to be confined to the household, with the people out on the streets being preponderantly male.  
It is thus relatively unusual to bump into a female IT professional in BTM, and even more so to see them  
on their own without either a male or female companion. For social reasons and through sheer chance  
(see 6.2.1), my own research was mostly restricted to male IT employees. This could, at times, make it 
appear as if the whole IT sector is exclusively male. The reasons for these observed gender issues are 
both traditional and informed by current affairs. Women are traditionally much more restricted to the  
household  than  men,  and  this  is  reflected  in  the  exclusively  female  PGs.  Advertisements  for  these  
establishments,  often  designed  to  reassure  parents  as  much  as  actual  guests,  emphasise  the  high 
security standards and homely atmosphere, as well as the self-contained nature of the accommodation,  
which makes it unnecessary to leave the premises too often. And since incidents of violent and sexual 
assaults on women working in IT are well published,228 avoiding potential danger leaves women further 
228 One very public case was the rape and murder of Jyoti Kumari Choudhari in 2007. Compare her case in: Shehzad Nadeem, 
'The Uses and Abuses of Time: Globalization and Time Arbitrage in India's Outsourcing Industries',  Global Networks, 9/1 
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isolated in small monitored islands of perceived security. As confirmed in an interview with a security  
manager of a large MNC, IT companies are obsessed with the safety of their employees, especially so if  
they are women (minutes 20.05.2009). 
According to Indian labour laws, women are not to be employed in situations that could infringe their  
personal and moral autonomy, including a prohibition on work hours that would entail return home after  
dark (n.a. 2006).229 The IT and ITES industry, however, whose working hours are often scheduled not to 
the Indian time zone but to that of their customers, has reached concessions with the state government  
of  Karnataka  to  break  this  rule  and  thus  employs  women  at  night.230 To  accommodate  this,  the 
companies (at least the major ones) provide shuttle services to and from the workplace for the safety of  
their female workforce, a side effect of which is to keep them out of the public eye altogether. In this  
way, the IT industry is pioneering work relations that are more gender-neutral, less patronising and more  
flexible than those otherwise prevailing in India. Yet, however liberating this might be for the women in 
question, the whole legal situation indicates a strong sense of insecurity, however justified this is in  
practice. The relative absence of unaccompanied women in public, therefore, is in itself a sign of the 
stalemate between the push of liberalisation and the pull of moral constraints and security concerns – 
and of the overall conservative power of family traditions, whereby women are primarily confined to the  
home.
Consequently, the IT employees in my observation group (that is, the ones I spent my time with) had 
little or no contact with the opposite sex, and even if they had, this would mostly be restricted to rare or  
sporadic encounters. During the time I spent with male IT employees, there was never any woman in the  
group and even though some claimed to have girlfriends, it could never be verified by me or even their  
close friends. If such friendships or relationships exist between young IT guys and girls, they do not seem 
to be lived in public where only married couples seem to enjoy the privilege of openly displayed bonds.  
While  some openly  stated that  they were still  virgins  (in  their  mid-  to  late-20s),  others  boasted of  
experiences that were hard to confirm. However, for my Indian friends it would be completely unnatural  
and forced to befriend women casually. Any contact between the sexes is still highly awkward, especially  
for the younger ones amongst them, and would be disapproved of by both their own families and the  
wider public. Consequently, Western-style gender co-existence is still inconceivable in the near future,  
even if increased economic independence would technically allow for greater freedom of women from 
their  families,  less  traditional  personal  relationships  and  a  generally  more  relaxed  attitude  towards 
sexual relations. However, vertical family bonds do not appear to be weakening nor does India seem on 
the brink of a sexual revolution – while technically possible, such a cultural change appears unlikely any 
time soon.
Most of the obvious consequences for caste are quite severe – in regard to the modern interpretation of 
(2009b), 20-40.
229 Compare the situation in the manufacturing sector:  Jayati Ghosh, 'Globalization, Export-Oriented Employment for Women 
and Social Policy: A Case Study of India', Social Scientist, 30/11/12 (2002), 17-60.
230 Special Correspondent, 'Government Warns It, Bpo Firms', The Hindu, 29 Dec 2005 2005, sec. Karnataka / Bangalore News.
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caste in general, and the essential biological element in particular (chpt. 1.2.2). As apparent from the 
observations,  sexuality  and  reproduction  are  strictly  controlled  and  very  few  changes  seem  to  be 
imaginable in the near future.  Pre-marital  or extra-marital  relationships are considered some of the 
worst  social  offences;  if  such  were  to  occur,  they  would  have  to  be  kept  strictly  secret  as  the  
consequences of disclosure would be severe. Bearing a child outside of marriage is still considered one 
of the greatest social taboos, and this, in  turn, has consequences for caste endogamy. When sexual 
relations  are  restricted  to  wedlock,  with  this  controlled by  the  parents  (cf.  chpt.  6.5.4.2),  then the 
parental generation essentially holds the key to the biological survival of caste. While, according to my 
observations, there seems to be considerable change in attitudes with the modern generation – some of  
the  respondents  told  of  almost  complete  freedom  to  choose  a  partner231 –  this  should  not  to  be 
confused with autonomy. The control mechanisms for upholding caste endogamy are still in place, even 
though the potential pool of marriage candidates has widened in individual cases. If this trend continues,  
it would mean that caste as Jati is replaced by broader social groups that only vaguely resemble former 
Varna categories.  However,  this  conclusion  could  also  prove  premature,  especially  as  most  of  my 
respondents had no actual experience of marriage arrangements. Compared to the 94 per cent of intra-
caste marriages that are the norm for the Indian population as a whole (Desai et al. 2007), more scope 
exists for the crossing of caste boundaries in the most modern, educated and prestigious segment of this  
population. However, gender relations as they are now apparent do not support any radical departures 
from the pre-modern (anti-individualistic) practices of the past.
8.5. Vegetarian / Non-Vegetarian schism
8.5.1. Observations on food practices
One of the most salient indicators of cultural divide within the IT workforce, as well as in the general  
population  of  Bangalore,  is  the  distinction  between  vegetarian  and  non-vegetarian  eateries  and 
restaurants.  While those PGs who offer food as part  of  their  service are clearly  segregated in their  
clientele, the question of vegetarian or non-vegetarian diet, an issue that is not caste-neutral, goes much  
further than accommodation alone. As restaurants advertise according to their fare, this allows for a 
graded distinction; between “pure veg” (no meat or eggs, and often offering specific “Jain food” for 
those who do not eat onions,  tomatoes or garlic),  at  one end, to “non-veg” (providing poultry and 
mutton, but not pork or beef232), at the other. In effect, then, these restaurants are ultimately catering to 
the caste traditions of their individual customers. For those who observe caste rules, it is easily possible 
to comply with dietary requirements by staying in an appropriate PG and by eating in restaurants that  
231 Even in this case, it was limited to Hindus and the tacit agreement that his choice would be Indian. 
232 Beef and pork are considered the most impure forms of meat and I never saw any restaurant serving them. Notwithstanding 
social conventions, however, both are available in BTM – although the beef stall especially is well hidden as the slaughtering 
and consumption of cows is an obvious insult to orthodox Hindus. 
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offer the required food. In the case of BTM layout, the prevalence of North Indian High Caste members is  
visible in the many restaurants that provide vegetarian food with North Indian characteristics. This is not  
surprising, given the high representation of Upper Castes in IT itself, and can be locally explained by the 
sheer dominance of North Indians in this area (cf. chpt. 4.4).
In this locality, the choice of eatery varies widely, with a slight bias towards the “purer” side of the  
spectrum. The popular chain restaurant A2B – Adyar Ananda Bhavan – at the North-Western fringe of  
BTM  represents  an  example  of  the  ‘purest’  vegetarian  category,  considered  suitable  for  orthodox 
vegetarians and with items of “Jain food” on the menu. At the other end of the spectrum are places with  
a “veg & non-veg” sign, which seem to cater for all, even though strict vegetarians would never enter 
such a place. And while most differences are obvious to all – such as the signs advertising the region and 
the pure veg / veg / veg & non-veg distinction – actual personal preferences seem to go further. For 
example,  a  rather  orthodox  Brahmin friend,  who was  obviously  pure  vegetarian,  appeared  able  to 
instantly recognise if a place (in this case, a corner bakery shop we were walking past) would be suitable 
or not. For me, it was unclear why he would not drink a milkshake from this particular shop until I found 
out that they also served pastry that included eggs, which is not vegetarian according to Indian notions.  
It appears that a subtle and fine-grained distinction with regard to the suitability of food mirrors the 
traditional pure / impure hierarchy, which has its base, not surprisingly, in conventional caste hierarchy.  
On  the  other  hand,  the  overwhelming  choices  on  offer  in  the  food  market  can  blur  traditional  
preferences somewhat, although the rough distinctions remain. According to my observations, a number  
of  young  IT  employees,  who  would  by  family  and  caste  tradition  be  vegetarians,  are  at  least  
experimenting  with  occasional  meat  consumption.  Although  they  would  still  consider  themselves 
vegetarian, and would not mix with those for whom meat-eating is part of a family and caste tradition, 
the ideal of a pure vegetarian – for whom meat is a strict no-go – is increasingly being abandoned. This 
does not imply that the prestigious appeal of a pure, vegetarian lifestyle is diminishing, but rather that 
pragmatic and situational behaviour is undermining the strictness of traditional restrictions. One of my 
co-residents, for instance, told me that he and his brothers used to fry omelettes on the rooftop of the  
family house, something that would have certainly infuriated his rather orthodox (Brahmin) parents. 
Likewise, the fact that he told me this story over a beer in a central Bangalorean bar would not have met  
with their approval either. However, what is telling is the manner in which strict rules, mandatory at  
home, are twisted and bent once direct parental control is absent. 
The same goes for the Western culinary influence. Several outlets, such as Domino's pizza, the now-
ubiquitous  McDonald's  and  other  Western  fast-food  chains,  cater  to  both  vegetarians  and  non-
vegetarians,  while  at  the  same  time  undermining  the  strictest  version  of  separation.  Whereas  the 
restaurants for “pure vegetarians” would keep their kitchen clean of anything thought of as impure (such 
as meat or eggs), here non-vegetarian options are served alongside the vegetarian fare. All items on the 
menu are marked as “veg” or “non-veg”, and sometimes different counters serve the respective queues,  
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yet  the  food  is  prepared  in  one  kitchen  and  under  one  roof,  even  if  the  dishes  are  meticulously  
separated. That these Western fast-food outlets simultaneously form and represent their own cultural 
niche has wider social consequences, not just for their customers. As they represent Western culture  
and generally draw a customer base that is both relatively affluent and regarded as trend-setting, these  
fast-food outlets further undermine the notion that only vegetarian food is respectable or acceptable for  
status-conscious  Indians.  The high prestige granted to selected aspects  of  Western culture amongst 
young Indians not only increases the social acceptability of meat and egg products, it also changes their  
attitudes  towards  alcohol.  Thus,  although  alcohol  is  traditionally  seen  as  impure,  and  liquor  shops 
usually small, seedy places with trellised counters, the new upmarket pubs and clubs are anything but  
cheap and rundown. Social drinking in Bangalore is seen as an accepted and even prestigious activity, 
with the posh upmarket United Breweries mall owned by Vijay Mallya only underlining alcohol’s new-
found position in society.
8.5.2. The social significance of the Vegetarian / Non-Vegetarian divide
For a sociological  analysis,  food customs and habits  are  particularly  valuable,  especially  as  they are  
situated exactly at the interface of private and public cultural practices. In terms of caste, traditional 
rules about purity and commensality come into play and require reworking in the modern environment.  
At least two main findings are immediately obvious to the observer: Commensality no longer seems of  
concern in restaurants; in the eateries and restaurants I visited, there was, with one salient exception, 233 
no attempt to regulate or prohibit  the intermix of people.  Thus,  even if  price levels  and separation 
according to regional tastes and dietary restrictions pre-selects the customer base in a way that is not 
caste-neutral, transgressions of these subtle barriers are neither recognised nor sanctioned in any way.  
And while it  might still  be unusual, and would perhaps cause a considerable stir,  if,  for example, an  
obvious  Muslim  ate  in  a  pure  vegetarian  restaurant,  this  would  most  likely  have  no  real-life 
consequences other than consternation.
This is strongly related to the other immediate observation; that food consumption in public reveals a 
great deal about the customs that are followed in private. Notwithstanding the fact that customs are  
interpreted more strictly in the family home than elsewhere, food consumption in public mirrors the  
preferences that are acquired and practised at  home. As practically  all  tastes and requirements are 
catered for in the market, the veg / non-veg divide does not amount to discrimination because it is 
based  on  voluntary  choices,  even  if  these  choices  are  influenced  by  family  and  caste  traditions.  
Additionally, the veg / non-veg divide is weakened by young urban professionals who tend to loosen 
their  family’s  dietary  restriction  considerably.  However,  and  in  spite  of  all  the  convergence  in 
metropolitan life, this dietary divide is still a manifestation of a fundamental cultural cleavage between 
parts of the Indian population. The more differentiated the market is in providing for varied needs of 
233 In a “pure vegetarian” “Home Food” restaurant in Hyderabad, I was met with obvious dislike; I was reminded several times  
that this was a “pure veg” place, that the cooking followed traditional customs and that each item had a significant place in 
a traditional dinner. Admittedly, the feeling of inappropriateness of an (impure) foreigner in this place of strict purity was  
displayed by the owner of the place, not by other guests, who mainly belonged to the IT workforce.
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different caste groups, the less overlap there needs to be in any of their dealings with each other. In fact,  
the  observations  reveal  a  parallel  existence  of  people  from  different  regional  origin  and  caste 
background who had nothing in common but spatial proximity and an IT job qualification.
To summarise the observations, an apparent fading of caste rules is evident both in the disappearance of  
public  enforcement and the gradual  loosening of  the strict  dietary requirements that are ultimately  
based  on  caste  and  religious  affiliation.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  remaining  differences,  
increasingly more by choice than by force of tradition, are widespread, very visible and catered for by a  
diverse and sophisticated market. Even the strictest dietary limitations are catered for – meaning that  
basically all castes rules can be and are being followed when home-cooked options are not available. The 
non-enforceability of commensality – one of the main caste rules according to the classic interpretation 
in chapter one – corresponds with a widespread (if loosened) adherence to dietary rules that are based  
on private caste traditions. This confirms the general trend that caste is increasingly absent in public, but 
still  practised  in  private.  One  apparent  contradiction  only  confirms  this  trend:  Since  rules  of  
commensality are especially applicable when it comes to the family home, the eating preferences of  
potential  tenants in a private house are even more important than in a PG. Thus,  whereas PGs are 
relatively  liberal,  the  sub-tenancy  of  rooms  in  private  houses  is  much  more  subject  to  caste 
considerations. Hence, in a large number of advertisements for rooms in family homes the preference is 
openly advertised, with statements such as “veg only” or “Brahmins preferred” seen regularly.  
8.6. Anonymity and Segregation
8.6.1. Living conditions for IT employees in BTM
What is most striking about the living conditions in BTM layout (and more generally in Bangalore) is the 
remarkable anonymity amongst people who live in close proximity to each other. In the PG that I lived in,  
there was hardly any social contact between residents, apart from actual roommates (the PG operated 
on shared twin-room basis). Even people who had lived in the PG for more than half a year hardly knew  
any of their co-residents, except for three or four casual acquaintances they may have made. The lack of  
a  common area (like a mess or  dining area) and the constant fluctuation of  guests made it  almost  
impossible  to  develop  anything  like  a  sense  of  community.  Contact  was  neither  sought  nor  much  
appreciated, and during occasional  encounters in the staircase or the hallway a polite but reserved 
greeting was the most one could expect from fellow guests. In the six months that I lived in this PG, and  
with considerable effort, I got to know seven out of the 40 people who lived there – indeed, I never even  
saw the majority  of  residents.  Social  interaction originating  from acquaintance in  the PG itself  was 
unheard of, and each person I had contact with only knew perhaps two or three other residents.
This anonymity, which was sometimes critically acknowledged by the tenants, can be seen as a result of  
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both the working conditions in IT and the throwing together of disparate people from various parts of  
India. After working up to twelve hours, and often spending an additional one-and-a-half hours in traffic,  
the desire for social interaction is understandably muted. The PG is seen as a place of rest and not of  
social  engagement,  hence  the  fact  that  all  the  doors  to  the  rooms  were  shut  most  of  the  time.  
Furthermore,  since the  tenants  in  the rooms came from linguistically  diverse  parts  of  India,  where  
cultural  orientations might differ,  there is  little  common ground that could form the basis  for social  
interaction. I would also suspect that due to a strong in-family socialisation, most people living there 
were simply not looking for much social contact outside their comfort zone of long-time friends and  
extended family.234 Only in circumstances when no family options existed did friendships seem to be 
appreciated or needed. Needless to say, these friendships rarely crossed cultural boundaries, such as the  
Veg / Non-Veg divide, and included mainly people from a comparatively similar caste background (see 
below).
Altogether, it seems that a lack of trust, or a more generalised watchfulness, informs and guides social  
interactions between people who are not related to each other, or whose contact is not reinforced by a 
network of trustworthiness and shared references. A person needs to be already known or introduced 
by someone who is trustworthy in order to be accepted socially – otherwise he or she would not be seen  
as a potential subject for social interaction. I was faced with this phenomenon almost every time I met 
someone new. Background checks or practicable equivalents are the norm, and one of the first questions 
is always about where your family is from and what your parents do professionally. As pointless as it may  
be in the case of a foreign visitor, the very fact that this reassurance about someone's social background  
is deemed necessary before any further social interaction ensues is revealing both of the vacuum of trust  
and the muted role of the individual:235 If someone can be judged solely by the profession of his or her 
parents, plus the place of origin, he or she could obviously be expected to conform to any expectations  
that arise from this background information. In addition, the need for background checks demonstrates  
a general lack of trust amongst new acquaintances.
8.6.2. Empirical test of Socio-cultural Segregation 
As all these observations indicate, it is very possible that socio-economic groups, formed on cultural  
lines, co-exist side by side without much contact or conflict. However, empirical confirmation of this is  
still needed, even though anecdotal evidence consistently points towards this general scheme. In order  
to trial  an approach that could possibly be developed into a more broad-based, statistically reliable 
research project, I developed a little test236 amongst those I had befriended and who would therefore 
accept rather personal questions. I first asked them to list the names of their best friends in order of 
closeness and then, once the names had been written down, to specify the caste background (or religion  
234 One of the most ubiquitous activities on the weekend seemed to be paying a visit to members of the extended family.  
235 When I was flat-hunting before I settled in my PG, one of the first questions I was asked was one about my “god name”. By 
signing the contract, I was openly asked about my food habits under the disguise of finding the appropriate caterer who 
could bring me lunch or dinner. 
236 The idea was originally developed by Skrikant Patibandla, a friend who was at this time PhD candidate at ISEC Bangalore.
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in case of Non-Hindus) as well as the region their friends came from. Unfortunately, because this would  
only work on the basis of mutual trust, the participant size could not be extended beyond the circle of  
friends I had made during my time in Bangalore. However, this ethnographic approach highlights some 
of  observations  that  I  had  made  independently  beforehand,  and  which  were  therefore  anecdotally  
confirmed. The results are as follows:
Table 8.6.2.: Caste and Local origin of the 10 closest friends of the respondents 
Caste and local origin of 
respondent
Caste of his friends Local origin of his friends
1 Brahmin / Rajasthan
3 Vaishya, 2 Brahmin, 2 Jain, 1 Jat 
(DAC), 1 Christian
5 Rajasthan, 2 Madhya Pradesh, 1 
Chhattisgarh, 1 Andhra Pradesh, 1 
unknown
2 Jain / Madhya Pradesh
4 Brahmin, 3 Jain, 2 Marathi, 1 
Vaishya
8 Madhya Pradesh, 1 Rajasthan  
3 Vaishya / Chhattisgarh
3 Brahmin, 2 Rajput, 1 Jain, 1 
Vaishya, 1 Christian, 1 OBC, 1 Sindhi
4 Madhya Pradesh, 3 Chhattisgarh, 2 
Rajasthan, 1 Andhra Pradesh
4
Christian / Madhya 
Pradesh
2 Brahmin, 2 Jain, 2 SC, 2 Vaishya, 1 
OBC, 1 Rajput
6 Madhya Pradesh, 1 Rajasthan, 1 
Bihar, 1 Chhattisgarh, 1 Maharashtra 
5
Kshatriya / 
Maharashtra
2 Vaishya, 2 Brahmin, 2 Punjabi, 1 
Kayasth, 1 Christian, 1 Jain, 1 
unknown
6 Madhya Pradesh, 1 Delhi, 1 
Madhya Pradesh, 1 Rajasthan, 1 
unknown
6 Jat / Rajasthan 
4 Vaishya, 2 Brahmin, 2 Kshatriya, 1 
Christian, 1 Jain 
5 Rajasthan, 3 Madhya Pradesh, 1 
Chhattisgarh, 1 Bihar
7 SC / Karnataka
3 SC, 3 ST, 1 OBC, 1 Christian, 1 
Gowda (DAC), 1 Lingayat
8 Karnataka, 1 West Bengal, 1 Kerala
8
Brahmin / Madhya 
Pradesh
4 Brahmin, 2 Vaishya, 1 Punjabi, 1 
Sikh, 1 Bengali, 1 Kshatriya
7 Madhya Pradesh, 2 Uttar Pradesh, 
1 West Bengal
9 Brahmin / Tamil Nadu
5 Hindus (excl. Brahmin) 3 Christian, 
1 Brahmin, 1 Muslim
3 Tamil Nadu, 2 Andhra Pradesh, 2 
Karnataka, 1 France, 1 UK, 1 
Rajasthan
10
Kamma237 / Andhra 
Pradesh
7 Kamma, 2 Kshatriya, 1 Vaishya 10 Andhra Pradesh
Overall, the underlying assumptions about caste-based segregation are clearly confirmed, albeit with 
different nuances. While the overall picture is clear, discrepancies in the answering patterns need to be 
discussed. Respondents No. 1 to No. 6 are friends and there is a considerable overlap in their friendship  
network. For these six respondents, it is notable that all friends are from a part of India that could be 
considered Hindi-speaking, even though not all speak Hindi as a first language. It is remarkable, however,  
237 A Dominant Agricultural caste from Andhra Pradesh – nominally of Shudra rank but today considered as “Neo-Kshatriya”.
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that their friendship network does not include a single person from Karnataka, the state in which they all  
have lived for several years. Furthermore, there are only two Southerners in the circle of 60 friends (from 
Andhra Pradesh), a fact that only underlines the gap between the Hindi-speaking states in the North and  
the culturally divergent South of India, which is much more advanced both economically and in human 
development terms.
This network of friends, which is greater than the six people who agreed to give their personal data,  
reveals interesting details with regard to caste. Clearly, their network crosses caste and religious lines 
with great regularity. Christians as well as Jains are found alongside Hindus, although upper Hindu castes 
clearly predominate amongst the overall friends. Whereas some caste designations are unclear and hard  
to classify, such as Punjabi or Bengali – which are not really castes but regional denominations – the 
majority is clearly Higher Caste (or Dominant Agricultural Caste). As the overlap in the answers would  
jeopardise any real statistical analysis, it would be futile to compare the actual number; nevertheless,  
the  overall  picture  is  clear:  With  the  notable  exception  of  one  Christian  (who  is  among  the  six 
respondents themselves), none has any friend from SC or ST background, and only one would count a 
person from OBC among his friends. All in all, while the regional origin comprises a considerably broad 
spectrum of Central, Northern and Western India, with a number of castes (and religious minorities) 
included in the circle of trust, all share a vague origin in states in the Hindi belt, and a shared social  
position of privileged status and education.
The picture becomes clearer and more nuanced when one compares the first six respondents with No. 7 
and 8, both of whom are in the same age but from different states and very different social backgrounds. 
Here the impermeable nature of social status groups is manifested, with a clear division according to the  
respondents’ own social origins. The Brahmin respondent is deeply rooted in his own region, with seven 
out of ten friends from his home state. The same applies to the respondent from SC background, who is  
even more tied to his original locality, with eight out of ten friends from his own home state. Already, 
because of their different origins, and therefore also language, the two are very unlikely to become  
friends. What is more, both are also largely confined to their own socio-cultural background and caste, 
so there is even less chance of social interaction. Whereas respondent No. 7 has at least two close  
friends  from  Upper  Caste  background  (in  this  case  Lingayat238),  respondent  No.  8,  a  Brahmin,  is 
exclusively settled in a network of High Castes or Dominant Agricultural Castes (with a certain ambiguity  
about  the  locally  named  classifications).  From  a  traditional  caste  perspective,  there  is  already 
considerable caste admixture in both examples and closely defined Jati-boundaries are clearly blurred in 
those cases. But a marked preference for a cultural similarity to one's own cultural values is, as natural  
and self-explanatory as this might be, the starkest finding in this example. 
That these cultural patterns of in-group preferences can be overcome is indicated in the comparison  
between respondents nine and ten who, apart from working in IT, are quite opposite in their friendship 
238 Lingayats constitute something like a special case in South India: Originally founded as reform movement with an anti-caste 
stance, they claim to be more tolerant and egalitarian than the majority; at the same time, they command a very high 
position in the status hierarchy and are often indistinguishable from Brahmins or other vegetarian Upper Castes.
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choices. Respondent No. 10, a graduate in his early 20s from Andhra Pradesh, who came to live with his  
cousin in Bangalore to work in the IT industry, is simply at the start of his career and has not yet made  
any contacts outside of his home circle. Not surprisingly, he cites only friends from Andhra Pradesh, with  
most of them from his own caste, a Dominant Agricultural one. Respondent No. 9, in contrast, aged in 
his early 40s and with 17 years work experience in the United States, has a far wider recruitment base  
for friendships and is the only one who includes Muslims and foreigners in his list. Also telling is the fact  
that he could not name the exact caste of his friends and only stated “Hindu”. Since he was one of my 
best contacts during my research period, it is unlikely that he wanted to hide their background; the likely  
explanation being that he classified people in much looser terms, whereas those without exposure to  
foreign cultures could exactly name the caste of their friends. It is often said that Indians only become  
Indians once they have left their country and can thereby see India's internal divisions from further afar.  
If this is the case, there could be some accidental as well as anecdotal confirmation here. If age and  
greater experience was enough to allow people to transcend caste-based cultural barriers, then caste 
itself would find less meaning in the future.
8.6.3. Interpretation: Segregation and its Consequences for Caste
Most generally, and with only few exceptions, friendship networks seem to follow rough socio-cultural  
patterns, in which caste as interpreted as Jati is largely overridden in favour of cultural similarities, such 
as local  origin,  language and dietary preferences.  If  these findings are generalisable,  friendships  are  
unlikely between those of very different cultural background, even if exact Jati membership is seemingly 
irrelevant.  It  implies  a  pattern  of  socialisation  that  is  informed  and  limited  by  fault  lines,  such  as  
Hindi/Non-Hindi  speaker,  North/South  Indian  origin,  vegetarian  or  non-vegetarian  family  tradition,  
recipient or non-recipient of caste-quota benefits. Overall, the little test reveals a striking persistence of 
cultural barriers, even if exact Jati lines no longer channel social interaction. In most cases, this might not 
even be a conscious consideration by participants, even though the preference for friends from similar 
or at least comparable background is consistent – and, after all, this seems to be a human commonality  
(Blum 2008; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Whereas the youngest of the respondents are mainly influenced by 
their families and the environment where they grew up, professional contacts and a generally broader  
horizon seem to make contacts across a wider range more likely, potentially pointing towards future 
trends.  For the moment at  least,  segregation along broad cultural  lines,  with an indirect  impact on  
traditional caste divisions, is all that can be clearly identified.
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8.7. Conclusion – what role for Caste in everyday life?
From the quasi-ethnographic perspective that has been employed here, caste seems to merge into a  
phenomenon that is less visible and restrictive in public life, but still carries weight in private decisions, 
although in a more remote and indirect way. In public, there is a seemingly conflict-free co-existence 
between people of different caste heritage, enabled by an obvious tolerance-cum-ignorance about the 
caste practices of others. Closer to the individuals themselves, the remnants of caste still tend to sustain  
a variance in trust that, in turn, determines the formation of friendship networks. At the most individual  
level, in the interpretation of caste as an ingredient of one's personal identity, it is rarely invoked in a  
direct way. However, caste membership in the wider sense shapes perceptions about social and political 
issues, as discussed earlier (chpt. 6) in the case of reservation quotas. Thus, while the institution of caste 
has certainly lost much of its sting, it continues to wield influence, in often implicit and surprising ways.  
Even if caste-based discrimination is increasingly uncommon in public affairs, caste practices are directly  
or indirectly observable when it comes to a private engagement with caste-based ideas. 
This has clear consequences for the society in question. As long as vaguely caste-based networks of trust  
are  not  interconnected,  people  who  live  side-by-side  may  inhabit  parallel  universes,  and  remain 
oblivious of others’ lives. This would explain both the remarkable tolerance for beliefs and practices that 
contrast to one's  own ethics,  and the (relative) peaceful co-existence of mutually  exclusive religious 
affiliations and social groups in India. It is, in consequence, perhaps the main reason why religions such  
as Islam are readily integrated, relatively speaking, into the Indian cultural environment, even though 
some Muslim practices (such as eating beef or prohibiting idol-worship) are repellent vis-à-vis the Hindu  
majority. On the other hand, this pre-empts the development of a social ethic that transcends actual  
social  groups  and  particularistic  belief  systems.  Any  society  that  is  based  on  this  form of  ‘tolerant  
ignorance’  is  perhaps  able  to  accommodate  various  potentially  conflicting  sub-groups  with  their 
respective ethics and belief systems. Nevertheless, it is hardly conceivable as the social basis for a unified 
nation.
All in all, caste is a receding factor in public affairs, one that is clearly losing its importance against the 
backdrop of weakening or disappearing purity rules, a widespread confusion about caste practices apart 
from one's own, the prevailing anonymity and resultant absence of mutual caste-relations, and the rise 
of alternative interpretations of individual identities. However orthodox or liberal the caste rules may be 
when practised in private, only a fraction of them can ever be translated into metropolitan life, let alone  
be  forced  on  others.  Notwithstanding  this  visible  decline  of  the  institution  of  caste,  the  surviving 
remnants  of  the  purity  rules  can  be  observed  in  the  dietary  differentiation  that  matches  the 
requirements of literally all parts of society with a wide range of food options. Especially amongst young 
males who are unmarried and live apart from their families, specific dietary rules are being bent or  
broken in relation to the increasing freedom from their families; at the same time, however, the whole  
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belief system, the preconceived notion that certain people have to eat certain food, is not challenged on  
a broader level. As long as economic class is correlated with caste status, and this connection is still  
apparent,  especially  at  the bottom and top of  the traditional  caste spectrum, caste  differences  will  
remain visible in public. But since this correlation is increasingly submerged by capitalistic developments, 
with no opposing developments yet evident, caste in public is undoubtedly in decline, however slow,  
uneven and even contradictory this process is and will be. 
However, and this is the strongest point to be made here, the mainstay of caste in modern circumstances  
–  the biological  element incorporated in  endogamy (chpt.  1.2.2) – is  changing considerably without 
disappearing entirely. In my observations, the incipient stages of a shift towards a relaxed interpretation 
of Jati-boundaries in marriage considerations is becoming visible, and this is firmly to be expected since 
the research focused on the most modern segment of Indian society. Yet even here, no real revolution is  
taking place, and personal autonomy in partner choice, let alone sexual freedom, is still inconceivable.  
Even if there is a considerable loosening of strict caste endogamy, the social origin of a potential spouse 
is still of utmost importance, with caste remaining one of the first considerations, despite a larger group  
of culturally similar castes gaining acceptance. Thus, if this trend holds and inter-caste marriages become 
increasingly accepted, it  would only blur the boundaries,  not break them completely.  An intra-caste 
marriage would then become a choice where it was once the norm, although this does not mean that 
caste  considerations  would  necessarily  lose  importance.  The  seemingly  rational  argument  that  it  is  
better for offspring to grow up in a culturally homogeneous environment serves as a powerful substitute  
for older arguments that are more focused on the relationship between different castes. Should caste  
boundaries be broken, it would still be unlikely that great social and cultural divides suddenly become 
meaningless; rather it is likely that castes (as  Jatis) that are already close in social and cultural terms 
would merge to become supra-castes (perhaps, but not necessarily, oriented on Varna). As long as caste 
and  socio-economic  status  are  connected  –  and  this  is  widely  the  case  in  India  today  –  old  social  
inequality  would simply  be replaced with  new social  inequality,  albeit  now based on more rational 
terms.
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Conclusion
This  thesis  has  covered  a  great  deal  of  ground  and  this  fact  alone  prohibits  an  all-too  simplistic  
conclusion. It would, therefore, be advisable to come to a separate conclusion for each of the specific 
areas that have been researched and discussed. 
First and foremost, this thesis proposes a new and more comprehensive means to theorise about caste. 
Clearly,  an approach that  views caste  as  an institution that  systematically  interconnects  three main  
elements  is  not  in  keeping  with  the conventional  academic  descriptions  developed so  far.  This  will  
undoubtedly draw much criticism from the orthodox wardens of the discipline. Notwithstanding their  
objections, this way of analysing caste is not only more comprehensive than existing theories, it also 
takes into account the biological element that is intrinsic to caste endogamy– an issue central to caste 
that has been ignored for far too long. Moreover, this approach provides a systematic explanation for the  
underlying friction in caste practice. Because this social institution is based on three elements, three 
different  rationales  can  be  invoked  for  a  rationalisation  of  caste,  all  with  their  own,  sometimes  
competing principles. In the combination of these three elements, a complex picture of caste emerges; 
one that is vastly  superior to any theory in which caste is based on a single fundamental  principle.  
Finally, as it provides the framework for a meta-analysis of existing theoretical approaches to caste, this  
thesis constitutes a valuable tool for anyone interested in an epistemological examination of existing or  
future theories of caste. The approach offered here is not the final word on caste, and it will almost 
certainly  be  rejected  by  those  social  scientists  for  whom  the  mere  mention  of  anything  biological  
amounts to doctrinal heresy. Nevertheless, no one with a real interest in the social institution of caste 
can rightfully ignore this approach, no matter how he or she will ultimately assess its explanatory value. 
Of  course,  once  caste  is  analysed  in  relation  to  modernity,  the  topic  of  modernity  also  deserves 
consideration. As discussed in the second chapter, because modernity and modernisation are based on a 
number  of  inextricable  conflicts,  this  does  not  allow  for  sweeping  generalisations.  Nonetheless, 
following the discussion of modernity and its underlying rationales, it is clear that caste (even in its  
modern reinterpretation) is still in fundamental conflict with modernity as, while modernity is based on 
an  intrinsic  notion  of  egalitarian  individuality,  caste  has  intrinsic  anti-individualistic  features.  The 
biological element of caste, in particular – that is, the rule that one is born into a caste and must remain 
there for life – is in sharp contrast to the modern emphasis on life choices, of contingency and of the  
essential  value of  social  change.  Modernity  and the institution of  caste  are  therefore  in  systematic  
conflict, and any factual practice of caste can only be at variance with modernity. At the same time, 
however, modernity itself is accommodating such conflicts and contrasts, and the translation of both 
modernity and caste in real life is expected to allow for specific rearrangements.
In the most general terms, this conflict between modernity and caste, and the numerous arrangements 
to accommodate it, can be observed in the empirical chapters. At a first glance, there seems to be no  
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conflict at all. Caste does not appear to play any direct role in the IT workplace – or, at least, not in the 
elite companies that were at the centre of the research – and IT employees seem to have very low levels  
of  awareness  about  caste,  apart  from  knowledge  about  their  own  caste.  The  topic  of  caste  rarely 
surfaces in everyday conversations and in more than one instance it seemed actively suppressed and 
discouraged – both by the companies that view caste as a potential dividing factor within its workforce 
and the employees who seem to feel embarrassed by the sheer mention of potential conflicts informed 
by caste status. For all these reasons, the topic is quite difficult to research and seems to slip from one's  
grasp whenever a new perspective opens up.
So, while the direct approach is often blocked or hindered by a veil of silence, more indirect methods  
offer insights that circumvent these restrictions and confirm the findings in the available literature. For 
instance, and in the face of all denials, this particular elite workforce has a marked and distinct bias  
towards  Brahmins and  other  privileged  castes.  Even  if  caste  discrimination  is  unheard  of  in  these 
companies,  the unequal  recruitment  of  different  castes  into the IT  workforce  is  a  clear  sign of  the  
economic power of caste in India today. The very fact alone that the Special Training Programme has  
been conducted by one of the leading IT companies in India, tells of the situation and the awareness by a 
significant part  of  the industry.  Although the climate at  the workplace is  largely informed by caste-
anonymity, there are clear signs that the power difference of caste groups becomes reflected here and 
while most Higher Caste members are open about their caste background, the overwhelming majority of  
SC/ST members would never mention their caste status to anyone except very close friends. The old  
hierarchy, visible in the status differences between Higher and Lower Castes, is still apparent in the most  
modern section of Indian society. 
It appears that, in order to blend into the socio-cultural elite, those from a Lower Caste or religious  
minority background prefer to abandon their caste (or religious) identity and adapt to a cultural frame 
that is distinctly intellectual and modern – and based on an unexpressed, but perceptible 'Brahmin-ness'  
(cf. Bairy 2010). In popular opinion, and notwithstanding the constant denials from the official side, the 
Indian IT industry is associated with Brahmins and the research qualifies the claim. There is indeed a  
certain Brahmin prominence in IT; not only in their numerical over-representation in the workforce but 
also in the way the industry presents itself (the emphasis on moral values, the ideal of education and 
merit, the aim to be more than a business but a service to society plus the general understanding of the  
work as being intellectual and non-polluting). Nevertheless, the workforce is far from uniform and if  
there is a cultural hegemony, then it is a contested one, not least because powerful competitors such as  
Dominant Agricultural Castes play an increasingly prominent role. While this could imply change in the 
future, for those in a minority position – and IT engineers from SC and ST backgrounds represent a tiny 
minority – cultural assimilation is still the clear strategy of choice. 
This situation markedly contrasts with the private situation of IT employees in Bangalore. In this fast-
growing metropolis, there is caste-anonymity for those who prefer it, but no group that could lay claim 
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to dominance, culturally or economically. Consequentially, a new order of coexistence is being practised  
that could well be a model for India's future. Whereas the consequences of caste practice are clearly  
apparent,  conflicts between castes or caste groups are a rare exception. A city like Bangalore easily 
accommodates a variety of caste-informed lifestyles side-by-side that, in other circumstances,  would 
lead to cultural clashes. Moreover, a deep market, which caters to fine-tuned cultural differences, and a  
distinct  social  segregation  reduces  the  potential  for  caste-based  conflicts,  while  at  the  same  time 
providing the basis for a parallel co-existence of otherwise irreconcilable social and cultural differences.  
This  admixture  of  people  from  mutually  incomprehensible  cultural  backgrounds  could  potentially  
precede a new model for the reinterpretation of caste; not in terms of small jati anymore, but in terms  
of  larger  caste  alliances  along  cultural  lines.  At  least  in  the  small  sample  used  in  this  study,  caste  
differences based on  Jati  are apparently giving way to broader distinctions, such as native language, 
middle class background or vegetarian or non-vegetarian lifestyle. 
At present, these tentative empirical findings cannot adequately support further speculation about the 
future of  caste,  although some scenarios have more plausibility  than others.  If  the trends currently  
apparent  were  to  continue,  caste  in  its  Jati  version  would  be  incrementally  replaced  by  broader 
classifications that, while not totally caste-neutral, would have only a very vague resemblance to the old 
Varna categories. In the public sphere, caste (or its remnants) would become even less important with  
caste considerations increasingly restricted to the private sphere. Any resulting society, therefore, would 
no longer be determined by caste, but would still not be totally free from caste remnants, such as the  
distinction  between  vegetarian  and  non-vegetarian  lifestyles.  For  the  time  being,  general  caste 
considerations and, in particular, the underlying biological rationale – in the guise of an obligation to  
preserve a specific family culture – constitute an important factor in Indian social life, especially once  
marriages are considered. 
Here, however, lies the greatest challenge to any conclusion and a great potential for further research. 
The biological rationale that is intrinsically connected to the very idea of caste (see chpt. 1) does feature 
in some narratives and underpins others, but it is rarely expressed as a biological assumption. Although 
it is central to caste in a theoretical sense, it is also the most controversial aspect since it ultimately  
essentialises every individual captured under the label of a certain caste. Therefore it stands to reason 
that caste is hardly expressed in the terms of “blood” or “genes”  (Bairy 2010: 277, 81). On the other 
hand, however, caste endogamy rests on exactly this biological assumption and cannot be justified on 
cultural terms alone. As this research project has only scratched the surface in this regard, one that is  
exclusively focused on this aspect is needed to explore it  in more detail.  For the moment, the topic 
stands as a contradiction that can be rationalised in theoretical terms, but lacks almost all  empirical 
clarification.
While this surely remains a weak spot, there are some more general implications that can be drawn from  
the research at hand. At the moment, only the incipient stages of a loosening of caste boundaries are 
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visible in a very small, elite section of society. This thesis' underlying assumption that the social changes  
observable here have implications for the rest of society is both plausible and audacious. Arguably, the 
new middle classes, with the New Economy of IT as their iconic centre, have tremendous influence –  
symbolically as well as factually – to shape the future direction of social change in India. On the other 
hand, however, the very elite status that IT enjoys today makes it nearly impossible to extrapolate these 
social changes to the wider society. The life world reality of the overwhelming majority of the population 
not  working  in  IT  remains  fundamentally  different,  with  these  separate  lived  realities  unlikely  to 
converge in the near future. Thus, as much as the IT industry claims to act – and, indeed, does act – as a  
beacon for the capitalist modernisation of India, it is unclear how successful this undertaking will be. If,  
and only if, the Indian IT industry maintains its position at the forefront of socio-economic change will  
the broad conclusions below be relevant to wider Indian society. 
If the emphasis on the use of English and on education becomes further entrenched, a meritocratic elite  
would slowly but steadily replace the old hierarchy based on ascribed status and the birthright – at least  
in the corporate world, if not necessarily in politics. The social composition of this new elite would, in 
turn, widen its social base and include more Low Caste members alongside the existing old High Castes.  
And as education becomes more accessible, the Lower Castes would acquire greater social status and 
economic influence. At the same time, however, two other social groups – not necessarily caste related –  
would benefit unequally from the emphasis on education. As evident in the empirical findings, Christians  
already contribute more of their members to the IT workforce than their share of the overall population  
would suggest  –  and  this  would  continue  if  no  dramatic  social  change occurs.  On  the  other  hand,  
Muslims,  who are  already consistently  under-represented in  IT,  could  lose  out  further  if  a  modern,  
English-medium education continues to grow in importance. While the reasons for the divergent social  
trajectories of Christians and Muslims have not been fully discussed in the thesis – in which religious  
background is  not  a  focus  –  it  seems clear  that  cultural  openness  towards  Western  education and  
attendance at an English-medium school plays a crucial role.
This brings the argument back to a much wider topic: the overall adaptability of Indian society in the  
context  of  capitalist  globalisation.  The  seemingly  straightforward  manner  in  which  a  pre-modern 
institution such as caste has adapted to modernisation has implications elsewhere in Indian society. As 
surprising  as  it  may  be  for  many,  India  appears  to  have  adopted  the  rationale  of  a  market-based,  
capitalistic  rationality  relatively easily,  without obvious large-scale social  or  political  resistance.  Why,  
then, did a clear social revolution not occur in India? Ironically, the very institution of caste (in its Varna 
manifestation) could provide an explanation for this, as the old, caste-based hierarchy is much more  
compatible with the ideals of modernity than was the case in, say, pre-revolutionary France. Those traits  
that are deemed essential and valuable under capitalism – notably the bourgeois emphasis on education 
and economic self-reliance – have always been represented in the Indian socio-cultural elite, in the ideal-
typos of the Brahmin and the Vaishya respectively. In contrast to the pre-modern and pre-Revolutionary 
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situation in France, where an education-hungry and economically rational third estate had to forcefully 
confront a dominant aristocracy and clergy, a much smoother transition from the old to a new elite  
appears to be the case in India. The newer, more modern rationale is adapted without much evident 
social disruption or violent upheaval precisely because it does not conflict with the old cultural models. 
The belief in constant self-improvement through education and economic self-reliance based on rational 
considerations  is  already epitomised in  the traditional  Varna  ideal;  thus  capitalism finds  a  symbolic 
foothold in India’s cultural past. 
Thus, while the institution of caste (in its  Jati form) has always been seen as one of the main barriers 
preventing the modernisation of India on capitalist principles, this thesis clearly demonstrates that this  
view  is  obsolete.  Caste  in  the  modernised  reinterpretation  is  not  an  insurmountable  obstacle  to 
capitalism; quite the opposite, caste readily adapts itself to a capitalistic mode of production. Even in  
capitalism, the individual could benefit immensely from membership of a caste-based network, even if  
this was at the expense of the wider society (that is, in much the same way as in pre-modern times, such 
networks  can  prevent  open  and  fair  access  to  resources).  However,  even  at  the  individual  level,  
immanent tensions between capitalist modernity and caste remain. Not only are the ideals of capitalism 
–  that  is,  open  and  transparent  competition  –in  conflict  with  the  factual  reality  of  pre-modern 
institutions retaining an influence in India's  modern economy. Moreover,  as the second chapter has 
demonstrated, the very idea of caste is openly hostile to the underlying ideals of modernity; notably the  
rights of the individual and the notion of social mobility independent of birth and descent. As evident in  
the empirical chapters, the frictions between caste and the expectations of life in modernity are clear; in  
the inter-generational disagreements about individual autonomy and obedience to the family, in the 
still-existing  ritual  considerations  relating  to  food,  and,  most  obviously,  in  the  entrenched  conflict  
concerning individual choice in marriage arrangements.
While these conflicts will remain disputed in the years to come, caste itself is not likely to vanish either.  
Just  as  this  institution  showed  itself  to  be  adaptable  to  the  Nehruvian  socialism  of  the  post-
independence period, so too is it remodelling itself within the new, post-liberalisation market economy.  
The  intrinsic  dissonance between pre-modern  institutions  and the  modern  rationale  –  visible  in  all  
modernising societies but clearly exemplified here – is shaping Indian society and will further influence it  
in the foreseeable future. Of course, capitalism and the market-based society are still developing in India  
and their influence is only likely to increase. Nevertheless, the evolving relationship between caste and  
modernity is already very visible in the IT sector today. Thus, while the fundamental direction of social  
change is clear, at least within this small, elite section of society, the extent to which this is generalisable  
to wider Indian society remains to be resolved. 
Of  course,  this  thesis  has  only  begun to explore  this  complex  relationship  and it  provides  only  the 
faintest outline of the social, political, economic and cultural future of India. While, obviously, it is an  
academic truism that more research is necessary, any future analysis of caste that ignores the conceptual 
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issues addressed here is likely to be severely compromised. As so many past investigations have been 
hindered by theoretical shortcomings and ideological blindness, the need for a fundamentally different 
approach is obvious. If nothing else, this thesis provides an alternative paradigm that may result in a  
more comprehensive understanding of the social institution that is caste. 
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Appendix
In  the  following,  the  eight  fictive  CVs  and  the  pre-test  questionnaires  from the  socio-psychological  
experiment (chpt. 7) are attached.
CV Brahmin Hyderabad highly qualified A1
CV Brahmin Hyderabad ambiguously qualified A2
CV Brahmin North highly qualified A3
CV Brahmin North ambiguously qualified A4
CV ST North highly qualified A5
CV ST North ambiguously qualified A6
CV ST Hyderabad highly qualified A7
CV ST Hyderabad ambiguously qualified A8
Questionnaire pre-test I A9
Questionnaire pre-test II A10
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Work Experience
10/2008 - 
present
User Interface Designer at Communication Design Group, Wipro Technologies, Hyderabad  
• Developed the first Web 2.0 based generic User Interface framework and design guidelines for 
a transport support system for BNSF Railways. 
• Designed the interface for a transport management system for Meridian IQ, a leading American 
logistics service provider. 
• Was part of the usability evaluation team, and conducted usability analysis and reviews for 
several in-house and external applications
07/2007 - 
08/2008
Junior Program Manager for APCO Systems, USA at Lemuir IT Corporation PVT LTD, Noida 
• Training: 2 Months / Duration: 10 Months 2 Weeks
• Platform: MS SQL Server 2000 with Warehouse Management Systems (WMS).
• Job Role: SQL Server Database Designing and Database Handling.
Educational Qualifications
Qualification Year Aggregate Marks Scored  Institution Name
B.E (Computer 
Science and 
Design)
2007 57.24% Maharishi Markdeshwar Engineering College, Ambala, Haryana 
Intermediate 2003 49.12% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
ICSE 2001 65.28% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
Personal Details
Date of Birth  7th February 1986
Languages  Punjabi, English, Hindi, Sanskrit
Hobbies  Music, Net Surfing, F1, Cricket
SANTOSH V. BANGDIKAR
Objective
Seeking a challenging position in a well-established IT Company that offers professional growth and ample opportunity to 
learn and enrich my competencies in my profession. 
Technical Skills
Languages C, C++, Visual C++, HTML, ActionScript, UML, XML, Java
O/S Windows9x/NT/2000/XP, DOS, MAC OSX, Linux/UNIX
Software
3d Studio Max 6.0, Flash (+actionscripting), Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, CorelDraw, AutoCAD, 
PageMaker, Dream weaver MX, Adobe Premier, Director, Sound Forge
Areas of interest Human Computer Interaction, User Centered Design, Usability, Information Studies
Work Experience
10/2008 - 
present
User Interface Designer at Communication Design Group, Wipro Technologies, Hyderabad 
• Developed the first Web 2.0 based generic User Interface framework and design guidelines for 
a transport support system for BNSF Railways. 
• Designed the interface for a transport management system for Meridian IQ, a leading American 
logistics service provider. 
• Was part of the usability evaluation team, and conducted usability analysis and reviews for 
several in-house and external applications
07/2007 - 
08/2008
Junior Program Manager for APCO Systems, USA at Lemuir IT Corporation PVT LTD, Noida 
• Training: 2 Months / Duration: 10 Months 2 Weeks
• Platform: MS SQL Server 2000 with Warehouse Management Systems (WMS).
• Job Role: SQL Server Database Designing and Database Handling.
Educational Qualifications
Qualification Year Aggregate Marks Scored  Institution Name
B.E (Computer 
Science and 
Design)
2007 77.54% Maharishi Markdeshwar Engineering College, Ambala, Haryana 
Intermediate 2003 68.12% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
ICSE 2001 83.28% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
Personal Details
Date of Birth  7th February 1986
Languages Lambadi, Punjabi, English, Hindi, 
Hobbies  Music, Net Surfing, F1, Cricket
SANTOSH V. BANGDIKAR
Objective
Seeking a challenging position in a well-established IT Company that offers professional growth and ample opportunity to 
learn and enrich my competencies in my profession. 
Technical Skills
Languages C#, C, HTML, ActionScript, UML, XML
O/S Windows9x/NT/2000/XP, DOS, MAC OSX, Linux/UNIX
Software
3d Studio Max 6.0, Flash (+actionscripting), Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, CorelDraw, AutoCAD, 
PageMaker, Dream weaver MX, Adobe Premier, Director, Sound Forge
Areas of interest Human Computer Interaction, User Centered Design, Usability, Information Studies
Work Experience
10/2008 - 
present
User Interface Designer at Communication Design Group, Wipro Technologies, Hyderabad 
• Developed the first Web 2.0 based generic User Interface framework and design guidelines for 
a transport support system for BNSF Railways. 
• Designed the interface for a transport management system for Meridian IQ, a leading American 
logistics service provider. 
• Was part of the usability evaluation team, and conducted usability analysis and reviews for 
several in-house and external applications
07/2007 - 
08/2008
Junior Program Manager for APCO Systems, USA at Lemuir IT Corporation PVT LTD, Noida 
• Training: 2 Months / Duration: 10 Months 2 Weeks
• Platform: MS SQL Server 2000 with Warehouse Management Systems (WMS).
• Job Role: SQL Server Database Designing and Database Handling.
Educational Qualifications
Qualification Year Aggregate Marks Scored  Institution Name
B.E (Computer 
Science and 
Design)
2007 57.24% Maharishi Markdeshwar Engineering College, Ambala, Haryana 
Intermediate 2003 49.12% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
ICSE 2001 65.28% Government High School, Chandigarh, Punjab
Personal Details
Date of Birth  7th February 1986
Languages  Lambadi, Punjabi, English, Hindi, 
Hobbies  Music, Net Surfing, F1, Cricket
SANDEEP G. NAIK
Objective
Seeking a challenging position in a well-established IT Company that offers professional growth and ample opportunity to 
learn and enrich my competencies in my profession. 
Technical Skills
Languages C, C++, Visual C++, HTML, ActionScript, UML, XML, Java
O/S Windows9x/NT/2000/XP, DOS, MAC OSX, Linux/UNIX
Software
3d Studio Max 6.0, Flash (+actionscripting), Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, CorelDraw, AutoCAD, 
PageMaker, Dream weaver MX, Adobe Premier, Director, Sound Forge
Areas of interest Human Computer Interaction, User Centered Design, Usability, Information Studies
Work Experience
10/2008 - 
present
User Interface Designer at Communication Design Group, Wipro Technologies, Hyderabad 
• Developed the first Web 2.0 based generic User Interface framework and design guidelines for 
a transport support system for BNSF Railways. 
• Designed the interface for a transport management system for Meridian IQ, a leading American 
logistics service provider. 
• Was part of the usability evaluation team, and conducted usability analysis and reviews for 
several in-house and external applications
07/2007 - 
08/2008
Junior Program Manager for APCO Systems, USA at Lemuir IT Corporation PVT LTD, Hyderabad 
• Training: 2 Months / Duration: 10 Months 2 Weeks
• Platform: MS SQL Server 2000 with Warehouse Management Systems (WMS).
• Job Role: SQL Server Database Designing and Database Handling.
Educational Qualifications
Qualification Year Aggregate Marks Scored  Institution Name
B.E (Computer 
Science and 
Design)
2007 77.54% Sreenidhi Institute of Science and Technology (SNIST) Hyderabad
Intermediate 2003 68.12% Sapthagiri Junior College (M.P.C)Vijayawada
C.B.S.E 2001 83.28% Sree Vidya Peeth (K.E.S)Narketpally
Personal Details
Date of Birth  7th February 1986
Languages Sugali, Telugu, English, Hindi
Hobbies  Music, Net Surfing, F1, Cricket
SANDEEP G. NAIK
Objective
Seeking a challenging position in a well-established IT Company that offers professional growth and ample opportunity to 
learn and enrich my competencies in my profession. 
Technical Skills
Languages C#, C, HTML, ActionScript, UML, XML
O/S Windows9x/NT/2000/XP, DOS, MAC OSX, Linux/UNIX
Software
3d Studio Max 6.0, Flash (+actionscripting), Adobe Photoshop, Adobe Illustrator, CorelDraw, AutoCAD, 
PageMaker, Dream weaver MX, Adobe Premier, Director, Sound Forge
Areas of interest Human Computer Interaction, User Centered Design, Usability, Information Studies
Work Experience
10/2008 - 
present
User Interface Designer at Communication Design Group, Wipro Technologies, Hyderabad 
• Developed the first Web 2.0 based generic User Interface framework and design guidelines for 
a transport support system for BNSF Railways. 
• Designed the interface for a transport management system for Meridian IQ, a leading American 
logistics service provider. 
• Was part of the usability evaluation team, and conducted usability analysis and reviews for 
several in-house and external applications
07/2007 - 
08/2008
Junior Program Manager for APCO Systems, USA at Lemuir IT Corporation PVT LTD, Hyderabad 
• Training: 2 Months / Duration: 10 Months 2 Weeks
• Platform: MS SQL Server 2000 with Warehouse Management Systems (WMS).
• Job Role: SQL Server Database Designing and Database Handling.
Educational Qualifications
Qualification Year Aggregate Marks Scored  Institution Name
B.E (Computer 
Science and 
Design)
2007 57.24% Sreenidhi Institute of Science and Technology (SNIST) Hyderabad
Intermediate 2003 49.12% Sapthagiri Junior College (M.P.C)Vijayawada
C.B.S.E 2001 65.28% Sree Vidya Peeth (K.E.S)Narketpally
Personal Details
Date of Birth  7th February 1986
Languages Sugali, Telugu, English, Hindi
Hobbies  Music, Net Surfing, F1, Cricket
After reading the resume above, please answer the following questions: 
How would you rate the design of the resume?
           very good               not good at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
If this person is your new teammate – would you like to work with him?
           very much                                    not at all 
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
How qualified is the candidate for an entry level position (less than 2 years experience)? 
       extremely qualified                             not at all qualified
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
Would you recommend this person for a position in your company?
          □  YES □  NO
How strongly would you recommend this person?
          very strongly                not at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
How are the applicant's chances in the labour market in the present situation?
          very good            not good at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
Has there been anything missing in the resume? If so, please state what should be included:
_______________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________
After  filling  the  questionnaire,  would  you  please  share  some  personal  details  for  statistical 
purposes? (it is 100 percent anonymous)
Age: (in years) ________________ Sex □  female □  male
state of origin ________________ religion __________________
caste (if applicable) ________________ caste category __________________
highest qualification ________________ job experience_____________(years)
Thank you very much, your involvement in this study is highly appreciated! Benjamin Lindt
After carefully reading the resume above, please answer the following questions: 
1. How informative is this resume for you?
      very informative      not informative at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
2. If this person is your new teammate – would you like to work with him?
           very much                                    not at all 
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
3. How qualified is the candidate for a position that requires less than 2 years experience? 
       extremely qualified                             not at all qualified
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
4. Would you recommend this person for a position in your company?
          □  YES □  NO → please go directly to question 6!
5. IF YES → How strongly would you recommend this person?
          very strongly                not at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
6. How are the applicant's chances in the present job market?
          very good            not good at all
          □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
                   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10
7. How much do you know about the person's social background? (if you don't know just guess!)
home state:  _______________          religion:  _______________          caste:  _______________
After filling the questionnaire,  please share your personal details for statistical  purposes.  It is  100 
percent anonymous so please answer all the questions!
Age: (in years) ________________ Sex □  female □  male
state of origin ________________ religion __________________
if Hindu → caste ________________ caste category __________________
highest qualification ________________ job experience_____________(years)
Thank you very much, your involvement in this study is highly appreciated! Benjamin Lindt
